

THE
PRINCIPLES
Francis OF THE *Hargrave*
LAW
OF
SCOTLAND:

In the Order of Sir GEORGE MACKENZIE'S
Institutions of that Law.

The THIRD EDITION, revised by the Author. *John Erskine*

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ADVERTISEMENT.

TO render the present edition more acceptable to the public, the Author has carefully compared all the decisions quoted in it, with the originals ; and he flatters himself, that they shall be found apposite to the points which they are brought to prove. Where the words in the former edition appeared obscure, or expressed in too general terms, he has endeavoured to make them more intelligible, or to guard them with proper limitations. He has in a few places, where he was sensible of more material errors, retracted his opinion ; but without giving the reader the needless trouble of letting him know, that formerly he thought otherwise : And in the last title of the book, the several crimes, which were before explained without any order, have been reduced to something, that has at least the appearance of a regular arrangement.

E R R A T A.

Page 13. line 20. dele *civil*. P. 20. l. 12. dele *p*. P. 48. l. 4. for *present*, read *provide*. P. 85. l. 9. for *it*, r. *the conveyance to him*. P. 87. l. 5. r. *versum*. P. 105. l. 5. from the bottom, r. *certain things*. P. 128. l. ult. for 29—9. 9. r. 299. 9. P. 147. l. 7. from bottom, for *this*, r. *his*. P. 158. l. 1. r. 1612. Ditto p. l. 4. from bottom, dele *as*. P. 173. l. 7. after *does*, add *not*. P. 219. l. 5. for *right*, r. *third*. P. 221. l. 1. for *from*, r. *to*. P. 256. l. 11. r. *heir renouncing*. P. 258. l. 24. for *affect*, r. *effect*. P. 271. l. 16. r. *in commodate*. P. 280. l. 5. from bottom, r. 12. *An*. P. 287. l. 26. r. *K. 99*. P. 306. l. 1. after *to which*, add *it is*. P. 322. l. 9. dele *as*. P. 345. l. 3. from bottom, for *that term*, r. *the term of prescription*. P. 429. l. 9. for *laws*, r. *actions*. *Ibid*. l. 3. from bottom, r. *upon*. P. 463. l. 9. for 1635. r. 1685.

Note of Abbreviations, and of the manner of quoting authorities.

<i>Act. S.</i>	Acts of Sederunt of the Session.
<i>Books S.</i>	Books of Sederunt.
<i>R. M.</i>	Books of <i>Regiam Majestatem</i> .
<i>Q. Att.</i>	<i>Quoniam Attachiamenta</i> .
<i>L. B.</i>	<i>Leges Burgorum</i> .
<i>St. 1. R. I.</i>	<i>Statuta prima Roberti primi</i> , and so of the other Statutes in <i>Skene's</i> collection.
<i>Cr.</i>	<i>Sir T. Craig de feudis</i> , quoted by the page and section of edition 1732, fol.
<i>Hop. Min. Pr.</i>	<i>Sir T. Hope's</i> Minor Practicks, by page and section of edition 1726, 8vo.
<i>St.</i>	<i>Visc. Stair's</i> Institutions, by the book, title, and section.
<i>Bankt. vol. 1. 2. or 3.</i>	<i>Lord Bankton's</i> Institute, by the volume, page and section.

Printed collections of decisions.

<i>Dirl.</i>	observed by Lord <i>Dirlston</i> .	} quoted by the number of the decision.
<i>Gilm.</i>	by President <i>Gilmour</i> .	
<i>P. Falc.</i>	by President <i>Falconer</i> .	
<i>Harc.</i>	by Lord <i>Harcarse</i> .	
<i>Dalr.</i>	by President <i>Dalrymple</i> .	
<i>Br.</i>	by Mr <i>Alexander Bruce</i> .	
<i>K.</i>	by Lord <i>Kaims</i> .	
<i>Falc. vol. 1. or 2.</i>	by Mr <i>D. Falconer</i> , 2 vol.	} by date of de- cision and pur- suer's name.
<i>New Coll.</i>	either by a committee of Advocates,	
by itself, or vol. 2.	in 2 vols.	
<i>Balf.</i>	by Sir <i>James Balfour</i> , quoted by the page and section.	} by date of de- cision and pur- suer's name.
<i>Spotif. Pr.</i>	by Sir <i>R. Spotiswood</i> .	
<i>F. vol. 1. or 2.</i>	by Lord <i>Fountainhall</i> , 2 vols.	

The

The manuscript collections by Lord *Haddington*, Sir *T. Hope*, Lord *Gosford*, Mr *Forbes*, Mr *Bruce*, &c. are marked, *Hadd. Hop Gosf. Forb. M. S. Br. M. S. &c.* by the date of the decision and the pursuer's name.

The decisions from 1621 to 1713, not distinguished by any name, are to be found in the printed collections by Lord *Dury*, Viscount *Stair*, or Mr *Forbes*.

As for the decisions after 1719, which are neither to be found in any printed collection, nor in the law dictionary, some few prior to *Nov. 1744*, were observed by the author. And those from that period, down to *Nov. 1749*, by the late *Charles Areskine* of *Alva*, Lord Justice Clerk, who had the goodness to allow to the author, the use of his most valuable papers.

The decisions from *Nov. 1735*, to *Nov. 1739*, in so far as they are contained in a printed collection during that period, are quoted by the dates, as they stand in that collection.

The acts of Parliament before the reign of *Ja. VII.* are quoted by the year of God, and number of the act, according to the edition 1681, fol.

The quotations from the Code of the *Roman* law are marked in the usual way, by the letter *C.* Those from the *Pandects* have no distinguishing letter.

The references from one part of this treatise to another, are marked by the number of the book, title, and section.

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THE

THE
PRINCIPLES

OF THE

L A W

O F

S C O T L A N D.

B O O K I.

TIT. I. *Of Laws in general.*

LAW is the command of a sovereign, ^{Law,} containing a common rule of life for his subjects. It is divided into the law of nature, the law of nations, and civil or municipal law.

2. The law of nature is that which God, ^{Law of nature,} the Sovereign of the universe, has prescribed to all men, not by any formal promulgation, but by the internal dictate of reason alone. It is discovered by a just consideration of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of human acti-

A

ons

ons to the nature of man; and it comprehends all the duties we owe either to the supreme being, to ourselves, or to our neighbour; as reverence to God, self-defence, temperance, honour to our parents, benevolence to all, a strict adherence to our engagements, gratitude, &c. This law is improperly attributed to the brute part of the creation; for brutes act from necessity, and are not capable of proper obedience, nor consequently of law.

Law of
nations.

2. The law of nations is also the result of reason, and has God for its author; but it supposes mankind formed into several bodies-politic, or states; and it comprises all the duties which one state owes to another. These must of necessity be similar to the duties arising between individuals, since both are dictated by reason, so that what is the law of nature, when applied to men considered simply as such, is indeed the law of nations, when applied to kingdoms or states. From this source proceed the rights of war, the security of ambassadors, the obligations arising from treaties, &c. The particular usages of nations in their mutual correspondence, which are not necessarily founded in reason, are no part of the law of nations in its proper sense; for they are arbitrary, and derive their sole authority from compact, either express or presumed; and may therefore, without violating the law of nature, be altered: For this reason, they ought to be thrown into the class of positive laws, whose obligation lasts no longer than the agreement upon which it is founded. Of this sort, are the ceremonial used in receiving and entertaining ambassadors, the privileges indulged to some of their servants,

vants, the rules observed in cartels for exchanging prisoners of war, &c.

4. Civil or municipal law, is that which every sovereign kingdom or state has appropriated to itself. The appellation of municipal law was originally confined to the laws of *municipia*, or dependent states; but it came by degrees to signify all civil laws without distinction. No sovereign state can subsist without a supreme power, or a right of commanding in the last resort; the supreme power of one age cannot therefore be fettered by any enactment of a former age, otherwise it would cease to be supreme. Hence the law last in date derogates from prior laws, *l. 4. de const. princ.*

Civil law.

5. The law of nature, where it either commands or forbids, is immutable, and cannot be controuled by any human authority; but where that law does no more than confer a right, without obliging us to use it, the supreme power may divest us thereof, in whole or in part. Thus, certain natural rights in point of dress, game, commerce, &c. are brought frequently, by positive enactment, under such restrictions as the legislature thinks most proper for the common interest. It sufficiently appears, that a sanction is annexed to the law of nature by its author, from the disquiet that fills the conscience upon a transgression thereof, though the person guilty should be without the reach of human penalties: But certain laws of nature, as gratitude, charity, benevolence, &c. have not been guarded with penalties by the positive enactment of any state, but are left intirely to the conscience.

General properties of the law of nature.

6. Though

Promul-
gation of
laws.

6. Though the laws of nature are sufficiently published by the internal suggestion of natural light, civil laws cannot be considered as a rule for the conduct of life, till they are notified to those whose conduct they are to regulate. The *Scots* acts of parliament were, by our most ancient custom, proclaimed in all the different shires, boroughs, and baron-courts of the kingdom, 1425, c. 67. — 1457, c. 89. But after our statutes came to be printed, in consequence of 1540, c. 127, that custom, which was no longer necessary, was gradually neglected; and at last, the publication of our laws, at the market-cross of *Edinburgh*, was declared sufficient; and they became obligatory forty days thereafter, 1581, c. 128. *British* statutes are deemed sufficiently notified, without formal promulgation; either because the printing is truly a publication, or because every subject is, by a maxim of the *English* law, party to them, as being present in parliament, either by himself or his representative. After a law is published, no pretence of ignorance can excuse the breach of it, *l. 9. pr. et § 3. de jur. et fact. ign.*

Declara-
tory laws.

7. As laws are given for the rule of our conduct, they can regulate future cases only; for past actions, being out of our power, can admit of no rule. Declaratory laws form no exception to this; for a statute, where it is declaratory of a former law, does no more than interpret its meaning; and it is included in the notion of interpretation, that it must draw back to the date of the law interpreted.

Divine
positive
law.

8. God himself gave by *Moses* to the *Jews*, a body of positive laws, which settled not only their public polity, but private right; but

as

as that law was directed to the *Jews* alone, and almost wholly framed with a special view to the *Jewish* constitution, and to the genius of that people, it is but a small part of it, which has been adopted by the legislature of other countries into their system of laws.

9. The *Roman* laws were, toward the middle Roman of the sixth century, reduced by the Emperor *law*, *Justinian* into one body, which consists of the digests or pandects, the institutions, the code, and the novels. Upon the irruption of the *Lombards* into *Italy*, soon after *Justinian's* death, this law became almost forgotten, till the year 1130, when, a copy of the pandects having been recovered at *Amalphi*, it was taught by authority in the schools of *Italy*, and from thence it spread quickly over *Europe*. The *Roman* law, from its peculiar beauty and elegance, got the appellation of *the* civil law, tho' that epithet was applicable originally, to the laws of all countries alike. In several acts of parliament, this law, sometimes by itself, 1540, c. 69.—1585, c. 18. and sometimes in conjunction with the canon law, 1540, c. 80.—1551, c. 22. goes under the name of the *common law*. Where the expression in the act is fuller, *the common laws of the realm*, it signifies perhaps our own ancient customary law, 1503, c. 79.—1584, c. 131, &c.

10. Soon after the recovery of the pan-Canon
 dects, a body of law was formed under the *law*.
 direction of the Bishop of *Rome*, stiled the
 canon law. It contained rules, not only for
 informing the conscience, but for the fixing of
 property, civil as well as ecclesiastical; and
 had the authority of law, in the countries where
 the

the Pope was temporal sovereign: But all the other nations of *Christendom*, even those which acknowledged the See of *Rome*, thought themselves at liberty, in so far as it related to civil right, either to reject it, or to receive it with such limitation as they judged proper. The canon law consists of the *decretum*, which, in imitation of the *Roman* digests, was composed by *Gratian*, a *Benedictine* Monk, from the judgments of the fathers, doctors, and church-councils; and of the decretal epistles, which, after the pattern of *Justinian's* code, is a collection of the rescripts and constitutions of the Popes.

Law of
Scotland.

11. The municipal law of *Scotland*, as of most other countries, consists partly of statutory or written law, which has the express authority of the legislative power; partly of customary or unwritten law, which derives force from its presumed or tacit consent.

Our writ-
ten law.
Acts of
parlia-
ment.

12. Under our statutory or written law is comprehended, first, our acts of parliament; not those only which were made in the reign of *James I.* of *Scotland*, and downwards to our union with *England* in 1707, but such of the *British* statutes enacted since the union, as concern this part of the united kingdom.

Regiam
majesta-
tem.

13. The remains of our ancient written law were published by Sir *John Skene* clerk of register, in the beginning of the last century, by licence of parliament, *Index to unprinted acts*, 1607, N^o 31. The books of *regiam majestatem*, to which the whole collection owes its title, seem to be a system of *Scots* law, written by a private lawyer at the command of *David I.*; and tho' no express confirmation of that treatise by the Sovereign appears, yet it is admitted
to

to have been the ancient law of our kingdom, by express statutes, 1471, c. 48.—1487, c. 115. The borough-laws, which were also enacted by the same King *David*, and the statutes of *William*, *Alexander II.* *David II.* and the three *Roberts*, are universally allowed to be genuine. Our parliaments have once and again appointed commissions to revise and amend the *regiam majestatem*, and the other ancient books of our law, and to make their report, 1425, c. 54.—1487, c. 115.—1633, c. 20.; but as no report appears to have been made, nor consequently any ratification by parliament, none of these remains are received, as of proper authority, in our courts; yet they are of notable use in proving and illustrating our most ancient customs.

13. Our written law comprehends, 2. the Acts of Sederunt, which are ordinances for regulating the forms of proceeding, before the court of Session, in the administration of justice, made by the judges, who have a delegated power from the legislature for that purpose, 1540, c. 93. Some of these acts dip upon matter of right, which declare what the judges apprehend to be the law of *Scotland*, and what they are to observe afterwards, as a rule of judgment.

15. The civil and canon laws, tho' they are not perhaps to be deemed proper parts of our written law, have undoubtedly had the greatest influence in *Scotland*. The powers exercised by our sovereigns and our judges, have been justified upon no other ground, than that they were conformable to the civil or canon laws, 1493, c. 51.—1540, c. 69. &c. And a special statute

Acts of
Sederunt.

The au-
thority of
the civil
and canon
laws.

statute was judged necessary upon the reformation, to rescind such of their constitutions, as were repugnant to the Protestant doctrine, 1567, c. 31. From that period, the canon law has been little respected, except in questions of tithes, patronages, and some few more articles of ecclesiastical right: But the *Roman* continues to have great authority in all cases, where it is not derogated from by statute or custom, and where the genius of our law suffers us to apply it.

Unwritten law or custom.

Its properties.

16. Our unwritten or customary law, is that which, without being expressly enacted by statute, derives its force from the tacit consent of King and people; which consent is presumed from the ancient custom of the community, *l. 32. § 1. de legib.* as the laws of primogeniture and succession, the terce, courtesy, &c. No precise time can be fixed, as necessary for constituting this sort of law, because some things require in their nature longer time, and a greater frequency of acts to establish them, than others. Custom, as it is equally founded in the will of the lawgiver with written law, has therefore the same effects: Hence, as one statute may be explained or repealed by another, so a statute may be explained by the uniform practice of the community, *l. 37. de legib.* and even go into disuse, by a posterior contrary custom. But this power of custom to derogate from prior statutes, is generally confined by lawyers, to statutes concerning private right, and does not extend to those which regard public policy.

Decisions of the Session.

17. An uniform tract of the judgments, or decisions of the court of Session, is commonly considered

considered as part of our customary law; and without doubt, where a particular custom is thereby fixed or proved, such custom of itself constitutes a law: But decisions, tho' they bind the parties litigating, have not, in their own nature, the authority of law in similar cases; yet, where they continue uniform, great weight is justly laid on them. Neither can the judgments of the house of Peers of *Great Britain*, reach farther than to the parties in the appeal, since in these, the Peers act as judges, not as lawgivers; nevertheless, where a similar judgment is repeated in the court of the last resort, it must have the strongest influence upon the determinations of inferior courts.

Judgments of
the house
of Peers.

18. By the rules of interpreting statute-law received in *Scotland*, an argument may be used from the title to the act itself, *a rubro ad nigrum*; at least, where the rubric has been either originally framed or afterwards adopted by the legislature. The preamble or narrative, which recites the inconveniencies that had arisen from the former law, and the causes inducing the enactment, may also lead a judge to the general meaning of the statute. But the chief weight is to be laid on the statutory words.

Interpre-
tation of
laws.

19. Laws, being directed to the unlearned as well as the learned, ought to be construed in their most obvious meaning, and not explained away by subtle distinctions; and no law is to suffer a figurative interpretation, where the proper sense of the words is as commodious, and equally fitted to the subject of the statute. Laws ought to be explained so as to exclude absurdities, *l. 19. de legib.*; and in the sense which appears most agreeable to

former laws, *l. 28. eod. t.* to the intention of the lawgiver, *l. 17. 18. eod. t.* and to the general frame and structure of the constitution. In prohibitory laws, where the right of acting is taken from a person, solely for the private advantage of another, the consent of him, in whose behalf the law was made, shall support the act done in breach of it; but the consent of parties immediately interested, has no effect in matters which regard the public utility of a state, *l. 38. de pact.* Where the words of a statute are capable but of one meaning, the statute must be observed, however hard it may bear on particular persons, *l. 12. § 1. qui et a quib.:* Nevertheless, as no human system of laws can comprehend all possible cases, more may be sometimes meant by the lawgiver than is expressed; and hence certain statutes, where extension is not plainly excluded, may be extended beyond the letter, to similar and omitted cases; others are to be confined to the statutory words.

Interpre-
tation by
extension.

20. A strict interpretation is to be applied,
 Strict in-
terpreta-
tion.
 1. To correctory statutes, which repeal or re-strict former laws, *l. 14. de legib.* and to statutes which enact heavy penalties, or restrain the natural liberties of mankind. 2. Laws, made on occasion of present exigencies in a state, ought not to be drawn to similar cases, after the pressure is over. 3. Where statutes establish certain solemnities as requisite to deeds, such solemnities are not suppliable by equivalents; for solemnities lose their nature, when they are not performed specifically. 4. A statute, which enumerates special cases, is, with difficulty, to be extended to cases not expressed;

expressed; but, where a law does not descend to particulars, there is greater reason to extend it to similar cases. 5. Statutes, which carry a dispensation or privilege to particular persons or societies, suffer a strict interpretation; because they derogate from the general law, and imply a burden upon the rest of the community: But at no rate, can a privilege be explained, to the prejudice of those in whose behalf it was granted. As the only foundation of customary law is usage, which consists in fact, such law can go no farther than the particular usage has gone.

21. All statutes, concerning matters specially favoured by law, receive an ample interpretation; as laws for the encouragement of commerce, or of any useful public undertaking, for making effectual the wills of dying persons, for restraining fraud, for the security of creditors, &c. A statute, tho' its subject-matter should not be a favourite of the law, may be extended to similar cases which did not exist when the statute was made; and for which, therefore, it was not in the lawgiver's power to provide. Ample interpretation.

22. Every statute, however unfavourable, must receive the interpretation necessary to give it effect: And, on the other hand, in the extension of favourable laws, scope must not be given to the imagination, in discovering remote resemblances; the extension must be limited to the cases immediately similar. Where there is ground to conclude, that the legislature has omitted a case out of the statute purposefully, the statute cannot be extended to that case, let it be ever so similar to the cases expressed.

TIT.

TIT. 2. Of Jurisdiction and Judges in general.

Jurisdiction.
on.

THE objects of law are persons, things, and actions: Among persons, judges, who are invested with jurisdiction, deserve the first consideration. Jurisdiction is a power conferred upon a judge or magistrate, to take cognisance of, and decide causes according to law, and to carry his sentences into execution. That tract of ground, or district, within which a judge has the right of jurisdiction, is called his territory: And every act of jurisdiction, exercised by a judge without his territory, either by pronouncing sentence, or carrying it into execution, is null, *l. 20. de jurisd.*—
5. Dec. 1671, *Millar*.

The King,
the foun-
tain of ju-
risdiction.

2. The supreme power, which has the right of enacting laws, falls naturally to have the right of erecting courts, and appointing judges, who may apply these laws to particular cases: But, in *Scotland*, this right has been, from our earliest times, intrusted with the Crown, as having the executive power of the state. In our supreme courts of Session and Exchequer, not only process, but execution of diligence runs in the name of the Sovereign; notwithstanding which, these courts have a proper jurisdiction, seeing all their necessary writs, both of process and execution, are issued under their direction.

Jurisdiction,
on, volun-
tary and
contenti-
ous.

3. Jurisdiction was, by the *Roman* law, either voluntary or contentious. Voluntary, was that which related to matters that admitted of no opposition; and therefore might be exercised by

by any judge, and upon any day, and in any place. Contentious, was that which was exercised in debatable matters, and by its nature required a judicial discussion; and this sort could not be proceeded in, but upon a lawful day, in court, and by that judge alone who was competent to the suit. The judicial ratifications of women cloathed with husbands, may be classed among the acts of voluntary jurisdiction. *F. 3. Feb. 1688. Cocbran.*

4. Jurisdiction is either supreme, inferior or mixed. That jurisdiction is supreme, from which there lies no appeal to a higher court. Tho' the *British* house of Peers is, since the union of the two kingdoms, our only supreme court in a strict acceptation, our courts of Session, Justiciary, and Exchequer, may still be called supreme in a lower sense; as their jurisdiction is universal over the whole kingdom, as the sentences of all our other ~~civil~~ courts are subject to their review, and as their sentences can be brought under review by no court proper to *Scotland*. Inferior courts, are those whose sentences are subject to the review of the supreme courts, and whose jurisdiction is confined to a particular county, borough, or other territory; as Sheriffs, Justices of the peace, Magistrates of boroughs, inferior Admirals and Commissaries, Barons, &c. Mixed jurisdiction participates of the nature, both of the supreme and inferior; Thus, the judge of the high court of Admiralty, and the Commissaries of *Edinburgh*, have an universal jurisdiction over *Scotland*, and they can review the decrees of inferior Admirals and Commissaries; but since their own decrees are subject to the review of

Supreme,
inferior
and mix-
ed.

of the courts of Session or Justiciary, they are, in that respect, inferior courts.

Civil and
criminal.

5. Jurisdiction is either civil or criminal: By the first, questions of private right are decided; by the other, crimes are punished. But, in all jurisdiction, tho' merely civil, there is a power inherent in the judge to punish, either corporally, or by a pecuniary fine, those who offend during the proceedings of the court, or who shall afterwards obstruct the execution of the sentence; *omnia enim cum jurisdictione concedi videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari nequit. l. 2. de jurisd.*

Privative
and cumu-
lative.

6. Jurisdiction is either privative or cumulative. Privative jurisdiction, is that which belongs only to one court, to the exclusion of all others. Cumulative, otherwise called concurrent, is that which may be exercised by any one of two or more courts, in the same cause. In civil cumulative jurisdiction, the private pursuer has the right of election before which of the courts he shall sue; but as, in criminal questions which are prosecuted by a public officer of court, a collision of jurisdiction might happen, through each of the judges claiming the exercise of their right, that judge, by whose warrant the delinquent is first cited or apprehended, (which is the first step of jurisdiction) comes thereby to have the *jus praeventionis*, or the exclusive right of judging in the cause. But no citation by the Procurator-Fiscal, or public prosecutor of one court, which is simply intended *ad vindictam publicam*, can bar the private party injured, from bringing his process for damages, which is a right merely civil, before any other competent court, 9. Nov. 1672; *Scot.*

7. All

7. All rights of jurisdiction, being original- ^{Personal} ^{and} ^{heritable.} ty granted in consideration of the fitness of the grantee, were therefore personal, and died with himself. But, upon the introduction of the feudal law, by which certain jurisdictions, as of sheriff-ship, regality, &c. were annexed to lands, these jurisdictions became patrimonial and descendible to heirs, as well as the lands to which they were annexed; and even after sheriff-ships ceased to be territorial, by the Sovereign's resuming the jurisdiction into his own hands, *Cr.* 104, §. 14. the Crown frequently made heritable grants of them to others: But, by 20. *Geo.* II. *c.* 43. all heritable jurisdictions, except a small pittance reserved to Barons, are either abolished, or resumed and annexed to the crown.

8. Jurisdiction is either proper or delegated. ^{Proper} ^{and} ^{delegated.} Proper jurisdiction, is that which belongs to a judge or magistrate himself, in virtue of his office. Delegated, is that which is communicated by the judge, to another who acts in his name, called a depute or deputy. Where a deputy appoints one under him, he is called a substitute. No grant of jurisdiction, which is an office requiring personal qualifications, can be delegated by the grantee to another, without an express power in the grant. Such power has been given in all personal grants of sheriff-ship, stewardry, admiralty, &c.; but justices of the peace and magistrates of burghs have no power of deputation. In patrimonial jurisdiction, as it was possible the heritable officer might be incapable of rightly discharging the office in proper person, he was empowered to appoint

appoint deputies, for whom he should be answerable, 1424. c. 6.

Civil jurisdiction is founded, 1st, *ratione domicilii*.

9. Civil jurisdiction is founded, 1. *ratione domicilii*, if the defender has his domicile within the judge's territory. A domicile is the dwelling place where a person lives, with an intention to remain; and custom has fixed it as a rule, that residence for forty days founds jurisdiction. If one has no fixed dwelling-place, *e. g.* a soldier, or a travelling-merchant, a personal citation against him within the territory, is sufficient to found the judge's jurisdiction over him, even in civil questions, *F. 12. Nov. 1709, Lees*. As the defender is not obliged to appear before a court to which he is not subject, the pursuer must follow the defender's domicile, *Actor sequitur forum rei*.

2. *Ratione rei sitae*.

10. It is founded, 2. *ratione rei sitae*, if the subject in question lie within the territory. If that subject be immoveable, the judge, whose jurisdiction is founded in this way, is the sole judge competent, excluding the judge of the domicile; for an immoveable subject cannot shift places; and must therefore be restored in that place where it is situated.

Letters of supplement.

11. Where one, who has not his domicile within the territory, is to be sued before an inferior court *ratione rei sitae*, the court of Session must be applied to, whose jurisdiction is universal, and who, in course, grant letters of supplement, to cite the defender to appear before the inferior judge. Where the party to be sued, resides in another kingdom, and has an estate in this, the court of Session is the only proper court, as the *commune forum* to all persons residing abroad; and the defender, if his

his estate be heritable, is considered as lawfully sifted before that court, by a citation at the market-cross of *Edinburgh*, and pier and shore of *Leith*: But where a stranger, not a native of *Scotland*, has only a moveable estate in this kingdom, he is deemed to be so little subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, that action cannot be brought against him, till his effects be first attached by an arrestment *jurisdictionis fundandae causa*, *Harc.* 487. which is laid on, by a warrant issuing from the court within whose territory the subject is situated, at the suit of the creditor.

12. A judge may, in special cases, arrest or secure the persons of such as have neither domicile nor estate within his territory, even for civil debts. Thus, on the border between *Scotland* and *England*, warrants are granted of course by the judge ordinary of either side, against those who have their domicile upon the opposite side, for arresting their persons, till they give caution *judicio fisci*: And even the persons of citizens or natives may be so secured, where there is just reason to suspect that they are *in meditatione fugae*, *i. e.* that they intend suddenly to withdraw from the kingdom; upon which suspicion, the creditor who applies must make oath. An inhabitant of a borough-royal, who has furnished one who lives without the borough in meat, cloaths or other merchandize, and who has no security for it but his own compt-book, may arrest his debtor, till he give security *judicio fisci*, 1672, c. 8.

13. A judge may be declined, *i. e.* his jurisdiction disowned judicially, 1. *ratione causae*, of declinatione. 1. *Ratione causae*. brought before him. Thus, the court of Session

sion may be declined in criminal causes: Inferior judges in declarators of property, &c.

2. *Ratione suspecti judicis*; where either the judge himself, or his near kinsman, has an interest in the suit. Where a company is constituted by patent or act of parliament, by which a public benefit is intended, a judge cannot be declined in the cause of such company, merely because he is a proprietor; an example of which we have in our bank companies; see *Voet Com. tit. de judic. §. 45.* The judges of the Session were by 1594, *c. 212.* disqualified from voting in the causes of their fathers, brothers, or sons: But by 1681, *c. 13.* one rule is laid down for all judges, supreme and inferior, that no judge can vote in the cause of his father, brother or son, either by consanguinity or affinity; nor in the cause of his uncle or nephew by consanguinity. A deputy may be declined, as suspected, where the principal judge is a party, 1555, *c. 39. §. ult.* except in causes, in which he is authorised to judge by special statute, 1579, *c. 84.*

3. *Ratione privilegii*. 14. Judges may be declined, 3. *ratione privilegii*; where the party is by privilege exempted from their jurisdiction. Thus all members of the College of Justice may decline the jurisdiction of inferior judges, 1555, *c. 39.*: But as such privilege has no operation till it be pleaded, therefore, if declinature be not proponed, the judge may proceed in the cause. The privilege, exempting members of parliament from civil jurisdiction, sitting the parliament, is so strongly founded, that action cannot proceed against them, unless they expressly wave their privilege.

15. Prorogated jurisdiction (*jurisdictio in consentientes*) is that which is, by the consent of parties, conferred upon a judge, who, without such consent, would be incompetent. A defender's absence does not infer his consent; the decree will be void, as pronounced a *non suo iudice*, if an explicate consent be not adhibited, or some positive act done by the defender, importing consent, e. g. exhibiting defences *in causa*; because, where a judge is incompetent, every step he takes must be null, till his jurisdiction be made competent, by the party's actual submission to it. It is otherwise, where the judge is competent, but may be declined by the party upon privilege, *supr.* §. 14. Where the Defender enters a declination which is repelled, prorogation is not inferred, though he should afterwards offer defences *in causa*, F. 29. July 1696, *Shaw*.

16. A clause, consenting to the registration of a writing in the books of a judge's court, does not imply a prorogation of that judge's jurisdiction, in any question that may be moved afterwards upon the effect of the writing; such consent is limited to the registration, which is *quodammodo jurisdictionis voluntariae*, and is not to be stretched by implication, to acts of contentious jurisdiction.

17. In order to prorogation, the judge must have jurisdiction, such as may be prorogated, l. 1. *de judic.* Hence, prorogation cannot be admitted, where the judge's jurisdiction is excluded by statute; which seems to be the case of 1681, c. 13. Hence likewise, no consent can prorogate the jurisdiction of a judge whose commission is vacated, or its term expired; nor of a judge while he is out of his territory. But a defender, tho' his

Prorogated jurisdiction.

It requires 1. consent of parties.

Does a clause for registering import consent.

2. Jurisdiction in the Judge.

his domicile be without a judge's jurisdiction, may, if cited within the territory, subject himself to the jurisdiction, by appearing in court, and offering peremptory defences, 23. Feb. 1627, *Service*.

*Prorogatio
de causa in
causam.*

18. In questions of civil jurisdiction, a judge, who was only constituted to a certain sort of causes, might, by the *Roman* law, have had his jurisdiction prorogated, to causes of a different nature, *l. 1. C. de jurisd. omn. jud.* By our practice, such prorogation is rejected, *Falc. A* 13. Yet where the cause is of the same nature, with those to which the judge is competent, though law may have confined his jurisdiction, within a certain sum, parties may prorogate it above that sum, unless where prorogation is prohibited; an instance of which prohibition, we have in the jurisdiction of barons, as restricted by 20. *Geo. II. c. 43*. Prorogation is not admitted in the King's causes; for the interest of the crown cannot be hurt by the negligence of its officers, in the management of processes, 1600, *c. 14*.—19. *Jan. 1711, Eyres*.

*Oaths to
be taken
by judges.*

19. All judges must at their admission swear, 1. the oath of allegiance, and subscribe the assurance, 1693, *c. 6*. 2. The oath of abjuration, which was first imposed 6. *An. c. 14*. and has been since continued by several *British* statutes. 3. The oath of supremacy, 1. *Geo. I. c. 13*. Lastly, the oath *de fidei administratione*.

*Letters of
advoca-
tion.*

20. A party who has either properly declined the jurisdiction of the judge before whom he had been cited, or who thinks himself aggrieved by any proceedings in the cause, may before decree apply to the court of Session, to issue Letters of advocacy for calling the action from before the inferior court

court to themselves. The grounds therefore upon which a party may pray for letters of advocation, are incompetency and iniquity. Under incompetency, is comprehended not only defect of jurisdiction, but all the grounds of declining a jurisdiction, in itself competent, arising either from suspicion of the judge, or privilege in the parties. A judge is said to commit iniquity, when he either delays justice, or pronounces sentence, in the exercise of his jurisdiction, contrary to law.

Upon incompetency.

Upon iniquity.

21. Tho' the grounds, on which letters of advocation proceed are personal, respecting that judge alone who is incompetent, or who has committed iniquity; yet their style carries an injunction to all inferior judges, not to proceed in the cause: And even, where that part of style happened to be omitted, the nature of an advocation was adjudged to imply a general prohibition, 18. *July 1623, Cranstoun*: But till the advocation be intimated, it can neither restrain judges from deciding, nor parties from insisting. If, after intimation, a judge shall presume to proceed, his sentence is null; and both he, and the party insisting, are punishable for contempt of authority.

Effect of advocation.

22. That the court of Session may not waste their time in trifles, no cause for a sum below 200 merks Scots, 1663, c. 9. (now 12 l. Sterling, by 20. Geo. II. c. 43.) can be advocated to the court of Session from the inferior judge competent: But if an inferior judge shall proceed upon a cause, to which he is incompetent, the cause may be carried from him by advocation, let the subject be ever so inconsiderable,

How limited.

BOOK I. Tit. 3.

Of the Supreme Judges, and Courts of SCOTLAND.

King.

THE King, who is the fountain of jurisdiction, might by our constitution have judged in all causes, either in his own person, 1469, c. 27. *in fin.* of which Sir Thomas Craig gives a strong instance, p. 519. §. 12. or by those whom he was pleased to vest with jurisdiction. In the reign of Ch. II. the parliament extended this part of the prerogative, by declaring, that the King retained a cumulative jurisdiction, notwithstanding any offices or grants of jurisdiction formerly bestowed upon his subjects, 1681, c. 18.; in consequence of which, he assumed a power of erecting regalities within the bounds of heritable sheriffships, &c. But this act was repealed, 1690, c. 28.

Parliament of Scotland.

2. The parliament of Scotland, as our court of the last resort, had the right of reviewing the sentences of all our supreme courts; particularly those of the court of Session, against which, parties have been early in use to protest for remedy of law, to King and parliament, Books S. 29. Jan. 155 $\frac{1}{2}$, and 7. March 156 $\frac{1}{2}$. The court of Session in 1674 (founding their plea upon 1457, c. 62. joined with 1537, c. 39.) disallowed this right, and procured an order of Council, for banishing all the advocates who would not disclaim the lawfulness of appeals to parliament, twelve miles from Edinburgh; but the convention of Estates 1689,

c. 13.

c. 13. asserted it to be the right of every subject, to protest for remedy of law against the sentences of the Session.

3. Private acts, or ratifications of private grants by parliament, as they passed of course, without hearing those having interest, could not hurt the right of third parties; for which reason, they are declared subject to reduction by the court of Session, 1567, c. 18. N°. 1. And all the sessions of our *Scots* parliaments, downwards from 7a. VI. were closed with an act, saving the right of third parties. Private acts.

4. By the treaty of union, 1707, c. 7. art. 3. the parliaments of *Scotland* and *England* are united into one parliament of *Great Britain*. From this period, the *British* house of Peers, as coming in place of the *Scots* parliament, is become our court of the last resort, to which appeals lie, from all the supreme courts of *Scotland*: But that court has no original jurisdiction in civil matters, in which they judge only upon appeal. By art. 22. of that treaty, the *Scots* share of the representation in the house of Peers, is fixed to sixteen *Scots* Peers elective, and in the house of Commons, to forty five Commoners; of which thirty are elected by the freeholders of counties, and fifteen by the royal boroughs. The principal acts relating to the right of election, are 1681, c. 21.—1707, c. 8.—6. An. c. 6. and 23.—12. An. st. 1. c. 6.—2. Geo. II. c. 24.—7. Geo. II. c. 16.—16. Geo. II. c. 11. Parliament of Great Britain.

Scots representation in it.

5. The King, altho' he might have determined all causes by himself, committed the regular exercise of that branch of his prerogative to his stated judges, as justiciary, sheriff, &c. Privy council.
except

except in certain particular trials, which parties were at liberty to bring, either before the King and his council, or before the judge ordinary, *arg.* 1425, c. 65. compared with 1457, c. 61. After the court of Session got the cognisance of the causes, that might have been formerly determined by the King and his council, *infr.* §. 6. the jurisdiction of the council seemed to be confined to questions, which called for the more special attention of the public, 1471, c. 48.—1487, c. 105. This council was stiled the King's secret, or privy council, 1489, c. 12.—1609, c. 14. in contradistinction to the parliament, which was the great or general council, 1457, c. 75.—1537, c. 40.; and it came at last, besides its powers in matters of state and government, to be vested with a fixed supreme jurisdiction, in all questions that had a relation to the public peace. They inquired into, and punished violent incroachments upon possession, and other grosser breaches of the peace; they decreed alimony to pupils, and to wives barbarously used by their husbands, and judged in many other questions of that sort, where summary proceeding was necessary: But by 6. *An.* c. 6. the *Scots* privy council was abolished, and sunk into that of *Great Britain*, which for the future is declared to have no other powers, than the *English* privy council had at the time of the union.

Session.

6. A court was erected by 1425, c. 65. consisting of certain persons to be named by the King out of the three estates of parliament, which was vested with the jurisdiction formerly lodged in the Council, and got the name of the Session, because in place of being itinerant,

rant, and without any fixed terms of sitting, it was ordained to hold annually a certain number of sessions, at the places to be specially appointed by the King. This court had a jurisdiction, cumulative with the judge-ordinary, in spulzies, and other possessory actions, and in debts; but they had none in questions of property of heritable subjects, 1457, c. 61. No appeal lay from its judgments to the parliament, *ib.* c. 62. The judges of this court served by rotation, and were changed from time to time after having sat 40 days in whole, *ib.* c. 63. and became so negligent in the administration of justice, that it was thought necessary by 1503, c. 58. to transfer their powers to a council to be named by the King, called the daily council.

7. The present model of the court of Session, Or college of justice. was formed in the reign of *Ja. V.* The judges thereof, who are by 1537, c. 36. vested with an universal civil jurisdiction, consisted originally of seven churchmen, seven laymen, and a president, whom it behoved to be a prelate, *arg.* 1579. c. 93: And even after the reformation, parsons, rectors, and other churchmen were received as judges. Parochial ministers were first disqualified for the office, by 1584, c. 133.; afterwards by 1640, c. 26. which extended the prohibition to all churchmen, the distinction of spiritual and temporal judges was suppressed. And tho' that act was not renewed after the restoration, no clergyman has been, since that period, admitted to the bench. The judges thereof, by whom named. The judges of session have been always received by warrants from the crown. His Majesty, 1579, c. 93. seems

seems to have transferred to the court itself, the right of chusing their own president; and in a *Sederunt* recorded 26. *June* 1593, the King condescended to present to the Lords, upon every vacancy in the bench, a list of three persons, out of which they were to chuse one; in which form, Mr *John Preston* of *Fenton*, was admitted, 8. *March* 1593, and Mr *David Macgill* of *Cranshoun*, 23. *May* 1597. But his Majesty soon resumed the exercise of both rights, which continued with the crown till the usurpation, when it was ordained, that the King should name the judges of the Session, by the advice of parliament, 1641, c. 15. After the restoration, the nomination was again declared to be solely in the sovereign, 1661, c. 2.

Their
qualifica-
tions.

8. Tho' judges may, in the general case, be named at the age of twenty one years, the Lords of Session must be at least twenty five, 1592, c. 132.; by which statute, other qualifications are also required to that office. By 1707, c. 7. art. 19. no person can be named Lord of Session, who has not served as an advocate or principal clerk of Session for five years, or as a writer to the Signet for ten: And in the case of a writer to the signet, he must undergo the ordinary trials upon the *Roman* law, and be found qualified, two years before he can be named. Upon a vacancy in the bench, the King presents the successor by a letter addressed to the Lords, wherein he requires them to try and admit the person presented. The Lords, at the desire of *Ch. II.* fixed the method of trial, by *Act. S.* 31. *July* 1674. The powers given them to reject the presentee upon trial, 1579, c. 93. are taken away,

Their
trial.

away, by 10. *Geo. c.* 19. and a bare liberty to remonstrate substituted in its place.

9. Besides the 15 ordinary judges, the King was allowed to name three or four Lords of his great council, who might sit and vote with them, 1537, *c.* 40. Upon a complaint made by the court of Session, that the crown had exceeded the fixed number of extraordinary Lords, *Ja. VI.* by a letter recorded, *Books S.* 28. *March* 1617, promised to restrict himself to four, which number was from that time never exceeded. By the said act 10. *Geo. I.* no vacancy happening thereafter, through the death of any extraordinary Lord, can be supplied. At the first institution, ten Lords, with the president, made a quorum, 1537, *c.* 57: But it appears from 1587, *c.* 44. that the practice prior to that statute, had reduced the quorum to nine ordinary Lords.

10. The appellation of the *College of Justice* is not confined to the judges, who are distinguished by the name of *Senators*, 1540, *c.* 93; but comprehends advocates, clerks of Session, writers to the Signet, and others, as described, *Act. S.* 23. *Feb.* 1687. Where therefore the college of justice is intitled to any privilege, it extends to all the members of the college. Besides the privilege mentioned under the former title, § 14. they are exempted from watching, warding, and other services within borough, 1592, *c.* 153.; and from the payment of ministers stipends, and of all customs, &c. imposed upon goods carried to, or from the city of *Edinburgh*, said *Act S.*

11. Tho' the jurisdiction of the Session be properly limited to civil causes, 1537, *c.* 36. the

Extraor-
dinary
Lords.

Quorum.

Privileges
of the col-
lege of ju-
stice.

Jurisdic-
tion of the
Session in
the crimes.

the judges have always sustained themselves, as competent to the crime of falsehood, either from its necessary connexion with civil right, or perhaps, because the summary proceedings of the court of Justiciary, were not well adapted to the tedious proofs frequently brought in improbations, when pursued in the indirect manner. Where the falsehood is alleviated by favourable circumstances, the Lords themselves inflict the punishment by imprisonment, fine, &c.; but where it deserves death or membration, they, after finding the crime proved, remit the criminal to the court of Justiciary. Special statute has given the court of Session jurisdiction in contraventions of lawborrows, deforcements, and breach of arrestment, 1581, c. 117, 118. And they have been in use to judge in battery *pendente lite*, and in usury, tho' statute seems to have excluded them, 1594, c. 219.—1597, c. 247.

In civil
causes.

12. In certain civil causes, the jurisdiction of the Session is exclusive of all inferior jurisdictions; as in declarators of property, and other competitions of heritable rights, provings of the tenor, *cessiones bonorum*, restitution of minors, reductions of decrees or of writings, sales of the estates of minors or bankrupts, &c. In a second class of causes, their jurisdiction can be only exercised in the way of review, after the cause is brought from the inferior court; as in maritime and consistorial causes, which must be pursued in the first instance before the admiral or commissary; and in actions below 200 merks, which must be commenced before the judge-ordinary, 1672, c. 16. §. 16. *Concerning the Session.* In all civil actions, which fall under neither of these classes, the jurisdiction

tion of the Session is concurrent, even in the first instance, with that of the judge-ordinary.

The Session may proceed as a court of equity by the rules of conscience, in abating the rigour of law, and giving aid in proper cases, to such as in a court of law can have no remedy: And this power is inherent in the Supreme court of every country, where separate courts are not established for law and for equity.

The Session is a court of equity.

13. The supreme criminal judge was styled Justiciar. the Justiciar, and he had anciently an universal civil jurisdiction; even in matters of heritage, *R. M. l. 1. c. 5. §. 3, 4.—l. 2. c. 16. §. 37.* He was obliged to hold two justice-courts or ayres yearly, at *Edinburgh* or *Peeblis*, where all the freeholders of the kingdom were obliged to attend, *2. Alt. c. 79.* Besides this universal court, special justice-ayres were held in all the different shires of the kingdom, twice in the year, *Stat. R. III. c. 30.—1440. c. 5, &c.* These last having gone into disuse, his Majesty was authorised, 1587, *c. 81.* either by himself, or his justice-general, to name eight deputies, two for every quarter of the kingdom, who should make their circuits over the whole, in *April* and *October*.

14. The office of deputies was suppressed, by 1672, *c. 16.* and five Lords of Session were added as commissioners of Justiciary, to the justice-general and justice-clerk. The justice-general, if present, is constant president of the court, and in his absence the justice-clerk. This statute divides the kingdom into three districts, and appoints two of the judges of the new erected court, to hold circuits in certain boroughs of each district, once a year in *May*. Soon after the union, circuit courts were appointed

Circuit courts.

pointed to be held twice in the year, by 6. *An. c. 6.* Afterwards they were, by 10. *An. c. 33.* brought back to the regulation of 1672.; and now again, by the late jurisdiction-act 20. *Geo. II.* they are to be held twice in the year, in the spring and harvest vacations; with a power to his Majesty, to add to, or alter the places or districts at which the courts are to be held. One judge may, by the last quoted statute, proceed to business in the absence of his colleague.

Jurisdiction
of Ju-
sticiary.

15. By *St. Al. II. c. 14. §. 2.* the crimes of robbery, rape, murder, and wilful-fire-raising, (the four pleas of the crown) are said to be reserved to the King's court of Justiciary; but the only crime, in which, *de praxi*, the jurisdiction of Justiciary came at last to be exclusive of all inferior criminal jurisdiction, was that of high treason, *Mack. Crim. Tit. Jurisd. of Reg.* Treason is since the Union triable, not only by the Justiciary, but by special commission of *oyer and terminer*, in which three of the Lords of Justiciary must be named, whereof one to be of the quorum, 7. *An. c. 21.* The court of Justiciary, when sitting at *Edinburgh*; has a power of advocating causes from all inferior criminal judges, and of suspending their sentences. Formerly, the court of Session assumed the power of advocating criminal causes from inferior courts, not only on incompetency, but iniquity, in order again to remit them to the proper judge: But the Session has not interposed in such advocations, since the Justiciary was new-modelled by statute 1672.

New powers
of the
circuit.

16. The circuit-court has, by the late jurisdiction-act, a power given them to judge in all criminal causes, which do not infer death or demembration,

demembration, upon appeal from any inferior court within their district. By the same statute, a supreme civil jurisdiction is also given to them, by way of appeal, in all causes not exceeding 12 *l. Sterling*, in which their decrees are not subject to review; but no appeal is to lie to the circuit, till the cause be finally determined in the inferior court. This last branch of the act was only temporary, but is now made perpetual by 31. *Geo. II. c. ult.*

17. The *Scots* court of Exchequer, as the *Exchequer* King's Chamberlain court, judged in all *que-quer.* ritions of the revenue. By 6. *An. c. 26.* (passed in pursuance of 1707, *c. 7. art. 19.*) that court is abolished, and a new court erected, consisting of the Lord High Treasurer of *Great Britain*, and a chief Baron, with four other Barons of Exchequer; which Barons are to be made of sergeants at law, *English* barristers, or *Scots* advocates of five years standing. All the privileges, belonging to the college of justice, are communicated to the Barons and other members of this court; and the council intitled to practise in it, are such as can practise before the courts of *Westminster*, or the court of Session. This court has a privative jurisdiction conferred upon it, as to the duties of customs, excise, or other revenues appertaining to the King or Prince of *Scotland*, and as to all honours and estates that may accrue to the Crown; in which matters, they are to judge by the forms of proceeding, used in the *English* court of Exchequer; under the following limitations, That no debt due to the Crown shall affect the debtor's real estate, in any other manner, than such estate, may be affected by the laws of *Scotland*; (see *New Coll.*

Coll. 112. and that the validity of the Crown's titles to any honours or lands shall continue to be tried by the court of Session. The Barons have the powers of the *Scots* court continued with them, of passing the accounts of Sheriffs, or other officers who have the execution of writs issuing from, or returnable to the court of Exchequer; and of receiving resignations, and passing signatures of charters, gifts of casualties, &c. But tho' all these must be passed in Exchequer, it is the court of Session only, who can judge of their preference, after they are completed, 1661, c. 59. See *Stair's Decis.* 14. June 1665.

Admiral,
his jurisdic-
tion.

Criminal.

And civil.

18. The jurisdiction of the Admiral in maritime causes was, of old, concurrent with that of the Session. It has the title of sovereign given to it, by 1609, c. 15. and is much enlarged by 1681, c. 16. whereby the High-Admiral is declared the King's Justice-General, upon the seas, on fresh water within flood-mark, and, in all harbours and creeks. His civil jurisdiction extends by this statute, to all maritime causes, and so comprehends questions of charter-parties, freights, salvages, bottomries, &c. He exercises this supreme jurisdiction by a delegate, the judge of the high court of admiralty; and he may also name inferior deputies, whose jurisdiction is limited to particular districts, and whose sentences are subject to the review of the high court. In causes which are declared to fall under the Admiral's cognisance, his jurisdiction is sole; in so much that the Session itself, though they may review his decrees by suspension or reduction, cannot carry a maritime question from him by advocacy: Yet the Session may advocate causes from inferior

ferior admiralties in order to remit them to the judge of the high court. The Admiral has acquired, by usage, a jurisdiction in mercantile causes, even where they are not strictly maritime, cumulative with that of the Judge-ordinary, 19. July 1706, *Turnbull*. The jurisdiction of the commissaries of *Edinburgh*, which is as properly supreme as that of the High Admiral, is explained below, 1. 5. 24. 25.

19. All our supreme courts have seals or signets, proper to their several jurisdictions. The courts of Session and Justiciary used formerly the same signet; which was called the King's, because the writs issuing from thence run in the King's name; and tho' the Justiciary got at last a separate signet for itself, yet that of the Session still retains the appellation of the *King's signet*. In this office, are sealed summonses for citation, letters of executorial diligence, or for staying or prohibiting of diligence, and generally whatever passes by the warrant of the Session, and is to be executed by the officers of the court. All these must, before sealing, be signed by the writers, or, as they are called in our ancient statutes, 1537, c. 59. *et seqq.* clerks of the signet: But letters of diligence, where they are granted in a depending process, merely for probation, tho' they pass by the signet, must be subscribed by a clerk of Session. The clerks of the signet also prepare and subscribe all signatures of charters, or other royal grants, which pass in Exchequer.

Seals of court.

TIT. 4. *Of inferior Judges and Courts.*

Sheriff.

His jurisdiction.

As it stood
anciently.As it
stands at
present.

SHERIFF, from *reeve*, governor, and *sheer* to cut or divide, is the Judge-ordinary constituted by the Crown, over a particular division or county. Our Kings sometimes erected certain lands, which were only parts of a county, and at other times royal boroughs, with the jurisdiction of sheriff-ship within themselves; in which case, the judge of the privileged territory had a jurisdiction, cumulative with the jurisdiction of the Sheriff of that county, within which it was locally situated. The Sheriff's jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, was in ancient times, nearly as ample within his own territory, as that of the supreme courts of Session and Justiciary was, over the whole kingdom; for he received in his court the four pleas of the crown, when authorized by the Justiciary, *St. Gul. c. 2. §. 5.* and he judged in declarators of property or pleas of right, and in other questions of the greatest importance, *R. M. l. 1. c. 3. et 5.* And, even after his jurisdiction came to be more limited, it retained for some time this mark of supreme, that causes were carried for review, from the baron-courts of subject-superiors, to the Sheriff-court, as the King's baron-court, 1503, c. 95.

2. The Sheriff, to this day, judges in all actions upon contracts, or other personal obligations, to the greatest extent, whether the suit be brought against the debtor himself, or against his representative, in forth-comings, in poindings of the ground, in mails and duties, and

and in all possessory actions, as removings, ejections, spolzies, &c.; in all briefes issuing from the chancery, as of inquest, terce, or division, rutory, &c. and even in adjudications of land-estates, when deduced on the renunciation of the apparent heir. His present criminal jurisdiction extends to certain capital crimes, as theft, and even murder, tho' it be one of the pleas of the Crown, 1426.c. 90. 1491.c. 28; and he is competent to most questions of public police.

3. Sheriffs have a ministerial power, in virtue of which, they were anciently employed in sending written copies of the laws to prelates, barons, and boroughs, before the art of printing, 1425, c. 67.; and to this day, they return juries, in order to the trial of causes that require juries. The writs for electing members of parliament, have been, since the union, directed to the Sheriffs, who, after they are executed, return them to the crown-office from whence they issued. They also execute writs, issuing from the court of Exchequer; and, in general, take care of all estates, duties, or casualties that fall to the crown within their territory, for which they must account to the Exchequer.

4. A Lord of Regality was a magistrate, who had a grant of lands from the Sovereign, with royal jurisdiction annexed thereto. No lands could be comprehended under this grant, which did not belong, either in property or superiority, to the grantee. His civil jurisdiction was equal to that of a Sheriff; his criminal extended, in practice, to the four pleas of the crown. He had a right to repledge or reclaim all criminals, subject to his jurisdiction, from any other competent court, tho' it were the Justiciary itself, His right of repledging.

self, to his own; at least till 1672, c. 16. He who used this right, was obliged to give caution to the court from whom the criminal was repledged, that Justice should be ministred by himself; in which if he failed, he forfeited his right of holding courts for a year, and the first judge might again take up the cause; and if the delinquent did not appear, the cautioner or security was to answer for him, *2. Att. c. 8.* §. 6. 7. He had also right, according to the most common opinion, to the single escheat of all denounced persons residing within his jurisdiction, even tho' such privilege had not been expressed in the grant of regality. As this ample jurisdiction was attended with too great power and influence, a stop was put to farther grants of regality, without consent of Parliament, by 1455, c. 43.; notwithstanding which, our Sovereigns continued to make new grants, that, for the greatest part, were either confirmed by ratifications of Parliament, or fortified by the immemorial exercise of the jurisdiction.

His right
to the
single es-
cheat of
delin-
quents.

Stewart.

5. The Stewart was the magistrate appointed by the King, over such regality-lands as happened to fall to the crown by forfeiture, &c.; and therefore the Stewart's jurisdiction was equal to that of a regality. The two Stewartries of Kircudbright, and of Orkney and Zetland, make shires or counties by themselves, and send each a representative to Parliament. Where lands, not erected into a regality, fell into the King's hands, he appointed a Bailie over them, whose jurisdiction was equal to that of a Sheriff.

Bailie.

All heri-
table ju-
risdictions
are now
dissolved.

6. By the late jurisdiction-act 20. *Geo. II.* all heritable regalities and baileries, and all such heritable sheriff-ships and stewartries, as were only parts of a shire, are dissolved; and the

the powers formerly vested in them, are made to devolve upon such of the King's courts, as these powers would have belonged to, if the jurisdictions dissolved had never been granted. All sheriff-ships and stewardries that were no parts of a shire, where they had been granted, either heritably or for life, are resumed and annexed to the crown. No High Sheriff or Stewart can hereafter judge personally in any cause. One Sheriff or Stewart-Depute is to be appointed by the King in every shire, who must be an Advocate of three years standing; and after a certain term not yet expired, all commissions to these deputies are to be granted for life.

7. Formerly, the jurisdiction of Sheriffs must have been exercised at the head borough of the shire; but, by the foresaid act, Sheriffs and Stewarts depute, have a power to name a substitute or substitutes during pleasure, either over the whole shire, or within such a particular district as shall be mentioned in the substitution; and they may hold courts at any place within the shire, upon previous notice, to be published at the several churches within the district where the court is to be held. The head borough of the shire still continues the only place where letters of diligence can be published and registred. Notwithstanding this statute, several diligences continued to be executed at the head boroughs of regalities and stewardries, tho' there could not possibly be any record kept in these abolished jurisdictions, in which diligences might be registred; such executions were therefore discharged, by *Act S. 29. Feb. 1752*. No Sheriff could have sat, by our former

Sheriffs may hold courts any where within the shire:

But diligences must be published at the head borough.

mer law, during the vacation of the Session, without a dispensation from the Lords, until *Michaelmas* head court, which was considered as the beginning of the Sheriffs session; but, by this statute, Sheriff-deputes and their substitutes may sit at all times, and in all causes, without dispensation.

Prince of
Scotland,

8. The appanage, or patrimony of the Prince of *Scotland*, has been long erected into a regality-jurisdiction, called the principality. It is personal to the King's eldest son, upon whose death or succession, it returns to the crown. The Prince may have his own chancery, from which his writs are issuable, and may name his own Chamberlain and other officers, for receiving and managing his revenue. The vassals of the Prince are intitled to elect, or to be elected members of Parliament for counties, equally with those who hold of the crown.

Justices of
the Peace.

The extent of
their present
jurisdiction

9. Justices of the Peace are magistrates named by the Sovereign, over the several counties of the kingdom, for the special purpose of preserving the public peace. Their power by 1609, c. 7. reached little farther, than to bind over disorderly persons, for their appearance before the Privy Council or Justiciary; but by 1617, c. 8. and 1661, c. 38. they are specially directed to judge in breaches of the peace, and in most of the laws concerning public policy. They may compel workmen or labourers to serve for a reasonable fee, and they can condemn masters in the wages due to their servants, which is the only point of civil jurisdiction given them by these statutes. By 1669, c. 16. they have power to judge in questions of high-ways; and if it should be necessary to make a high-way

high-way upon new ground, they may, in conjunction with the heritors, assess the shire, to compensate the loss of the proprietor, through whose grounds the new road is to be carried.

10 To prevent collision between Justices of Their the peace and other judges, they are enjoined powers of not to cite any party to their court, till fifteen holding days are expired from his committing the offence. The act 1661 ordains them to meet four times in the year, with power to continue or adjourn these meetings, to such day and place as shall be most convenient; but in practice, they hold courts at any time, and in any place within the shire, tho' not by way of adjournment of the quarter-sessions. In the quarter-sessions, which are always held at the head borough of the county, the Justices have been in use of reviewing the sentences pronounced in their intermediate meetings. Constables are the proper officers for executing their Constable orders. They have powers by the act above-cited to suppress tumults, with the assistance of the neighbourhood, and to apprehend delinquents, and those who can give no good account of themselves, and carry them to the next Justice. Any one Justice may, by proper warrants of commitment, imprison delinquents in order to trial, or, by a warrant to a constable, ordain suspected houses to be searched, and suspected persons to be brought before him, in order to their examination, or to give security for their good behaviour.

11. By 6. An. c. 6. our Justices of the The peace, over and above the powers committed powers of to them by the laws of *Scotland*, are authorised Justices. since the to exercise whatever belongs to the office of an union.

English

English Justice of the peace, in relation to the public peace. From that time, the *Scots* commissions have run in the same style with the *English*, which contain powers to inquire into, and judge in all capital crimes, witchcrafts, felonies, and several others specially enumerated, with this limitation subjoined, *Of which Justices of the Peace may lawfully inquire*: But in cases of difficulty, they shall not proceed, unless one of the King's judges be present; which, when applied to our law, must signify one of the Lords of Justiciary. These commissions bear, that two Justices shall make a quorum in the trial of crimes, &c. And therefore, tho' by the laws of *Scotland* three were required, and tho' by the above quoted act 6. *An.* the forms of trial were to continue as formerly; two Justices can now constitute a court, *Dec. 1730. Reid.* Special statute has given the cognisance of several matters of excise to the Justices, in which their sentences are final: See 25. *Jan. 1710. Paterson.*

Two Ju-
stices
make a
quorum.

Boroughs. 12. A Borough is a body corporate, made up of the inhabitants of a certain tract of ground erected by the Sovereign, with jurisdiction annexed to it. Boroughs are erected, either to be holden of the Sovereign himself, which is the general case of royal boroughs; or of the superior of the lands erected, as boroughs of regality and barony. Boroughs royal have power, by their charters, to chuse annually certain office bearers or magistrates; and in boroughs of regality and barony, the nomination of magistrates is, by their charter, lodged, sometimes in the inhabitants, sometimes in the superior. Bailies of boroughs, have jurisdiction in matters

of debt, services, and questions of possession betwixt the inhabitants. Their criminal jurisdiction extends to petty riots; and, by special statute, to reckless, (not intended) fire-raising, 1426, c. 75. Boroughs royal had anciently the same privilege with regalities, of repledging from the Justiciary or Sheriff; for which see *L. B. c. 61. §. 1.* and 1488, c. 1. The Dean of Guild is that magistrate of a royal borough, who is head of the merchant-company; he has the cognisance of mercantile causes within borough, 1593, c. 180.; and the inspection of buildings, that they encroach, neither on private property, nor on the public streets; and he may direct insufficient houses to be pulled down. His jurisdiction has no dependance on the court of the borough, or baily court, 21. *July 1631, Adamson.* By the late jurisdiction-act, all jurisdiction, competent to any borough of regality, or barony, or Magistrates thereof, which is independent of the Lord of regality or barony, is reserved entire; but their privilege of repledging from the Sheriff and Stewart-courts, is taken away.

13. A Baron, in the large sense of that word, *Barons.* is one who holds his lands immediately of the Crown; and, as such, had by our ancient constitution, right to a seat in Parliament, however small his freehold might have been. When titles of honour and dignity came to be conferred by the Sovereign, the Barons that were distinguished by these, had the appellation of *Barones majores et minores.* By 1427, c. 102. the lesser Barons were exempted from the burden of attending the service of Parliament, provided that commissioners were sent from the Barons of each county to
F represent

represent them. This exemption, which was renewed under certain restrictions by 1457, c. 75. and 1503, c. 78. was changed insensibly in less than a century into an utter disability in all the lesser Barons, from sitting in Parliament, without election by the county; tho' no statute is to be found expressly excluding them; see 1587, c. 113.

Lesser Barons excluded from Parliament, if not elected.

Their jurisdiction.

Civil.

And criminal.

How restricted by 20. Geo. II. c. 43.

14. To constitute a Baron in the strict law sense, his lands must have been erected, or, at least, confirmed by the King in *liberam baroniam*; and such Baron had a certain jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, which he might have exercised, either in his own person, or by his bailly; but where he himself was a party, he could not judge in person. In civil matters, he might have judged in questions of debt within the barony, and in most of the possessory actions; he had also a power of police, by which he could fix reasonable prices on work, &c.; and he was competent to every question, necessary for making his own rents effectual. His criminal jurisdiction extended anciently to all crimes, except treason, and the four pleas of the crown, *Leg. Milc. II. c. 13*. He might, by our later practice, have judged in reckless fire-raising, 1426. c. 75., in penal statutes, 3. Feb. 1674, *L. Strowan*, and in riots and bloodwits: And in the general opinion of lawyers, every Baron, as such, could have punished the crime of theft capitally, *Cr. 105. §. 16.—Skene, de verb. sig. voce Baron,—H. Min. Pr. 93*.

15. By the late jurisdiction-act, the civil jurisdiction of a Baron is reduced to the power of recovering, from his vassals and tenants, the rents of his lands, and of condemning them in mill

mill services; and of judging in causes where the debt and damages do not exceed 40 *s. Sterling*. His criminal jurisdiction is, by the same statute, limited to assaults, batteries, and other smaller offences, which may be punished by a fine, not exceeding 20 *s. Sterling*, or by setting the offender in the stocks in the day time, not above three hours: The fine to be levied by poinding, or one month's imprisonment. The jurisdiction formerly competent to proprietors of mines, and coal or salt works, over their workmen, is reserved; and also, that which was competent to proprietors who had the right of fairs or markets, for correcting the disorders that might happen during their continuance; provided they shall exercise no jurisdiction, inferring the loss of life or demembration. No charter to be hereafter granted for erecting lands into a barony, is to convey any greater jurisdiction than for recovery of rents and for mill services; which is a right that every proprietor, tho' neither baron nor infest *cum curiis*, was understood to have by our former law. The jurisdictions of Sheriffship, Stewartry and Barony, had certain stated head courts yearly, at which all the vassals subject to the jurisdiction were obliged to attend; but this obligation is taken off by act 20. *Geo. II. c. 50.* for abolishing tenures by ward-holding.

How future erections are restricted.

Attendance at head courts abolished.

16. The High Constable of *Scotland* had no fixed territorial jurisdiction, but followed the court; and had jointly with the Marischal, the cognisance of all crimes committed within two leagues of it, *Leg. Milc. II. c. 6.* All other constabularies were dependent on him: These had castles, and sometimes boroughs subject to their

Constabularies.

their jurisdiction, as *Dundee, Montrose, &c.*; and amongst other powers, now little known, they had the right of exercising criminal jurisdiction within their respective territories, during the continuance of fairs, 18. *July 1676, E. Kinghorn.* By the late jurisdiction-act, all jurisdictions of constabulary are dissolved, except that of high constable.

Lyon K.
of arms.

17. The office of the Lyon King of arms was chiefly ministerial, to denounce war, proclaim peace, carry public messages, &c. But he has also a right of jurisdiction, 1592, c. 125, whereby he can punish all who usurp arms, contrary to the law of arms, and deprive or suspend messengers, heralds or pursuivants, (who are officers named by himself); but he has no cognisance of the damage arising to the private party, through the messenger's fault, 27. *June 1673, Heriots.* Messengers, anciently called officers at arms, were first brought under regulations, by 1587, c. 46. They are subservient to the supreme courts of session and justiciary; and their proper business is to execute all the King's letters, either in civil or criminal causes.

Messengers.

Sentence-money.

18. Our judges had, for a long time, no other salaries or appointments, than what arose from the sentences they pronounced. Our criminal judges applied to their own use, the fines or issues of their several courts; and regalities had a right to the single escheat of all persons denounced, who resided within their jurisdiction. A small sum was allowed to our supreme civil court, upon every decree, by 1457, c. 63; and afterwards, the twentieth part also of the sums decreed, 1587, c. 43.; and it was not, till after certain yearly provisions were settled on the
Lords,

Lords, (for which see 1609, c. 11. and 1633, c. 22.) that sentence-money was prohibited, 1641, c. 55. which has never since been exacted, 1661, c. 50. Sheriffs were likewise intitled to the twentieth part of the sum contained in every decree, in name of sheriff-fee; both proper Sheriffs, 1491, c. 30. and messengers, when invested with the power of Sheriffs, 1503, c. 66.; but by the late jurisdiction-act, fixed salaries are settled upon Sheriffs-depute in place thereof. Messengers, when employed in poindings, are still intitled to their sheriff-fee, which they usually assign to the creditor, on getting a reasonable allowance for their trouble.

Sheriff-fee.

TIT. 5. *Of Ecclesiastical Persons.*

THE Pope, or Bishop of *Rome*, was long acknowledged over Christendom, for the head of the Christian church. The papal jurisdiction was first abolished in *Scotland*, anno 1560, in a parliament not regularly authorized by the Sovereign; and afterwards, by 1567, c. 2. By 1669, c. 1. the King was declared to have supreme authority over all persons, and in all causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil; but this act was repealed by 1690, c. 1. as inconsistent with Presbyterian church government which was then upon the point of being established.

The Pope.

2. Before the reformation from Popery, the clergy was divided into secular and regular. The secular had a particular tract of ground given them in charge, within which they exercised the pastoral office of Bishop, Presbyter, or other church officer. The regular clergy had

Clergy secular and regular.

Commen-
dators.

had no cure of souls, but were tied down to residence in their abbacies, priories, or other monasteries: And they got the name of regular, from the rules of mortification to which they were bound, according to the institution of their several orders. Upon the vacancy of any benefice, whether secular or regular, commendators were frequently appointed to levy the fruits, as factors or stewards during the vacancy. The Pope alone could give the higher benefices *in commendam*; and at last, from the plenitude of his power, he came to name commendators for life, and without any obligation to account. After the reformation, several abbacies and priories were given by *Ja. VI. in perpetuam commendam*, to laicks.

Church
govern-
ment since
the refor-
mation.

3. Upon abolishing the Pope's authority, the regular clergy was totally suppressed; and, in place of all the different degrees which distinguished the secular clergy, we had at first only parochial Presbyters or Ministers, and superintendents, who had the oversight of the church within a certain district: Soon thereafter the church-government became episcopal, by Archbishops, Bishops, &c. 1606, c. 2: And after some intermediate turns, is now Presbyterian, by kirk-sessions, presbyteries, synods, and general assemblies, 1689, c. 3.—1690, c. 5.

Prelates,
Bishops,
and Chap-
ters.

4. Prelate in our statutes signifies a Bishop, Abbot or other dignified clergyman, who in virtue of his office had a seat in Parliament. Every Bishop had his Chapter (*capitulum*), which consisted of a certain number of the ministers of the diocese, by whose assistance the Bishop managed the affairs of the church within that district. The nomination of Bishops to vacant
sees

tees has been in the Crown since 1540, c. 125. Nomina-
though under the appearance of continuing the tion of Bi-
ancient right of election, which was in the shops was
Chapter. The confirmation by the Crown in the
under the great seal, of the chapter's election, crown.
conferred a right to the spirituality of the be-
nefice; and a second grant, upon the consecra-
tion of the Bishop elect, gave a title to the
temporality, 1617, c. 1.; but this second grant
fell soon into disuse.

5. He who founded or endowed a church, Patron.
was intitled to the right of patronage thereof,
or *advocatio ecclesiae*; whereby, among other
privileges, he might present a churchman to the
cure, in case of a vacancy. The presentee,
after he was received into the church, had a
right to the benefice, *proprio jure*; and if the
church was parochial, he was called a Parson.
The Pope claimed the right of patronage of e- Who pa-
very kirk, to which no third party could shew tron of
a special title; and since the reformation, the kirks.
Crown, as coming in place of the Pope, is
considered as the universal patron, where no
right of patronage appears in a subject. Where
two churches are united which had different
patrons, each patron presents by turns, 1617.
c. 3. §. 3.

6. Gentlemen of estates frequently founded Patrons of
colleges or collegiate churches, the head of Provostries
which got the name of Provost, under whom and chap-
were certain Prebendaries or Canons, who had lainries.
their several stalls in the church, where they
sung masses. Others of lesser fortunes founded
chaplainries, within the precincts of a parochial
church; or altarages, which were donations
granted for the singing of masses for deceased
friends,

friends, at particular altars in a church. Tho' all these were suppressed upon the reformation, their founders continued patrons of the endowments; out of which, they were allowed to present burfars, to be educated in any of the universities, 1567, c. 12. As the residence of the burfars, who were truly the superiors of these benefices, and were dispersed over all the universities in *Scotland*, could hardly be discovered by the heirs who were to enter to the lands as their vassals, the right of entering vassals to these lands, was by 1661, c. 54. given to the patron.

Patrons of collegiate charges.

7. Where a fund is gifted for the establishment of a second minister, in a parish where the cure is thought too heavy for one, the patronage of such benefice does not belong to the donor, but to him who was patron of the church, 18. *Nov.* 1680, *B. of Haddington*; unless either, where the donor has reserved to himself the right of patronage in the donation, or where he and his successors have been in the constant use of presenting the second minister, without challenge from the patron, *P. Falc.* 42.

The right of presentation.

The right of presenting incumbents was by 1690, c. 23. taken from patrons, and vested in the heritors and elders of the parish, upon payment to be made, by the heritors to the patron, of 600 merks; but it was again restored to patrons, 10. *An.* c. 12. with the exception of the presentations sold in pursuance of the former act.

Right of applying the vacant stipends.

8. Patrons were not simply administrators of the church; for they held the fruits of the vacant benefice as their own, for some time after the reformation, 1593, c. 172. &c. But that

that right is now no more than a trust in the patron, who must apply them to pious uses within the parish, at the sight of the heritors, yearly as they fall due. If he failed, he lost his right of presenting for the next turn, by 1685, c. 18.; and after that right was taken away, the penalty is by 1690. c. 23. declared to be the forfeiture of his right of administering the vacant stipend for that and the next vacancy. The King, who is not subjected to this rule, may apply the vacant stipend of his churches, to any pious use, tho' not within the parish. If one should be ordained to a church, in opposition to the presentee, the patron whose civil right cannot be affected by any sentence of a church-court, may retain the stipend as vacant, *Falc. vol. 2. 213.* Patrons are, to this day, intitled to a seat and burial-place in the churches of which they are patrons; and the right of all the teinds of the parish, not heritably disposed, is given to them by 1690, c. 23.—1693, c. 25.

Penalty of not applying them.

Other rights of Patrons.

9. That kirks may not continue too long vacant, the patron must present to the presbytery, (formerly to the Bishop), a fit person for supplying the cure, within six months of his knowledge of the vacancy, otherwise the right of presentation accrues to the presbytery, *jure devoluto*, 1567, c. 7.—10. *An. c. 12.* Upon presentation by the patron, the Bishop collated or conferred the benefice upon the presentee, by a writing, in which he appointed certain ministers of the diocese, to induce or institute him into the church; which induction completed his right, and was performed by their placing him in the pulpit, and delivering him the bible and the keys of the church.

Patrons must present within six months.

Form of admission into kirks, during episcopacy.

Present
form of
admission.

The Bishop collated to the churches of which himself was patron, *pleno jure*, or without presentation; which he also did in menſal churches, whoſe patronages were ſunk, by the churches being appropriated to him, as part of his patrimony. Since the revolution, a judicial act of admiſſion by the preſbytery, proceeding either upon a preſentation, or upon a call from the heritors and elders, or upon their own *jus devolutum*, compleats the miniſter's right to the benefice.

Proviſion
for the re-
formed
clergy.

10. Soon after the reformation, the Popiſh churchmen were prevailed upon, to reſign in the Sovereign's hands, a third of their benefices, which, by 1567, c. 10. was appropriated, in the firſt place, for the ſubſiſtence of the reformed clergy. To make this fund effectual, particular localities were aſſigned in every benefice, to the extent of a third, called the *aſſumption of thirds*; and for the farther ſupport of miniſters, Queen Mary made a grant in their favour of all the ſmall benefices not exceeding 300 merks; which was confirmed by 1572, c. 52. Biſhops, by the act which reſtored them to the whole of their benefices, 1606, c. 2. were obliged to maintain the miniſters within their dioceses, out of the thirds; and in like manner, the laick titulars, who got grants of the teinds, became bound, by their acceptation thereof, to provide the kirks within their erection, in competent ſtipends.

Commif-
ſion for
planting
kirks and
valuing
teinds.

11. But all theſe expedients for the maintenance of the clergy having proved ineffectual, firſt one commiſſion of parliament, and ſoon thereafter another, were appointed in the reign of *James VI.* for planting kirks, and modifying ſtipends

stipends to ministers out of the teinds. A third commission was appointed, 1633, c. 19. not only for modifying stipends, but for the valuation and sale of teinds. After the restoration, several new commissions were granted by Parliament, with the additional power of uniting and disjoining parishes, &c. ; but the powers of all these were, by 1707, c. 9. transferred to the court of Session, with this limitation, that no parish should be disjoined, nor new church erected, nor old one removed to a new place, without the consent of three fourths of the heritors, computing the votes, not by their numbers, but by the valuation of their rents within the parish. The Judges of Session, when sitting in that court, are considered as a commission of Parliament, and have their proper clerks, macers, and other officers of court, as such.

And for uniting and disjoining parishes.

Now transferred to the Session.

12. The lowest stipend, that could be modified to a minister by the first commission 1617, c. 3. was 500 merks, or 5 chalders of victual, unless where the whole teinds of the parish did not extend so far: And the highest was 1000 merks, or 10 chalders. The Parliament, 1633, c. 8. raised the *minimum* to 8 chalders of victual, and, proportionally in silver; but as neither the commission appointed by that act, nor any of the subsequent ones, was limited as to the *maximum*, the commissioners have been in use to augment stipends, considerably above the old *maximum*, where there is sufficiency of free teinds, and the cure is burdensome, or living expensive.

Maximum and minimum of stipends.

13. Where a certain quantity of stipend is modified to a minister, out of the teinds of a parish,

Decree of modification, and of locality.

How a
modified
stipend is
secured.

parish, without proportioning that stipend among the several heritors, the decree is called, *of modification*: But where the commissioners also fix the particular proportions payable by each heritor, it is a decree of *modification and locality*. Where a stipend is only modified, it is secured on the whole teinds of the parish, so that the minister can insist against any one heritor, to the full extent of his teinds; such heritor being always intitled to relief against the rest, for what he shall have paid above his just share, 3. *Dec. 1664, Hutchison*; but where the stipend is also localled, each heritor is liable in no more than his own proportion.

Minister's
manse.

its ex-
pence.

Who bur-
dened with
it.

14. Few of the reformed ministers were, at first, provided with dwelling-houses; most of the popish clergy having, upon the first appearance of the reformation, let their manse, in feu, or in long tacks: Ministers therefore got a right, by 1563, c. 72. to as much of these manse as would serve them, notwithstanding such feus or tacks. Where there was no parson's nor vicar's manse, one was to be built by the heritors, at the sight of the Bishop, (now the Presbytery) the charge not exceeding *L. 1000 Scots*, nor below 500 merks, 1649, c. 45.—1663, c. 21. Under a manse are comprehended stable, barn and byre, with a garden; for all which, it is usual to allow half an acre of ground. A person, whose only interest in the lands within the parish is a life-rent right, is to be burdened with no proportion of the charge in building a manse, 14. *Nov. 1679, Minister of Moreham*; but he must bear his share in repairing it, because that has less of the nature of a perpetuity.

15. Every

15. Every incumbent is intitled at his entry, to have his manse put into good condition; for which purpose, the presbytery may appoint a visitation by tradesmen, and order estimates to be laid before them, of the sums necessary for the repairing, which they may proportion among the heritors, according to their valuations; and letters of horning will, on bill to the Lords, be granted for carrying the presbytery's sentence into execution. The presbytery, after the manse is made sufficient, ought, upon application of the heritors, to declare it a free manse, which lays the incumbent under an obligation to uphold it in good condition, during his incumbency; otherwise, he or his executors shall be liable in damages; see 1612, c. 8.; But they are not bound to make up the loss, arising from the necessary decay of the building, by the waste of time.

16. All ministers, where there is any landward or country-parish, are, over and above their stipend, intitled to a glebe, which comprehends four acres of arable land, or sixteen fowms of pasture ground, where there is no arable land, (a fowm is what will graze ten sheep or one cow), and is to be designed or marked by the Bishop or presbytery, out of such kirk-lands within the parish as lie nearest to the kirk, 1593. c. 161.—1606, c. 7. As the benefit intended by these acts to the clergy must have been lost, where there were no kirk-lands in the parish, it was provided by 1644, c. 31. that in default of kirk-lands, the glebe should be designed out of temporal lands; and this act, tho' falling under the act rescissory of *Charles II.* seems to have been considered as still in force, by

Free manse.

Glebe.

To be designed out of kirk-lands.

by 1663, c. 21. which takes it for granted, that all ministers, except those in certain royal boroughs, have right to glebes; see *St. 2. 3. 40.*

Relief arising from the designation of a manse or glebe.

Is only personal.

Glebes and manses unalienable.

Ministers' grass.

17. A right of relief is competent to the heritors, whose lands are set off for the manse or glebe, against the other heritors of the parish, 1594, c. 199. The statute limits this right, to heritors of kirk-lands, and to the special case, where the greatest part of the lands in the parish are kirk-lands. The foresaid act, 1644, which allowed designations out of temporal lands, extended the relief to the heritors of these lands: And, if the first part of that act, allowing such designations, has been received as our law since the restoration, it may be justly thought, that the equitable quality annexed to it ought not to be rejected. This relief, tho' constituted by statute, is not real against the lands themselves; it is only personal, against those who were proprietors at the time of the designation, or their heirs, 24. *June* 1675, *Snow*. Manse and glebes, being once regularly designed, cannot be feued or sold by the incumbent, in prejudice of his successors, 1572, c. 48. which is in practice extended, even to the case where such alienation evidently appears profitable to the benefice.

18. Ministers, besides their glebe, were intitled to grass for a horse and two cows, by 1649, c. 45. which act is revived by 1663, c. 21.: And, if the kirk-lands, out of which the grass may be designed, either lie at a distance, or are not fit for pasture, the heritors are to pay to the minister *L. 20 Scots* yearly, as an equivalent. Ministers have also freedom of fog-

gage,

gage, pasturage, fewel, feal, divot, loaning, and free ish and entry, according to use and wont, 1593, c. 161.—1663, c. 21.: What these privileges are, must be determined by the local custom of the several parishes. Besides the above mentioned burdens which are imposed upon heritors, the parishioners were obliged to provide communion-cups and lavers, 1617, c. 6. and to repair the kirk and kirk-yard-dikes, 1572, c. 54.—1597 c. 232. but these burdens are now for the most part undertaken by the heritors.

19. It sometimes happens, that lands lying at a distance from the kirk to which they originally belonged, are annexed to another nearer kirk, *quoad sacra*, or in so far as concerns the pastoral charge. Such lands continue, in all civil respects, part of the old parish, and consequently are liable in no proportion of the stipend, nor of the expence necessary for upholding the manse, or even the kirk of the parish to which they constantly resort for divine service, *Falc. vol. 1. 274.*

20. The legal terms at which stipends become due to ministers, are *Whitsunday* and *Michaelmas*. If the incumbent be admitted to his church before *Whitsunday*, till which term the corns are not presumed to be fully sown, he has right to that whole year's stipend; and, if he is received after *Whitsunday*, and before *Michaelmas*, he is intitled to the half of that year; because, tho' the corns were sown before his entry, he was admitted before the term at which they are presumed to be reaped. By the same reason, if he dies, or is transported before *Whitsunday*, he has right to no part of that

Annexati-
on *quoad*
sacra.

Terms of
payment
of stipend.

Michael-
mas, the
legal term
in sti-
pends.

that year; if before *Michaelmas*, to the half; and if not till after *Michaelmas*, to the whole. The reason why the legal term in stipends is *Michaelmas*, and not *Martinmas*, as in liferents, arises from the different nature of the two rights. All kirk-benefices did originally, and are still accounted in law to consist of teinds, which were drawn by the churchman, at the cutting of the corns, which was seldom so late as *Michaelmas*; but rents are not deliverable by the tenant to the landlord, till *Martinmas* at soonest, before which term, the corns are perhaps not fully brought into the barn-yard.

Annat or
ann.

21. After the minister's death, his executors have right to the annat; which, in the sense of the canon-law, was a right reserved to the Pope, of the first year's fruits of every benefice. Upon a threatened invasion from *England*, anno 1547, the annat was given by our Parliament, notwithstanding this right in the Pope, to the executors of such churchmen, as should fall in battle in defence of their country, c. 4.: But the word annat or ann, as it is now understood, is the right, which law gives to the executors of all ministers of half a year's benefice, over and above what was due to the minister himself for his incumbency, 1672, c. 13.: So that, if the incumbent survives *Whitsunday*, his executors have the half of that year for the deceased's incumbency, and the other half as annat; if he survive *Michaelmas*, they have that whole year for his incumbency, and the half of the next, in name of ann. This right was first introduced into our law, upon a letter of *James VI.* desiring the Bishops to make an

an act for that purpose, 19. July 1626. E. Marisball.

22. The executors of a minister need make up no title to the ann, by confirmation: Neither is the right assignable by the minister, or affectable with his debts 1672. c. 13.; for it never belonged to him, but is a mere gratuity given by law, to those whom it is presumed the deceased could not sufficiently provide: And law has given it, without distinction, to the executors of all ministers; even where the stipend is made up, not of teinds, but of the public revenue of a borough, or of a voluntary contribution, *Falc. vol. 1. 182.* The statute 1672, gives this right of ann expressly to executors: And if it were to be governed by the rules of succession in executory, the widow, in case of no children, would get one half, the other would go to the next of kin; and where there are children, she would be intitled to a third, and the other two thirds would fall equally among the children, (3: 9. 6.) But the court of Session, probably led by the general practice, have in this last case divided the ann into two equal parts, of which one goes to the widow, and the other among the children *in capita*, July 1747, children of *Macdermeit*.

The nature of the right.

How divided.

23. From the great confidence that was, in the first ages of Christianity, reposed in Churchmen, dying persons frequently committed to them the care of their estates, and of their orphan-children; but these were simply rights of trust, not of jurisdiction. The clergy soon had the address, to establish to themselves a proper jurisdiction, not confined to points of ecclesiastical right, but extending to questions that had

Jurisdiction of Bishops.

no concern with the church. They judged not only in teinds, patronages, testaments, breach of vow, scandal, &c. but in questions of marriage and divorce, because marriage was a sacrament; in tochers, because these were given in consideration of marriage; in all questions where an oath intervened, on pretence that oaths were a part of religious worship, *R. M. l. 1. c. 2.—l. 2. c. 38. §. 5.—l. 3. c. 7. §. 2.*; and in the deprivation of notaries, and the trial of those that used false instruments, 1503, *c. 64*. As churchmen came, by the means of this extensive jurisdiction, to be diverted from their proper functions, they committed the exercise of it to their officials or commissaries: Hence the commissary-court was called the *Bishops court*, and *curia Christianitatis*; it is also styled the *consistorial court*, from *consistory*, a name first given to the court of appeals of the *Roman* Emperors, and afterwards to the courts of judicature held by churchmen.

Commissaries.

By whom named.

24. At the reformation, all episcopal jurisdiction, exercised under the authority of the Bishop of *Rome*, was abolished, by an act 1560, ratified by 1567, *c. 2*. As the course of justice in consistorial causes was thereby stopped, *Q. Mary*, besides naming a Commissary for every diocese, did, by a special grant mentioned in *Books S. 1. March 1563*, establish a new commissary-court at *Edinburgh*, consisting of four judges or commissaries; which grant is ratified by an unprinted act, 1592, *c. 25*. This court is vested with a double jurisdiction; one diocesan, which is exercised in the special territory contained in the grant, *viz.* the counties of *Edinburgh*, *Haddington*, *Linlithgow*, *Stirling* and *Peebles*;

Commissaries of Edinburgh

Peebles; and another universal, by which the judges confirm the testaments of all who die in foreign parts, and may reduce the decrees of all inferior commissaries, provided the reduction be pursued within a year after the decree: See *Instr. to Comm.* 1666, c. 16. recited in *Acts S.* 28. *Feb.* 1666. Bishops, upon their re-establishment in the reign of *James VI.* were restored to the right of naming their several commissaries, by 1609, c. 6; and as to the commissariot of *Edinburgh*, two of the four judges were by that act to be appointed by the Archbishop of *St. Andrew's*, and two by the Archbishop of *Glasgow*. Since the revolution, the nomination of all the Commissaries in the kingdom, has devolved on the Crown, as coming in place of the Bishops. There was but one commissary-court in each diocese, till the erection of the commissariot of *Edinburgh*; and, in pursuance of a commission by *Ja. VI.* in 1581, authorising the Session to erect new ones, for the benefit of persons who lived most remote from the court of the diocese, commissariots were established at *Stirling*, *Peebles*, *Lauder*, and other places, which had never been episcopal sees.

25. As the clergy in times of Popery assumed a jurisdiction, independent of the civil power, or any secular court, their sentences could be reviewed only by the Pope, or judges delegated by him; so that with regard to the courts of *Scotland*, their jurisdiction was supreme. But by an act 1560, ratified by 1581, c. 115. the appeals from our Bishops courts, that were then depending before the *Roman* Consistories, were ordained to be decided by the court of Session: And by a posterior act 1609, c. 6. the

Their two-
fold jurisdic-
tion.

Jurisdiction
of
Commis-
saries, ori-
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Now sub-
ject to the
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sion.

the Session is declared the King's great Con-
fistory, with power to review all sentences pro-
nounced by the Commissaries. Nevertheless,
since that court had no inherent jurisdiction in
consistorial causes prior to this statute; and since
the statute gives them a power of judging only
by way of advocacy, they have not to this
day any proper consistorial jurisdiction in the
first instance, *St. 4. 1. 36.*; neither do they
pronounce sentence, in any consistorial cause
brought from the Commissaries, but remit it
back to them with instructions. By the prac-
tice immediately subsequent to the act before
quoted, they did not admit advocations from
the inferior Commissaries, till the cause was first
brought before the Commissaries of *Edinburgh*;
but that practice is now in disuse, *Edg. 28.*
Jan. 1725, White.

Extent of
the Com-
missary's
jurisdicti-
on,

26. The Commissaries retain to this day an
exclusive power of judging in declarators of
marriage, and of the nullity of marriage; in
actions of divorce and of non-adherence, of
separate alimony to wives, bastardy and con-
firmation of testaments; because all these mat-
ters are still considered to be properly consisto-
rial. Inferior Commissaries are not competent
to questions of divorce, 1609, *c. 6.* under
which, are comprehended questions of bastardy
and adherence, when they have a connection
with the lawfulness of marriage, or with adulte-
ry: See *Instr. to Comm. 1666, c. 2.*

27. The Bishops did, by these instructions in
1666, authorize their Commissaries to judge in
all causes referred to oath, to the extent of 40*l.*
Scots, tho' the matter should not be consisto-
rial: And by older instructions, 156 $\frac{3}{4}$, the
Commissaries

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Commissaries were empowered to determine the causes of widows, orphans, and other *personae miserabiles*, to the highest extent. This part of their jurisdiction is now fixed, by *Act S. 29. July 1752*, declaring that the Commissaries have no power to pronounce decrees in absence, for any sum above 40 *l. Scots*, except in causes properly consistorial; but that they may authenticate tutorial and curatorial inventories; and that all bonds, contracts, &c. which contain a clause for registration in the books of any judge competent, and protests on bills, may be registered in their books. Long before this act of sederunt, Commissaries had been judged not competent to physicians fees, 26 *Nov. 1622, Liddel*; nor to tutory accounts, 8. *Dec. 1675, Wright*; tho' they claimed the cognisance of them, as the causes of dying persons, and of orphans.

Now limited by a late regulation.

TIT. 6. Of Marriage.

PERSONS, when considered in a private Marriage. capacity, are chiefly distinguished by their mutual relations; as husband and wife, tutor and minor, father and child, master and servant. The relation of husband and wife is constituted by marriage; which is the conjunction of man and wife, vowing to live inseparably till death.

2. Marriage is truly a contract, and so requires the consent of parties. Idiots therefore, and furious persons cannot marry. As no person

Is null without consent.

son is presumed capable of consent within the years of pupillarity, which, by our law, lasts till the age of fourteen in males, and twelve in females, marriage cannot be contracted by pupils, *l. 3. C. quando tut. vel cur.*; but if the married pair shall cohabit after puberty, such acquiescence validates the marriage, *l. 4. de rit. nupt.* Marriage is fully perfected by consent; which, without consummation, founds all the conjugal rights and duties. The consent requisite to marriage must be *de praesenti*. A promise of marriage, (*stipulatio sponsalitia*), tho' it was guarded by certain penalties in the Roman law, *l. 5. C. de spons.* may, by ours, be safely refused from, as long as matters are entire; but if any thing be done by one of the parties, whereby a prejudice arises from the non-performance, the party refusing is liable in damages to the other, *F. 2. Jan. 1685. Graeme*. The canonists, and after them our courts of justice, explain a *copula* subsequent to a promise of marriage, into actual marriage, *New Coll. 46.*

Which
must be
de praesenti.

Form of
celebra-
tion.

Presumed
marriage.

3. It is not necessary, that marriage should be celebrated by a clergyman. The consent of parties may be declared before any Magistrate, or simply before witnesses: And tho' no formal consent should appear, marriage is presumed from the cohabitation, or living together, at bed and board, of a man and woman who are generally reputed husband and wife, *1503, c. 77.* One's acknowledgment of his marriage to the midwife, whom he called to his wife, and to the minister who baptized his child, was found sufficient presumptive evidence of marriage, without the aid, either of cohabitation,

cohabitation, or of *habite and repute*, Feb. 1739, *Arrot*. The father's consent was, by the *Roman* law, essential to the marriage of children *in familia*: But, by our law, children may validly enter into marriage, without the knowledge, and even against the remonstrances of a father.

4. Marriage is forbidden within certain degrees of blood. The *Romans* reckoned a degree for every person generated; by which rule, a father and son are in the first; brothers in the second, and first cousins in the fourth degree of consanguinity. The canon law computes by the persons generated upon one side only, which, in the direct line of ascendants and descendants, comes to the same account with the *Roman* computation; but, in the transverse or collateral line, makes a considerable variation from it. By 1567, c. 15. which adopts the law of *Moses*, *Levit. c. 18.* into ours, seconds in blood, and all remoter degrees, may lawfully marry. By seconds in blood, are meant first cousins, according to the computation of the cannon law, which was at that time the common way in *Scotland* of reckoning degrees. Marriage in the direct line is forbidden *in infinitum*; as it is also in the collateral line, in the special case where one of the parties is *loco parentis* to the other, as grand-uncle, great grand-uncle, &c. with respect to his grand-niece, &c. The same degrees that are prohibited in consanguinity, are prohibited in affinity; which is the tie arising from marriage, betwixt one of the married pair, and the blood relations of the other. Marriage also, where either of the parties is naturally unfit for generation, or stands already

Consent of
parents.

Marriage
within
forbidden
degrees,
null.

And mar-
riage in
the direct
line.

Other
grounds
of nullity.

already married to a third person, is, *ipso jure*, null.

Procla-
mation of
banns.

5. To prevent bigamy and incestuous marriages, the church has introduced proclamation of banns; which is the ceremony of publishing the names and designations (additions) of those who intend to intermarry, in the churches where the bride and bridegroom reside, after the congregation is assembled for divine service; that all persons, who know any objection to the marriage, may offer it. Not Bishops only, but Presbyteries, assumed formerly a power of dispensing with proclamation of banns on extraordinary occasions; *Act. Aff. 1638. Sess. 23. §. 21.* which has not been exercised since the revolution. When the order of the church is observed, the marriage is called regular; when otherwise, clandestine. Clandestine marriage, tho' it be valid, has statutory penalties annexed to it affecting not only the parties, but the celebrator and witnesses, 1661, c. 34.—1695, c. 12.—1698, c. 6.: And over and above, the parties were punished with the loss of certain conjugal rights; the husband lost his *jus mariti*, and the wife her *jus relictæ*, by 1672, c. 9. This last act, which also inflicted penalties against the then non-conforming clergy, was rescinded in the lump with other acts for conformity, by 1690, c. 27.; in respect of which, the penalties of the act 1672, against clandestine marriages, were found to be taken off, *F. 11. Dec. 1705, Carruthers.*

Clande-
stine mar-
riage.

Communi-
cation of
goods.

6. By marriage, a society is created between the married pair, which draws after it a mutual communication of their civil interests, in as far as is necessary for maintaining it. As
the

the society lasts only for the joint lives of the *socii*, therefore rights that have the nature of a perpetuity, which our law styles heritable, are not brought under the partnership or communion of goods; as a land estate, or bonds bearing a yearly interest: It is only moveable subjects, or the fruits produced by heritable subjects during the marriage, that become common to man and wife.

7. The husband, as the head of the wife, *Jus mariti*. has the sole right of managing the goods in communion, which is called *jus mariti*. This right is so absolute, that it bears but little resemblance to a right of administering a common subject; for the husband can in virtue thereof sell, or even gift at his pleasure, the whole goods falling under communion; and his creditors may affect them for the payment of his proper debts: So that the *jus mariti* carries all the characters of an assignation by the wife to the husband, of her moveable estate. It arises *ipse jure* from the marriage; and therefore needs no other constitution. Our lawyers of the last age were of opinion, that this was a right so inseparable from the husband, that all reservation by the wife of the right of administration, or renunciation of it by the husband, was ineffectual; for that such reservation or renunciation, as a moveable right conceived in favour of the wife, fell under the *jus mariti*: But it is now an agreed point, not only that a stranger may convey an estate to a wife, so as it shall not be subject to the husband's administration, but that a husband may, in the marriage-contract, renounce his *jus mariti*, in all or any part of his wife's moveable estate, 23. June 1730, *Walker*.

Is equivalent to an assignation.

How far it may be renounced.

Paraphernalia not subject to the *jus mariti*.

8. From this right are excepted paraphernal goods, which, as the word is understood in our law, comprehends the wife's wearing apparel, and the ornaments proper to her person, as necklaces, ear-rings, breast or arm jewels, buckles, &c.; these are neither alienable by the husband, nor affectable by his creditors. Things of promiscuous use to husband and wife, as plate, medals, &c. may become paraphernal, by the husband's giving them to the wife, at or before marriage; but they are paraphernal, only in regard to that husband who gave them as such, and are esteemed common moveables, if the wife, whose *paraphernalia* they were, be afterwards married to a second husband; unless he shall in the same manner appropriate them to her, *F. 4. Dec. 1696, and 15. Jan. 1697, Dicks.*

Burdens affecting the *jus mariti*.

9. The right of the husband, to the wife's moveable estate, is burdened with the moveable debts contracted by her before marriage: And as his right is universal, so is his burden; for it reaches to her whole moveable debts, tho' they should far exceed her moveable estate. Yet the husband is not considered as the true debtor in his wife's debts. In all actions for payment, she is the proper defender; the husband is only cited for his interest, that is, as curator to her, and administrator of the society goods: As soon therefore as the marriage is dissolved, and the society goods thereby suffer a division, the husband is no farther concerned in the share belonging to his deceased wife; and consequently is no longer liable to pay her debts, which must be recovered from her representatives, or her separate estate.

How restricted in favour of the husband.

10. This

10. This obligation upon the husband is perpetuated against him, 1. Where his proper estate, real or personal, has been affected, during the marriage, by complete legal diligence; in which case, the husband must, by the common rules of law, relieve his property from the burden with which it stands charged: But the utmost diligence against his person, is not sufficient to perpetuate the obligation, *Had.* 26. *Feb.* 1623, *Douglass*; nor even incomplete diligence against his estate, 23. *Jan.* 1678, *Wilky*.

How extended against the husband.

2. The husband continues liable, even after the wife's death, in so far as he is *lucratus* or profited by her estate. Law does not consider a husband, who has got but a moderate tocher by his wife, as a gainer by the marriage, 23. *Dec.* 1665, *Burnet*: It is the excess only, which is *lucrum*, and which must be judged of, according to the quality of the parties, and their condition of life. As the husband was at no time the proper debtor in his wife's moveable debts, therefore, tho' he should be *lucratus*, he is, after the dissolution, only liable for them, *subsidiarie*, i. e. if her own separate estate is not sufficient to pay them off, *P. Falc.* 54.

11. Where the wife is debtor in that sort of debt, which, if it had been due to her, would have excluded the *jus mariti*, e. g. in bonds bearing interest, the husband is liable only for the bygone interests, and those that may grow upon the debt during the marriage; because his obligation for her debts, must be commensurated to the interest he has in her estate, 13. *July* 1708, *Gordon*. It is the husband alone, who is liable in personal diligence for his wife's debts, while the marriage subsists: The wife, who

who is the proper debtor, is free from all personal execution upon them, while she is *vestita viro*, *F. 11. Jan. 1704, Gordon.*

The husband is his wife's curator.

Effects of this curatory.

Even before marriage.

12. The husband, by marriage, becomes the perpetual curator of the wife. From this right it arises, 1. That no suit can proceed against the wife, till the husband be cited for his interest: And if she is married during the dependence of a process against her, the husband must be called, by letters of supplement, which are granted of course, by the Court of Session. 2. All deeds, done by a wife without the husband's consent, are null; neither can she sue in any action without the husband's concurrence. Where the husband refuses, or by reason of forfeiture, &c. cannot concur; or where the action is to be brought against the husband himself, for performing his part of the marriage-articles, the Judge will authorize her to sue in her own name. To prevent the necessity of applying for the Court's authority, care is generally taken in marriage-contracts, to name certain trustees, at whose instance execution may pass against the husband. The effects arising from this curatorial power, discover themselves even before marriage, upon the publication of banns; after which the bride, being no longer *sui juris*, can contract no debt, nor do any deed, either to the prejudice of her future husband, nor even to her own, *Dirl. 13.*: But it is not enough for this purpose, that the banns have been published at the bridegroom's parish-church; the notification must be also made at the bride's, in order to interpel persons from contracting with her, 3. *July 1623, Macdougall.*

13. If the husband should either withdraw from his wife, or turn her out of doors, or if, continuing in family with her, he should by severe treatment endanger her life, the Commissaries will authorise a separation, *à mensa et toro*, and give a separate alimony to the wife, suitable to her husband's estate, from the time of such separation, until either a reconciliation or a sentence of divorce. Separate alimony.

14. Certain obligations of the wife are valid, notwithstanding her being *sub cura mariti*; first, obligations arising from delict; for wives have no privilege to commit crimes. But if the punishment resolves into a pecuniary mulct, the execution of it must, from her incapacity to fulfil, be suspended till the dissolution of the marriage, unless the wife has a separate estate exempted from the *jus mariti*, Edg. 2. July 1724, *Murray*.—5. Dec. 1738, *Gordon*. What obligations of the wife valid.

15. Obligations arising from contract affect either the person or the estate. The law has been so careful to protect wives, while *sub cura mariti*, that all personal obligations granted by a wife, tho' with the husband's consent, as bonds, bills, &c. are null; with the following exceptions. Obligations ex delicto.

1. Where the wife gets a separate *peculium* or stock, either from her father or a stranger, for her own or her children's alimony, she may grant personal obligations in relation to such stock, *Dirl.* 164.; and by stronger reason, personal obligations granted by a wife are good, when her person is actually withdrawn from the husband's power by a judicial separation. Personal obligations, null.

2. A wife's personal obligation is valid, if it is not to take effect till her death, *Feb.* 1720, *L. Tillihewn*. Exceptions.

3. Where the

Contracts
of a wife
who is
praeposita.

Bind the
husband,
not her.

The wife
is *praeposi-
ta negotiis
domesticis*.

Inhibition
against a
wife.

the wife is by the husband *praeposita negotiis*, entrusted with the management, either of a particular branch of business, or of his whole affairs, all the contracts she enters into, in the exercise of her *praepositura*, are effectual, even tho' they be not reduced to writing, but should arise merely *ex re*, from furnishings made to her: But such obligations have no force against the wife; it is the husband only, by whose commission she acts, who is thereby obliged. A *praepositura* may be constituted, not only formally by writing, but tacitely, by the wife's being in use, for a tract of time together, to act for her husband, while he either approves of it by fulfilling her deeds, or at least, being in the knowledge thereof, connives at it, *Dirl.* 319.

16. A wife, while she remains in family with her husband, is considered as *praeposita negotiis domesticis*: and consequently, may provide things proper for the family, for the price whereof the husband is liable, tho' they should be misapplied, or tho' the husband should have given her money to provide them elsewhere, *Dirl.* 310. A husband, who suspects that his wife may hurt his fortune by high living, may use the remedy of inhibition against her; by which all persons, are interpellated from contracting with her, or giving her credit. After the completing of this diligence, whereby the *praepositura* falls, the wife cannot bind the husband, unless for such reasonable furnishings, as he cannot instruct that he provided her with *aliunde*. As every man, and consequently every husband, has a right to remove his managers at pleasure, inhibition may pass at the suit of the

the husband against the wife, tho' he should not offer to justify that measure by an actual proof of the extravagance or profuseness of her temper, *Falc. vol. 1. 209.*

17. As to rights granted by the wife affecting her estate; she has no moveable estate, except her *paraphernalia*; and these she may alien or impignorate, with consent of the husband as curator, otherwise not, 11. *July 1735, Gemmil.* She can even, without the husband, bequeath by testament, her share of the goods in communion; but she cannot dispose of them *inter vivos*, for she herself has no proper right to them, while the marriage subsists; see 19. *Dec. 1626, Matthew.* A wife can validly oblige herself, in relation to her heritable estate, with consent of her husband; for tho' her person is in some sense sunk by the marriage, she continues capable of holding a real estate; and in such obligations, her estate is considered, and not her person, 15. *Dec. 1665, Eleis.—23. Jan. 1678, Bruce.* A husband, tho' he be curator to his wife, can by his acceptance or intervention, authorize rights granted by her in his own favour; for a husband's curatory is not intended only for the wife's advantage, but is considered as a mutual benefit to both.

Rights affecting
her moveable estate

Her heritable estate.

18. All donations, whether by the wife to the husband, or by the husband to the wife, are both by the *Roman* law and ours, revocable by the donor; *ne conjuges mutuo amore se spolient*, l. 1. *de don. int. vir. et ux.*; but if the donor dies without revocation, the right becomes absolute. A right may be revoked, not only by an explicate revocation, but tacitely, by afterwards conveying to another the subject of

Donations
betwixt
husband
and wife
are revocable.

Rational
or remun-
eratory
grants are
not revo-
cable.

of the donation, or by charging it with a burden in favour of a third party; but in so far as the subject is not burdened, the donation subsists, *Dirl.* 204. Tho' the deed should be granted nominally, or in trust, to a third party, it is subject to revocation, if its genuine effect be to convey a gratuitous right, from one of the spouses to the other, *plus enim valet quod agitur, quam quod simulate concipitur*, 1. *Feb.* 1728, *Sanders*. Where the donation is not pure, it is not subject to revocation: Thus, a grant made by the husband, in consequence of the natural obligation that lies upon him to provide for his wife, is not revocable, unless in so far as it exceeds the measure of a rational settlement; neither are remuneratory grants revocable, where mutual grants are made in consideration of each other, 26. *Jan.* 1669, *Chisholm*, except where an onerous cause is simulated, and a donation truly intended; or where what is given *hinc inde*, by the husband and wife, bears no proportion to each other. All voluntary contracts of separation, by which the wife is provided of a yearly alimony, were by our more ancient practice reprobated, as contrary to one of the essential duties of marriage, adherence, 11. *Feb.* 1634, *Drummond*; but by our later decisions, they are effectual as to the time past, but revocable either by the husband or wife, 6. *Feb.* 1666, *Livingston*.

Ratifica-
tion by
wives.

19. As wives are in the strongest degree subject to the influence of their husbands, third parties, in whose favour they had made grants, were frequently vexed with actions of reduction, as if the grant had been extorted from the wife, thro' the force or fear of the husband.

To

To secure the grantees against this danger, ratifications were introduced, whereby the wife, appearing before a judge, declares upon oath, her husband not present, that she was not induced to grant the deed *ex vi aut metu*. Every deed, by which any interest accrues to a third party, may be secured by ratification, tho' a consequential benefit should arise from it to the husband, 1481, c. 84.; but pure donations, betwixt man and wife, do not appear to be the proper subjects of ratification; for law has made these revocable, as proceeding from the love, not the fear of the husband: And if a donation by a wife were rendered irrevocable by her ratification, which a husband might easily obtain, by the same methods of persuasion which procured the gift, the law of donations betwixt man and wife would turn out a most unequal one to the wife. A wife's ratification is not absolutely necessary for securing the grantee: Law indeed allows the wife to bring reduction of any deed she has not ratified, upon the head of force or fear, of which, if she brings sufficient evidence, the deed will be set aside; but if she fails in the proof, it will remain effectual to the receiver, 28. June 1706, Hay.

The proper subject thereof.

20. Marriage, like other contracts, might, by the *Roman* law, be dissolved by the contrary consent of parties; which unlimited power of divorce, after it had been for some time restrained, was again revived by the Christian Emperor *Justinian*, Nov. 140, c. 1.; but, by the law of *Scotland*, agreeably to the rules of our holy religion, marriage cannot be dissolved till death, except by divorce, proceeding

Dissolution of marriage.

K

either

either upon the head of adultery, *Matth.* xix. 8. 9. *Mark* x. 11. or of wilful desertion, *1 Cor.* vii. 15.

By death
within
year and
day.

21. Marriage is dissolved by death, either within year and day from its being contracted, or after year and day. If it is dissolved within year and day, all rights, granted in consideration of the marriage, become void, and things return to the same condition in which they stood before the marriage: The tocher returns to the wife, or those from whom it came; and all the interest, either legal or conventional, arising to the wife in the husband's estate, returns to the husband or his heirs. In consequence of this rule, the right that the husband acquires by marriage, to the wife's moveable estate, determines by the dissolution within year and day; with this restriction, that he is considered as a *bona fide* possessor, in relation to what he has consumed of these moveables, upon the faith of his right, while it subsisted; but he is liable to repay the tocher, without any deduction, in consideration of his family-expenditure during the marriage, 23. *Feb.* 1681, *Gordon*. If things cannot be restored on both sides, equity hinders the restoring of one party, and not the other, 20. *July* 1664, *Petry*.

After year
and day.

Wife's
mourn-
ings, and
alimony
to the
term.

22. Upon the dissolution of a marriage, after year and day, the surviving husband becomes the irrevocable proprietor of the tocher; and the wife, where she survives, is intitled to her jointure, or to her legal provisions of terce, (2. 9. 26.) and *jus relictæ*, (3. 9. 5.) She has also right to mournings, suitable to the husband's quality; and to alimony from the day of his death, till the term at which her life-rent-provision

vision, either legal or conventional, commences: The measure of which alimony is regulated, not by the extent of her jointure, but by the husband's quality and fortune, and the condition of the family left by him, 15. *July 1713*, Cred. of *Scot.* If a living child be procreated of the marriage who has been heard to cry, the marriage has the same effect, as if it had subsisted beyond the year. The crying of the child is according to *St. 1. 4. 19.* the only evidence that ought to be received of its being born alive, that the matter may not be left to the uncertain conjectures of those who attend the birth of children; but the doctrine of the *Roman* law appears more equitable, which admits other circumstances, where they are equally strong, in proof of that fact, *l 3. c. de post. haer.* A day is adjoined to the year, *in majorem evidentiam*, that it may clearly appear that the year itself is elapsed; and therefore, the running of any part of the day, after the year, has the same effect as if the whole were elapsed. The disputes that might arise from the dissolution of a marriage within the year, are generally prevented by a clause in marriage-contracts, that the interests of the husband and wife shall continue, tho' the marriage should be dissolved sooner, without a living child. The legal right of courtesy, competent to the surviving husband, is to be explained, 2. 9. 30.

Diffolu-
tion after
a living
child.

23. Divorce is such a separation of married persons, during their lives, as looses them from the nuptial tie, and leaves them at freedom to intermarry with others. Marriage, being by the canonists numbered among the sacraments, is reckoned a bond so sacred, that nothing can dissolve it. In the case of adultery itself, they allow

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on by di-
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upon a-
dultery.

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Diffoluti-
on by di-
vorce
upon a-
dultery.

Cohabitation after adultery excludes divorce.

allow only of a separation from bed and board : And even, by our law, neither adultery, nor wilful desertion, are grounds which must necessarily dissolve marriage; they are only handles, which the injured party may take hold of, to be free. Cohabitation therefore, by the injured party, after being in the knowledge of the acts of adultery, implies a passing from the injury ; and no divorce can proceed, which is carried on by collusion betwixt the parties, left, contrary to the first institution of marriage, they might disengage themselves by their own consent, 15. *July 1681, Watson*. As by divorce, the nuptial tie itself is loosed, the guilty person, as well as the innocent, may contract second marriages; but in the case of divorce upon adultery, marriage is by special statute, prohibited betwixt the two adulterers, 1600, c. 20.; a doctrine borrowed from *l. 13. de his quib. ut ind.*

Divorce upon wilful desertion.

24. Where either party has deserted from the other for four years together, that other may, by 1573, c. 55. sue for adherence before the Commissary, whose decree the Session may enforce, by letters of horning: If these have no effect, the church is to proceed, first by admonition, then by excommunication ; all which previous steps, are declared to be a sufficient ground for pursuing a divorce. *De praxi*, the Commissaries pronounce sentence in the adherence, after one year's desertion; but four years must intervene between the first desertion and the decree of divorce. By the instructions, 1666, c. 2. the inferior Commissaries can only judge in the previous action of adherence; the divorce must be carried before the Commissaries of *Edinburgh*.

25. The legal effects of divorce on the head of desertion are particularly defined by 1573, c. 55. by which the party offending forfeits the tocher and the *donationes propter nuptias*, (as to which, see *Nov. 117. c. 8. §. 2.*) By these, when applied to our law, must be understood the provisions that the wife is intitled to, either by law or by paction, in consideration of the tocher; and the meaning of the act is, that the offending husband shall restore the tocher, and forfeit to the wife all her provisions, legal and conventional; and, on the other hand, the offending wife shall forfeit to the husband her tocher, and all the rights that would have belonged to her, in the case of her survivance. This, Lord *Stair*, 1. 4. 20. judges to be also the rule in divorces upon adultery; as it was by the *Roman law, d. Nov. 117.* But by a decision 1762, *Justice*, founded on a tract of ancient decisions recovered from the records, the offending husband was allowed to retain the tocher. Its effects.

TIT. 7. Of Minors, and their Tutors and Curators.

THE stages of life principally distinguished in law are, *pupillarity*, *puberty* or *minority*, and *majority*. A child is under pupillarity, from the birth till fourteen years of age, if a male, and till twelve, if a female. Minority begins where pupillarity ends, and continues till majority, which, by the law of *Scotland*, is the age of twenty-one years compleat, both in males and females: But minority in a large sense includes all under age, whether pupils or *pubescentes*. Pupillarity.
Minority.
Majority.

Tutory. *res.* Because pupils cannot in any degree act for themselves, and minors seldom with discretion, pupils are put by law under the power of tutors, and minors may put themselves under the direction of curators. Tutory is a power and faculty to govern the person, and administer the estate of a pupil. Tutors are either nominate, of law, or dative; which answers to the *tutores testamentarii, legitimi, and dativi* of the *Roman* law.

Tutor nominate. 2. A tutor nominate is he who is named by a father, in his testament or other writing, to a lawful child. As the right of naming tutors proceeds from the fatherly power, those who are named by a mother or stranger, are not proper tutors; their powers are limited to the special estate left to the pupil; and therefore, their being named, cannot hinder the pupil from getting one who may defend his person, and manage his other estate. The nomination of tutors, being entirely pendent on the will of the father, may be altered at his pleasure, even tho' it should have been ingrossed in a writing in its nature irrevocable, as a disposition. A tutor nominate is not obliged to give caution, for the faithful discharge of his office, because his fidelity is presumed to have been sufficiently known to the father.

Tutor of law. 3. If there be no nomination by the father, or if the tutors nominate do not accept, or if the nomination falls by death or otherwise, there is place for a tutor of law, so called, because he succeeds by the mere disposition of law. This sort of tutory devolved by the ancient *Roman* law, and devolves also by ours, upon the next agnate; but the word *agnate* is differently

Devolves
on the
next ag-
nate.

differently understood in our law and in theirs.

Agnates, in the sense of the *Roman* law, were those whose propinquity was connected by males only; in the relation of cognates, one or more females were interposed. We understand by agnates, all who are related by the father, even tho' females intervene; and by cognates, those who are related by the mother.

Agnates,
who?

4. Where there are two or more agnates equally near to the pupil, he who is intitled to the pupil's legal succession, falls to be preferred to the others, because it is presumed, that he will be the most diligent in preserving the estate; but as the law suspects, that he may not be over careful, to preserve a life which stands in the way of his own interest, this sort of tutor is excluded from the custody of the pupil's person, which is commonly committed to the mother, while a widow, until the pupil be seven years old; and in default of the mother, to the next cognate. The tutor of law must be at least twenty-five years of age, 1474, c. 52. He is served or declared by a jury of sworn men, who are called upon a brief issuing from the chancery, which is directed to any judge having jurisdiction, 8. *March* 1636, *Stuart*. He must give caution, before he enters upon the management. He ought regularly to serve, within a year after he could have served by law; that is, a year after the death of the deceased, if there is no nomination; and if there is, a year after the nomination falls.

Not in-
trusted
with the
person of
the pupil.

Form of
declaring
a tutor of
law.

5. Upon the tutor of law's neglecting to serve within the allowed time, any person, even a stranger, may apply for a tutory dative. It is the King alone, as the father of his country,

Tutor da-
tive.

Named by
the King.

try, who gives tutors dative, by his court of exchequer; and no gift of tutory can pass in exchequer, without the citation or consent of the next of kin to the pupil, both by the father and mother, 1672, c. 2.; nor till the tutor give security, recorded in the books of exchequer.

If there be
no tutor
nominate,
or dative.

Judicial
factor for
a minor.

Curators.

In what
cases im-
posed on
minors.

The father
is tutor
and cura-
tor to
his child-
ren.

There is no room for a tutor of law, or tutor dative, while a tutor nominate can be hoped for: And tutors of law, or dative, even after they have begun to act, may be excluded by the tutor nominate, as soon as he offers to accept, unless he has expressly renounced the office, 6. July 1627, *Campbell*. If a pupil be without tutors of any kind, the court of Session will, at the suit of any kinsman, name a factor, (Steward) for the management of the pupil's estate, who must conduct himself by the rules laid down, *Act S. 13. Feb. 1730.*

6. After the years of pupillarity are over, the minor is considered as capable of acting by himself, if he has confidence enough of his own capacity and prudence. The only two cases, in which curators are imposed upon minors are, first, where they are named by the father, in *liege poustie*, (or in a state of health) in consequence of 1696, c. 8. 2. Where the father is himself alive; for a father is *ipso jure*, without any service, administrator, that is, both tutor and curator of law to his children, in relation to whatever estate may fall to them during their minority. This right in the father does not extend to grand-children, *Harc. 713.*; nor to such even of his immediate children, as are foris-familiated, *arg. Dirl. 31.*: Neither has it place, in subjects which are left by a stranger to the minor, exclusive of the father's administration.

stration. If the minor chuses to be under the direction of curators, he must raise and execute a summons, citing, at least, two of his next of kin, to appear before his own judge-ordinary, upon nine days warning, 1555, c. 35. At the day and place of appearance, he offers to the judge, a list of those whom he intends for his curators: Such of them as resolve to undertake the office, must sign their acceptance, and give caution; upon which an act of curatory is extracted.

Form of
chusing
curators.

7. These curators are stiled *ad negotia*, to distinguish them from another sort, called curators *ad lites*, who are authorised by the judge to concur with a pupil or minor in actions of law, either where he is without tutors and curators, or where his tutors or curators are parties to the suit. This sort is not obliged to give caution, because they have no intermeddling with the minor's estate: They are appointed for a special purpose; and when that is over, their office is at an end. Women were, by the *Roman* law, debarred from the offices, both of tutory and curatory, except in special cases: With us they are capable, under the following restrictions; 1. The office of a female tutor or curator falls by her marriage, even tho' the nomination should provide otherwise; for, after she is herself subjected to the power of a husband, she is incapable of having any person under her power, 8. *March* 1636, *Stuart*. 2. No woman can be tutor of law; for that sort is marked out, purely on the score of blood, without any regard to personal qualities. Papists are declared incapable of tutory or curatory, by 1700, c. 3. Where the minor has more tutors and

Curators
ad lites.

Who de-
barred
from tu-
tory and
curatory?

Women,
in what
cases?

Papists.

L

curators

What
number
must con-
cur.

curators than one, who are called in the nomination to the joint management, they must all concur in every act of administration: Where a certain number is named for a quorum, that number must concur: Where any one is named *fine quo non*, no act is valid without that one's special concurrence. But if they are named without any of these limitations, the concurrence of the majority of the nominees then alive, is sufficient.

Difference
betwixt
tutory and
curatory.

8. In this, tutory differs from curatory, that as pupils are incapable of consent, they have no *person* capable of acting; which defect the tutor supplies: But a minor *pubes* can act for himself. Hence, the tutor subscribes alone all deeds of administration; but in curatory, it is the minor who subscribes, as the proper party; the curator does no more than consent. Hence also, the persons of pupils are under the power, either of their tutors, or of their nearest cognates; but the minor, after pupillarity, has the disposal of his own person, and may reside where he pleases, *Dirl.* 316. In this sense, the rule of the *Roman* law may be understood, *tutor datur personae, curator rei*. In most other particulars, the nature, the powers, and the duties of the two offices coincide. Both tutors and curators must, previous to their administration, make a judicial inventory, subscribed by them, and the next of kin, before the minor's judge-ordinary, of his whole estate, personal and real; of which, one subscribed duplicate is to be kept by the tutors or curators themselves; another, by the next of kin on the father's side; and a third, by the next of kin on the mother's. If any estate belonging to the minor, shall afterwards

Tutorial
and cura-
torial in-
ventories.

come

come to their knowlege, they must add it to the inventory, within two months after their attaining possession thereof. Should they neglect this, the minor's debtors are not obliged to make payment to them; they may be removed from their offices as suspected, and they are intitled to no allowance, for the sums disbursed by them in the minor's affairs, 1672, c. 2.; which last penalty does not reach, to the expence laid out upon the minor's entertainment, or upon his lands and houses, *Act S. 25. Feb. 1693*, nor even to sums expended in completing his titles, 18. *July 1707, Yeaman.*

Penalties
of neglect-
ing to
make
them up.

9. Tutors and curators have power to sue for, and levy the minor's rents, interest, and even principal sums, if his necessities call for it; to grant acquittances to the debtors, and to name factors or stewards, with reasonable salaries. They may remove tenants, and grant leases of the minor's lands, to endure as long as their own office; but not under the former rental, without either a warrant from the court of Session, or some apparent necessity: See *Dirl. 277*. But tho' they can use all diligence against the minor's debtors, the minor's creditors can use no execution against them, for payment of the debts due by the minor; for these are the minor's proper debts, and it cannot be known till accounting, whether the tutors or curators have, in their hands, any funds belonging to the debtor; Yet, they may be charged for the performance of facts in their own power, *e. g.* to make a subject forthcoming, to renew investitures to the heirs of vassals, &c.

Powers of
tutors and
curators.

In acts of
admini-
stration.

In selling
move-
ables.

In alien-
ing land-
estates.

In tran-
sacting or
submitting
claims.

10. They have power to sell the minor's moveables, without which his personal estate would frequently be lost to him. They were, by the *Roman* law, denied the power of aliening land-estates, without the authority of a judge, *l. 1. §. 2. de reb. eor. qui*; but that law obtains with us only in the case of tutors; for the alienation of heritage, by a minor, with consent of his curators, is valid, *sine decreto praetoris*, *St. 1. 6. 44.—F. 6. Dec. 1699, Cred. of Clerk*. This restraint upon tutors, does not reach to such alienations, as law can compel the pupil to grant, *e. g.* to renunciations of wadsets, upon redemption by the reverser, 31. *Jan. 1735, Graham*; nor to the renewing of charters to heirs; but such charters must convey no right to the heir, which the former vassal had not.

11. Tutors and curators may transact doubtful claims of moveable subjects, in which the minor's interest is concerned, or refer them to arbiters; which transactions, or decrees-arbitral, law will support, if the minor be not thereby enormously prejudiced, *F. 18. Jan. 1711, Ayton—F. 14. Nov. 1711, Aikenhead*. Tutors cannot alter the nature of the pupil's estate, so as to invert the former order of succession, *e. g.* by renewing his bonds with new clauses, secluding executors, *Harc. 1000*. But they may, if the pupil's security requires it, take an heritable bond in place of a personal; *Harc. suppl. 14*. It would seem, that a minor may, with consent of his curators, change a bond from moveable to heritable, since he can, by himself, dispose of a moveable bond by testament. Neither tutors nor curators can, contrary to the nature

ture

ture of their trust, (be *auctores in rem suam*) Tutor authorize the minor to do any deed for their cannot be own benefit ; nor can they acquire any right *auctor in rem suam.* affecting the minor's estate: And, where a tutor or curator makes such acquisition, in his Tutors are own name, for a less sum than the right will trustees. draw, the benefit thereof accrues to the minor, tho' the right should have been bought with the tutor's own money; or tho' it should purport, that the granter signed it, from the favour he had to the tutor himself, 17. Feb. 1732, *Cochran.*

12. It is the duty of tutors and curators, to Their duty in regard to the minor's person. take proper care of the minor's person and education, and to disburse the expence necessary for that purpose, not exceeding the yearly interest of his stock, or the rent of his estate: But they may incroach on the stock itself where it is small; or even employ the whole of it, if less will not do, for putting the minor in a way of business, *Br. 110.* It is also their duty to employ the minor's rents and interests profitably. The sums which belonged to the minor before their entry into the office, if they carried no interest, ought to be put to interest within a year thereafter: The rents of his land-estate which fall due during the office, are also to be put to interest within a year after they are payable, *F. 16. Jan. 1696, Irvine.* But the interest, arising on bonds, *pendente tutela*, need only be accumulated into a principal sum at the expiration of the office, *ibid.* If a right of succession should open to the minor during the office, the same rules must be observed in relation to the subject thereof, as if it had opened before the commencement of the office. In regard to the management of his money.

13. By

Their obligation to diligence after acceptance.

13. By the *Roman* law, tutory and curatory, being *munera publica*, might be forced upon every one who had not a relevant ground of excuse; but, with us, the persons named to these offices, may either accept or decline: And where a father, in *liege poustie*, names certain persons, both as tutors and curators to his children, tho' they have acted as tutors, they may decline the office of curatory, 1696, c. 8. Tutors and curators having once accepted, are liable *in diligence*, that is, are accountable for the consequences of their neglect in any part of their duty, from the time of their acceptance, *Dirl.* 233. ; infomuch that tho' they have not had the least intromission with the minor's estate, they are accountable as if they had intermeddled. They are therefore liable to the minor for the debts due to him, if, so soon as a debtor is known to decline in his affairs, they neglect the proper diligence against his estate, 9. *July* 1667, *Steven*, and if that will not do, personal diligence by a charge upon letters of horning; but they ought not to throw away the minor's money unprofitably against a debtor who has no fund of payment, 2. *July* 1628, *Hamilton*. Tutors and curators are accountable, *singuli in solidum*, i. e. every one of them is answerable, not only for his own diligence, but for that of his co-tutors; and any one may be pursued without citing the rest: But he who is condemned in the whole, has action of relief against his co-tutors.

They are liable, *singuli in solidum*.

Pro-tutors and pro-curators.

14. This obligation to diligence reaches to pro-tutors and pro-curators, persons who act as tutors or curators, without having a legal title to the office. These have none of the active powers,

or

or privileges competent to tutors or curators : They cannot pursue the minor's debtors for payment, nor will their acquittances exoner the debtors, unless the sum paid to them has been (*in rem versam*) profitably applied to the minor's use ; but they are subjected *passive* to all the obligations that lie on tutors and curators, *Act S. 10. June 1665.* From this obligation to diligence, we may except, 1. Fathers or administrators in law, who, from the presumption that they act to the best of their power for their children, are liable only for actual intromissions. 2. Tutors and curators who are named by the father in *liege poustie*, in consequence of 1696, c. 8. with the special provisos, that they shall be liable barely for intromissions, not for omissions ; and that each of them shall be liable only for himself, and not *in solidum* for the co-tutors : But this power of exempting the nominees from diligence, is by the act limited to the estate descending from the father himself.

What tutors are exempted from diligence.

15. The action, by which a minor may compel his tutors to account for their administration, is called *actio tutelae directa*. It does not lie, till the office expires, because as they have the complex management of the minor's whole affairs, a judgment cannot be formed on any one part, till all be wound up : But pro-tutors and pro-curators may be sued by the minor at any time. Tutors and curators can compel the minor to repay what they have profitably expended for him during the administration, by the *actio tutelae contraria*. This action does not lie, till after they have accounted to the minor ; because, till then, they are presumed

Actio tutelae, vel curatela, directa.

Actio contraria.

intus

intus habere, to have effects of the minor in their own hands, sufficient for answering their disbursements. They cannot, in this action, charge against the minor any salary or allowance for pains, unless a salary has been expressly contained in the testator's nomination; for their office is presumed gratuitous, 19. Feb. 1736, *Scot.*

How tuto-
ry and cu-
ratory ex-
pire.

Tutors
may be re-
moved, as
suspect.

What if
their mis-
conduct be
not wilful.

In what
case, tuto-
ry falls by
the death
of any
one of the
tutors.

16. Tho' no person is obliged to accept the office of tutor or curator, yet having once accepted, he cannot throw it up or renounce it, without sufficient cause, 1555, c. 35.: But, if he should be guilty of misapplying the minor's money, or fail in any other part of his duty, he may be removed by the *actio*, or rather *accusatio suspecti tutoris*, which was, by the Roman law, *popularis*, but with us can be pursued only by the minor's next of kin, or by a co-tutor, or co-curator. By the last quoted act, the judge-ordinary was competent to this complaint; but, by our later custom, it must be tried by the court of Session; and it may be brought before them summarily, in the special case of tutors, named in consequence of the act 1696, c. 8. Where the misconduct proceeds merely from indolence, or inattention, the court, in place of removing the tutor, either join a curator with him, *Dirl.* 90.; or, if he be a tutor nominate, they oblige him to give caution for his past and future management, *F.* 16. Feb. 1705, *Balfours*.

17. The offices of tutory and curatory expire also by the pupil's attaining the age of puberty, or the minor's attaining the age of 21 years compleat; and by the death, either of the minor, or of his tutor or curator. If two or more tutors or curators are called to the

the joint management, the gift or nomination has no force, till all of them accept, and it falls upon the death of any one of them, 17. *Jan.* 1671, *Drummond*. The non-acceptance or death of a *sine quo non*, has the same effect: And this holds, not only in tutories dative, and in curatories, but in the nomination of tutors by a father; notwithstanding the presumption, that the father would have trusted any of the tutors named, rather than the tutor of law, *F.* 24. *June* 1703, *Aikenhead*. Where they are named in general terms, the nomination subsists, if any one accepts; and, upon the death of any one, the office accrues to the survivor.

18. Deeds either by pupils, or by minors having curators without their consent, are null; but they oblige the granters, in as far as relates to sums profitably applied to their use. A minor under curators can indeed make a testament by himself, 30. *Nov.* 1680, *Stevenson*; but whatever is executed in the form of a deed *inter vivos*, requires the curator's consent, *New Coll. vol. 2.* 66. Deeds by a minor who has no curators, are as effectual as if he had had curators, and signed them with their consent; he may even alien his heritage, without the interposition of a judge, 13. *Dec.* 1666, *Thomson*.

The effect
of deeds by
minors.

19. Minors may be restored against all deeds granted in their minority, that are hurtful to them. Deeds, in themselves void, need not the remedy of restitution; but where hurtful deeds are granted by a tutor, in his pupil's affairs, or by a minor who has no curators, as these deeds subsist in law, restitution is necessary: And even where a minor, having curators, exe-

Restituti-
on of mi-
nors.

M

cutes

Within
what time
it must be
sought.

cutes a deed hurtful to himself with their consent, he has not only action against the curators, but he has the benefit of restitution against the deed itself, both by the *Roman law*, l. 2. 3. C. *si tut. vel cur. interv.* and by ours, *Dirl.* 88. The minor cannot be restored, if he does not raise and execute a summons for reducing the deed, *ex capite minorennitatis et laesionis*, before he be twenty-five years old. These four years, between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five, called by us, *quadriennium utile*, are indulged to the minor, that he may have a reasonable time, from that period, when he is first presumed to have the perfect use of his reason, to consider with himself, what deeds done in his minority have been truly prejudicial to him. This action must be pursued within the *quadriennium*, not only against third parties, but against the tutors or curators, who have granted or consented to the deeds excepted to; tho' the action of tutory does not prescribe in less than ten years, *K.* 98.

Its requi-
sites.

1. The
granter's
minority.

2. His le-
sion.

Which
must be
owing to
impru-
dence.

20. Questions of restitution are proper to the court of Session. Two things must be proved by the minor, in order to the reduction of the deed; 1. That he was minor when it was signed: Of this, an extract of the minor's baptism, from the kirk-session books, is generally received as sufficient evidence; either by itself, 1722, *L. Logan*, or joined with the most slender collateral circumstances, *Dirl.* 72. 2. That the minor is hurt or lesed by the deed: This lesion must not proceed merely from accident; for the privilege of restitution was not intended to exempt minors from the common misfortunes of life; it must be owing to the imprudence

imprudence or negligence of the minor, or his curator. For this reason, tho' a minor may be restored against the sentence of a judge, where the proper allegations or defences for him have been omitted, or hurtful ones offered in his name, 7. *Dec.* 1705, *Murray*; yet, if the minor's plea has been well conducted, there is no place for restitution, tho' the sentence should have been iniquitous, *F.* 7. *Jan.* 1698, *C. Kincardine*.

21. A minor cannot be restored against his own delict or fraud, *e. g.* if he should induce one to bargain with him, by telling him he was major. 2. Restitution is excluded, if the minor, at any time after majority, has approved of the deed, either by a formal ratification, or tacitly by payment of interest, or by other acts inferring approbation. 3. A minor, who has taken himself to business, as a merchant, shopkeeper, &c. cannot be restored against any deed granted by him, in the course of that business, *Dirl.* 360.; especially if he was *proximus majoremmitati*, at signing the deed. 4. According to the more common opinion, a minor cannot be reponed against a minor, unless some gross unfairness shall be qualified in the bargain. *Lastly*, A minor could not, by our old law, have been restored, if he had sworn not to reduce the deed, agreeably to the constitution of *Friderick*, *Auth. l. 1. C. si adv. vend.* : But, by 1681, *c. 19.* the elicitors of such oaths are declared infamous, and reduction is made competent to any of the minor's relations; lest himself should be backward to reduce, in his own name, a deed which he had sworn never to quarrel.

How excluded.

How far
transmit-
ted to the
heir.

22. The privilege of restitution does not always die with the minor himself: If one should die in minority, or within the *quadriennium utile*, the right transmits to his heir, according to the following rules. 1. If a minor succeeds to a minor, the time allowed for restitution is governed by the minority of the heir, not of the ancestor. 2. If a minor succeeds to a major, who was not full twenty-five, the privilege continues with the heir during his minority; but he cannot avail himself of the *anni utiles*, except in so far as they were unexpired to the ancestor at his death. 3. If a major succeeds to a minor, he has only the *quadriennium utile* after the minor's death; and if he succeeds to a major dying within the *quadriennium*, no more of it can be profitable to him, than what remained when the ancestor died, *l. 18. §. 5. l. 19. de minor.—l. 5. C. de temp. in int. restit.—14. March 1628, Macmath.*

Effect of
restitution.

23. Restitution has the effect to make every thing return, *hinc inde*, to its former state. If matters are not entire, and so cannot be restored on both sides, the minor is not intitled to restitution, against such contracts as the other party has been, by the necessity of law, compelled to enter into with him, *1. Dec. 1708, Towy*: But in voluntary contracts, the minor will be restored, without being obliged to put the other party in his own place, unless he can do it without prejudice to himself: See *Dirl. 88.*

Minor non
tenetur
placitare.

24. *Minor non tenetur placitare super hereditate, R. M. l. 3. c. 32. §. 15.—Stat. Gul. c. 39.* No minor can be compelled to state himself as a defender, in any action, whereby his heritable estate may be evicted from him, by

by one pretending a preferable right. Tho' the direct right contested should belong to a major, the minor may plead this privilege, if the eviction of his heritage should be the consequence of reducing the major's right, 23. *June 1625, Pringle*: The privilege indeed, as it is personal to the minor, cannot be pleaded in such case by the major, 25. *Nov. 1624, Hamilton*; but then, no sentence pronounced in the action against the major, can affect the minor, who is not bound to appear in the suit. Our later lawyers, in explaining this rule, have restricted it to *hereditas paterna*; under which, *Visc. Stair*, 1. 6. 45. comprehends all heritage, flowing either from remote ascendants, or from mothers. Heritage flowing from collaterals, as brothers, uncles, &c. has been, beyond all controversy, excluded from the rule, for some centuries past. By heritage is to be understood, a compleat feudal right; so that the rule has no place in rights not perfected by seisin, where seisin is necessary to perfect them, 31. *Jan. 1665, Kello*; unless either the right has been completed by seisin, in the person of the father's author, 23. *June 1625, Pringle*; or the father, or his author, have done all they could to obtain seisin, *P. Falc.* 66. Leases not being in their nature perpetual, fall not under this rule; but rights, tho' they be incorporeal, if they are feudal, e. g. rights of patronage, and even redeemable rights, are included in it, *F.* 21. *Nov. 1694, Davidson*.

Limitations of this rule.

25. This privilege is intended merely to save minors from the necessity of disputing upon questions of preference; it does not therefore take place, where the action is pursued on the

the father's falsehood or delict, 27. *Dec.* 1711, *Crawfurd*, nor upon his obligation to dispoſe heritage, 25. *July* 1710, *Mackenzie*, nor on his liquid bond for a ſum of money, *R. M. l.* 3. c. 32. §. 16. tho' ſuch action ſhould have the effect to carry off the minor's eſtate by adjudication. Neither has it room in actions brought againſt the minor, for ſettling marches, nor in actions of moleſtation *in poſſeſſorio*, *Dirl.* 64. neither of which tend to evict the minor's heritage: Nor in actions purſued by the minor's ſuperior, upon feudal casualties or delinquencies; ſince theſe are burdens, inherent in every feudal grant, and conſequent upon the *dominium directum*, which remains with the ſuperior. This privilege cannot be pleaded in bar of an action which had been firſt brought againſt the father, and is only continued againſt the minor; nor where the father was not in the peaceable poſſeſſion of the heritable ſubject at his death. Before the minor can plead it, he muſt be ſerved heir to his father, *P. Falc.* 66.

Pupils free
from cap-
tion.

26. The perſons of pupils are protected from impriſonment on civil debts, by 1696, c. 41. The privileges of minors, in caſes of preſcription, redemption of adjudications, &c. will be explained in their proper places.

Curatory
of idiots
and furi-
ous per-
ſons.

27. Curators are given, not only to minors, but in general, to every one who, either through defect of judgment, or unſuitneſs of diſpoſition, is incapable of rightly managing his own affairs. Of the firſt ſort, are idiots and furious perſons. Idiots or *fatui* are entirely deprived of the faculty of reaſon. . The diſtemper of the furious perſon does not conſiſt in the defect of reaſon, but in an over-heated imagination, which ob-
ſtructs

structs the application of it to the purposes of life. Curators may be also granted to lunatics, and even to persons dumb and deaf, tho' they are of sound judgment, if they cannot exert it in the management of business. Every person, who is come of age, and is capable of acting rationally, has a natural right to conduct his own affairs. The only regular way therefore, of appointing this sort of curators, is by a jury summoned upon a brief from the chancery; which is not, like the brief of common tutory, directed to any judge-ordinary, but to the judge of the special territory, where the person alleged to be fatuous or furious resides; that if he is truly of sound judgment, he may have an opportunity to oppose it: And, for this reason, he ought to be made a party to the brief. The care of furious persons belonged anciently to the Sovereign; because he alone had the power of coercing with fetters, *Cr. 393. §. 9.* whereas, the care of idiots was committed to the next agnate. By 1585, c. 18. the *Roman* law, which commits the curatory of both to the agnate, is made ours: But a father is, by the custom of *Scotland*, preferred to the curatory of his fatuous son, and the husband to that of his fatuous wife, before the agnate.

How deferred.

To whom

28. Tho', in the brief of idiocy, the inquest is directed to inquire, whether the next agnate be of lawful age, by which, in the general case, is meant the age of twenty-one; yet in this question, the age of twenty-five seems to be understood; both from 1474, c. 52. which requires that age in tutors of law, without distinction; and from the reference made in 1585, c. 18. to the *Roman* law, by which none under

His age.

The ver-
dict has a
retrospect.

under the age of twenty-five can be curator to an idiot or furious person. By our old law, the inquiry of the inquest was confined to the present state of the fatuous or furious person; and, consequently, no verdict of idiotry could be brought, as evidence, in the reduction of deeds, granted by the idiot, prior to the date of the verdict; but, by 1475, c. 67. a clause is ordained to be inserted in the brief, for inquiring how long the fatuous or furious person has been in that condition; and the verdict to be pronounced by the inquest, is declared a sufficient ground, without farther evidence, for reducing all deeds, granted after the period at which it appeared, by the proof, that the fatuity or furiosity began. But, as fatuous and furious persons are, by their very state, incapable of being obliged, all deeds done by them may be declared void, upon proper evidence of their fatuity at the time of signing, tho' they should never have been cognosced idiots by an inquest, 26. *July* 1638, *Loch*.

Curatory
dative of
idiots.

29. We have some few instances of the Sovereign's giving curators to idiots, where the next agnate did not claim; but such gifts are truly deviations from our law, since they pass, without an inquiry into the state of the person upon whom the curatory is imposed. Hence the curator of law to an idiot, serving *quandocunque*, is preferred as soon as he offers himself, before the curator-dative, 21. *Jan.* 1663, *Stewart*. This sort of curatory does not determine, by the lucid intervals of the person *sub cura*; but it expires by his death, or perfect return to a sound judgment; which last
ought

How this
curatory
expires.

ought regularly to be declared by the sentence of a judge.

30. Persons, let them be ever so profuse, or liable to be imposed upon, if they have the exercise of reason, can effectually oblige themselves, till they are fettered by law. Interdiction, is a legal restraint laid upon such persons, from signing any deed to their own prejudice, without the consent of their curators or interdictors.

Interdiction.

31. There could be no interdiction, either by the *Roman* law, or our ancient practice, without a previous inquiry into the person's condition, *l. 6. de curat. fur.—Hope, (Interd.)*

Voluntary interdiction.

30. *Jan. 1618, Robertson.* But as there were few who could bear the shame that attends judicial interdiction, however necessary the restraint might have been to preserve their families, voluntary interdiction has received the countenance of law; which is generally executed in the form of a bond, whereby the granter obliges himself, to do no deed which may affect his estate, without the consent of certain friends therein mentioned. Tho' the reasons inductive of the bond should be but gently touched in the recital, the interdiction stands good, 10.

Nov. 1676, Stewart. Voluntary interdiction, though it be imposed by the sole act of the person interdicted, cannot be recalled at his pleasure: But it may be taken off, 1. By a sentence of the court of Session, declaring, either that there was, from the beginning, no sufficient ground for the restraint, or that the party is, since the date of the bond, become *rei suae providus*. 2. It falls, even without the authority of the Lords, by the joint act of the

How taken off.

person interdicted, and his interdictors, concurring to take it off. 3. Where the bond of interdiction requires a certain number as a quorum, the restraint ceases, if the interdictors shall be by death reduced to a lesser number, 8. Dec. 1708, *Hepburn*.

Judicial
interdicti-
on.

32. Judicial interdiction is imposed by a sentence of the court of Session. It commonly proceeds on an action sued by any near kinsman to the party; and sometimes from the *nobile officium* of the court, when they perceive, during the pendency of a suit, that any of the litigants is, from the facility of his temper, subject to imposition, 17. Feb. 1681, *Robertson*.

How ta-
ken off.

This sort must be taken off, by the authority of the same court that imposed it; which authority secures those, who shall afterwards contract with him who had been interdicted, even tho' the strongest evidence should be brought, that he still continues profuse, or easy to be imposed upon.

Publicati-
on and re-
gistration
of inter-
dictions.

33. An interdiction need not be served against the person interdicted; but it must be executed, or published, by a messenger, at the market-cross of the jurisdiction where he resides, by publicly reading the interdiction there, after three oyeses made for convoking the lieges. A copy of this execution must be affixed to the cross; and thereafter, the interdiction, with its execution, must be registred in the books, both of the jurisdiction where the person interdicted resides, and where his lands lie, within forty days from the publication, 1581, c. 119. No 1.—1597, c. 264. Where the Sheriff refused registration, the presenter of the interdiction might apply to the clerk of register, to have

have it recorded in the general register of the Session, 1597, c. 265.; but liberty is now given to record all interdictions there, even tho' the judge of the inferior jurisdiction should not refuse to registrate them, 1600, c. 13. An interdiction, before it is registred, has no effect against third parties, tho' they should be in the private knowlege of it; but it operates against the interdictors themselves, as soon as it is delivered to them, 24. *July 1678, Grier-son.*

At what period is interdiction effectual.

34. An interdiction, duly registred, has this effect, that all deeds, done thereafter, by the person interdicted, without the consent of his interdictors, affecting his heritable estate, are subject to reduction. Registration, in the general register, secures all his lands from alienation, where-ever they lie; but where the interdiction is recorded in a particular register, it covers no lands, but what are situated in that shire. It appears, both from the old style of interdictions, which continues to this day, and from our practice, that interdictions formerly secured the moveable estate from alienation, as well as the heritable, which made all commerce precarious; but since the decision of 11. *July 1634, Bruce*, persons interdicted have had full power to dispose of their moveables, not only by testament, but by present deeds of alienation: And creditors, in personal bonds granted after interdiction, may use all execution against their debtor's person, and moveable estate; such bonds being only subject to reduction, in so far as diligence against the heritable estate may proceed upon them.

Interdiction secures the heritage from alienation.

But not the moveable estate.

35. All

It does not
strike a-
gainst ra-
tional
deeds.

Office of
interdic-
tors.

Reduction
to whom
compe-
tent.

Lawful
children.

35. All onerous or rational deeds granted by the person interdicted, are as effectual, even without the consent of the interdictors, as if the granter had been laid under no restraint; but he cannot alter the succession of his heritable estate, by any settlement, let it be ever so rational. No deed, granted with consent of the interdictors, is reducible, tho' the strongest lesion or prejudice to the granter should appear: The only remedy competent, in such case, is an action by the granter against his interdictors, for making up to him what he has lost through their undue consent. It is no part of the duty of interdictors, to receive sums, or manage any estate; they are given, merely *ad auctoritatem praestandam*, to interpose their authority to reasonable deeds; and so are accountable for nothing but their fraud or fault, in consenting to deeds hurtful to the person under their care. Reduction *ex capite interdictionis*, may be sued, not only by the heirs of the interdicted person, and by the interdictors, but by the interdicted person himself; tho' he was not, by our ancient practice, allowed to sue, in his own name, a reduction of his own deed, at least without the consent of his interdictors, *Maitland, 14. March 1554, Ure.*

36. The law concerning the state of children falls next to be explained, 1. 6. 1. Children are either born in wedlock, or out of it. All children, born in lawful marriage or wedlock, are presumed to be begotten by the person to whom the mother is married; and consequently to be lawful children. This presumption is so strongly founded, that it cannot be defeated, but by direct evidence, that the mother's husband could not be the father of the child,

e. g.

e. g. where he is impotent, or was absent from the wife till within six lunar months of the birth. The canonists indeed maintain, that the concurring testimony of the husband and wife that the child was not procreated by the husband, is sufficient to elide this legal presumption for legitimacy; which doctrine is adopted by *Craig*, 371. §. 20, and Lord *Stair*, 3. 3. 42: But it is an agreed point, that no regard is to be paid to such testimony, if it be made after they have owned the child to be theirs, *St.* 4. 45. 20. A father has the absolute right of disposing of his children's person, of directing their education, and of moderate chastisement, during their pupillarity; and even after they become *puberes*, he may compell them to live in family with him, and to contribute their labour and industry, while they continue there, towards his service; which power of compulsion lasts, in Lord *Stair's* opinion, 1. 5. 13. after their majority. Children, tho' in family with their father, are capable of receiving sums in gift or legacy, either from strangers or from the father himself, which thereby become their property. A child who gets a separate stock from the father for carrying on any trade or employment, even tho' he should continue in the father's house, may be said to be emancipated or foris-familiated, in so far as concerns that stock; for the profits arising from it are his own. Foris-filiation, when taken in this sense, is also inferred by the child's marriage, or by his living in a separate house, with his father's permission, or goodwill, *St.* 1. 5. 13. Children, after their full age of twenty one years, become according to the general opinion, their own masters; and
from

from that period are bound to the father, only by the natural ties of duty, affection and gratitude. The mutual obligations between parents and children to maintain each other, are explained afterwards, 3. 1. 4.

Bastards.

37. Children born out of wedlock are stiled natural children or bastards. The state of these persons, while they are alive, must be tried by the Commissaries; but all actions sued by the King or his donatary for fixing bastardy on persons deceased, must, like other declaratory actions, be sued before the Session. For the effects of bastardy, see afterwards, 3. 10. 3. 4. Bastards may be legitimated or made lawful, either, 1. By the subsequent intermarriage of the mother of the child with the father. And this sort of legitimation, tho' it was not received by our ancient customs, *R. M. l. 1. c. 51. §. 2.*—*Cr. 366. §. 8.* does by our present practice intitle the child to all the rights of lawful children. The subsequent marriage which effects legitimation, is considered by the law to have been entered into, when the child legitimated was begotten; and hence, if he be a male, he excludes by his right of primogeniture, the sons procreated after the marriage, from the succession of the father's heritage, tho' these sons were lawful children from the birth. Hence also, those children only can be thus legitimated, who are begotten of a woman whom the father might at that period have lawfully married. 2. Bastards are legitimated by letters of legitimation from the sovereign (3. 10. 3.).

Servants.

38. As to the power of masters over their servants: Tho' servants could not, by our old law,
be

be sold by their masters, as their property, yet, in most other respects, their condition was as hard as that of the *Roman servi*, *R. M. l. 2. c. 11. et seqq.*—*2. Att. c. 56.*: But they have now, of a long time, enjoyed the same rights and privileges with other subjects, unless in so far as they are tied down by their engagements of service. Servants are either necessary or voluntary. Necessary are those whom law obliges to work without wages, of whom immediately. Voluntary servants engage without compulsion, either for mere subsistence, or also for wages. Those who earn their bread in this way, if they should stand off from engaging, may be compelled to it by the Justices of the peace, who have power to fix the rate of their wages, 1661, c. 38.

Necessary.

And voluntary.

39. Colliers, coal-bearers, and salters, and other persons necessary to collieries and salt-works, as they are particularly described, 1661, c. 5. are, like the *adscriptitii glebae* of the *Roman* law, tied down to perpetual service, at the works to which they have once entered. Upon a sale of the works, the right of their service is transferred to the new proprietor. All persons are prohibited to receive them into their service, without a testimonial from their last master; and, if they desert to another work, and are redemanded within a year thereafter, he who has received them is obliged to return them within twenty four hours, under a penalty, 1606, c. 11. But though the proprietor should neglect to require the deserter within the year, he does not, by that short prescription, lose his property in him, *New Coll.* 117. Colliers, &c. where the colliery to which they are allotted, is either given up,
or

Colliers and salters.

or not sufficient for their maintenance, may lawfully engage with others, *Hope, (Coal-heughs) 7. March 1616, E. of Lothian*; but if that work shall be again set a-going, the proprietor may reclaim them back to it, *F. 4. Feb. 1708, Wallace.*

The poor. 40. The poor make the lowest class or order of persons. Indigent children may by 1617, c. 10, be compelled to serve any of the King's subjects without wages, till their age of thirty years. Vagrant and sturdy beggars may be also compelled to serve any manufacturer, by 1663, c. 16. And because few persons were willing to receive them into their service, public workhouses are by 1672, c. 18. ordained to be built for setting them to work. The poor who cannot work, must be maintained by the parishes in which they were born, 1535, c. 22.; and where the place of their nativity is not known, that burden falls upon the parishes where they have had their most common resort for the three years immediately preceeding their applying for the public charity, 1663, c. 16. —1698, c. 21. See *New Coll. vol. 2. 19.* Where the contributions collected at the churches to which they belong, are not sufficient for their maintenance, they are by 1672, c. 18. to receive badges from the minister and kirk-session, in virtue of which they may ask alms at the dwelling-houses of the inhabitants of the parish.

Indigent children.

Sturdy beggars.

The poor who cannot work.

BOOK II.

TIT. I. *Of the Division of Rights, and the several Ways by which a Right may be acquired.*

THE things or subjects to which persons have right, are the second object of law. The right of enjoying and disposing of a subject at one's pleasure, is called property. Property. Where a subject belongs in common to two or more different persons, the right is called common property. Proprietors are restrained by law, from using their property emulouſly to their neighbour's prejudice: But wherever the lawful act of the proprietor tends to his own advantage, though it ſhould prove detrimental to his neighbour, law allows him to uſe what is his own, at pleaſure. How re-
ſtrained. Every ſtate or ſovereign has a power over private property, called by ſome lawyers, *dominium eminens*, in virtue of which, the proprietor may be compelled to ſell his property for an adequate price, where an evident utility on the part of the public demands it.

2. Certain things are by nature itſelf incapable of appropriation, as the air, the light, the ocean, &c.; none of which can be brought under the power of any one perſon, though their uſe be common to all: Others are by Things
that fall
not under
commerce.
law

Res publica.

Res universitatis.

Things
sacred.

Right in
the seats
of a
church.

law exempted from private commerce, in respect of the uses to which they are destined. Of this last kind are 1. The *res publicae* of the *Romans*, the property of which was in the state, and their use common to all the members of it, as navigable rivers, highways, bridges, &c.: By our feudal system, the right of these is vested in the King, chiefly for the benefit of his people, and they are called *regalia*. (2. 6. 5). 2. *Res universitatis*, things which belong in property to a particular corporation or society, and whose use is common to every individual in it; but both property and use are subject to the regulations of the society; as town-houses, corporation-halls, market-places, church-yards, &c. The lands or other revenue belonging to a corporation, do not fall under this class, but are *juris privati*.

3. Of the same nature with the *res universitatis*, are things appropriated for the service of God, as churches, church-bells, communion-cups, &c.; which, by the *Roman* law, were reckoned the property of none; but by ours, may be disposed of, or sold on proper occasions, and others substituted in their room: Thus, churches may be removed from place to place, (1. 5. 11.) and church-bells or communion-cups, when they become unfit for use, may be sold, either by the heritors, or by the kirk-session with their consent. The right, which is sometimes acquired by private persons in the seats of a church, is not in strict speech a right of property, but is confined to the special purpose of attending divine service; and may be taken from the acquirer, if he removes

moves to another parish, and if the increase of the parishioners, to all of whom the common use of the church belongs, makes a division of the *area* necessary.

4. Property may be acquired, either by occupation or accession; and transferred, by tradition, or prescription: But prescription, being also a way of losing property, falls to be explained under a separate title. Occupation, or occupancy, is the appropriating of things which have no owner, by apprehending them, or seizing their possession. This was the original method of acquiring; for, in the first state of mankind, before societies were formed, every person barely by taking into his possession a certain portion of ground, and cultivating it, made the fruits thereof his own; and, when he thought fit to abandon it, the next occupier acquired the same right. This continued, under certain restrictions, the doctrine of the *Roman* law; *quod nullius est, fit occupantis*; but it can have no room in the feudal plan, by which the King is looked on, as the original proprietor of all the lands within his dominions.

Ways of acquiring property.

Occupation.

It takes no place in immoveable subjects.

Nor in moveables which have had an owner.

5. Even in that sort of moveable goods, which are presumed to have once had an owner, a different rule obtains by the law of *Scotland*, viz. *quod nullius est, fit domini regis*. Thus, the right of treasures hid under ground, is not acquired by occupation, but accrues to the King, 2. *Att. c. 48. §. 4. 5.*: Thus also, where one finds strayed cattle or other moveables, which have been lost by the former owner, (waif goods) the finder acquires no right in them, but must give public notice thereof;

thereof; and if within year and day after such notice, the proprietor does not claim his goods, they become escheat, *ib.* §. 14.; and so fall to the King, Sheriff, or other person, to whom the King has made a grant of such escheats.

But it obtains in moveables which never had an owner.

6. In that sort of things which never had an owner; whether animals, as wild beasts, fowls, fishes; or inanimate things, as pearls found on the shore, the original law takes place, that he who first apprehends, becomes proprietor; in so much, that tho' the right of hunting, fowling and fishing, be restrained by statute, under certain penalties, 1685, c. 20.—1707, c. 13.—24. *Geo.* II. c. 34. yet all game, even what is caught in contravention of these acts, becomes the property of the catcher, unless where the confiscation thereof is made part of the penalty: But whales thrown in or killed on our coasts, belong neither to those who kill them, nor to the proprietor of the grounds on which they are cast, but to the King; and are therefore called royal fishes. By the *leges forrestarum*, §. 17. according to a copy in the Advocates library, all great whales fall as escheat to the King; and also such smaller whales, as cannot be drawn by a wane with six oxen.

Royal fishes.

Accession.

7. Accession is that way of acquiring property, by which, in two things which have a connection with, or dependence on one another, the property of the principal thing, draws after it the property of its accessory. Thus, the owner of a mare or cow becomes the owner of the foal or calf; a house belongs to the owner of the ground on which it

it stands, tho' built with materials belonging to, and at the charge of another; trees taking root in our ground, tho' planted by another, become ours. Thus also, the insensible addition made to one's ground, by what a river washes from other grounds, which is called *alluvio*, accrues to the master of the ground which receives the addition, §. 19. 20. *Inst. de rer. div.* The Romans excepted from this rule, the case of paintings drawn on another man's board or canvas, in consideration of the excellency of the art, *ib.* §. 34.; which exception, our practice has for a like reason extended, to what is written on another man's paper or parchment.

Alluvio,

Paintings fall not under accession.

Nor writings.

Specification.

8. Under accession is comprehended specification, by which is meant, a person's making a new species or subject, from materials belonging to another. Where the new species can be again reduced to the matter of which it was made, law considers the former mass as still existing; and therefore, the new species, as an accessory to the former subject, belongs to the proprietor of that subject: But where the thing made cannot be so reduced, as in the case of wine, which cannot be again turned into grapes, there is no place for the *fiction juris*; and therefore the workmanship draws after it, the property of the materials, §. 25. *Inst. de rer. div.*

9. Tho' the new species should be produced, from the commixtion or confusion of different substances belonging to different proprietors, the same rule holds, *l. 5. §. 1. de rei vind.*; but where the mixture is made by

Commixtion.

Made by
consent of
the pro-
prietors.

Made
without
their con-
sent.

by the common consent of the owners, such consent makes the whole a common property, according to the shares that each proprietor had formerly in the several subjects. Where things of the same sort are mixed without the consent of the proprietors, which cannot again be separated, *e. g.* two hogshheads of wine, the whole likewise becomes a common property; but in the after-division, regard ought to be had to the different quality of the wines: If the things so mixed, admit of a separation, *e. g.* two flocks of sheep, the property continues distinct. This last rule was, with too great subtlety, extended by the *Roman* law, to the casual commixtion of all solids, even where a separation was really impracticable, *e. g.* to the mixture of two parcels of wheat; because each grain or particle retained its own form, notwithstanding the commixtion, §. 28. *Inst. de rer. div.*

Traditi-
on.

10. Property is carried from one to another by tradition, which is the delivery of possession by the proprietor, with an intention to transfer the property to the receiver. Two things are therefore requisite, in order to the transmitting of property in this way, 1. The intention or consent of the former owner, to transfer it on some proper title of alienation, as sale, exchange, gift, &c. 2. The actual delivery, in pursuance of that intention. The first is called the *causa*, the other the *modus transferendi dominii*: Which last is so necessary to the acquiring of property, that he who gets the last right with the first tradition is preferred, according to the rule

rule, l. 20. C. de pact. Traditionibus, non nudis pactis, transferuntur rerum dominia.

11. Tradition is either real, where the *ipsa corpora* of moveables are put into the hands of the receiver; or symbolical, which is used, where the thing is incapable of real delivery, e. g. in immoveable subjects, as lands, mills, houses; or in subjects which consist *in jure*, (things incorporeal) as rights of jurisdiction, patronage, fishing, &c.; in all which, certain symbols are delivered to the receiver, to stand in place of the delivery of the possession. The property of certain moveables, tho' they are capable of real delivery, may be transferred by symbolical; thus, if the subject be under lock and key, the delivery of the key is considered as a legal tradition of all that is contained in the repository. In one particular case, property is transferred without any tradition, either real or symbolical, *viz.* where the possession or custody of the subject, has been before, with him to whom the property is to be transferred; for which this plain reason may be given, without the necessity of recurring to a fiction of law; that in such case, there is no room for tradition.

Either real
or symbolical.

12. Possession, which is essential both to the acquisition and enjoyment of property, is defined, the detention of a thing, with a design or *animus* in the detainer, of holding it as his own. It cannot be acquired by the sole act of the mind, without real detention; but, being once acquired, it may be continued *solo animo*. Possession is either natural, or civil. Natural possession is, when

Possession.

How acquired.

How continued.

one

Natural
possession.

Civil pos-
session.

one possesses by himself : Thus, we possess lands by labouring them, houses by inhabiting them, moveables by detaining them in our hands. Civil possession is our holding the thing, either by the sole act of the mind, or by the hands of another who holds it in our name : Thus, the owner of a thing lent, possesses it by the borrower, the proprietor of lands by his tacksman, trustee or steward ; the pupil by his tutor, &c. The same subject cannot be possessed, entirely or *in solidum*, by two different persons, at one and the same time ; and therefore possession by an act of the mind ceases, as soon as the natural possession is so taken up by another, that the former possessor is not suffered to re-enter. Yet two persons may, in the judgment of law, possess the same subject, at the same time, on different rights ; thus, in the case of a pledge, the creditor possesses it in his own name, in virtue of the right of impignoration, while the proprietor is considered as possessing, in and through the creditor, in so far as is necessary for supporting his right of property. The same doctrine holds in liferenters, tacksmen, and, generally, in every case, where there are rights affecting a subject, distinct from the property.

Bona fide
possession
of the
fruits.

Secures the
possession.

13. A *bona fide* possessor is he, who, tho' he is not really proprietor of the subject, yet believes himself proprietor on probable grounds. A *mala fide* possessor knows, or is presumed to know, that what he possesses is the property of another. A possessor *bona fide* acquired right, by the *Roman* law, to the fruits of the subject possessed, that had been reaped and consumed

consumed by himself, while he believed the subject his own, §. 35. *Inst. de rer. div.* By our customs, perception alone, without consumption, secures the possessor: Nay, if he has sown the ground, while his *bona fides* continued, he is intitled to reap the crop, *propter curam et culturam*. But this doctrine does not, according to *Bankt. l. 214. §. 19.*, reach to civil fruits, *e. g.* the interest of money, which the *bona fide* receiver must restore, together with the principal, to the owner.

In as far as he has either consumed, or uplifted.

14. *Bona fides* necessarily ceaseth by the *conscientia rei alienae* in the possessor, whether such consciousness should proceed from legal interpellation, or private knowledge; for the essence of *bona fides* consists in the possessor's opinion that the subject is his own, *l. 20. §. 11. de her. pet.*—20. Nov. 1662, Children of *Woolmet*. The decision 14. March 1626, brought by *Visc. Stair* in support of the contrary opinion, proves no more, than that an assignation without intimation is an incomplete deed. *Mala fides* is sometimes induced, by the true owner's bringing his action against the possessor, by which the lameness of his title may appear to him; sometimes, not till litif-contestation, which was the general rule of the *Roman* law; and in cases uncommonly favourable, it is not induced, till sentence be pronounced against the possessor.

When *bona fides* ceaseth.

15. The property of moveable subjects is presumed by the bare effect of possession, until the contrary be proved; but possession of an immoveable subject, tho' for a century of years together, if there is no seisin, does

Effects of possession of moveables.

Of immoveables.

Privileges
of possession.

To what
title possession
ought to
be ascribed.

does not create, even a presumptive right to it; *nulla fasina, nulla terra*: Such subject is considered as caducuary, and so accrues to the sovereign. Where the property of a subject is contested, the lawful possessor is intitled to continue his possession, till the point of right be discussed; and, if he has lost it by force or stealth, the judge will, upon summary application, immediately restore it to him.

16. Where a possessor has several rights in his person, affecting the subject possessed, the general rule is, that he may ascribe his possession, to which of them he pleases: But, 1. One cannot ascribe his possession to a title, other than that on which it commenced, in prejudice of him from whom his title flowed, *St. 2. 1. 27.*—
2. If, in a competition, a possessor shall be forced to depart from a title as lame, by which he had defended himself, he cannot thereafter ascribe his intromission, in prejudice of his competitor, either to that title from which he was beat, or to any other equally insufficient.
3. He, who has a sovereign right in his person to a subject, will not be allowed to ascribe his possession to any other right, which he may have acquired as accessory to the first, 7. *July* 1708, Lord *Al. Hay*.

TIT. 2. *Of heritable and moveable Rights.*

FOR the better understanding the doctrine of this title, it must be known, that tho' by the *Roman* law, the person or persons next of blood to one dying intestate, succeeded to the right of his whole estate, of whatsoever subjects it might have consisted: Yet by the law of *Scotland*, and indeed of most nations of *Europe*, since the introduction of feus, wherever there are two or more in the same degree of consanguinity to the deceased, who are not all females, such rights as are either properly feudal, or have any resemblance to feudal rights, descend by law wholly to one of them, who is considered as the proper heir of the deceased; the others, who have the name of next of kin or executors, must be contented with that portion of the estate, which is of a more perishable nature. Hence has arisen the division of rights to be explained under this title; the subjects descending to the heir, are styled heritable, and those that fall to the next of kin, moveable.

Rights are either heritable or moveable.

2. All rights of, or affecting lands, under which are comprehended houses, mills, fishings, teinds, and whatsoever is *fundo annexum*, whether completed by seisin or not, are heritable *ex sua natura*. On the other

ther part, every thing that moves itself, or can be moved, and in general, whatever is not united to land, is moveable; as household-furniture, corns, cattle, cash, arrears of rent and of interest, even tho' they should be due on a right of annualrent: For tho' the arrears last mentioned are secured on land, yet being presently payable, they are considered as cash. It has been doubted, whether bygone feu-duties fall under this rule; and on the supposition that they did not, as being inseparable from the right of superiority itself, it was adjudged, *K. 14.* that the vassal's heir was the proper debtor in the feu-duties resting by him before his death: But it was since decided, *26. June 1755, Martin*, that bygone feu-duties, like other arrears, are moveable, and consequently belong to the superior's executors. In rights bearing a tract of future time, *i. e.* rights which cannot be fulfilled at once, and which carry a yearly profit to the creditor while they subsist, *e. g.* an annuity for a certain term of years; tho' the arrears due before the creditor's death are moveable, yet the rights themselves are heritable; both, because they yield an annual profit, and because nothing falls under executory, but what is instantly payable, and can be gathered in, and distributed among those that have interest in it, *New Coll. 39*: So that admitting them not to be heritable, *ex sua naturâ*, the heir is the only person who can take them. Leases of land are heritable, both as they have a tract of future time, and as statute has given to them, in certain respects, the effect of real rights, (2. 6. 9.)

Bygone
feu-duties
are move-
able.

Rights
bearing a
tract of
future
time are
heritable.

3. Debts,

3. Debts, (*nomina debitorum*) when due by bill, promissory note, or account, are moveable. When constituted by bond, they do not all fall under any one head; but are divided into heritable and moveable, by the following rules. The taking of interest being forbidden by the canon law, persons who could make no profit of their money, but by putting it to interest, were, before the reformation, laid under the necessity of purchasing rights on land constituted by infestment; by which, the lands contained in the right, were burdened with the yearly payment of a certain sum to the receiver, redeemable by the proprietor, on repayment of the purchase-money. As these were bargains affecting land, they were understood to be heritable. Even after the reformation, till towards the end of the last century, the form of these rights suffered but little variation: During that period, the debtor, in consideration of a certain sum lent, became bound to infest the creditor, in a correspondent annual-rent forth of his lands, and obliged himself personally to the payment thereof; after which, he granted likewise an obligation for the principal sum and interest remaining due, in the special case, that the creditor should chuse to require his money, rather than retain the heritable right. But now these rights are changed into proper bonds, by the first part of which, the debtor is personally bound to repay the principal sum and interest; and for the creditor's farther security, obliges himself to infest him in the annual-rent. All debts constituted by either of these forms are heritable, for they

Rights of
annual-
rent.

And bonds
bearing in-
festment.

Are heri-
table.

not

not only carry a yearly profit, but are secured upon land.

Personal
bonds
were for-
merly he-
ritable, af-
ter the
term of
payment,

4. Bonds merely personal, tho' bearing a clause of interest, have been always moveable before the term of payment, because it is presumed, that the creditor is at that term to turn his bond into cash, 26. *Feb.* 1629, *Douglas*: But such bonds, after the term of payment, were, by our old law, considered as *feoda pecuniae*, and consequently heritable; for which this reason is generally given, that by the creditor's not calling then for his money, his intention was presumed, to let it ly for some time, at a yearly profit: And where the first term of payment of the interest, was made prior to the term of payment of the principal sum, the bond became heritable from the period that the interest first fell due, because the creditor was thereby presently intitled to yearly profits on his bonds, *Harc.* 348. Debts which carried interest, not from the force of any clause in the obligation, but *ex lege*, as bills, claims of relief, &c. were moveable; because in these, it was not the creditor who created the interest, but the law itself, which considered, not so much the raising a yearly profit on the subject, as the equity of the case, 10. *July* 1628, *Cant.*

They are
now
moveable,
as to suc-
cession.

5. For enlarging the fund for the provision of younger children, all sums contained in contracts and obligations having clauses of interest, are declared to belong in time coming, not to the heir, but to the next of kin or executors, by 1661, c. 32. (copied after 1641, c. 57.); and so are made moveable in regard to succession. But the statute provides, that they shall still

still continue heritable with respect to the fisk, and to the rights of husband and wife; that is, tho' by the general rule, moveable rights fall under the communion of goods consequent upon marriage, (1. 6. 7.) and the moveables of denounced persons fall to the crown or fisk, by single escheat, (2. 5. 27.) yet bonds bearing interest do neither, but are heritable in both these respects.

But continue heritable, as to the fisk and relict.

6. By this statute, bonds bearing an obligation to infest, and bonds taken payable to heirs and assignees, secluding executors, continue heritable in all respects; the first, from the proper nature of the right, and the other from the destination of the creditor. A bond secluding executors, when it is carried from the original creditor to his heir by a service, continues heritable, *K. 53*. Where the creditor assigns such bond to his eldest son, and his heir, tho' without any express seclusion of executors, it also continues heritable in the person of the eldest son, *Falc. vol. 1. 215*; but if it were so assigned to a stranger and his heirs, it would probably go to the assignee's executors; since the exception in the statute arises, not from the heritable nature of the debt, (bonds secluding executors being, in their nature, as really moveable as others) but from the destination of the creditor, which cannot be interpreted to regulate the succession of an assignee, over whom the creditor has no power.

What bonds are still heritable.

Bonds secluding executors.

7. The right of a bond, which is made payable to heirs, without mention of executors, descends, not to the proper heir in heritage, tho' heirs are mentioned in the bond, but to the executor; for the word *heir*, which is a generic

Bond taken to heirs.

Bond taken to heirs male.

generic term, points out him who is to succeed by law in the right; and the executor, being the heir *in mobilibus*, is considered as the person to whom such bond is taken payable. But where a bond is taken to heirs male, or to a series of heirs, one after another, such bond is heritable, because its destination necessarily excludes executors. This statute has made no alteration in the condition of rights that were formerly moveable; and therefore, such bonds, or other rights, as were moveable by the old law, continue moveable to this day, in all respects, even *quoad fiscum et relictam*, Edg. 18. Dec. 1724, *Lefly—Falc.* vol. 2. 14.

Moveable rights become heritable, Either destination.

Or sua natura.

8. Subjects originally moveable become heritable. 1. By the proprietor's destination. Thus, a jewel, or any other moveable subject, may be provided to the heir. And if the destination be properly expressed, it has this effect, tho' it should not be carried into execution. Hence, a sum destined by a marriage-contract to be settled on heirs, is heritable, tho' no settlement should be made in pursuance of the destination, 19. Jan. 1637, *Robertson*. This arises from the right competent to every proprietor, to settle his property on whom he pleases. 2. Moveable rights become heritable, from the nature of the superveining security; thus, a sum due by a personal bond becomes heritable, by the creditor's accepting an heritable security for it, or by adjudging upon it. In these instances, destination is not considered; for creditors, when they take heritable rights, or deduce adjudications on their debts, are presumed to do it, to secure their payment, and not to alter the order of succession: And for

that

that reason, in the case of an adjudication, the debt does not change its nature, from the date of the summons of adjudication, by which the creditor shews his intention to adjudge; but from the date of the decree, by which the debt is made a real burden on the lands, *F. 16. Jan.*

1700, *Carnegy*. Trust-rights of heritable subjects, granted by a debtor to his personal creditors, and accepted or acceded to by them, make their debts heritable; but, as soon as the subject of the trust is sold, the debts return to their former moveable nature, *Falc. vol. 1. 276.*

By trust-rights of heritable subjects.

9. Heritable rights do not become moveable by supervening moveable securities, *P. Falc. 43.* the heritable right being, in such case, the *jus nobilius*, which draws the other after it. By our former law, requisition by a creditor in a right of annualrent, made the sum in the right, moveable, which before was heritable. This seems to have proceeded, not so much from the indication thereby given of the creditor's purpose to have his money, as from the old style of heritable bonds bearing requisition, by which, the creditor's requisition, and the subsistence of the real right of annualrent, were made incompatible, *supr. §. 3.*; so that, the real right being dissolved, the sum could remain no longer heritable. In other cases, therefore, where no such speciality occurs, the creditor, tho' he should discover an intention to have his money, does not thereby alter the nature of the debt: Thus, tho' the obtaining of a decree, implies in it a demand of the debt by the creditor, it does not make an heritable sum moveable, *F. 27. Feb. 1712, Scot*; thus also, tho' a charge given upon letters of horning by

Heritable rights do not become moveable.

Either by obtaining decree.

Or even
by charging
for
the debt.

a creditor, is the strongest indication of his purpose to recover payment, yet by our latest decisions, neither a charge on a bond made heritable by adjudication, 12. Nov. 1728, *Reids*, nor on a bond secluding executors, 24. July 1705, *Gray*, has the effect to make the sum moveable; see *Falc. vol. 2. 234*. In the same manner, a bond not falling under the *jus mariti*, continues, in the opinion of Sir *Geo. Mackenzie h. t. §. 7.* heritable, so as to exclude the husband, notwithstanding a charge given on it by the wife.

Price of
lands,
when heritable,
when
moveable.

10. Where lands are voluntarily sold, either by a formal disposition, or even by a minute of sale, the price, if it be not heritably secured, must, as a moveable subject, go to the seller's executors, *F. 22. Dec. 1704, Chiefly*. But in judicial sales for the behoof of creditors, the debts continue heritably secured on the price, till payment or conveyance to the purchaser; and therefore, in so far as they are not paid to the creditor himself, they must go to his heir.

Rights
partly
heritable,
partly
moveable.

11. Certain subjects partake, in different respects, of the nature both of heritable and moveable. Personal bonds are now moveable in respect of succession, but heritable as to the fisk, and husband and wife. All bonds, whether merely personal or even heritable, on which no seisin has followed, may be affected at the suit of creditors, either by adjudication, which is a diligence proper to heritage; or by arrestment, which is peculiar to moveables, 1661, c. 51.

Heritable
bonds before
seisin.

Bonds secluding
executors.

Bonds secluding executors, tho' they descend to the creditor's heir, are payable by the debtor's executors, without relief against the heir; since the debtor's succession cannot be affected by
the

the destination of the creditor: And on the same ground, an obligation to employ a sum due by a moveable bond, in favour of the heir of a marriage, is heritable as to the creditor, because of the destination; but it continues moveable as to the debtor. A bond taken to the creditor and the heir of his body, and failing him, to a substitute, is in the opinion of some lawyers, *St. Ans. voce, Bond heritable, p. 17.* in so far moveable, that the creditor can bequeath it by testament; and yet the method of completing titles to it after the creditor's death, is by service as heir of provision, which is a method of transmission proper to heritage: But it is a rule more agreeable to the analogy of our law, that nothing which goes to the heir by service, can be carried off to his prejudice, either by a deed on deathbed, or even by testament.

Bonds
with a
substitu-
tion.

12. All questions, whether a right is heritable or moveable, must be determined according to the condition of the subject, at the time of the predecessor's death. If it was heritable at that period, it must belong to the heir; if moveable, it must fall to the executor, without regard to any alterations that may have affected the subject, in the intermediate period between the ancestor's death and the competition.

What pe-
riod
makes a
subject,
heritable
or move-
able.

TIT. 3. *Of the Constitution of heritable Rights, by charter and seisin.*

Origin of
the feudal
law.

HERITABLE rights are governed by the feudal law, which owed its origin, or at least its first improvements, to the *Longobards*; whose Kings, upon having penetrated into *Italy*, the better to preserve their conquests, found it their interest to make grants, to their principal commanders, of great part of the conquered provinces, to be again subdivided by them among the lower officers, under the conditions of fidelity and military service.

Consuetudines feudorum.

2. The feudal constitutions and usages were first reduced into writing, about the year 1150, by two lawyers of *Milan*, under the title of *consuetudines feudorum*, and have been subjoined to *Justinian's* Novels, in almost all the editions of the body of the *Roman* law. None of the *German* Emperors appear to have expressly confirmed this collection, by their authority; but it is generally agreed, that it had their tacite approbation, and was considered as the customary feudal law of all the countries subject to the empire. No other country has ever acknowledged these books for their law; but each state has formed to itself such a system of feudal rules, as best agreed with the genius of its own constitution. In feudal questions, therefore, we are governed in the first place, by

Are not
of univer-
sal autho-
rity.

by our own statutes and customs ; where these fail us, we have regard to the practice of neighbouring countries, if the genius of their law appears to be the same with ours ; and should the question still remain doubtful, we may have recourse to those written books of the feus, as to the original plan on which all feudal systems have proceeded.

By what law, feudal questions are to be decided.

3. This military grant got the name, first of *beneficium*, and afterwards of *feudum*; and was defined a gratuitous right to the property of lands, made under the conditions of fealty and military service, to be performed to the grant-er, by the receiver ; the radical right of the lands still remaining in the granter. Underlands in this definition, are comprehended all rights or subjects, so connected with land, that they are deemed a part thereof ; as houses, mills, fishings, jurisdictions, patronages, &c. Tho' feus in their original nature were gratuitous, they soon became the subject of commerce, *lib. 1. feud. t. 16* ; services of a civil or religious kind were frequently substituted in place of military, *lib. 2. t. 2. §. 2.* ; and now of a long time, services of every kind have been intirely dispensed with, in certain feudal tenures. He who makes the grant is called the superior, and he who receives it, the vassal. The subject of the grant is commonly called the feu ; tho' that word is at other times, in our law, used to signify one particular tenure, (*2. 4. 2.*). The interest retained by the superior in the feu is styled *dominium directum*, or the superiority ; and the interest acquired by the vassal, *dominium utile*, or the property. The word *fee* is promiscuously applied to both.

Definition of feus.

Feus are now patrimonial.

Superior and vassal

4. Allodial

Allodial
goods.

4. Allodial goods are opposed to feus ; by which are understood, goods enjoyed by the owner, independent of a superior. All moveable goods are allodial; lands only are so, when they are given, without the condition of fealty or homage. In this sense, all subjects, immoveable as well as moveable, were allodial by the *Roman* law; but by the feudal system, the sovereign, who is the fountain of feudal rights, reserves to himself the superiority of all the lands, of which he makes the grant; so that with us, no lands are allodial, except those of the King's own property, the superiorities which the King reserves in the property-lands of his subjects, and manses and glebes, the right of which is compleated by the presbytery's designation, without any feudal grant.

Who can
grant feu-
dal rights.

5. Every person who is in the right of an immoveable subject, provided he has the free administration of his estate, and is not debarred by statute, or by the nature of his right, may dispose of it to another. Nay a vassal, tho' he has only the *dominium utile*, can subfeu his property to a subvassal by a subaltern right, and thereby raise a new *dominium directum* in himself, subordinate to that which is in his superior; and so *in infinitum*. The vassal who thus subfeus, is called the subvassal's immediate superior, and the vassal's superior is the subvassal's mediate superior. Professed or known papists are debarred by 1695, c. 26. from granting gratuitous deeds in prejudice of the heir.

Who can
receive
them.

6. All persons who are not disabled by law, may acquire and enjoy feudal rights. Persons excommunicated were declared incapable of

possessing

possessing their own lands, and no charter of re-
signation or adjudication of lands holden of the
crown, was allowed to be passed in their favour,
1609, c. 3. 4. ratified by 1661, c. 25.; but
these disabilities are taken off, 1690. c. 28.
Papists cannot purchase a land estate by any
voluntary deed, 1700, c. 3. Aliens, who owe
allegiance to a foreign Prince, cannot hold a
feudal right without naturalization; and there-
fore, where such privilege was intended to be
given to favoured nations or persons, statutes
of naturalization were necessary, either gene-
ral, 1558, c. 65. 66.—1669, c. 7. or special;
or at least, letters of naturalization by the sove-
reign. The act, 1594, c. 216. prohibiting
all members of any court of justice to buy
claims of heritable rights depending in court,
does not annul the sale, though it subjects the
buyer to deprivation, *F. 20. Dec. 1683,*
Purves.

Aliens
cannot
hold a
feu.

7. Every immoveable subject, capable of
commerce, may be granted in feu. From this
general rule is excepted, 1. The annexed pro-
perty of the crown, which is not alienable
without a previous dissolution in Parliament.
2. Tailzied lands, which are devised under con-
dition that they shall not be aliened. 3. An
estate *in hereditate jacente*, cannot be effe-
ctually aliened by the heir apparent, (*i. e.*
not entered); but such alienation becomes ef-
fectual upon his entry, the supervenient right
accruing in that case to the purchaser; which
is a rule, applicable to the alienation of all sub-
jects not belonging to the vendor at the time
of the sale. Leases of the rents or revenues
of boroughs-royal, whether proceeding from
lands

What sub-
jects may
be grant-
ed in feu.

*Jus super-
veniens ac-
crescit
emptori.*

lands, fishings, mills, &c. for more than three years, are prohibited by 1491, c. 36; but as there is no prohibition with regard to leases or feus of the lands themselves, these may be effectually granted by the magistrates, notwithstanding the statute, *New Coll.* 22.

Feudal
charter.

8. The feudal right, or, as it is called, investiture, is constituted by charter and seisin. By the charter, we understand that writing, which contains the grant of the feudal subject to the vassal, whether it be executed in the proper form of a charter, or of a disposition. Charters by subject-superiors are granted, either, 1.

Charter
a me.

A me de superiore meo, when they are to be holden, not of the granter himself, but of his superior. This sort is called a public holding, because vassals were in ancient times publicly received in the superior's court, before the *pares curiae* or co-vassals. Or, 2. *De me*, where the lands are to be holden, of the granter. These were called sometimes base rights, from *bas*, lower; and sometimes private, because, before the establishment of our records, they were easily concealed from third parties; the nature of all which will be more fully explained, *tit.*

De me.

Original.
By pro-
gress.

7. An original charter is that by which the fee is first granted: A charter by progress is a renewed disposition of that fee; e. g. a charter by a superior to the heir of his vassal, or by a vassal to a singular successor, to be holden of the granter's superior, or a charter of adjudication. All doubtful clauses in charters by progress, ought to be construed agreeably to the original grant; and all clauses in the original charter, are understood to be implied in the charters by progress, if there be no express alteration, *Cr.* 190. 27. 29—9. 9.

9. The

9. The first clause in an original charter, is the narrative or recital, which expresses the names and designations of the grantor and receiver, and the causes inductive of the grant. If the grant be made for a valuable consideration, it is said to be onerous; if for love and favour, gratuitous. In the dispositive clause of a charter, the subjects made over are described either by special boundaries or march-stones, (which is called a bounding charter) or by such other characters as may sufficiently distinguish them. In this clause is also expressed the order of succession, and limitation of the fee, which was, by our more ancient style, inserted in the clause of *tenendas*. A charter regularly carries right to no subjects but what are contained in this clause, tho' they should be mentioned in some other clause of the charter. In charters by progress, a clause of *novodamus* is sometimes thrown in, whereby the superior grants of new (*de novo*) certain subjects specially mentioned. Such charters have the effect of an original grant, as to these subjects; and consequently imply a release to the vassal, of all burdens affecting their property, prior to such grant. They are generally no more than renewed rights, of some subject that had been formerly granted to the vassal: Yet every subject contained in the clause of *novodamus*, is deemed to be conveyed to the vassal, tho' there should have been no antecedent title to it in his person, 29. Feb. 1680, Scot.—14. July 1737, heritors of Spey.

Its constituent parts.

The narrative.

The dispositive clause.

A clause of *novodamus*.

10. The clause of *tenendas*, (from its first words, *tenendas praedictas terras*) expresses the particular tenure by which the lands are to be

The *tenendas*.

R

holden,

holden, and frequently contains a long and unnecessary enumeration of the parts and perti-
nents of the subject made over in the charter.

The *red-
dendo*.

The clause of *reddendo*, (from the words, *reddendo inde annuatim*) specifies the particular duty or service, which the vassal is to pay or perform to the superior; and hence, the duty itself, to which the vassal is subjected, has got the name of the *reddendo*.

Clause of
warran-
dice.

11. The clause of warrandice, (warranty) is that by which the granter obliges himself, that the right conveyed shall be effectual to the receiver. Warrandice is either personal or real.

Personal
warran-
dice is ei-
ther sim-
ple.

Personal warrandice, where the granter is only bound personally, is either, 1. Simple, that he shall grant no deed in prejudice of the right; and this sort, which is confined to future deeds,

Or from
fact and
deed.

is implied even in donations. Or 2. Warrandice from fact and deed, by which the granter warrants, that the right neither has been, nor shall be hurt by any fact of his. This is generally stipulated, where rights are compounded for less than the sums contained in them; and sometimes the clause is so conceived, as to reach also to the deeds of the granter's ancestors or authors, from whom he himself derives his right.

Or abso-
lute.

Or, 3. Absolute warrandice *contra omnes mortales*, (warrandice at all hands, and against all deadly) whereby the right is warranted against all legal defects in it, which may carry it off from the receiver, either wholly, or in part.

Implied
warran-
dice.

Where a sale of lands proceeds upon an onerous cause, the granter is liable in absolute warrandice, tho' no warrandice be expressed; but in assignations to debts or decrees, no higher warrandice

warrantice than from fact and deed is implied, *F. 4. March 1707, Riddel.*

12. Warrantice cannot extend to burdens which may affect the subject after the grant, whether they shall arise from misfortune, *e. g.* inundation, or from statute: For the receiver, as he has the whole benefit arising from its improvement after that period, must run all the hazards of its deterioration, 12. *July 1667, Watson.* Nay, this doctrine holds, where the supervening burden is imposed under the authority of a public law prior to the grant; unless the receiver, who is presumed to know the burden which by law may be imposed on the subject, has taken care to secure himself against it by express warrantice, 1. *July 1676, L. Auchintoul*; see *Harc. 963.* Gratuitous grants by the Crown imply no warrantice; and tho' warrantice should be expressed, the clause is ineffectual, from a presumption, that it has crept in by the negligence of the Crown's officers. But where the Crown makes a grant, not *jure coronae*, but for an adequate price, the sovereign is in the same case with his subjects, and liable to the same degree of warrantice with them, according to the nature of the right. Absolute warrantice in the assignation of a debt, imports only that the debt is really due, and free from all legal exceptions, but not that the debtor is solvent; and this holds, tho' the sums contained in the debt should be warranted to be effectual to the assignney, 12. *Dec. 1671, Liddel*: Which is also the doctrine of the *Roman law, l. 4. de hered. vel act. vend.*

How far grants by the crown imply warrantice.

Absolute warrantice in the assignation of a debt.

The effects of warrandice.

Intimation of distress.

Real warrandice.

Excambion.

13. Absolute warrandice, in case of eviction, affords an action to the grantee, against the granter, for making up to him all that he shall have suffered through the defect of the right; and not simply for his indemnification, by the granter's returning the price to him. This obtains, not only in irredeemable, but in redeemable grants; for in both, the warrandice strikes against all defects in the right itself; yet as warrandice is penal, and consequently *stricti juris*, it is not easily presumed, nor is it incurred from every light servitude that may affect the subject, 21. *June 1672, Sandilands*. Regularly the grantee, when the eviction is threatened, ought to intimate his distress to the granter, that he may defend the right granted by himself; but, tho' such intimation should not be made, the grantee does not lose his right of recourse, unless it shall appear, that in the process of eviction he has omitted a relevant defence, or subjected himself to an incompetent mean of proof, 23. *June 1681, Clerk—Falc. vol. 2. 2.*

14. Real warrandice is either, 1. Express, whereby, in security of the lands principally conveyed, other lands, called warrandice-lands, are also made over, to which the receiver may have recourse, in case the principal lands be evicted. Or, 2. Tacit, which is constituted by the exchange or excambion of one piece of ground with another; for, if the lands exchanged are carried off, from either of the parties, the law itself, without any paction, gives that party immediate recourse, upon his own

own first lands, which he had given in exchange for the lands evicted, even tho' a third person should have acquired a real right in them, prior to the eviction, 25. Nov. 1623, *E. Melrofs contra Ker*: But this holds only, where the grant by which the lands are exchanged, is expressly said to be an excambion.

15. The charter concludes with a precept of seisin, which is the command of the superior granter of the right to his baily, for giving seisin or possession to the vassal, or his attorney, by delivering to him the proper symbols. Possession was, in the infancy of feus, given by the superior himself to the vassal, immediately upon granting the charter, in presence of the *pares curiae*; (the name given to the co-vassals, who were equal to one another in the superior's court) and this was styled the proper investiture, by which the vassal's right was compleated *unico contextu*. Precepts or letters of seisin, when they were first introduced, were made out in writings separate from the charter; but now all precepts, on charters flowing from the crown, must be ingrossed in the charter or disposition, by act 1672, c. 7. which by custom was soon extended to the case of all precepts without distinction. Any person, whose name may be inserted in the blank, left in the precept for that purpose, can execute the precept as baily; and whoever has the precept of seisin in his hands, is presumed to have a power of attorney from the vassal, for receiving possession in his name.

Precept of seisin.

Proper investiture.

Precepts must now be engrossed in the charter.

16. A seisin is the instrument or attestation of a notary, that possession was actually given by the superior or his baily, to the vassal

Instrument of seisin.

or

or his attorney; and it sometimes gets the name of infestment, tho' that word, in its proper sense, signifies the whole feudal right, *Cr.* 187.

At first not
used.

§. 18. For a long time, the appending of the baily's seal to the superior's charter or precept, *Cr.* 238. §. 2. and sometimes his separate declaration, that he had given seisin, completed the vassal's right, without the attestation of a notary: But afterwards, a notorial instrument came to be considered as a necessary solemnity, not suppliable, either by a proof of natural possession, or even of the special fact, that the vassal was duly entered to the possession, by the superior's baily.

Now an
essential
solemnity.

Symbols
used in
seisins.

17. The symbols, by which the delivery of possession is expressed, are, for lands, earth and stone; for rights of annualrent payable furth of land, it is also earth and stone, with the addition of a penny money; for parsonage-teinds, a sheaf of corn; for jurisdictions, the book of the court; for patronages, a psalm-book, and the keys of the church; for fishings, net and coble; for mills, clap and happer, &c. The seisin must be taken upon the ground of the lands, except where there is a special dispensation, as in the seisins of *Nova Scotia*, *St.*

Seisin *pro-*
priis mani-
bus.

2. 3. 18. Seisins given, not by the baily in virtue of a precept, but *propriis manibus* of the granter, are generally used in rights granted to wives, children, or other conjunct persons. When such seisin is neither subscribed by the granter, nor supported by a separate warrant from him, it is null, being the bare assertion of a notary, *P. Falc.* 28.

Registra-
tion of
seisins.

18. A short abbreviate of all seisins, whether flowing from the crown, 1540, c. 79. or from

from a subject, 1555, c. 46. &c. was directed to be entered into a record of exchequer, for the benefit of all having interest; but a more certain provision was made in the reign of J. VI. for the security of purchasers and creditors, by an unprinted statute passed at *Faulkland*, 31. July, and recorded in the books of *federunt*, 3. Nov. 1599.; and by another, made the year thereafter, mentioned in the index of the unprinted Acts, 1600, N^o 34. whereby the full tenor of seifins, &c. was to be registred in the secretary's register, within forty days after their date, under the certification of nullity. These acts were but little observed, *Books S. 6. Jan. 1604.*; wherefore, a third act was made 1617, c. 16. directing all seifins, and other real rights therein mentioned, to be registred within sixty days after their date, either in the general register of seifins at *Edinburgh*, or in the register of the particular shire appointed by the act, which, it must be observed, is not, in every case, the shire within which the lands lie.

Required
by statute.

19. This act does not, as the two former, render unregistred seifins null; they are indeed declared ineffectual against third parties, but they are valid against the granters and their heirs. From this statute were excepted seifins of burgage tenements, probably from an opinion of the exactness, with which the town-clerks, who alone could be notaries thereto, 1567, c. 27. booked them in their protocolls or registers, which lie open to all the lieges; but as this exactness sometimes failed, 30. June 1668, *Burnet*, burgage seifins

Except
seifins of
burgage
tenements.

That ex-
ception
now taken
off.

seins were ordained to be registred in the books of the borough, 1681, c. 11.

What is
considered
as regi-
stration.

20. The attestation of the keeper of the records on the back of the seisin, that it was registred, was deemed a sufficient registration, 1686, c. 19.: But as this weakened the security intended from the records to singular successors, the actual booking of seisions, and of other writings presented for registration, is now required, 1696, c. 18. Seisions regularly recorded, are preferable, not according to their own dates, but the dates of their registration, 1693, c. 13. the reason whereof may be gathered from the next act, 1693, c. 14.

Crown's
right con-
stituted
without
seisin.

21. Seisin necessarily supposes a superior by whom it is given; the right therefore which the sovereign, who acknowledges no superior, has over the whole lands of *Scotland*, is constituted, *jure coronae*, without seisin. In several parcels of land, that ly contiguous to

One seisin
serves in
contigu-
ous, and
in united
tenements.

one another, one seisin serves for all, unless the right of the several parcels be derived from different superiors, or held by different tenures, *July 1729, Bank of Scotland*. In discontiguous lands, a separate seisin must be taken on every parcel, unless the sovereign has united them into one tenandry, by a charter of union; in which case, if there is no special place expressed, a seisin taken on any part of the united lands, will serve for the whole, even tho' they be situated in different shires. The only effect of union is, to give the discontiguous lands, the same quality, as if they had been contiguous, or naturally united; union therefore does not take off the necessity of separate seisions, in lands holden by different tenures,

nures, or the rights of which, flow from different superiors, these being incapable of natural union. Where the sovereign unites lands, he generally, in the clause of union, declares the symbol of earth and stone to be sufficient for expressing the delivery, not only of the lands themselves, but of all other feudal rights or subjects conveyed by the charter, let them be ever so different in their natures, *e. g.* fishings, mills, patronages, &c.

22. The privilege of barony carries a higher right than union does, and consequently includes union in it, as the lesser degree. This right of barony can neither be given, nor transmitted, unless by the crown, *St. 2. 3. 45.*; but the quality of simple union, being once conferred on lands, by the sovereign, may be communicated by the vassal to a sub-vassal, *25. Jan. 1627, Stuart.* Tho' part of the lands united or erected into a barony, be sold by the vassal to be holden *a me*, the whole union is not thereby dissolved; what remains unsold retains the quality. These, and all other feudal privileges, must be granted in the charter, not in the seisin; for the seisin is not intended to confer any new right, but merely for completing such right as is before given by the charter.

Barony
implies
union.

All privileges must
be expressed in the
charter.

23. A charter, not perfected by seisin, is a right merely personal, which does not transfer the property, (*3. 1. 1.*) and a seisin of itself bears no faith, without its warrant: It is the charter and seisin joined together, that constitutes the feudal right, and secures the receiver against the effect of all posterior seisins, even tho' the charters on which they

A charter
becomes
real only
after seisin.

S

proceed

proceed should be prior to his ; and still more, against all qualities burdening his author's right contained in latent personal declarations or backbonds, which have not been rendered litigious before his seisin.

All real burdens must be inserted in the investiture.

What burdens are deemed real.

24. No quality which is designed as a lien or real burden on a feudal right, can be effectual against singular successors, if it be not inserted in the investiture. By our former practice, the burden must have been fully expressed in the seisin, which is made public by the record, *F. 27, Nov. 1711, Lady Montboddo*; but it was found, 26. *July 1737, creditors of Smith*, that a general reference in the seisin, to the burdens specially contained in the charter, was sufficient to make a real burden; for that the charter is truly a part of the investiture. If the creditors in the burden are not particularly mentioned, the burden is not real ; for no perpetual unknown incumbrance can be created upon lands, *July 1734, creditors of Maclellan*. On the same principle, a faculty reserved to the granter, to charge the lands with a certain sum to be paid to any person he shall name, is not effectual against singular successors, if he does not properly exercise that faculty, by granting an heritable bond for the sum, and giving seisin thereon, 21. *June 1737, Ogilvies*. Where the right itself is granted with the burden of the sum therein mentioned; or where it is declared void, if the sum be not paid against a day certain, the burden is real ; but where the receiver is simply obliged, by his acceptance, to make payment, the clause is effectual only against him and his heirs, *P. Falc. 101*.

TIT. 4.

TIT. 4. *Of the several Kinds of Holding.*

FEUDAL subjects are chiefly distinguished by their different manners of holding, which were either ward, blanch, feu or burgage. Ward-holding, which is now abolished by 20. Geo. II. c. 50. was that, which was granted for military service. Its proper *reddendo* was, *services*, or *services used and wont*; by which last, was meant the performance of service, whenever the superior's occasions required it. As all feudal rights were originally held by this tenure, ward-holding was *in dubio* presumed. Hence, tho' the *reddendo* had contained some special service, or yearly duty, the holding was presumed ward, if another holding was not particularly expressed.

Ward-
holding.

Was ori-
ginally
presumed.

2. Feu-holding is that, whereby the vassal is obliged to pay to the superior, a yearly rent in money or grain, and sometimes also, in services of a civil nature, as plowing, reaping, carriages for the superior's use, &c. *nomine feudi firmæ*. It has a strong resemblance to the Roman *emphyteusis*, in the nature of the right, the yearly duty payable by the vassal, the penalty in case of not punctual payment, and the restraint frequently laid upon vassals by their feu-charters, not to alien without the superior's consent; but all clauses *de non alienando*, are now prohibited, by the foresaid statute for abolishing

Feu-hold-
ing.

Its resem-
blance to
*emphyteu-
sis*.

bolishing ward-holdings. This kind of tenure was introduced for the encouragement of agriculture, the improvement of which was considerably obstructed, by the vassal's obligation to military service. The statute, which first mentions it, is, 1457, c. 71. tho' it appears to have been a tenure known in *Scotland*, as far back as *leges burgorum*, c. 100.

Blanch-
holding.

When
blanch
duties can
be exacted
after the
year.

3. Blanch-holding (not unlike the *feudum Francum* of the *Lombards*) is that, whereby the vassal is to pay to the superior an elusory yearly duty, as a penny money, a rose, a pair of gilt spurs, &c. merely in acknowledgment of the superiority, *nomine albae firmae*. This duty, where it is a thing of yearly growth, if it be not demanded within the year, cannot be exacted thereafter; and where the words, *si petatur tantum*, are subjoined to the *reddendo*, they operate a release to the vassal, whatever the quality of the duty may be, if it is not asked within the year. The Lords of exchequer were by 1606, c. 14, prohibited to exact money as the value of such blanch-duties as are by the charter payable in kind. By our present practice, such duties are usually converted in the investitures themselves, to a certain sum in money; but even where they are not, their values continue to be exacted by the crown.

Burgage-
holding.

4. Burgage-holding is that, by which boroughs royal hold of the sovereign, the lands which are contained in their charters of erection. This, in the opinion of *Craig*, 81. §. 36., does not constitute a separate tenure, but is a species of ward-holding; with this speciality, that the vassal is not a private person, but a community: And indeed, watching and warding, which
is

is the usual service contained in the *redlendo* of such charters, might be properly enough said, some centuries ago, to have been of the military kind. As the royal borough is the King's vassal, all burgage-holders hold immediately of the crown: The magistrates therefore, when they receive the resignations of the particular burghesses, and give seisin to them, act, not as superiors, but as the King's bailies specially authorised thereto by 1567, c. 27.

The borough itself is the vassal.

5. Feudal subjects, granted to churches, monasteries, or other societies for religious or charitable uses, are said to be mortified, or granted *ad manum mortuam*; either because all casualties must necessarily be lost to the superior, where the vassal is a corporation, which never dies; or because the property of these subjects is granted to a dead hand, which cannot transfer it to another. The lands mortified in times of Popery to the church, were granted *in puram eleemosynam*; the only services prestable by the vassal were prayers, and singing of masses for the souls of the deceased, which approaches nearer to blanch-holding than ward. The purposes of such grants having been, upon the reformation, declared superstitious, the lands mortified were annexed to the crown: But mortifications to universities, hospitals, &c. were not affected by that annexation; and lands may, at this day, be mortified to any lawful purpose, either by blanch or by feu-holding.

Mortification.

TIT. 5. *Of the Casualties due to the Superior.*

Fixed
rights of
superiority.

THE right of the superior continues unimpaired, notwithstanding the feudal grant, unless in so far as the *dominium utile*, or property, is conveyed to his vassal: His infeudment in the lands subsists, and his heir is intitled to be vested, not in the superiority only, but in the lands themselves, of which his ancestor had made over the property. Hence, he can sue all real actions, concerning the lands, against every person, other than the vassal, or those deriving right from him: see 19. Nov. 1624. *L. Lag.* The superiority carries a right to the services, and annual duties, contained in the *reddendo* of the vassal's charter.

The yearly
redde-
do is debi-
tum fundi.

The duty payable by the vassal is a *debitum fundi*; i. e. it is recoverable, not only by a personal action against himself, but by a real action against the lands. The services prestatable by him, if they are annual, as plowing, cutting of corns or hay, &c. must be exacted within the year, 30. Jan. 1624, *L. Carnoufy.* The services of personal attendance, by hosting, hunting, watching and warding, due by vassals, are abolished, 1. Geo. I. St. 2. c. 54.; and in lieu thereof, the superior is intitled to a certain annual payment, to be fixed by the court of Session, if the parties themselves cannot settle it.

Personal
services
abolished.

2. Besides

2. Besides the constant fixed rights of superiority, there are others, which, because they depend upon uncertain events, are called casualties. The casualties proper to a wardholding, while that tenure subsisted, were ward, recognition and marriage. The casualty of ward is that, whereby the superior was intitled to the full rent of the ward-lands, after the vassal's death, during the heir's minority; because the heir, in that period, was incapable of performing military service. The written feudal law, which knew no such casualty, allowed the minor to serve by a substitute, *Arg. lib. 2. feud. t. 26. vers. si minori*, §. 5.; but it has obtained with us, as far back as *Malcolm Mackenneth*: And at first, it comprehended the office of tutor of law to the heir, the remains of which continued till the reign of *J. VI., Cr. 394. §. 13.—Skene, voce Varda.*

Casual rights of superiority.

Casualty of ward.

3. The right arising to the superior from this casualty, could not be hurt by any debt or deed of the vassal, not consented to by the superior. But, 1. If the superior was charged by an adjudging creditor of his vassal to enter him, in consequence of 1469, c. 37. the ward falling thereafter, by the death of the vassal and the minority of the heir, was burdened with the adjudger's debt. 2. By 1457, c. 71. the ward-vassals, holding of the crown, were allowed to subseque their lands in feu-holding; and the feuars were secured against the ward of their immediate superiors, on payment to the crown, of the yearly feu-duty contained in their charters, while the ward continued. Under colour of this act, the power of subsequeing was assumed

Burdens attending it.

Either temporary.

assumed by the vassals of subject-superiors : But these were prohibited to subfeu without the consent of the superior, by 1606, c. 12.; and the prohibition is extended to the crown's vassals, by 1633, c. 16.

Or perpetual.

4. Ward was burdened with the charge of upholding the houses, inclosures, &c. in good condition during the heir's minority, and with an alimony to the heir, if he had no separate means of subsistence, 1491, c. 25.—1535, c.

Taxed ward.

How ward expired.

15. It was also affected with the terce due to the vassal's widow, and wholly excluded by the courtesy belonging to the surviving husband of the last female vassal; for these, being the provisions of law, were effectual without the superior's consent. It was sometimes restricted by the investiture, to a certain sum to be paid annually by the minor heir, in place of the full rents: This was called *taxed* ward, and the other *simple* ward; the taxed duties were *debita fundi*. Ward regularly expired at the heir's age of twenty-one years, if a male; in females, it lasted only till fourteen, which was the age at which women were marriageable by our old law; *R. M. l. 2. c. 48. §. 1.—Skene, voce Varda*. In the case of co-heiresses, the ward determined at the eldest's age of fourteen; for heirs portioners are proprietors *pro indiviso*, and so each of them is vassal in every part of the ward-lands.

Recognition.

5. Recognition was not simply a casualty, but a total forfeiture of the ward-lands, arising to the superior from the alienation, by the vassal, of more than the half thereof to a stranger, without the superior's consent. By the feudal customs, it was only the part aliened which recognised,

recognised, *lib. 2. feud. t. 38*. It was originally introduced, that the superior might not, by the vassal's alienation of his lands, lose the benefit of his services, *ib. l. 2. t. 52*.

§. 1. It took place in all ward-holdings, even taxed; but in no other holding, without an express clause in the charter. Legal alienations by adjudication, drew no forfeiture after them; but all voluntary deeds, whereby the lands were either sold or burdened, did infer it, as wadsets or rights of annualrent; but not rights of warrandice, because these are not present deeds of alienation. A right of annualrent, tho' granted over the whole ward-lands, inferred no recognition, if the sum thereby secured, did not exceed the half of their value; nor an improper wadset, when the back-tack duty was not above the half of the yearly rents, 7.

July 1681, Hay. Where there was no right effectually aliened, *e. g.* if the charter or feifin were intrinsically null, recognition was not incurred.

6. Alienation even by a minor vassal inferred recognition; but a vassal, whose lands were subject to a right of redemption in favour of another, tho' he might, by alienation, forfeit the interest which he himself had in the subject, could not hurt the reverser's right: Nor could deeds granted by a vassal inhibited, posterior to the inhibition, hurt the right of the creditor inhibitor, 1686, c. 15. All were deemed strangers to the vassal, but those who were *alioqui successuri*, *i. e.* those, who, if they had survived him, must necessarily have succeeded to him, tho' there had been no disposition: Recognition was therefore incurred by the vassal's

Was inferred by all voluntary alienations,

Of the vassal,

To a stranger.

T

alienation

alienation to his brother, tho' he was at that time next in succession, because the vassal might have afterwards had heirs of his own body, 29. July 1672, Lord *Hatton*; and by a wife's alienation to her husband, *Edg.* 13. Jan. 1725, Sir *Fa. Hall*.

The superior's consent secured against it.

7. A purchaser, buying from a ward-vassal the smallest part of his lands, was not secure without the superior's confirmation; for, if the vassal should have afterwards sold what with the first purchase exceeded the half, both the first and last alienations, and all likewise that remained unsold, recognised to the superior.

The superior's confirmation of an infestment, tho' it secured the subject confirmed, against the effect of prior alienations, did not hinder these prior alienations from being brought *in computo* with subsequent ones, so as to make the rest of the ward-lands recognise. *P. Falc.* 53. But a charter of *novodamus* to the vassal implied a confirmation of all prior deeds of alienation, and consequently hindered them from being conjoined with alienations made after the *novodamus*, so as to infer recognition, *ibid.*

Casualty of marriage.

Single and double avail.

8. Marriage, or *maritagium*, was that casualty, by which the ward-superior was intitled to receive from the heir of his former vassal, after the age of puberty, a certain sum as the value (avail) of his tocher: In some cases, the single avail was due; in others, the double. This casualty is no where mentioned in the feudal customs; but we have received it, as far back as the books of the Majesty, *l. 2. c. 48.*: It obtained only in wardholdings, unless where there was a special clause in the charter importing it. In some charters, most

most commonly in those where the ward was taxed, the casualty of marriage was also taxed to a liquid sum, which in that case was *debitum fundi*, being of the same nature with the taxed ward-duties.

9. This casualty took its rise, chiefly from the right that the superior was understood to have over the person, as well as estate of the minor heir, *2. Att. c. 93. §. 2.*: Anciently therefore it affected only minor heirs, who after puberty refused to marry upon the superior's requisition; but afterwards, the single avail became due, tho' the heir had been major at the death of his ancestor, and he himself had died, neither married nor required by the superior to marry, *3. Jan. 1677, Campbell*. In the case of heirs portioners, only one marriage was due, because heirs portioners enjoy the estate *pro indiviso*, as if they were but one person; tho' the contrary practice obtained in Sir *Th. Hope's* time, *Min. Pr. 47. 48*. Marriage could not possibly fall, where the heir was married before the ancestor's death, nor where he had died before puberty. The superior's express consent to the heir's marriage, was considered as a renunciation of the casualty, *Dirl. 434*.

10. In estimating the avail of marriage, the precise sum got in tocher was not considered, but what the heir might from this fortune reasonably expect. The court of Session, *anno 1674*, fixed the modification of the single avail, to three years free rent of the vassal's estate, *Dirl. 202*; afterwards, they brought it down to two years, *F. 7. Nov. 1701, Baird*. The double avail was due, where the superior ha-

Single a-
vail, when
due:

How esti-
mated.

Double a-
vail when
due:

How e-
stimated.

ving offered a wife to the heir, who was in all respects his equal, the heir not only refused the woman offered, but married with another, *2. Att. c. 91. §. 2. and c. 93.* At first, the double avail was estimated at two single avails; but by the later practice, it came to be fixed to three years free rent of the estate belonging to the vassal. And in the estimation of either of the avails, not the ward-lands only, but all the other free estate of the vassal was brought *in computo*, both heritable and moveable, 19. June 1630. *Somervel*; as it stood at the period when the heir first became marriageable.

Marriage
was due
only to
the eldest
superior.

The King
always
the eldest.

11. Where a vassal held different ward-fees of different superiors, the marriage was due only to one superior, because the heir could be married but once. In such case, the superior, from whom the vassal's ancestors in blood had got the first feudal grant, was intitled to the casualty, as eldest superior, *2. Att. c. 94.*; since he ought not to be cut out of his right, by the vassal's afterwards acquiring ward-lands from another; but the sovereign, who is the fountain of feudal rights, was always considered as the eldest superior, tho' the grant by the crown to the ancestor of the vassal whose marriage falls, should have been posterior to the rights of the vassal's other ward-holdings. It was enacted in favour of the crown-vassals, who should get their holdings changed from ward to feu or blanch, that they should be exempted from the marriage that might be claimed from them by other superiors, in the same manner as if the lands, whose holding was changed, had still continued to be holden ward, 1661, *c. 58.*

12. By

12. By the late statute, 20. *Geo. II.* for abolishing ward-holdings, the tenure of the lands, holding ward of the Crown, is turned into blanch, for payment of one penny *Scots* yearly, *si petatur tantum*; and the tenure of those holden of subjects, into feu, for payment of such yearly feu-duty in money, victual or cattle, in place of all services, as shall be fixed by the court of Session. The following rules have accordingly been settled by *Act S. 8. Feb.*

Ward-fees
now abo-
lished,
whether
holding of
the crown,

1749. In lands that are held simple ward of a subject, one *per cent.* of the rent is to be paid, as a yearly feu-duty on account of the marriage, and one *per cent.* as the value of the other casualties consequent upon ward-holding. Where the vassal holds other lands ward of the King, he is not liable in any feu-duty on account of the marriage: In lands holden taxed ward of a subject, two *per cent.* of the sum taxed by the charters, is to be paid yearly, as the value of all the casualties, whether the vassal holds other lands of his Majesty or not. A doubt having arisen, whether the principality-lands were included in this statute, and in what manner the vassals holding of the Prince were to be received; an act passed, 25. *Geo. II. c. 20.* giving to the King the same powers that had been formerly exercised by the Kings of *Scotland* over the lands of the principality, when there was no Prince; in consequence of which, his Majesty, by a warrant under the Privy-Seal, *Jan. 1753*, signified his pleasure, that all lands, formerly holden ward of the Prince, should, for the future, be holden blanch.

Or of a
subject,

Or of the
Prince.

13. The only casualty, or rather forfeiture, proper to feu-holdings, is the loss or tinsel of the feu-right, by the neglect of payment of the

Irritancy
of feus *ob
non solu-
tum cano-
nem.*

the feu-duty for two full years. The act which establishes this irritancy, 1597, c. 246. declares that all feuars so failing in payment, shall lose their feu, in the same manner as if there had been an irritant clause in the right: Yet subsequent practice has made a distinction; where there is no conventional irritancy, the vassal is allowed to purge the legal irritancy at the bar, that is, he may prevent the forfeiture, by making payment before sentence; but where the legal irritancy is fortified by a conventional, he is not allowed to purge, unless where he can give a good reason for the delay of payment, 13. Feb. 1666, *L. Wedderburn*, or where the irritant clause has been doubtfully expressed, 18. Feb. 1680, *E. Mar.*

Non-entry,

Ceases upon the heir's entry.

14. The casualties common to all holdings are non-entry, relief, liferent-escheat, disclamation and purpresture. Non-entry is that casualty, which arises to the superior out of the rents of the feudal subject, through the heir's neglecting to renew the investiture, after his ancestor's death. By the written feudal law, the investiture was necessarily to be renewed, upon every change, either of the superior or vassal, *lib. 2. feud. t. 24. pr.*; but our customs require no renovation upon the death of the superior. This casualty was introduced, that the superior, while he was without a vassal, might be enabled to provide himself in a proper person to serve him; the heir therefore, as soon as by entering he becomes capable of serving his superior, returns by our customs to the full enjoyment of his feu; tho' by the feudal usages, *ibid.* the heir, who neglected

neglected to renew the investiture for year and day, lost his right for ever.

15. The superior is intitled to this casualty, not only where the heir has not obtained himself infeft, but where his retour or seisin is set aside upon nullities, 29. *Feb.* 1628, *E. Nithsdale*; for a seisin declared null is equal to none. From the death of the ancestor, till

the heir is cited by the superior in a process of general declarator of non-entry, the heir loses only the retoured duties of his lands; and he lost these by our former practice, tho' his delay had not been in the least degree blameable, because they were considered to fall as a condition implied in the feudal right, and not as a penalty of transgression: But reasonable excuses are now admitted to liberate the heir, even from the retoured duties before citation, 29.

June 1745, *Chalmer*.

16. For understanding the nature of retoured duties, it must be known, that there was anciently a general valuation of all the lands in *Scotland*, designed both for regulating the proportion of public subsidies, and for ascertaining the quantity of non-entry and relief-duties payable to the superior; which appears by a contract betwixt *K. R. Bruce* and his subjects, *anno* 1327, preserved in the Advocates library, to have been settled at least as far back as the reign of *Alex. III.* This valuation came in course of time, by the improvement of agriculture, and perhaps also by the heightning of the nominal value of our money downwards from the reign of *Rob. III.*, to be thought much too low a standard for the superior's casualties: Wherefore, in all services of heirs, the inquest came

What
non-entry
duties are
due before
citation.

Retoured
duties.

Valuati-
on.

at

Old and
new ex-
tents.

at last to take proof likewise of the present value of the lands contained in the brief, (*quantum nunc valent*) in order to fix these casualties. The first was called the old, and the other the new extent. Tho' both extents were ordained 1474, c. 56. to be specified in all retours made to the chancery upon briefs of inquest, yet by the appellation of retoured duties in a question concerning casualties, the new extent is always understood. The old extent continued the rule for levying public subsidies, (see 1633, c. 1.) till a tax was imposed by new proportions, by 1640, c. 34; and thereafter, in pursuance of a commission appointed August 1649, c. 21. a valuation was made of all the lands in the several counties of Scotland, commonly called the valued rent, which fixed the proportions payable by each county; and according to these, the land-tax, and most of the other public burdens, have been levied since that time.

Valued
rent.

The re-
toured
duty in
feu-hold-
ings;

In teinds;

In rights
of annu-
alrent.

17. In feu-holdings, the feu-duty is retoured as the rent, because the feu-duty is presumed to be, and truly was at first, the rent. The superior therefore of a feu-holding gets no non-entry, before citation in the general declarator; for he would have been intitled to the yearly feu-duty, tho' the fee had been full, *i. e.* tho' there had been a vassal infest in the lands. The superior of teinds gets the fifth part of the retoured duty as non-entry, because the law considers teinds to be worth a fifth part of the rent, (2. 10. 10.) In rights of annualrent which are holden of the granter, the annualrenter becomes his debtor's vassal; and, as the annualrent contained in the right is retoured *valere seipsum*

seipsum, the heir of the creditor, while he continued in non-entry, lost the whole interest of the debt due to him: But by 1690, c. 42. annualrents are only to be retoured to the blanch or other duty contained in the right. As this act does not extend to the non-entry after citation in the action of declarator, care is generally taken, in rights of annualrent, to liberate the creditor from all non-entries, by a special clause.

18. It is because the retoured duty is the presumed rent, that the non-entry is governed by it. If therefore no retour of the lands in non-entry can be produced, nor any evidence brought of the retoured duty, the superior is intitled to the real, or at least, to the valued rent, even before citation. But, if lands which have been retoured shall be sold out in parcels, the non-entry of each parcel will be restricted to that particular proportion of the retoured duties, that such parcel bears to the whole lands, 5. Feb. 1623, *Ker*. In lands formerly holden ward of the King, the heir, in place of the retoured duties, is, by the act 20. Geo. II. c. 50. subjected only to the annual payment of one *per cent.* of the valued rent; which valuation therefore, as well as the old and new extents, is to be set forth in the retour.

In lands not formally retoured.

And in lands that formerly held ward of the crown.

19. The heir, after he is cited by the superior in the action of general declarator, is subjected to the full rents till his entry, because his neglect is less excusable after citation. The decree of declarator, proceeding on this action, intitles the superior to enter into possession, and gives him right to the rents, downward from

Non-entry duties after citation.

Are properly penal.

Non-entry subsequent to ward.

What non-entry duties are *debita fundi*.

In what cases non-entry is not due.

the citation. As this sort of non-entry is properly penal, our law has always restricted it to the retoured duties, if the heir had a probable reason for declining to enter, see *Dirl.* 273, or if he lay under any incapacity, 24. *July* 1677, Lord *Melvil*, or had ground to believe that he held of another superior, 22. *Jan.* 1706, *Maitland*. While ward-holdings subsisted, the wardatar, who had been in possession of the lands, in virtue of the ward, might, even without declarator, continue his possession after the expiration of the ward, till the heir's entry, (which was called non-entry subsequent to the ward); but if he had not attained possession, he was in the common case of other superiors, as to the non-entry. The retoured duties due before citation are *debita fundi*, which the superior, as creditor, may recover by a poinding of the ground; but the right which he has to the full duties that fall after citation, is not as creditor, but as proprietor of the rents; in which character he can make the rents effectual, by a petitory action against tenants and intruders, improperly called a special declarator.

20. In boroughs, each particular burgess holds of the King the special subject contained in his infeftment, and therefore, by the general rule, non-entry ought to take place against them, as it does against other vassals: Yet it is certain, that non-entry does not obtain in burgage holdings, *Hope Min. pr.* 96. because the incorporation of inhabitants holds the borough itself, *i. e.* the whole incorporated subjects, of the King; and there can be no non-entry due in lands granted to communities, because there the vassal never dies: This covers the right of

of particulars from non-entry; for, if non-entry be excluded with regard to the whole, it cannot obtain with regard to any part. Neither can non-entry fall, when the fee is full by infeftments of property, either flowing from, or confirmed by the superior; or even by the reserved liferent of the fiar. It is also excluded, as to a third of the lands, by the terce during the widow's life, and as to the whole of them, by the courtesy during the life of the husband. But it is not excluded by a precept of seisin granted to the heir, till seisin be taken thereon. Non-entry falls by the vassal's resigning his fee to the superior in favour of a third party; and it continues, till seisin be taken by the resignatary, *St. 3. 2. 12.* A superior infeft, who is charged by the heir to enter him, is barred, *personali exceptione*, from the non-entry duties, so long as he refuses to receive him: Where the superior is not entered, and so is not in a capacity to receive the heir, and yet refuses to make up his titles upon a charge, he forfeits the non-entry duties during his life, 1474, c. 58.

21. Three seisins proceeding upon retours, or on precepts granted by the superior to three consecutive heirs, presume that all preceeding non-entries are satisfied. A charter of *novodamus* imports a discharge of all casualties incurred prior to its date, 12. Feb. 1713, *Erskine*. Entry by the heir, on a precept voluntarily granted by the superior, even without a *novodamus*, imports a liberation from all bygone non-entries, incurred before the death of the immediate ancestor, *St. 4. 8. 7.*; but charters or precepts by the superior, upon charges directed

Bygone
non-en-
tries how
excluded.

rected against him, do not exclude his claim for past duties, since these, being granted in obedience to the law, imply a reservation of former claims.

Relief.

22. Relief is that casualty, which intitles the superior to an acknowledgment or consideration from the heir, for receiving him as vassal. It is called relief, because, by the entry of the heir, his fee is relieved out of the hands of the superior. There is no mention of this casualty, in the books of the feus; but by our ancient feudal customs, not only proper vassals, by whatever tenure they held, were liable in relief, *R. M. l. 2. c. 71.* but even naked possessors of lands, paid to their masters upon their entry, a duty much resembling it, *2. Att. c. 23.—Skene, voce Herezelda*; so that it might be thought that feu-holding, when that tenure came to be introduced, ought also to have been subject to it: Nevertheless, relief was found not due in feu-holdings flowing from subjects, unless where it was stipulated in the charter, by a special clause for doubling the feu-duty at the entry of an heir, *24. Nov. 1736, E. Dundonald*; but in feu-rights, holden of the crown, our ancient law is observed; for the precept issuing from the chancery for infefting the heir, directs the Sheriff to take security for the relief, tho' there should be no such clause in the charter. The superior can recover this casualty, either by a pinding of the ground, as a *debitum fundi*, or by a personal action against the heir, who, if the lands hold of the crown, is subjected, by his taking a precept of seisin from the chancery, tho' he should not infeft himself upon it, *12. March*

When due
in feu-
holdings.

It is *debitum fundi*.

1628, L. *Lauriston*. In blanch and feuholdings, a year's blanch or feu-duty is due in name of relief, beside the current year's duty payable in name of blanch or feu-farm. In wardholdings, the superior, if he was in possession by the ward, continued another year in possession on account of the relief; otherwise, he was intitled only to the retoured duty. No composition or abatement of the relief-duties can be given to the crown's vassals, 1587, c. 73. How estimated.

23. Escheat (from *echeoir*, *to happen or fall*) Escheat.
 anciently signified any casualty or forfeiture, by which a right fell from the proprietor, or accrued to another, 2. *Att. c.* 48.; but it has been since restricted to that special forfeiture which falls through a person's being denounced rebel. It is either single or liferent. Single Single Escheat.
 escheat, tho' it does not accrue to the superior, must be explained in this place, because of its coincidence with liferent.

24. After a debt is constituted, either by a formal decree, or by registration of the ground of debt, which to the special effect of execution, is in law accounted a decree; the creditor may obtain letters of horning, issuing from the signet, commanding messengers to charge the debtor to pay or perform his obligation, within a day certain. Where horning proceeds on a formal decree of the Session, the time indulged by law to the debtor is fifteen days; if upon a decree of the commission of teinds, it is ten, Letters of horning.
 1633, c. 8. By our former law, horning on a charge of ten days followed upon the decrees of all inferior judges, 1593, c. 177.—1606, c. 10.; but by our present practice, on fifteen, On what number of days they proceed.
 which is possibly owing to a misinterpretation of

6112, c. 7. Yethorning still proceeds on admiral decrees upon ten days, according to the directions of 1609, c. 15. Where it proceeds on a registred obligation, which specifies the number of days, that number must be the rule; and, if no precise number be mentioned, the charge must be given on fifteen days, which is the term of law, unless where special statute interposes; as in bills, upon which the debtor may be charged on six days, 1681, c. 20.

Their execution.

25. The messenger must execute these letters, (and indeed all summonses) against the debtor, either personally, or at his dwelling-house; and, if he get not access to the house, he must strike six knocks at the gate, and thereafter affix to it a copy of his execution, 1540, c. 75. If payment be not made within the days mentioned in the horning, the messenger, after proclaiming three oyesses at the market-cross of the head borough of the debtor's domicile, and reading the letters there, blows three blasts with a horn, by which the debtor is understood to be proclaimed rebel to the King, for contempt of his authority; after which, he must affix a copy of the execution to the market-cross: This is called the publication of the diligence, or a denunciation at the horn. Where the debtor is not in *Scotland*, he must be charged on sixty days, and denounced at the market-cross of *Edinburgh*, and pier and shore of *Leith*.

Form of denunciation.

Its consequences.

26. Denunciation, if registred within fifteen days, either in the Sheriff's books, 1579, c. 75. or in the general register, 1600, c. 13. as drew after it the rebel's single escheat, *i. e.* the forfeiture of his moveables to the crown. So severe a penalty, with the character of rebel, affixed

affixed to denunciation on civil debts, was probably owing to this, that anciently letters of horning were not granted, but to enforce the performance of facts in one's own power, *Books S. 1. March 1564*; and, when afterwards they came to be issued upon liquid debts, 1584, c. 139. the legislature neglected to soften the penalty: in so much, that those who were denounced even for debt, might be put to death with impunity, till 1612. c. 3. Persons denounced rebels have not a *persona standi in judicio*; they can neither sue nor defend in any action, *Falc. vol. 2. 113*. But this incapacity, being unfavourable, is personal to the rebel, and cannot be pleaded against his assigney.

27. Persons cited to the court of Justiciary may be also denounced rebels for not giving security or not appearing; which denunciations must be made at the head-borough of the county where the court is held, and registred fifteen days thereafter in the books of adjournal of the Justiciary, 1584, c. 140. Single escheat falls without denunciation, upon sentence of death pronounced in any criminal trial; and by special statute, upon one's being convicted of certain crimes, tho' not capital; as perjury and bigamy, 1551, c. 19. deforcement and breach of arrestment, 1581, c. 118. and usury, 1597, c. 247. By the late act abolishing wardholdings, the casualties both of single and liferent escheat are discharged, when proceeding upon denunciation for civil debts; but they are still continued, when they arise from criminal causes. All moveables belonging to the rebel at the time of his rebellion, (whether proceeding upon denunciation, or sentence in a criminal trial), and

Denunciation in criminal cases.

S. escheat may fall without denunciation.

Escheat upon debts, now discharged.

Subjects falling by S. escheat.

all

Bonds
bearing in-
terest fall
not under
it.

But tacks
do.

What
debts are
a burden
upon
single es-
cheat.

all that shall be afterwards acquired by him un-
til relaxation, fall under single escheat. Bonds
bearing interest, because they continue heritable
quoad fiscum by 1661, c. 32. fall not under
it, nor such fruits of heritable subjects as become
due after the term next ensuing the rebellion,
these being reserved for the liferent-escheat.
Tacks or leases, tho' they are heritable as to
succession, (2. 2. 2.) fall under it, unless they
be liferent-tacks, 1617, c. 15. and even life-
rent-tacks, and all other liferent-rights, in the
person of an assigney, fall as single escheat;
infr. §. 32.

28. Our former law allowed the Treasury to
levy the escheat-goods summarily, 1579, c. 75.
without hearing the person denounced upon
any objections that might have been competent
to him; but by the later practice, the right of e-
scheat is not compleat till declarator; whether
the King retains it to himself, or whether, as is
most common, he gifts it to a donatary, 8.
Nov. 1710, *Borthwick*: Every creditor there-
fore of the rebel, whose debt was contracted be-
fore rebellion, and who has used diligence before
declarator, is preferable to the donatary; in so
much that an arrestment used before declarator,
tho' not compleat by a furthcoming, is effectual
against him, 19. *Feb.* 1667, *Glen.* But the
escheat cannot be affected by any debt contract-
ed, nor by any voluntary deed of the rebel after
rebellion, tho' such deed has been granted in
security of a debt prior thereto; since other-
wise, the rebel would have it in his power to
evacuate the escheat. Where the rebel was
before rebellion obliged to grant a right to his
creditor, the right granted after rebellion, in
consequence

consequence of the prior obligation, is not considered as voluntary; because he might have been compelled to it. Voluntary payment, by the rebel before declarator, of debts contracted before the rebellion, is, from the favour of commerce, sustained against the donatary, 10. Dec. 1673, *Veitch*. The right of escheat is, in every case, burdened with the debt of that creditor, on whose horning the escheat fell, 1592, c. 143.; but the crown's power over it, is not restrained in favour of any other creditor, 1551, c. 7.—1579, c. 75.

29. The rebel, if he either pays the debt charged for, or suspends the diligence, may procure letters of relaxation from the horn, which, if published in the same place, and registered fifteen days thereafter, in the same register with the denunciation, 1579, c. 75. have the effect to restore him to his former state; but they have no retrospect, as to the moveables already fallen under escheat, without a special clause for that purpose.

Letters of relaxation.

30. The rebel, if he continues unrelaxed for year and day after rebellion, is construed to be civilly dead: And therefore, where he holds any feudal right, his superiors, as being without a vassal, are intitled, each of them, to the rents of such of the lands belonging to the rebel as holds of himself, during all the days of the rebel's natural life, by the casualty of liferent-escheat; but where the denunciation proceeds upon treason or proper rebellion, the liferent falls to the King, 1535, c. 32.

Liferent-escheat.

31. The liferent escheat of an apparent heir, falls to the superior of the lands, as if the heir were entered: For his neglect ought to be nei-

To whom this right falls.

ther profitable to himself, nor hurtful to his superior. The liferent of a purchaser of lands not infest, cannot fall by this casualty; for, till his right be compleated by seisin, he can have no superior: The rents therefore of such lands, while the rebel is unrelaxed, fall to the King, who, by the rebellion, has right to all the rebel's moveable estate, that is not appropriated to liferent-escheat, 22. *July 1675, Menzies contra Kennedy*. In feudal rights which require no seisin, the liferent accrues to him who would have been superior in the right, had it required seisin. By this rule, the liferent-escheat of a widow having a right of terce, or of a husband having a right of courtesy, falls to the superior of the lands liferented, *Hope, (Horning) 12. July 1622, Maxwell*; and the escheat of ministers glebes and stipends, to the King: And it would appear, that, by the same principle, the liferent-escheat of a liferent-tack, ought to fall to the proprietor of the ground from whom the tack flowed.

What is
compre-
hended
under it.

32. It is that estate only, to which the rebel has a proper right of liferent in his own person, that falls under his liferent-escheat. A liferent-infestment therefore, or a liferent-tack, when assigned, falls not under the assigney's liferent-escheat, but his singe; because the assigney has such right, only during his cedent's life, not his own, (2. 9. 24). Hence if we shall suppose the liferent of the subvassal to fall first, and then that of the vassal; the subvassal's liferent, after it has accrued to the vassal, must make a part of that vassal's singe escheat, and so goes to the King; because the vassal's right to the subvassal's liferent, does not depend on his
own

own life, but on that of the subvassal: But if the liferent-escheat of the vassal should fall first, and thereafter that of the subvassal, the subvassal's escheat must go, as liferent, to his mediate superior, who, by coming in the place of the immediate one, has the same right to the subvassal's liferent, that such immediate superior would have had, if he had not been disabled from taking it, by his being year and day rebel, 26.

Feb. 1623, Sibbald.—24. July 1632, Rule.

33. Tho' neither the superior, nor his donatary, can enter into possession in consequence of this casualty, till decree of declarator; yet that decree, being truly declaratory, has a retrospect, and does not so properly confer a new right, as declare the right formerly constituted to the superior, by the civil death of his vassal. Hence, all charters or heritable bonds, tho' granted prior to the rebellion, and all adjudications, tho' led upon debts contracted before that period, are ineffectual against the liferent, unless seisin be taken thereon (*in cursu rebellionis*), within year and day of the granter's rebellion, after which he becomes *civiliter mortuus*, 28. *Nov. 1710, Ld. Al. Hay.*

It is constituted without declarator.

With what debts it is burdened.

34. Here, as in single escheat, no debt contracted after rebellion can hurt the donatary, at what time soever the diligence thereupon, or the rights granted for its security, may have been compleated; nor any voluntary right granted after that period, tho' in security or satisfaction of prior debts. Tho' the superior's right be fully established by the lapse of year and day, yet it is the decree of declarator upon the gift, which first vests that right in the donatary, that before remained with the superior; see 19.

Donatary's right not compleat, till declarator.

June

Rules of
preference
betwixt
gifts of
liferent.

June 1669, Scot; hence, in a competition between two donataries, the gift first declared, tho' last in date, is preferable. Where neither of the donataries have obtained decree, he is preferred, whose summons was first executed, 31. *Jan. 1635, L. Renton.* All other things being equal, priority in date is the rule of preference.

Difference
betwixt
liferent-e-
sheat and
other ca-
sualties.

35. In other casualties, as ward, non-entry, recognition, &c. the superior is not obliged to acknowledge any right affecting the feu, which is not either confirmed by himself, or established by law, because where the casualty arises from the genuine nature of the feudal grant, his right to it cannot be impaired by any fact of his vassal: But liferent-escheat is burdened with all rights granted before, and compleated in the course of the rebellion, tho' not confirmed by the superior; because that casualty is not so natural to feudal rights as the others, and is only superinduced upon the feudal plan by our special customs.

Simulate
gifts of
escheat.

36. Gifts, whether of single or liferent escheat, when granted for the behoof of the rebel himself, are null, as being simulate, *i. e.* intended for a cover to the rebel against his creditors, 1592, c. 145. This statute presumes simulation, from the rebel's being suffered by the donatary, to possess the escheat goods by himself or near relations; yet a gift may be taken, without challenge, directly to the rebel's son, if such son can prove himself creditor to his father. A presumption of simulation also arises from the gift's being obtained at the rebel's expence, or by his interest; but this may, where the do-

donatary is creditor, he elided by his own oath, 12. Dec. 1673, *Dickson*. Not only second donataries, but the creditors of the rebel, may object simulation against a gift, if their debts were contracted prior thereto; see 10. Jan. 1712, *White*, and the decisions there referred to. The rebel himself may, after relaxation, be constituted donatary; but such gift is considered simply as an extinction of the casualty, *confusione*; and cannot exclude the creditors from the subject of the escheat.

37. Disclamation is that casualty, whereby a vassal forfeits his whole feu to his superior, if he disowns or disclaims him without ground, as to any part of it, *R. M. l. 2. c. 63. §. 6. 9.* Purpresture draws likewise a forfeiture of the whole feu after it, and is incurred by the vassal's incroaching upon any part of his superior's property, or attempting by building, inclosing, or otherwise, to make it his own, *R. M. l. 2. c. 74. §. 1. 8.—1600. c. 5.* In both these feudal delinquencies, the least colour of excuse saves the vassal.

38. All grants from the crown, whether charters, gifts of casualties, or others, proceed on signatures which pass the signet. When the King resided in *Scotland*, all signatures were superscribed by him; but, on the accession of *Ja. VI.* to the crown of *England*, a cachet or seal was made, having the King's name engraved on it, in pursuance of an act of the Privy Council, 4. Apr. 1603, with which all signatures were to be afterwards sealed, that the Lords of exchequer were empowered to pass; and these powers are transferred to the court of exchequer, which was established in *Scotland* after

Disclama-
tion.

Purpre-
sture.

Signa-
tures.

after the union of the two kingdoms in 1707, (1. 3. 17.) Grants of higher consequence, as remissions of crimes, gifts proceeding upon forfeiture, and charters of *novodamus*, must have the King's sign manual for their warrant.

Great seal.

39. If lands holding of the crown were to be conveyed, the charter passed, before the union of the kingdoms in 1707, by the great seal of *Scotland*; and now by a seal substituted in place thereof, by 1707, c. 7. §. 24. Grants of church dignities, during episcopacy, passed also by the great seal; and the commissions to all the principal officers of the crown, as Justice Clerk, King's Advocate, Solicitors, &c. do so at this day. The form of expeding charters under the great seal, is distinctly set forth, *H. Min. Pr.* 86.—89. All rights which subjects may transmit by simple assignation, the King trans-

Privy seal.

mits by the privy seal; as gifts of moveables, or of casualties that require no seisin. The

Quarter seal.

quarter seal, otherwise called the testimonial of the great seal, is appended to gifts of tutory, commissions of brieves issuing from the chancery, and letters of presentation to lands holding of a subject, proceeding upon forfeiture, bastardy or *ultimus haeres*. While the practice continued, of writing charters, and their precepts of seisin, upon separate parchments, this seal was appended to precepts, proceeding on such charters as had passed the great seal.

The use of seals.

40. Seals are to royal grants, what subscription is to rights derived from subjects, and give them authority: They serve also as a check to gifts procured (*subreptione vel obreptione*) by concealing the truth, or expressing a falsehood; for, where this appears, the gift may be stopped

stopped before passing the seals, tho' the signature should have been signed by the King. By 1672, c. 7. all rights passing under the great or privy seal, must be registred in the registers of the great or privy seal *respectively*, before appending the seal.

TIT. 6. *Of the Right which the Vassal acquires by getting the Feu.*

UNDER the *dominium utile* which the vassal acquires by the feudal right, is comprehended the property of whatever is considered as part of the lands, whether of houses, woods, inclosures, &c. above ground; or of coal, limestone, minerals, &c. under ground. Mills have by the generality of our lawyers been deemed a separate tenement, and so not carried by a charter or disposition, without either a special clause conveying mills, or the erection of the lands into a barony. It must be admitted, that a mill is capable to be made a separate tenement by separating it from the lands by a disposition, since it is, in that case, susceptible of a seisin; but, before such separation, it is entirely *quæstio voluntatis*, whether it will be carried by a conveyance of the lands: And it is certain, that, if a proprietor builds a mill on his own lands, it will be carried by his entail or by a retour, without mentioning it. If the lands disposed be attricted, or thirled to another mill, the purchaser is not allowed to build a new corn-mill on his property, even tho'

Dominium utile.

What is comprehended under it. Mills.

tho' he should offer security, that it shall not hurt the thirle; which is introduced for preventing daily temptations to fraud, *New Coll.* 54.

Dove-
cotes.

2. Proprietors are prohibited to build dove-cotes, unless their yearly rent, lying within two miles thereof, extend to ten chalders of victual, 1617, c. 19.: All dove-cotes are presumed to have been built before this prohibition, if the contrary be not proved. A purchaser of lands, with a dove-cote, is not obliged to pull it down, tho' he should not be qualified to build one in terms of the act; but, if it becomes ruinous, he cannot rebuild it, 19. *Jan.*

Right of
brewing.

1731, *Kinloch*. The right of brewing, tho' not expressed in the grant, is implied in the nature of property, *P. Falc.* 14.; as are also the rights of fishing, fowling and hunting, in so far as they are not restrained by statute.

Steelbow-
goods.

Steelbow-goods, *i. e.* corns, straw, cattle or instruments of tillage, delivered by a landlord to the tenant upon his entry, for the like in quantity and quality, to be redelivered to him at the end of the lease, pass with the lands to the purchaser, if the purchase be made by a rental; for, as the tenant has been thereby enabled to give an higher rent, for which the purchaser is presumed to pay a just price, the purchaser would lose that very rent for which he has paid, if the steel-bow-goods were not esteemed part of his purchase: But, in a bargain which is made without reference to a rental, the steel-bow, which is in itself a moveable subject, is not carried by the disposition.

Regalia.

3. There are certain rights naturally consequent on property, which are deemed to be reserved by the crown as *regalia*, unless they be specially

cially conveyed. Gold and silver mines are of this sort: The first universally; and the other, where three half pennies of silver can be extracted from the pound of lead, 1424, c. 12. (three half pennies in the reign of *Ja. I.* is equal to about two shillings five pennies of our present *Scots* money, according to Mr *Ruddiman Pref. to Diplom. Scot. p. 82.*). These were, by our ancient law, annexed to the crown; but, by an unprinted act, 1592, N^o. 12. they are dissolved from it; and every freeholder (that is, as to this question, every proprietor, tho' he should hold his lands of a subject, 8. *Dec. 1739, D. Argyll*) is intitled to a grant of the mines within his own lands, with the burden of delivering to the crown a tenth of what shall be brought up. This unprinted statute mentions also tin and copper mines, as if these were *inter regalia*.

Gold and
silver
mines.

4. Salmon-fishing is likewise a right understood to be reserved by the crown, if it be not expressly granted; but forty years possession thereof, where the lands are either erected into a barony, or granted with the general clause of fishings, establishes the full right of the salmon-fishing in the vassal. A charter of lands, within which any of the King's forests lie, does not carry the property of such forest to the vassal. In charters granted with the right of a free forestry, the vassal was intitled to the privileges belonging to a King's forest, which see in 1592, c. 128.—1594, c. 210. These were so grievous to the neighbouring proprietors, that the court of Session gave their opinion for applying to the crown, against the

Salmon-
fishing.

Forestry.

future erection of lands into a forestry, 24. June 1680, M. Athole.

Res publicae now
inter regalia.

5. All the subjects, which were by the Roman law accounted *res publicae*, as rivers, highways, ports, &c. are, since the introduction of feus, held to be *inter regalia*, or *in patrimonio principis*; and hence, incroachment upon a highway is said to infer purpresture, R. M. l. 2. c. 74. §. 1. No person has the right of a free port without a special grant, which implies a power in the grantee to levy anchorage and shore-dues, and an obligation upon him to uphold the port in good condition. In this class of things, our forefathers reckoned fortalices, or small places of strength, originally built for the defence of the country, either against foreign invasions, or civil commotions; but these now pass with the lands in every charter. The privilege of barony, tho' it carries no right of itself to the *regalia* without a special grant, has the effect to transmit from the vassal to his heir or singular successor, such of them as the vassal himself had formerly a right to, 15. Jan. 1668, E. Argyll.

Pertinents.

6. The vassal acquires right by his grant, not only to the lands themselves, but to all that has been possessed forty years as pertinent thereof. But, 1. If the lands in the grant are marked out by special limits, the vassal is circumscribed by the tenor of his own right, which excludes every subject without these limits, from being pertinent of the lands, 17. Nov. 1671, Young. 2. A right by an express infestment is preferable, *caeteris paribus*, to one acclaimed only as pertinent. 3. Where neither party is infest *per expressum*, the mutual promiscuous

promiscuous possession by both, of a subject as pertinent, resolves into a commonty of the subject possessed: But, if one of the parties has exercised all the acts of property of which the subject was capable, while the possession of the other was confined to pasturage only, or to casting feal and divot, the first is to be deemed sole proprietor, and the other, to have merely a right of servitude.

7. As barony is a *nomen universitatis*, and unites the several parts contained in it, into one individual right, the general conveyance of a barony carries with it all the different tenements of which it consists, tho' they should not be specially enumerated (and this holds even without erection into a barony, in lands that have been united under a special name, 23. *March 1622, Ld. Borthwick.*). Hence likewise, the possession by the vassal of the smallest part of the barony-lands, preserves to him the right of the whole.

Privileges
of barony.

8. The vassal is intitled, in consequence of his property, to levy the rents of his own lands, and to recover them from his tenants, by an action for rent before his own court; and from all other possessors and intromitters, by an action of mails and duties before the Sheriff. He can also remove from his lands, tenants who have no leases, and he can grant tacks or leases to others. A tack is a contract of location, whereby the use of land or any other immoveable subject, is set to the lessee or tacksmen for a certain yearly rent, either in money, the fruits of the ground, or services. It ought to be reduced into writing, as it is a right concerning lands; tacks therefore, that are

Tack or
lease.

Verbal
tack.

are given verbally, to endure for a term of years, are good against neither party, for more than one year, 16. *July 1636, Keith.* An obligation to grant a tack is as effectual against the granter, as a formal tack. A liferenter, having a temporary property in the fruits, may grant tacks to endure for the term of his own liferent.

What is
included
in the
right of
tack.

9. The tacksmen's right is limited to the fruits which spring up annually from the subject set, either naturally, or by the industry of the tacksmen; he is not therefore intitled, to any of the growing timber above ground, and far less to the minerals, coal, clay, &c. under ground, the use of which consumes the substance, 15.

Tacks,
tho' in
them-
selves per-
sonal,

Feb. 1668, Colquhoun. Tacks are, like other contracts, personal rights in their own nature, and consequently ineffectual against singular successors in the lands, whose right intitles them to remove tenants from their own property, notwithstanding any tack they may have got from the former proprietor. To make tacks real, they were sometimes executed of old in the form of charters, and perfected by seisin; but all tacks were, by 1449, c. 17. for the encouragement of agriculture, declared effectual to the tacksmen for the full time of their endurance, into whose hands soever the lands might come.

Are now
in certain
respects
real rights.

Requisites
of a real
tack.

10. To give a written tack the benefit of this statute, it must mention the special tack-duty payable to the proprietor, which, tho' small, if it be not elusory, secures the tacksmen; and it must be followed by possession, which supplies the want of a seisin; If therefore the setter (or lessor) shall be divested of the property before the term of the tenant's entry, the tack

It must be
followed
by posses-
sion.

tack is not good against a singular successor; for a tenant can have no possession on his tack till that term, *Dirl.* 346. If a tack does not express the term of entry, the entry will commence at the next term after its date, agreeably to the rule, *quod purè debetur, praesentidie debetur*. If it does mention the ish, *i. e.* the term at which it is to determine, it is good for one year only; but, if the intention of parties to continue it for more than one year, should appear from any clause in the tack, *e. g.* if the tenant should be obliged to lead annually a certain quantity of coals, it is sustained for two years, as the *minimum*, 22. *Nov.* 1737, *Ridpath*. Tacks granted to perpetuity, or with an indefinite ish, fall not under the statute, *Gilm.* *June* 1666, *Dobie*. If a tack has the essential characters of a contract, it is effectual against the granter and his heirs; tho' it should have none of the solemnities necessary to bring it within the statute, *e. g.* tho' it were granted for perpetuity, 26. *July* 1631, *Grichton*, or were not cloathed with possession.

And the
ish must be
definite.

11. Tho' this act mentions only tacks of land, custom has by analogy extended it to tacks of mills, salmon-fishings and coleries, all which are subjects *fundo annexa*; but tacks of houses within borough do not fall within the act, because these are, by the more common practice, set from year to year, *F.* 5. *Feb.* 1680, *Rae*, cited in *Dictionary*, *vol.* 2. *p.* 417. The statute does not defend the tacksmen against the landlord's superior, when the fee opens to him by non-entry; for the superior is not bound to regard any deed of his vassal, not consented to by himself; but, upon the heir's entry,

Tacks of
mills,

And of
houses
within
borough.

try, the tacksmen's right, which before lay dormant, revives, and continues for as many years, as the tack had to run when he was first excluded. The same doctrine obtained in ward.

A clause
of retention,
if good
against
singular
successors.

12. If the tack-duty be made payable, not to the fether himself, but to one of his creditors; or if the tacksmen be allowed retention thereof, by his lease, in payment of a debt due to himself by the fether, such clause is unavailable against singular successors; for the statute was only designed to secure tacksmen in their possessions, not the creditors to whom the tack-duty might be made payable. The contrary doctrine would render tacks equal to rights of wadset, and consequently, as tacks need not be registered, would destroy the security intended for purchasers by the records: Singular successors therefore can, in such case, sue the tacksmen for the duties contained in their tacks; but where the tacksmen himself is the creditor, the clause of retention will defend him, as to all tack-duties prior to litiſcontestation, or other legal interpellation, *Falc. vol. 1. 240.* Tacks, being *quodammodo* real rights, intitle the tacksmen to pursue action of mails and duties, or of removing, against possessors; and, if he has been seven years in possession upon his tack, he has the benefit of a possessory judgment, whereby he may continue his possession, even against one having a preferable right, till his tack be formally reduced, 4. 1. 25.

Tacks are
stricti juris.

13. Tacks necessarily imply a *delectus personae*, a choice by the fether of a proper person for his tenant. Hence the conveyance of a tack, which is not granted to assignees, is ineffectual without the landlord's consent. A right
of

of tack, tho' it be heritable, falls under the *jus mariti*, because it cannot be separated from the labouring cattle and implements of tillage, which are moveable subjects, *Jan. 1734, Hume*. A tack therefore granted to a single woman falls by her marriage, because the marriage, which is a legal conveyance thereof to the husband, cannot be annulled. This implied exclusion of assigneys, is however limited to voluntary, and does not extend to necessary assignments, as an adjudication of a tack by the tackfman's creditor; but a tack, expressly excluding assigneys, cannot be carried even by adjudication, *Falc. vol. 1. 217*. Liferent-tacks, because they import a higher degree of right in the tackfman, than tacks for a definite term, may be assigned, unless assigneys be specially excluded: These therefore, when granted to a woman, do not fall by marriage, tho' *Craig* asserts the contrary, 279. §. 6.

Liferent
tacks are
assignable

14. It is not a fixed point, whether a tackfman may subfet the lands, without an express power of subfetting. Lord *Stair*, 2. 9. 22. and *Mackenzie, h. t.* affirm he cannot; but it was adjudged, *Harc. 955*. that he might, even where the tack excluded assigneys *per expressum*; far more ought he to have this power, where the exclusion of assigneys is only implied. A subtack requires the same solemnities, and has the same effects, as a principal tack: It defends against singular successors; and the principal tackfman cannot, by renouncing his tack to the setter, hurt the right of the subtackfman. An assigney to a tack is personally liable to the setter for the current tack-duties, while his assignation subsists; but without extinguishing the

Tackf-
men may
subfet.

Effect of
a subtack.

the obligation on the original tackfman. A subrackfman may pay his tack-duty to the principal tackfman whole tenant he is; but the fetter is preferable on it, in as far as it remains unpaid, in a competition with the other creditors of the principal tackfman, 31. *Jan.* 1665. *Anderson.*

Tacit relocation,

15. If neither the fetter nor tackfman shall properly discover their intention, to have the tack dissolved at the term fixed for its expiration, they are understood, or presumed, to have entered into a new tack upon the same terms with the former, *l.* 14. *loc. cond.*; which is called *tacit relocation*, and continues till the landlord warns the tenant to remove, or the tenant renounces his tack to the landlord: This obtains also in the case of moveable tenants, who possess from year to year without written tacks.

Has no place in judicial tacks.

In judicial tacks set by the court of Session, where cautioners are always interposed, tacit relocation cannot subsist on the same footing with the written tack, because the cautioners in these tacks are loosed from their engagement, at the expiration of the term to which they had bound themselves; neither is there any deed of the court, by which their consent to continue such tack can be inferred, for they are not in use to warn their tackfmen to remove: Judicial tackfmen are therefore accountable as factors, after the expiration of their tacks, *Dec.* 1719, *Bethune.*

Rentals.

16. Rentals (now seldom used) were a sort of liferent-tacks, *arg.* 1587, *c.* 68. granted, either to the lineal successors of the antient possessors, or to those whom the landlord designed to favour as such, for the old tack-duty. These tackfmen had the name of kindly tenants or rentallers,

rentallers; and at their entry they paid a certain sum, as a present to the landlord for their right, more or less, according to the custom of the barony. If the rental was not delivered in writing to the rentaller, it could not operate against singular successors; but an inrollment of the tenant as a rentaller, in the landlord's rental book, was effectual against the landlord himself, and his heirs. A rentaller who assigned his right without the landlord's consent, was punished for his ingratitude, by the forfeiture of his rental; whereas, in common tacks, the assignation is only null, except in the case of a legal assignation by marriage, which infers a forfeiture, because the marriage cannot be annulled. Where the rental was granted to the rentaller personally, it was found to last, only during the joint lives of the setter and rentaller, 5. *July 1625, Ayton*; contrary both to the nature of liferent-tacks, and to the opinion of *V. Stair*, 2. 9. 20. Where it was granted to the rentaller and his heirs, it determined upon the death of the first heir, 13. *March 1632, Ahan-nay*, conformable to l. 14. *C. de usufr.*

17. In tacks of land, the setter is commonly bound to put all the houses and office-houses, necessary for the farm, in good condition at the tenant's entry; and the tenant must keep them, and leave them so at his removal. But in tacks of houses, the setter must not only deliver to the tenant the subject set, in tenantable repair at his entry, but uphold it in that repair, during the whole years of the tack; and, if it should become insufficient before the ish, tho' without the setter's fault, the tack-duty must either be entirely remitted, or suffer an abatement,

A rental-
ler who
assigns,
forfeits his
rental.

How long
rentals
endure.

Obligati-
ons upon
the setter,
in tacks
of land.

In tacks
of houses.

in proportion to the damage sustained by the tenant, 2. Jan. 1667, *Hamilton*.—*P. Falc.* 10.

Obligations on the tacksmen.

18. A tenant, if his landlord should refuse the victual-rent, when offered in due time, is liable only for the prices, as fixed for the Sheriff fiars of that year; but, if he has not timeously offered his rent in kind, he must pay the value at the ordinary prices of the country; and over and above, make good to the heritor the damages incurred by him through the not delivery, *e. g.* by his being disabled from performing a contract with his victual merchant. If the inclemency of the weather, inundation, or calamity of war, should have brought upon the crop an extraordinary damage (*plus quam tolerabile*), the landlord had, by the *Roman* law,

In case of sterility.

no claim for any part of the tack-duty: If the damage was more moderate, he might exact the full rent, *l. 25. §. 6. locati*. It is no where defined, what degree of sterility or devastation makes a loss not to be born; but the general rule of the *Roman* law seems to be made ours,

As to public burdens.

by *Dirl.* 108. Tenants are obliged to pay no cesses nor public burdens, to which they are not bound by their tacks; but the law itself divides the burden of the schoolmaster's salary, equally between the proprietor and tenant, 1696, *c. 26*. Clauses were formerly thrown into

As to services.

most tacks, obliging tenants to services indefinitely, under the name of arriage and carriage, or services used and wont; but, by the act abolishing ward-holdings, tenants are exempted from all services, that shall not be specially mentioned, either in their tacks, or in a separate writing; except mill-services, which continue as formerly.

19. Tacks may be evacuated during their currency, 1. In the same manner as feu-rights, by the tacksmen's running in arrear of his tack-duty for two years together. This irritancy, tho' it was, by our former practice, triable only by the court of session, may now be declared before the Judge-ordinary, by *Act. S. 14. Dec. 1756.*; but it may be prevented, by the tenant's making payment at the bar before sentence. 2. Where the tenant either runs in arrear of one year's rent, or leaves his farm unlaboured at the usual season, the Judge-ordinary, when applied to by the proprietor, is required by the said *Act. S.* to ordain the tenant to give caution for the arrears, and for the rent of the five following crops, if the tack shall subsist so long; otherwise, to decern him to remove, as if the tack were at an end. 3. Tacks may be evacuated at any time, by the contrary consent of parties, *e. g.* by the tacksmen's renunciation accepted by the proprietor; but verbal renunciations may be refuted from.

Destitution of tacks, during their currency.

20. The tenant, who intends to quit his possession at the ish of his tack, ought to deliver a written renunciation thereof to his landlord, forty days before the term of *Whitsunday* at, or immediately preceeding the ish. The landlord, when he wanted to remove a tenant whose tack was expiring, or who possessed without a tack, might, by our old custom, upon a previous verbal notice given to him, eject him *viâ facti*, the very day after the term at which he was obliged to remove, *Cr. 268. §. 4.* But by 1555, *c. 39.* the tenant, upon a precept signed by the landlord, must be warned forty days preceeding the term of *Whitsunday* before described, personally,

Upon their determination.

Warning.

In tene-
ments
within
borough.

sonally, or at his dwelling-house, to remove at that term, with his family and effects. This precept must be also executed on the ground of the lands, and thereafter read in the parish-church where the lands lie, after the morning service, and affixed to the most patent door thereof. *Whitsunday*, tho' it be a moveable feast, is, in questions of removing, fixed to the fifteenth of *May*, by 1690, c. 39. In warnings from tenements within borough, it is sufficient that the tenant be warned forty days before the ish of the tack, whether it be *Whitsunday* or *Martinmas*, 21. Nov. 1671, *Riddel.*; and in these, the ceremony of chalking the door is sustained as warning, when proceeding upon a verbal order from the proprietor, tho' without the warrant of a magistrate, 24. *June* 1709, *Barton.*

Warning
is not
now pre-
cisely ne-
cessary.

21. This process of warning was precisely necessary for founding an action of removing against tenants, till the above quoted *Act. S.* 14. *Dec.* 1756, which leaves it in the option of the proprietor, either to use the order prescribed by 1555, c. 39, or to bring his action of removing before the Judge-ordinary; which if it be called forty days before the said term of *Whitsunday*, shall be held as equal to a warning. Where the tenant is bound, by an express clause of his tack, to remove at the ish of it without warning, such obligation is, by the said act, declared to be a warrant for letters of horning, upon which, if the landlord charge his tenant forty days before the said *Whitsunday*, the judge is authorised to eject him within six days after the term of removing stipulated by the tack,

22. Actions

22. Actions of removing might, even before this act, have been pursued without any previous warning, 1. Against vitious possessors, *i. e.* persons who had seized the possession by force, or who without any legal title had intruded into it, after the last possessor had given it up. 2. Against possessors who had a naked tolerance. 3. Against tenants who had run in arrear of rent during the currency of their tacks, *P. Falc.* 13.—4. Against such as had sold their lands, and yet continued to possess after the term of the purchaser's entry; for such possession is without a title. Upon the same ground, warning was not required, in removings against possessors of liferented lands, after the death of the liferenter who died in the natural possession: But if he possessed by tenants, warning was necessary against these tenants, that they might have time to look out for new farms, *Cr.* 270. §. 13. —16. *Feb.* 1628, *Thomson*; as it also was, against the representatives of a liferent tacksmen, after the tacksman's death, 13. *Feb.* 1630, *L. Rowallan*.

Extraordinary actions of removing.

23. A landlord's title in a removing, let it be ever so lame, cannot be challenged by a tenant whose tack flows immediately from him; but, if he is to insist against tenants, not his own, his right must be perfected by infeftment, unless it be such as requires no infeftment, as terce, &c. The seisin itself is a sufficient title, against tenants who cannot shew a better; but, if the defender has a real right in the lands, the pursuer must also produce the relative charter. The seisin must be dated prior to the precept of warning; otherwise the precept will be null, as granted *a non habente potestatem*, and

The landlord's title in a removing.

and consequently, the removing also which is founded on it; but, if an apparent heir be infest on his service, before citation in the removing, his bare right of apparency will support the previous warning, 28. *July 1637, E. Haddington*. If a proprietor is to remove a tenant, whose right is derived from one who has been in possession, he ought to make that person a party to the suit.

Violent profits.

24. The defender, in a removing, must, before offering any defence which is not instantly verified, give caution to pay to the fetter the violent profits, if they should be decreed against him, 1555, c. 39. These are so called, because the law considers the tenant's possession after the warning, as violent. They are estimated, in tenements within borough, to double the rent; and in lands, to the highest profits the pursuer could have made of them, by possessing them either by a tenant, or by himself.

Effect of warning not insisted in.

Decrees of removing effectual against assignees.

25. If the action of removing shall be let fall, or if the landlord shall, after using warning, accept of rent from the tenant, for any term subsequent to that of the removal, he is presumed to have changed his mind, and tacit relocation takes place. All actions of removing against the principal or original tacksmen, and decrees thereupon, if the order be used, which is set forth *supr.* §. 21., are, by the act of Sederunt, 1756, declared to be effectual against the assignees to the tack, or subtenants.

The landlord's hypothec in the fruits.

26. The landlord has, in security of his tack-duty, over and above the tenant's personal obligation, a tacit pledge or hypothec, not only in the fruits, as he had by the *Roman law*, l. 7. *pr. in quib. caus. pign. contr.*—l. 61. §. 8. *de*

defurt., but in the cattle pasturing on the ground. The corn, and other fruits, are hypothecated for the rent of that year whereof they are the crop, *Mackenzie, h. t. §. 12.*; for which they remain affected; tho' the landlord should not use his right for years together, 25. *July 1623, Hay.* In virtue of this hypothec, the landlord can,
 1. Retain the corns upon the ground, tho' a creditor of the tenant should have legal diligence, ready to be executed against them by poiding. If the poiding be attempted before the term of payment of the tenant's rent, the landlord may stop it, unless sufficient security be offered to him for that year's rent, 21. *Jan. 1737, Craufurd:* And if the tack-duty be payable in victual, the security must be offered for the tenant's specifical delivery of the farm-bolls, *Falc. vol. 1. 252.* Tho' the poider should leave corns on the ground, sufficient for answering the rent, the landlord may stop the diligence; because what is so left, may be destroyed or carried off, before the term of payment, till which term the landlord cannot make it his own: But he is not at liberty to stop a creditor's poiding after the term, if sufficiency of corns be left for the rent; because he can then appropriate what is so left to his own payment.

Its effects
 either by
 retention,

27. This hypothec intitles the landlord, 2. To recover all corns that are carried off from the tenant, either by legal diligence, or voluntary purchase. Tho' a tenant, who is liable in silver rent, cannot well pay it, but by the sale of his corns, the landlord's right extends in practice, even to that case; and our older decisions carried it still farther, against purchasers in public markets, 29. *March 1639, Hay,*
 contrary

Or recovery of the
 corns.

contrary both to equity and public policy. The landlord may bring back the corns, without the authority of a judge, if he use his right *de recenti*, 11. Dec. 1672, *Crichton*; unless where a creditor has made them his own by compleat legal diligence, 24. June 1745, *Curry*. But in every case where the landlord has not exercised his right of recovery immediately, he must make it good by a common process.

Either *via facti*,

Or by a common action.

Hypothec on cattle.

28. The whole cattle on the ground, considered as a quantity, are hypothecated for a year's rent, one after another successively. The landlord may apply this hypothec for payment of the past year's rent, at any time within three months from the last conventional term of payment, K. 76, after which it ceases for that year. As the tenant may increase the subject of this hypothec, by purchasing oxen, sheep, &c. so he can impair it, by selling part of his stock; but if the landlord suspects the tenant's management, he may, by sequestration or pouding, make his right, which was before general upon the whole stock, special upon every individual. A superior has also a hypothec for his feu-duty, of the same kind with that just explained, *Mackenzie, h. t. §. 12.*

Hypothec on *inveſta et illata*.

29. In tacks of houses, breweries, shops and other tenements, which have no natural fruits, the furniture and other goods brought into the subject set (*inveſta et illata*), are hypothecated to the landlord for one year's rent, 7. Dec. 1630, *Dick*: But the tenant may by sale impair this hypothec, as he might that of cattle in rural tenements; and indeed, in the particular case of a shop, the tenant rents it for no other purpose, than as a place of sale.

Tit. 7.

Tit. 7. Of the Transmission of Rights, by Confirmation and Resignation.

A Vassal may transmit his feu; either to universal successors, as heirs; or to singular successors, *i. e.* those who acquire by gift, purchase, or other singular title. This last sort of transmission is either voluntary, by disposition; or necessary, by adjudication.

Transmis-
sion of feu-
dal rights.

2. By the first feudal rules, no superior could be compelled to receive any vassal in the lands, other than the heir expressed in the investiture; for the superior alone had the power of ascertaining, to what order of heirs the fee granted by himself was to descend, *F. 24. Feb. 1685, Cleland.* Hence *Craig* justly maintained, that no vassal could limit the descent of his feu, to any new order of heirs, without the superior's consent, *p. 344. §. 20.* But this right of refusal in the superior was restrained, 1. In the case of creditors apprisers or adjudgers, whom superiors were obliged to receive upon payment of a year's rent, 1469, *c. 37.*—1672, *c. 19.* 2. In the case of purchasers of bankrupt estates, who were put on the same footing with adjudgers, by 1681, *c. 17.* joined with 1690, *c. 20.* The Crown refuses no voluntary disponent, on his paying a composition to the Exchequer, of a sixth part of the valued rent.

The vas-
sal's power
to transmit
to a singu-
lar succes-
sor.

3. Notwithstanding the general rule above-mentioned, indirect methods were in practice fallen upon, to compel superiors to receive all singular successors; *e. g.* by the vassal-disponent's

A a

granting

Is now
more ab-
solute than
formerly.

granting bond to the disponent, who thereupon adjudged the lands: And now, by 20. *Geo. II. for abolishing wardholdings*, the legislature, looking upon vassals as proprietors, and not merely at beneficiaries, has directed superiors to enter all singular successors, who shall have got from the vassal a disposition, containing procuratory of resignation; they always receiving the fees or casualties that law intitles them to, on a vassal's entry, *i. e.* a year's rent. As this was enacted, merely for the more expeditious making up of the titles of purchasers, without recurring to the former tedious methods, it does not seem to lay superiors under the necessity of entering incorporations, by which the whole casualties of superiority would be for ever lost to them.

Base dis-
positions.

4. Dispositions, to be holden of the disponent, are transmissions only of the property, the superiority remaining as formerly. This sort does not necessarily require a confirmation by the superior, because his vassal continues the same, notwithstanding the subaltern right granted to the subvassal; but, because the subvassal's property is exposed to the hazard of all the casualties falling by his immediate superior, where confirmation is not adhibited, it is commonly applied for; and, when granted, it secures against all such casualties as entirely carry off, or exhaust the property, *e. g.* forfeiture, recognition, &c.; but can hardly be explained into a renunciation by the superior, of his other casualties arising from the nature of the feudal contract, which infer only a temporary right to the rents, or to any part thereof, *St. 2. 3. 28.*

Confirma-
tions of
base
rights.
their
effect.

5. Base rights, 2. 3. 8. had by our ancient law as strong effects as public; but as they might, before establishing the registers, have been kept quite concealed from all but the granter and receiver, it was enacted for the security of purchasers, by 1540. c. 105. that whoever purchased lands on an onerous title, and attained possession thereof, should be preferred to persons claiming under a private right, tho' it should bear a date prior to his. Tho' the opposition runs by the words of the statute between onerous rights cloathed with possession, and private rights, the act was so explained by custom, that an onerous and public right, whether followed by possession or not, was preferred to a private right not followed by possession. Where the base right came to be cloathed with possession, it was esteemed effectual from that period; because the presumption of simulation arising from its latency was thereby taken off: And indeed, after the act 1617, which ordained the registration of all deeds, private as well as public, the most slender acts of possession were admitted in support of the base right. As this distinction, which was no longer necessary after the establishment of our records, rendered the rights of lands extremely precarious, by frequently resting them on an uncertain proof by witnesses, of the disponent's possession, all infestments are by 1693. c. 13. declared to be for the future preferable, according to the dates of their several registrations; without respect to the former distinctions of base and public, or of being cloathed and not cloathed with possession.

Base rights postponed to public by our former law.

That distinction is now taken off.

6. Dispositions

Public
rights.

Confirma-
tion of
public
rights.

Seisin ta-
ken on a
precept
both *a me*
and *de me*,
how con-
strued.

Confirma-
tions of
public
rights,
their pre-
ference.

6. Dispositions to be holden of the granter's superior may be perfected, either by confirmation, or resignation; and therefore, they generally contain, both precept of seisin and procuratory of resignation. When the receiver is to compleat his right in the first way, he takes seisin upon the precept; but such seisin is ineffectual without the superior's confirmation; for the disponent cannot be deemed a vassal, till the superior receive him as such, or confirm the holding. This confirmation used formerly to be adhibited by the superior, upon the back of the charter or disposition granted by the vassal; but, since the acts imposing certain duties upon stamped paper and parchment, is always written in a charter apart, in which the superior recites at full length the charter confirmed, and then subjoins his own confirmation or ratification thereof. By the usual style in the transmission of lands, the disposition contains an obligation and precept of infeftment, both *a me* and *de me*, in the option of the disponent; upon which, if seisin is taken indefinitely, it is construed in favour of the disponent, to be a base infeftment, because a public right is null without confirmation: But, if the receiver shall afterwards obtain the superior's confirmation, it is considered, as if it had been originally a public right; see 15. July 1680, B. of Aberdeen.

7. Where two several public rights of the same subject are confirmed by the superior, their preference is governed by the dates of the confirmations, not of the infeftments confirmed; because it is the confirmation which compleats a public right. This was specially provided

provided in the case of confirmations from the crown, by 1578, c. 66.; but the reason of the rule applies to all confirmations, whether flowing from the crown or a subject-superior; and therefore that statute must be considered merely as declaratory; and not as having introduced any new rule. In confirmations from the crown, it is the charter first passing the seals that is preferred, because the seals are in place of the royal superscription, 26. *Feb.* 1680, *L. Clackmannan*; unless he, who has presented the first signature, has been obstructed in completing his right, by the indirect methods or nimious diligence of a competing party, 6. *Dec.* 1678, *Mill*.

Prefer-
ence in
confirma-
tions from
the crown.

8. Tho' a public right becomes by the superior's confirmation valid from its date, *St.* 2. 3. 28., yet if any mid impediment intervene betwixt that period and the confirmation, to hinder the two from being conjoined, *e. g.* if the granter of a public right should afterwards grant a base right to another, upon which seisin is taken before the superior's confirmation of the first, the confirmation will have effect only from its own date, and consequently the base right first compleated, will carry the property of the lands, preferable to the public one.

Effect of
confirma-
tion,

9. Resignation is that form of law, by which a vassal surrenders his feu to his superior; and it is either *ad perpetuam remanentiam*, or *in favorem*. In resignations *ad remanentiam*, where the feu is resigned, to the effect that it may remain with the superior, the superior, who before had the superiority, comes by the resignation, to have also the property of the lands resigned: And as his infestment in the
lands

Resignati-
on.

*Ad perpe-
tuam re-
manenti-
am.*

lands still subsisted, notwithstanding the right by which he had given his vassal the property, therefore, upon the vassal's resignation, the superior's right of property revives, and is consolidated with the superiority, without the necessity of a new investment; so that resignations *ad remanentiam* are truly extinctions, not transmissions of a right. The property returns by this resignation to the superior, with all the burdens charged upon it by the vassal, which could have affected any singular successor, as feus, tacks, rights of annualrent, &c. ; for the superior's voluntary accepting of the resignation from the vassal, implies a confirmation of all these. The reason has been already given, why it is otherwise, when the fee returns to the superior in virtue of any feudal casualty, 2. 5. 35. This sort of resignation was not ordained to be recorded by the act 1617, for registering real rights; which omission, because it weakened the security of singular successors, is now supplied by 1669, c. 3.

How burdened.

Resignation in favorem.

Does not divest the resigner.

Till seisin by the resignatory.

10. Resignations *in favorem*, are made, not with an intention, that the property resigned should remain with the superior, but that it should be again given by him, in favour either of the resigner himself, or of a third party: They have not therefore the effect, like resignations *ad remanentiam*, of divesting the resigner; for the surrender is not attended with any purpose, or *causa habilis* of transferring the property to the superior, but is only used as a step to convey it to another; consequently the fee remains in the resigner, till the person in whose favour resignation is made, gets his right from the superior perfected by seisin,
Cr.

Cr. 436. §. 17. And it is, because resignations *in favorem*, are but incomplete personal deeds, that law has made no provision for recording them. Hence, the first seisin on a second resignation is preferable to the last seisin upon the first resignation; but the superior, accepting a second resignation, whereupon a prior seisin may be taken in prejudice of the first resignatory, is liable in damages. In all resignations, the vassal surrenders the lands, by giving the symbol of staff and baston on his knee to the superior, who in the case of a resignation *in favorem*, immediately delivers it to the disponent: And upon this fact, a notarial instrument is extended, which compleats the act of resignation. A pen is in practice used for a staff, in the ceremony of resigning.

Form of
resigna-
tion.

11. Resignation may be made either by the vassal himself, *propriis manibus*, or by his procurator, in virtue of the procuratory or power to resign, contained in the disposition. If the vassal resign *ad remanentiam*, *propriis manibus*, he himself, as well as the notary, must sign the instrument, 1555, c. 38.; which statute is expressed in general terms, tho' it was perhaps intended to take place, only where the resigner had subscribed no previous obligation or conveyance, that such resignation might not rest solely on the credit of the notary. Tenements within borough had been long resigned erroneously, by the symbols of earth and stone, and such resignations were sustained, in respect of the universal *communis error*, 7. Feb. 1708, *Calderwood*: But, by Act S. 11. Feb. that year, all symbols are prohibited in resignations, other than staff and baston.

Resignati-
on *propri-*
is manibus.

Symbols
of resigna-
tion
within
borough.

12. By

The act
dispensing
with the
producti-
on of re-
signations

12. By statute 1594, c. 214. the necessity of producing procuratories or instruments of resignation, or precepts of seisin, is dispensed with, where the rights and infeftments themselves have taken effect by possession, for forty years together. Procuratories and precepts were, in those days, written separate from the dispositions on which they proceeded; and the view of the act was, that the validity of the infeftment should not depend upon the preserving of writings, which were considered as little worth the keeping: But now that the procuratory or precept is ingrossed in the deed of alienation, and that tailzies are frequently executed by simple procuratories, such rights, if not supported by some separate deed divesting the granter, cannot stand on the footing of *this act*, (tho' it may, in most cases, be supported by the posterior act of prescription, see 3. 7. 2. 3.) without production of the procuratories; because these are really the deeds of conveyance, which were not designed to fall under the statute. In burgage tenements, the instrument of seisin contains the whole transaction, without any separate instrument of resignation; and therefore seisin, expressing resignation of these to have been made, constitutes a valid right, even before the lapse of forty years.

Transmis-
sion of
personal
rights of
land.

13. By our former decisions, one who was vested with a personal right of lands, *i. e.* a right not compleated by seisin, effectually divested himself by disposing it to another; after which, no right remained in the disponent, which could be carried by a second disposition, because a personal right is no more than a *jus obligationis*, which may be transferred by any deed

deed, sufficiently expressing the will of the granter. But this doctrine, at the same time that it rendered the security of the records extremely uncertain, was not truly applicable to such rights as required seisin to compleat them; and therefore it now obtains, that the granter of a personal right of lands, is not so divested by conveying the right to one person, but that he may effectually make it over afterwards to another; and the preference between the two does not depend on the dates of the dispositions, but on the priority of the seisins following upon them, 21. *June* 1737, *Bell*; see also 22. *Dec.* 1738, *Nielsen*.

TIT. 8. *Of redeemable Rights.*

AN heritable right is said to be redeemable, when it contains a right of reversion, or return, in favour of the person from whom the right flows. Reversions are either legal, which arise from the law itself, as in adjudications, which law declares to be redeemable within a certain term after their date; or conventional, which are constituted by the agreement of parties, as in wadsets, rights of annualrent and rights in security. A wadset (from wad or pledge) is a right, by which lands, or other heritable subjects, are impignorated by the proprietor to his creditor, in security of his debt; and like other heritable rights, is perfected by seisin. The debtor, who grants the wadset, and has the right of reversion, is called

Redeemable rights containing a reversion.

Wadset-

B b

the

the reverfer; and the creditor receiver of the wadset, is called the wadsetter.

2. Wadsets were, in the reign of *David II.* granted in the form of a charter, whereby the reverfer impignorated to his creditor the lands therein mentioned, to be enjoyed by him, until payment should be made of the sum lent, *Skene, voce, Reversion*. But a custom prevailed in the reign of *Ja. III.* of executing these rights in the form of irredeemable dispositions; and the right of reversion was granted to the debtor in a separate writing. By this means, wadsetters, who appeared from the face of their rights to be absolute proprietors, had it in their power, by aliening the wadset-lands, to defeat the reversion competent to the debtor, which, being no more than a personal right, could only affect the wadsetter himself and his heirs, but not his singular successors. To obviate these frauds, all reversions were declared real rights, tho' granted in writings apart, 1469, c. 28.; but, as the act did not make their registration necessary in order to give them this effect, the rights of singular successors were rendered insecure, till 1617, c. 16. which ordains reversions in separate writings to be recorded in the same register with seifins; otherwise, not to be effectual against singular successors. Wadsets, by the present practice, are commonly made out in the form of mutual contracts, in which one party sells the land, and the other grants the right of reversion.

Reversions
of wadsets.

Made
real.

If registred
in the regi-
ster of re-
versions.

3. Obligations to grant reversions, as well as reversions themselves, are directed by this act to be recorded; these, within sixty days after their date; and those, within sixty days after

the wadset is itself made real by seisin. An eik to a reversion is a writing signed by the reverser, acknowledging the receipt of a farther sum lent by the wadsetter, and declaring the wadset not redeemable, till payment of the last debt, as well as of the first. These, as burdens upon, and consequently parts of the reversion, are also real rights, if registred in terms of the statute. Reversions incorporated in the body of the wadset are excepted from this act, because the singular successor in the wadset is in that case sufficiently certified of the reversion, tho' it be not registred, by looking into his own right which bears it *in gremio*. Reversions of burgage-tenements were in like manner excepted, but these are ordained also to be recorded, by 1681, c. 11.

Eiks to reversions must be registred.

Reversion *in gremio juris* need not be registred.

4. Rights of reversion are generally esteemed *stricti juris*; yet they go to heirs, tho' heirs should not be mentioned, unless there be some clause in the right, discovering the intention of parties, that the reversion should be personal to the reverser himself, 9. *Jan.* 1662, E. *Murray*. In like manner, tho' the right should not expresse a power to redeem from the wadsetter's heir, as well as from himself, redemption will be competent against the heir, 6. *Feb.* 1630, *Muir*. All our lawyers have affirmed that reversions cannot be assigned, unless they are taken to assignees, *St.* 2. 10. 7.—*Cr.* 224. §. 3. But it is certain, that from the favour of legal diligence, they may be adjudged.

Reversions, how far *stricti juris*.

5. Reversions were sometimes burdened with a power to the wadsetter, to hold the lands in tack, for a certain number of years after their redemption, for a tack-duty equal to the inter-

Tack by the reverser, to subsist after redemption.

est on.

est of the wadset sums, which was commonly far below the true rents of the lands: Such tacks are, by 1449, c. 18. declared null, if the tack-duty be not in some degree proportioned to the rent. Reversions commonly leave the reverser at liberty to redeem the lands *quando-cunque*, without restriction in point of time; but a clause is adjected to some reversions, that, if the debt be not paid against a determinate day the right of reversion shall be irritated, and the lands shall become the irredeemable property of the wadsetter. Tho' this condition

*Pactum legis commissoriae in pignori-
bus.*

(*pactum legis commissoriae in pignori-
bus*) was reprobated by the Roman law, as *contra bonos mores*, l. ult. C. de pact. pign.; yet all irritant clauses in contracts, infestments and obligations, are effectual with us, by Act S. 27. Nov. 1592,—1661, c. 62. §. 14.: Nevertheless, where the irritancy is penal, as in wadsets, in which the sum lent falls always short of the value of the lands, the right of redemption is by indulgence continued to the reverser, even after the term is expired, while the irritancy is not declared. But the reverser, if he does not take the benefit of this indulgence, within forty years after the lapse of the term, is cut out of it by prescription, 10. Nov. 1738, *Pollock*.

How far
it is effe-
ctual.

Order of
redemption.

Premonition.

Voluntary
redemption,
how
executed.

6. If the reverser would redeem his lands, he must use an order of redemption against the wadsetter; the first step of which, is premonition (or notice given under form of instrument) to the wadsetter, to appear at the time and place appointed by the reversion, then and there to receive payment of his debt, and thereupon to renounce his right of wadset. In the voluntary redemption of a right of wadset hold-

en

en base, it is usual to insert in the wadsetter's renunciation, a procuratory of resignation in the hands of the superior granter of the wadset, *ad remanentiam*; and to register the instrument taken thereupon, in the register of reversions: But a renunciation by itself, if duly registred, re-establishes the reverser in the full right of the lands. Where the wadset was granted to be holden of the granter's superior, letters of regrefs from the superior, were necessary by our former law, by which he became bound, again to receive the reverser his old vassal, upon redemption of the lands; but now, since the act 20. *Geo. II. c. 50.* the superior, tho' he has granted no such letters, must receive the reverser, on payment of a year's rent, if he produce a disposition from the wadsetter. If, at executing the wadset, the superior has granted letters of regrefs, he will be obliged to receive him, without payment of the year's rent. Letters of regrefs are not effectual against singular successors in the superiority, if they are not registred in the register of reversions. All wadsets that remain personal rights, are extinguished by simple discharges, tho' they should not be recorded.

Letters of
regrefs.

7. If the wadsetter, either does not appear at the time and place appointed, or refuses the redemption-money, the reverser must consign it under form of instrument, in the hands of the person thereto appointed in the right of reversion; or, if no person be named, in the hands of the clerk to the bills, a clerk of session, or any responsal person. An instrument of consignation, tho' it proves that the proper solemnities were used, yet, being but the asser-

Consigna-
tion of the
redemption-
money.

tion

tion of a notary, cannot fix the receipt of consigned money upon the consignatory, without an acknowledgment subscribed by himself. Extrinsic bonds due by the wadsetter to the reverser, cannot be consigned in place of the sums contained in the right of wadset; for compensation is excluded by the reversion itself, which requires consignation in current money: But where the compensation is founded on an article contained in the wadset-right, it will be received, 2. *Jan. 1667, Hog.* This instrument of consignation compleats the order of redemption, stops the farther currency of interest against the reverser, and founds him in an action for declaring the order to be formal, and the lands to be redeemed in consequence of it.

Its effects.

Declarators of redemption.

8. Declarators of redemption are not competent to the reverser's apparent heir; for an heir before entry, has no title to sue on the rights of his ancestor, 19. *Jan. 1672, Lord Lovat*; but they may be insisted in, against the wadsetter's apparent heir; because in choosing a defender, no more is necessary, than that he have an interest to oppose the suit: Yet such heir is not intitled to the redemption-money, tho' the lands should be found redeemed, till he compleat his titles, and so be capable of re-instating the reverser in the lands, 10. *Jan. 1665, Campbell.*

Orders of redemption may be assigned.

9. Tho' a right of reversion, which is barely a faculty to redeem, is said not to be assignable without special powers, yet an order of redemption used upon it may be made over to another, because the faculty is, by the order converted into an established right: The deposited
menoy

money may doubtless be assigned, and of course, the assignee must be intitled to prosecute the redemption. The act 1617, which requires the registration of grants of redemption and renunciations, does not make it necessary to register orders of redemption, tho' these joined with the decrees of declarator following upon them, are truly legal renunciations. But where a renunciation is consigned in an action of declarator; it must, by that statute, be registred within sixty days after the date of the decree, by which it shall be ordained to be delivered to the pursuer.

But need not be registred.

10. After decree of declarator is obtained, by which the lands are declared to return to the debtor, the consigned money, which comes in place of the lands, becomes the wadsetter's, who therefore can charge the consignatory upon letters of horning, to deliver it up to him; but, because the reverser may, at any time before decree pass from his order, as one may do from any other step of diligence, the consigned sums continue to belong to the reverser, till that period; and consequently the wadsetter's interest in the wadset continues heritable. If therefore, decree is not obtained till after the death of the wadsetter, the redemption-money will belong to the wadsetter's heir, and not to his executors; but, the moment the lands are declared redeemed by the decree, it becomes moveable, because it can be no longer said to be secured on land.

Till what period, does the consigned money belong to the reverser?

11. If the wadsetter chuses to have his money rather than the lands, he must require from the reverser, under form of instrument, the sums due by the wadset, in terms of the right.

Instrument of requisition.

This

Its effects. This instrument of requisition did, by the former law, dissolve the real right constituted by the wadset, and consequently made the sums contained in it moveable: But now, that provision is generally made by a special clause in the right, that no diligence to be used upon it, shall weaken the real security; the wadset sums, by our present law, continue heritable, notwithstanding requisition. It has been adjudged, that requisition may be past from, by the wadsetter, even after the reverser has consigned the redemption-money in consequence thereof, 14. Nov. 1710, *Ross*.

It may be passed from.

Wadset. proper.

12. Wadsets are either proper or improper. A proper wadset is that, whereby it is agreed that the use of the land shall go for the use of the money; so that the wadsetter takes his hazard of the rents, and enjoys them without accounting, in satisfaction, or *in solutum* of his interest. Tho' therefore the rent of the lands should be less than the yearly interest of the sum lent, the lands are redeemable upon payment of the bare principal sum, without any claim for bygone interests; if it amounts to more, the wadsetter is not obliged to impute the surplus (*in sortem*) towards the extinction of the principal sum. Where the wadsetter thus subjects himself to all the chances by which the fruits may be lost, it is a proper wadset, tho' the reverser should be obliged to pay the public burdens, *Dirl.* 436.—*P. Falc.* 114.: See act 1661, c. 62. §. 13. 14.

Improper.

13. In an improper wadset, the reverser, if the rent should fall short of the interest, is taken bound to make up the deficiency; if it amounts to more, the wadsetter is obliged to

to impute the excrescence towards extinction of the capital : And, as soon as the whole sums, principal and interest, are extinguished by the wadsetter's possession, he may be compelled to renounce, or divest himself in favour of the reverser. Where the wadsetter, in place of possessing by himself, grants a back-tack of the lands to the reverser, for payment of the interest of the wadset-sums, as the tack-duty, the wadset is thereby rendered improper ; for the wadsetter has, in that event, no chance of getting more than his interest ; and consequently the redemption is burdened, not only with the payment of the principal sum, but of the interest, or tack-duties remaining unpaid. But this burden is ineffectual against singular successors, if it be not expressed in the right of reversion, or if the back-tack be not recorded in the proper register.

14. If the wadsetter be intitled by his right, to enjoy the rents without accounting, and if, at the same time, the reverser be subjected to the hazard of their deficiency, such contract is justly declared usurious, by 1661, c. 62.; for, where the wadsetter runs no risk of losing any part of his interest, he should have no chance of drawing more. By another clause in the same act, it was provided, that, in proper wadsets granted during the usurpation, wherein unreasonable advantages had been taken of the debtors, the wadsetter should, during the not requisition of the sum lent, be obliged, either to quit his possession to the debtor, upon his giving security to pay the interest, or to subject himself to account for the surplus-rents, as in improper wadsets. This branch of the statute ap-

Usurious
wadsets.

A proper
wadsetter
must quit
possession,
on the re-
verser's gi-
ving secu-
rity.

The re-
verser's
personal
creditors
cannot of-
fer securi-
ty.

Right of
annual-
rent.

Poin-
ding
of the
ground is
competent
upon it.

And like-
wise a per-
sonal acti-
on.

pears, both from its narrative and the enacting words, to be limited to such wadsets as were granted before the restoration; but the subsequent practice has extended it to all wadsets without distinction. Either the reverser himself, or any in his right, *e. g.* a dispocee or adjudger, is intitled to make offer of security to the wadsetter, in terms of this statute; but the reverser's personal creditors have no such privilege, since their debts are no titles of possession, 10. Feb. 1713, *E. Leven*.

15. Infeftments of annualrent, the nature of which has been explained, 2. 2. 3. are also redeemable rights. A right of annualrent does not carry the property of the lands, but it creates a real *nexus* or burden upon the property, for payment of the interest or annualrent contained in the right; and consequently, the by-gone interests due upon it are *debita fundi*. The annualrenter may therefore insist in a real action for obtaining letters of poinding the ground, upon which he may distrain the corns, cattle or other moveables upon the lands, for payment of his interest. The nature of this diligence, and how far it may be used against the tenants of the debtor, will be particularly explained, 4. 1. 3. The annualrenter may also insist in a personal action, against the tenants and possessors of the lands burdened, for the rents, to the extent of his past interest: And in a competition for these rents, the annualrenter's preference will not depend on his having used a poinding of the ground, for his right was compleated by the seisin; and the power of poinding the ground, arising from that antecedent right, is *merae facultatis*, and need not be exercised, if payment can be otherwise got,

got, *Falc. vol. 2. 1.* As it is only the interest of the sum lent, which is a burden upon the lands, the annualrenter, if he wants his principal sum, cannot recover it by a real action; but must demand it from the debtor himself, on his personal obligation in the bond, either by requisition, or by a charge upon letters of horning, according as the right is drawn.

16. Rights of annualrent, being servitudes upon the property, and consequently consistent with the right of property in the debtor, may be extinguished without resignation. Where they were made out after the old style (2. 2. 3.), formal renunciations were necessary, which it behoved the debtor to record in the register of reversions; because such rights were truly wadsets: But, when the infeftment of annualrent came, by a variation in the form, to be accessory to a personal obligation, which is extinguishable merely by payment or intromission, renunciations were no longer required to the extinction of these infeftments; see 8. *July 1680, Rankin.*

Extinction
of rights of
annual-
rent.

17. Infeftments in security are another kind of redeemable right (now frequently used in place of rights of annualrent), by which the receivers are infeft in the lands themselves, and not simply in an annualrent furth of them; for security of the principal sums, interest and penalty, contained in the rights. These rights, when they are granted, not to creditors for payment of their debts, but to cautioners for relief of their engagements, are called infeftments of relief. If an infeftment in security be granted to a creditor, he may thereupon enter into immediate possession of the lands or annualrent

Rights of
security.

Infeft-
ments of
relief,

annualrent for his payment; whereas rights of relief are but conditional, and have no operation, till the cautioner either pays the debt, or is distressed for it, except in the special cases mentioned, 3. 3. 26. Infeftments of relief are granted, not for the behoof of the creditor who is no party to the right, but for the cautioner's, who therefore may renounce it at his pleasure, *Harc. 617.*: But if the creditor, by adjudging the right of relief from the cautioner, shall carry it to himself, the cautioner cannot thereafter renounce it in prejudice of him who has affected it by legal diligence. Where a right of security is granted, either for payment or for relief, not only of debts already contracted, but to be contracted by the granter, its effect is restricted to the debts contracted prior to the date of the seisin following on it, by 1696, c. 5. This was enacted, because such securities were found by experience to be frequently granted as covers to fraud. Infeftments in security are extinguished as rights of annualrent.

18. All rights of annualrent, rights in security, and generally whatever constitutes a real burden on the fee, is the ground of an adjudication, which is preferable to all adjudications, or other diligences, interveening between the date of the right and of the adjudication deduced on it; not only for the principal sum contained in the right, but also for the whole past interest contained in the adjudication. This preference arises from the nature of real debts, or *debita fundi*, and is expressly reserved by the act 1661, c. 62. establishing the *pari passu* preference of adjudications; but in order to obtain it for the interest of the interest

Have no present effect.

May be renounced in prejudice of the creditor.

Security for debts to be contracted, how limited.

Preference of *debita fundi*.

interest accumulated in the adjudication, such adjudication must proceed on a process of poinding the ground, *Dalr.* 12.

TIT. 9. *Of Servitudes.*

SERVITUDE is a burden affecting lands, or other heritable subjects, whereby the proprietor is either restrained from the full use of what is his own, or is obliged to suffer another to do something upon it. Servitudes are either natural, legal or conventional. Nature itself may be said to constitute a servitude upon inferior tenements, whereby they must receive the water that falls from those that stand on higher ground. Legal servitudes are established by statute or custom, from considerations of public policy; among which may be numbered the restraints laid upon the proprietors of tenements within the city of *Edinburgh*, by 1621, c. 26. and 1698, c. 8. There is as great a variety of conventional servitudes, as there are ways by which the exercise of property may be restrained by paction, in favour of another.

Servitude is either,

Natural,

Legal,

Or conventional.

2. Conventional servitudes are constituted, either by grant, or by prescription. A servitude constituted by writing, or grant, is not effectual against the granter's singular successors, unless the grantee has been in the use or exercise of his right; which in vulgar speech is called possession, tho' improperly; for servitudes are incorporeal rights, and so not capable of proper

Servitudes by grant, and by prescription.

proper possession: They are valid against the grantor and his heirs, even without use. In servitudes that may be acquired by prescription, forty years exercise of the right is sufficient, without any title in writing, other than a charter and seisin of the lands, to which the servitude is claimed to be due.

Difference
betwixt
the two.

3. Servitudes constituted by grant are not effectual, in a question with the superior of the tenement burdened with the servitude, unless his consent be adhibited; for a superior cannot be hurt by his vassal's deed: But, where the servitude is acquired by prescription, the consent of the superior, whose right afforded him a good title to interrupt, is implied. A servitude by grant, tho' followed only by a partial possession, must be governed as to its extent, by the tenor of the grant; but a servitude by prescription, is limited by the measure or degree of the use, had by him who prescribes; agreeably to the maxim, *tantum praescriptum quantum possessum*.

Predial
servitude.

4. Servitudes are either predial (sometimes called real) or personal. Predial servitudes are burdens imposed upon one tenement, in favour of another tenement. That to which the servitude is due, is called the dominant, and that which owes it, is called the servient tenement. No person can have right to a predial servitude, if he is not proprietor of some dominant tenement that may have benefit by it; for that right is annexed to a tenement, and so cannot pass from one person to another, unless some tenement goes along with it.

Rural servitude, or of lands.

5. Predial servitudes are divided into rural servitudes, or of lands; and urban servitudes, or of houses. The rural servitudes of the *Romans*

mans were *iter, actus, via, aquaeductus, aquaehaustus* and *jus pascendi pecoris*. Similar servitudes may be constituted with us, of a foot-road, horse-road, cart-road, dams and aqueducts, watering of cattle and pasturage. The right of a highway is not a servitude constituted in favour of a particular tenement, but is a right common to all travellers. The care of highways, bridges and ferries, is committed to the sheriffs, justices of peace, and commissioners of supply in each shire, 1669, c. 16.—1670, c. 9.—1686, c. 8.—5. *Geo*, 1. c. 30.

6. Common pasturage, or the right of feeding one's cattle upon the property of another, is sometimes constituted by a general clause of pasturage in a charter, or disposition without mentioning the lands burdened; in which case, the right comprehends, whatever had been formerly appropriated to the lands disposed, out of the granter's own property, and likewise all pasturage due to them out of other lands. When a right of pasturage is given to several neighbouring proprietors, on a moor or common belonging to the granter, indefinite as to the number of cattle to be pastured, the extent of their several rights is to be proportioned, according to the number that each of them can fodder in winter, upon his own dominant tenement; which proportions may be fixed by an action of *fouming* and *rouming*, two old words signifying the form of law, by which the number of cattle, that each proprietor may pasture upon the moor, is ascertained.

Common
pasturage.

What it
compre-
hends.

7. The chief servitudes of houses among the Romans were those of support, viz. *tigni immittendi*, and *oneris ferendi*. The first was the

Urban
servitudes,
or of
houses.

the right of fixing in our neighbours wall, a joist or beam from our house : The second was that of resting the weight of one's house upon his neighbour's wall, *l. 33. de serv. praed. urb.* In this last, he who owed the servitude was bound, not only to suffer the house to rest on his wall, but to repair the wall when it became unfit for supporting that weight, *d. l. 33.* ; not from the nature of servitudes, which laid the servient tenement under no obligation to do, but merely to suffer ; but in virtue of an express stipulation in the right, *l. 6. §. 2. si serv. vind.* By our customs also, the owner of the servient tenement is not obliged, in a servitude of support to repair it, unless the servitude be expressly so constituted, *St. 2. 7. 6.—Br. 117.*

Obligations of different owners of the same tenement of houses.

8. Where different floors or stories of the same house belong to different persons, as is frequent in the city of *Edinburgh*, the property of the house cannot be said to be entirely divided ; the roof remains a common roof to the whole, and the area on which the house stands, supports the whole ; so that there is a communication of property, in consequence of which, the proprietor of the ground-floor, must, without the constitution of any servitude, uphold it for the support of the upper, and the owner of the highest story, must uphold that, as a cover to the lower. Where the highest floor is divided into garrets among the several proprietors, each proprietor is obliged, according to this rule, to uphold that part of the roof which covers his own garret, *St. 2. 7. 6.*

9. No proprietor can build, so as to throw the rain water falling from his own house, immediately upon his neighbour's ground, without

without a special servitude which is called, of *stillicide*; but, if it falls within his own property, tho' at the smallest distance from the march, the owner of the inferior tenement must receive it. The *Romans*, to prevent the inconveniency of building too near a neighbour's property, obliged proprietors to keep within a certain distance of their own march, *l. 14. de serv. praed. urb.*: But we have no statute regulating this matter; tho' by the usage of several boroughs, proprietors are obliged to build some inches within the extremity of their property.

10. The servitudes *altius non tollendi, et non officiendi luminibus vel prospectui*, restrain proprietors from raising their houses beyond a certain height, or from making any building whatsoever, that may hurt the light or prospect of the dominant tenement, *l. 4. 15. de serv. praed. urb.* These servitudes cannot be constituted by prescription alone; for, tho' a proprietor should have built his house ever so low, or should not have built at all upon his grounds, for forty years together, he is presumed to have done so, for his own conveniency or profit; and therefore, cannot be barred from afterwards building a house on his property, or raising it to what height he pleases, unless he be tied down by his own consent.

11. We have two predial servitudes to which the *Romans* were strangers, *viz.* that of fewel or feal and divot, and of thirlage; the first is a right, by which the owner of the dominant tenement may turn up peats, turfs, feals or divots, from the ground of the servient, and carry them off either for fewal, or thatch, or the other uses of his own tenement. Common

D d

pasturage

Servitude,
*altius non
tollendi, et
non offici-
endi lumi-
nibus.*

Servitude
of feal and
divot.

Feal and divot not always comprehended under pasturage. pasturage, tho' a greater servitude than that of feal and divot, does not necessarily comprehend the lesser under it; for the two servitudes are quite distinct, and the greater can be used without the lesser: The right therefore of casting feal will be excluded, if he who is intitled to the pasturage, has never attempted to use the other right, or was interrupted in the attempt, 15. Feb. 1668, L. *Haining*.

Thirlage. 12. Thirlage is that servitude, by which lands are astricted, or thirled, to a particular mill, and the possessors bound to grind their grain there, for payment of certain multures and sequels, as the agreed price of grinding. In this servitude, the mill is the dominant tenement, and the lands astricted (which are called also the thirle or sucken), the servient. Multure. Multure is the quantity of grain or meal, payable to the proprietor of the mill, or to the multerer his tacksmen. Sequels. The sequels are the small quantities given to the servants, under the name of knaveship, bannock, and lock or gowpen. The quantities paid to the mill by the lands not astricted, are generally proportioned to the value of the labour, and are called out-town or out-sucken multures; but those paid by the thirle are ordinarily higher, and are called in-town or insucken multures.

Thirlage, how constituted. 13. Thirlage may be constituted by a landholder, when, in the disposition of certain lands, he astricts them to his own mill; or when, in the disposition of a mill, he astricts his own lands to the mill disposed: And sometimes he thirles his tenants to his own mill, by an act or regulation of his own court; which, however, cannot be binding on such tenants as do not oblige

oblige themselves to comply with it; for tenants cannot, but by their own consent, be subjected to any burden not mentioned in their tacks. The grant of a mill with the general clause of multures, without specifying the lands astricted, conveys the thirlage of all the lands formerly astricted to that mill, whether they were the property of the granter, or of a third party.

Dispositi-
on of a
mill with
multures.

14. A less formal constitution serves to astrict barony-lands to the mill of the barony, than is necessary in any other thirlage; which perhaps proceeds from the effects of the union between the mill of a barony, and the lands of it. Hence, if a baron makes over the mill of a barony, *cum multuris* or *cum astrictis multuris*, it infers an astriction of the barony-lands to the mill conveyed, even such as had been before sold to another, 17. *July 1629, L. Newliston*. But if prior to the baron's conveyance of his mill *cum multuris*, he had sold any part of the barony-lands to another *cum multuris*, the first purchaser's lands are not astricted by the posterior grant; for a right of lands with the multures, implies a freedom of these lands from thirlage; and no person has power, after he is divested of lands, to subject them to any servitude, from which they were before exempted, *Harc. 721. 722.*

Thirlage
to the mill
of a baro-
ny.

A right of
lands *cum*
multuris,
implies
their free-
dom from
thirlage.

15. Thirlage is either, first, of grindable corns; or, 2. Of all growing corns; or, 3. Of the *invecta et illata*, i. e. of all the grain brought within the thirle, tho' of another growth. Where the thirlage is of grindable grain, it is in practice restricted to the corns which the tenants have occasion to grind, either for the sup-
port

Thirlage
of grind-
able corns.

Thirlage
of *grana
crescentia*.

port of their families, or for other uses; the surplus may be carried out of the thirle unmanufactured, without being liable in multure, Feb. 1731, *Lockhart*,—17. Feb. 1736, *Lockhart*. Where it is of the *grana crescentia*, the whole grain growing upon the thirle is astricted, with the exceptions, 1. Of seed and horse-corn, which are destined to uses inconsistent with grinding; and, 2. Of the farm-duties due to the landlord, if they are deliverable in grain not grinded; for it is not to be presumed, that the landlord, who must sell his farms, meant to extend the servitude against himself: But, if the rent be payable in meal, flour or malt, the grain of which these are made, must be manufactured in the dominant mill.

Thirlage
of *inveſta
et illata*.

16. The thirlage of *inveſta et illata* is seldom constituted, but against the inhabitants of a borough or village, that they may grind all the corns they import thither, at a certain mill. Where this thirlage is imposed, the words generally are, *all corns brought within the thirle, that thole* (or suffer) *fire and water therein*. Lord *Stair*, 2. 7. 20. *Craig*, 253, §. 6. and *Mackenzie h. t.* §. 26. interpret these words, of such tholing of fire and water, as prepares the grain for the mill, that is, steeping the grain, and drying it in kilns; but not of brewing or baking, which is not done, till after the grain is actually manufactured; which opinion is supported by practice, 22. Feb. 1707, *Heriot's hospital*: And, upon this principle, multure cannot be exacted, in a thirlage of *inveſta et illata*, for flour or oat meal, brought into the servient tenement, unless the importer had bought it in grain, and grinded it at another mill, *Falc.*

How in-
terpreted.

vol. 2.

vol. 2. 61. The same grain that owes multure, as *granum crescens*, to the mill in whose thirle it grew, if it shall be afterwards brought within a borough where the *investa et illata* are thirled, must pay a second multure to the master of that dominant tenement; but, where the right of these two thirlages is in the same proprietor, he cannot exact both, *K. 30.* Where lands are thirled in general terms, without expressing the particular nature of the servitude, the lightest thirlage is presumed, from the favour of liberty; but in the astrictiō of a borough or village, where there is no growing grain which can be the subject of thirlage, the astrictiō of *investa et illata* must be necessarily understood, *Falc. vol. 1. 133.*

Grain thus
thirled
may pay
double
multure.

17. Thirlage, in the general case, cannot be established by prescription alone, for *iis quae sunt merae facultatis non praescribitur*; but, where one has paid for forty years together the heavy insucken multures, the slightest title in writing will subject his lands, *e. g.* a decree against him, in which he was not regularly called.

Thirlage
by pre-
scription.

Thirlage may be, contrary to the common rule, constituted by prescription alone, 1. Where one pays to a mill a certain sum, or quantity of grain yearly, in name of multure, whether he grinds at it or not (which is called dry multure); for such payment cannot bear a construction consistent with the freedom of his lands.

In the case
of dry
multure.

2. In mills of the King's property; because the King's original right to all heritable subjects is constituted *jure coronae*, without titles in writing; and, where he derives right from another, his titles are more liable to be lost. This is extended in practice to mills belonging to church-lands

In mills of
the King's
property.

In mills of
church-
lands.

lands, in consequence of *Act S. 16. Dec. 1612* (see *Spots. Pr. 190.*), whereby thirty years possession of church-lands by churchmen, computed backwards from the time of intenting the action against them, is deemed equivalent to a title in writing, from a presumption that their rights were destroyed at the reformation, 22. *Jan. 1740*, Lord *Maxwel*. Tho' thirlage itself cannot be constituted by mere possession, the proportion of multure payable to the dominant tenement may be so fixed.

Mill ser-
vices,

18. The possessors of the lands astricted, are bound to uphold the mill, repair the dam-dikes and aqueducts, and bring home the millstones.

Are im-
plied in
thirlage.

These services, tho' not expressed in the constitution, are implied in thirlage; and even in thirlage not expressly constituted by writing, if the thirle has been in use to perform certain

If services
have been
perform-
ed.

services, such partial use infers an obligation to perform all those that are usually demanded in that servitude, 16. *Dec. 1732*, *Craufurd*: But, where there is neither an explicate constitution of thirlage, nor proof of services of any sort, performed by the suckeners, the dominant tenement can claim none, *Dec. 1744*, L. *Inches*; for in such case, the rule holds, *tantum praescriptum, quantum possessum*.

Actions
competent
upon thir-
lage.

19. The proprietor of a mill can sue the tenants or possessors within the thirle, who have carried their grain to another mill, in an action of abstracted multures, which may be brought before the judge-ordinary. This action, if the proprietor of the lands be not called, cannot have the effect to interrupt him from prescribing an immunity from the thirlage; but such prescription may be effectually interrupted, by

by an action of declarator of thirlage against the proprietor, to which the court of Session alone is competent.

20. Servitudes, being restraints upon property, are *stricti juris*: They are not therefore presumed, if the acts upon which they are claimed can be explained consistently with freedom; and, when servitudes are constituted, they ought to be used in the way least burdensome to the servient tenement. Hence, when one has a right of pasturage, or of seal and divot upon a neighbouring moor or heath, tho' he has it, strictly speaking, upon the whole tenement, according to the rule in servitudes, *unaquaeque gleba servit*; yet the proprietor of the moor will be allowed to till part of it, if he leaves untilld what is enough for the purpose of the servitude, 20. *Jan.* 1680, *E. Southesk*,—*Dirl.* 86; hence also, one, who has a servitude of peats upon his neighbour's moss, is not at liberty to extend it, for the use of any manufacture which may require an extraordinary expence of fuel; but must confine it to the natural uses of the dominant tenement.

Servitudes
are *stricti*
juris.

21. Servitudes are extinguished, 1. *Confusione*, when the same person comes to be proprietor of the dominant and servient tenements; for *res sua nemini servit*, and the use the proprietor thereafter makes of the servient tenement, is not *jure servitutis*, but is an act of property. Nor is the attriction of tenants to the landlord's mill, an exception from this rule; for in thirlage, it is not the lands themselves that are attricted, but the fruits, which belong to the tenant. 2. By the perishing, either

Extinction
of servi-
tudes.
Confu-
sione.

Interitu
rei.

of

of the dominant or servient tenement: But, if a mill shall be only disabled for a time from service, the thirle can, during such temporary insufficiency, carry no more of their grain to other mills, than what they have immediate use for, *Jan.* 1736, *E. Wigton*. By the former practice, they were, in such case, subjected to the multures, as if the mill could have served them; and were only exempted from the sequels, *F.* 28. *Feb.* 1684, *Macdougall*.

Non utendo.

3. Servitudes are lost *non utendo*, by the dominant tenement's neglecting to use the right for forty years; which is considered as a dereliction of it, tho' he, who has the servient tenement, should have made no interruption, by doing acts contrary to the servitude.

Extinction
of thirlage,

By a clause
cum multu-
ris,

Even in
the *tenen-*
das,

Except
in rights
flowing
from the
crown.

22. Thirlage may be extinguished, by a charter of the astricted lands, granted by the owner of the dominant tenement, *cum multuris*; which does not barely presume, that the lands in the grant were before free, but implies a liberation, tho' they had been formerly burdened with thirlage, *F.* 26. *Jan.* 1705, *Graeme*: Nor is it necessary, that such clause be inserted in the dispositive part of the charter, because exemption from servitude is only a quality annexed to lands, and not a separate subject, *Dirl.* 1.; but where the vassal has continued to pay astricted multures, after such charter, liberation from thirlage is not inferred, *St.* 2. 7. 24. In rights flowing from the crown, the clause of multures, when it is only in the *tenendas*, has no effect; because, when signatures are presented in exchequer, the greatest part of the *tenendas* is left blank, which is afterwards filled up at the discretion of the chancery-clerk,

cery-clerk, or the framer of the signature,
8. Jan. 1662, *Steuart*.

23. Personal servitudes are those by which the property of a subject is burdened, in favour, not of a tenement, but of a person. The only personal servitude known in our law, is usufruct or liferent, which is a right to use and enjoy a thing during life, the substance of it being preserved. A liferent cannot therefore be constituted upon things which perish in the use; and, tho' it may, upon subjects which gradually wear out by time, as household-furniture, &c., yet with us, it is generally applied to heritable subjects. He, whose property is burdened, is usually called the *fiar*.

Personal
servitudes.

Liferent.

24. Liferents are divided into conventional and legal; conventional liferents are either simple, or by reservation. A simple liferent, or by a separate constitution, is that which is granted by the proprietor in favour of another: And this sort, contrary to the nature of predial servitudes, requires *seisin* in order to affect singular successors; for a liferent of lands is, in strict speech, not a servitude, but a right resembling property, which constitutes the liferenter-vassal for life; and singular successors have no way of discovering a liferent-right, which perhaps is not yet commenced, but by the records; whereas in predial servitudes, the constant use of the dominant tenement makes them public. The proper right of liferent is intransmissible, *omnibus usufructuarii inheret*: When the profits of the liferented subject are transmitted to another, the right becomes merely personal, for it intitles the assignee to the rent, not during his own life, but his

Conventional
liferent.

Simple
liferent.

Must be
constituted
by
seisin.

Proper
right of
liferent
intransmissible.

E c

cedent's

cedent's, and is therefore carried by simple assignation, without seisin.

Liferent
by reservation,

Intitles to
the en-
tring of
vassals,
and to ca-
sualties.

Liferents
by law.
Terce.

When
due.

Husband
must be
infeft.

25. A liferent by reservation, is that, which a proprietor reserves to himself, in the same writing, by which he conveys the fee to another. It requires no seisin; for the granter's former seisin, which virtually included the liferent, still subsists as to the liferent which is expressly reserved. A liferenter by reservation, may enter the heirs or singular successors of vassals, as if he were fiar, *Cr.* 416. §. 5., and is intitled to the casualties of superiority that fall during his life; his right being more amply interpreted, than that of a simple liferenter who had no prior interest in the lands. In conjunct infeftments taken to husband and wife, the wife's right of conjunct fee resolves, in the general case, into a liferent, which is however as extensive, as a liferent by reservation.

26. Liferents by law, are the terce and the courtesy. The terce (*tertia*) is a liferent competent by law to widows, in the third of the heritable subjects, in which their husbands died infeft. By our ancient customs, the widow was intitled, only to a third of the lands, in which the husband stood infeft at the marriage; so that she had no claim, upon what he had acquired during the marriage, perhaps by her own industry or œconomy, *R. M. l.* 2. c. 16. §. 5. 9. The terce takes place, only where the marriage has subsisted for year and day, or where a child has been born alive of it. No terce is due out of lands in which the husband was not infeft, 29. *Jan.* 1706, *Carruthers*, unless in the case of fraudulent omission; for which see *Cr.* 423. §. 27.—*St.* 2. 6. 16.

27. The

27. The terce is not limited to lands, but extends to teinds, and to servitudes and other burdens affecting lands; thus, the widow is intitled in the right of her terce, to a liferent of the right of the sums secured, either by rights of annualrent, or by rights in security. In improper wadsets, the terce is a third of the sum lent; In those that are proper, it is a third of the wadset lands; or in case of redemption, a third of the redemption-money. If the husband had two dwelling-houses, the widow has right to the second; if he had but one, the heir must either allow her the third of it, or provide her in another, *Gr. 424. §. 29.* Neither rights of reversion, superiority, nor patronage, fall under the terce; for none of these have fixed profits, and so are not the proper subjects of alimony; nor tacks, because they are not feudal rights. Burgage-tenements are also excluded from it, *Gr. 425. §. 34.*, the reason of which is not so obvious. Since the husband's seisin is both the measure and security of the terce, such debts or diligences alone, as exclude the husband's seisin, can prevail over it: A disposition of lands therefore, or an heritable bond granted by the husband, or an adjudication led against his estate, if not followed by seisin, cannot affect the terce.

Out of
what sub-
jects it is
due.

Its prefe-
rence.

28. Where a terce is due out of lands, burdened with a prior terce still subsisting, the second tercer has only right to a third of the two thirds that remain unaffected by the first terce; *R. M. l. 2.c. 16. §. 64.* But upon the death of the first widow, whereby the lands are disburdened of her terce, the lesser terce becomes enlarged, as if the first had never existed.

Lesser
terce.

Formerly,

Terce
now ex-
cluded by
a special
provision.

Formerly, the widow was contrary to the common rules, intituled to a terce, even tho' the husband had made a special provision in her favour, unless it had been expressly granted in satisfaction of the terce; but, by 1681, c. 10, the widow, who has accepted of a special provision from her husband, is thereby excluded from the terce, unless such provision shall contain a clause, that she shall have right to both.

Brief of
terce.

29. The widow has no title of possession, and so cannot levy the rents in virtue of her terce, till she be served to it; and in order to this, she must obtain a brief out of the chancery, directed to the Sheriff, who calls an inquest, to take proof that she was wife to the deceased; and that the deceased died intestate in the subjects contained in the brief. The service or sentence of the jury, finding these

Service of
widows.

Kenning
of widows
or the di-
vision of
the lands.

points proved, does, without the necessity of a retour to the chancery, intitle the wife to enter into the possession; but she can only possess with the heir *pro indiviso*, and so cannot remove tenants, till the Sheriff kens her to her terce, or divides the lands between her and the heir. In this division, after determining by lot or kaval, whether to begin by the sun or the shade, *i. e.* by the east or the west, the Sheriff sets off the two first acres for the heir, and the third for the widow. Sometimes the division is executed, by giving one entire farm to the widow, and two of equal value to the heir. The widow's right is not properly constituted by this service; it was constituted before, by the husband's seisin, and fixed by his death; the service only declares it, and so intitles her to the third part of the rents,

The right
of terce is
constitu-
ted before
service.

retro

retro from her husband's death, preferable to any rights that may have affected the lands, in the intermediate period between that and her own service. The relict, if she was reputed to be lawful wife to the deceased, must be served, notwithstanding any objections by the heir against the marriage, which may be afterwards tried by the commissary, 1503, c. 77.

30. Courtesy is a liferent given by law, to the surviving husband, of all his wife's heritage in which he died intestate, if there was a child of the marriage born alive. A marriage, tho' of the longest continuance, gives no right to the courtesy, if there was no issue of it. The child born of the marriage must be the mother's heir: If she had a child of a former marriage, who is to succeed to her estate, the husband has no right to the courtesy, while such child is alive, *F. 1. Dec. 1702, Darleith*, contrary to Sir *Tho. Craig's* opinion, 428. §. 43.; so that the courtesy is due to the husband, rather as father to an heir, than as husband to an heiress; conformable to the *Roman* law, which gives to the father, the usufruct of what the child succeeds to, by the mother, *l. 1. C. de bon. mat.* Heritage is here opposed to conquest, (3. 8. 6.) and so is to be understood only of the heritable rights, to which the wife succeeded as heir to her ancestors, excluding what she herself had acquired by singular titles.

Courtesy.

When due.

It is only of heritage.

31. Because the husband enjoys the liferent of his wife's whole heritage, on a lucrative title, he is considered as her temporary representative, and so is liable in payment of all the yearly burdens chargeable on the subject, and of the current interest of all her debts, real and personal,

How burdened.

personal, to the value of the yearly rent he enjoys by the courtesy, *K. 2.* The courtesy needs no solemnity to its constitution: That right, which the husband had to the rents of his wife's estate, during the marriage, *jure mariti*, is continued with him after her death, under the name of courtesy, by an act of the law itself. As in the terce, the husband's seisin is the ground and measure of the wife's right, so in the courtesy, the wife's seisin is the foundation of the husband's; and the two rights are, in all other respects, of the same nature; if it is not, that the courtesy extends to burgage-holdings, *L. B. c. 44.* and to superiorities.

It is constituted without any service.

Wife must be infeft.

Right of liferent how limited. As to growing timber.

As to minerals.

32. All liferenters, must use their right, *salvâ rei substantiâ*: Whatever therefore is a part of the fee itself, cannot be encroached on by the liferenter, *e. g.* woods or growing timber, even for the necessary uses of the liferented tenement, *F. 3. July 1696, Lady Borthwick.* But, where a coppice or *silva caedua* has been divided into haggs, one of which was in use to be cut annually by the proprietor, the liferenter may continue the former yearly cuttings; because these are considered as the annual fruits the subject was intended to yield, and so the proper subject of a liferent. Liferenters have no right to coals or minerals under ground, if they be not expressed in the right, for they are proper *partes soli*, 13. *July 1677, Lady Preston.—June 1727, heirs of Roseburn.* Where they are expressed, the liferenter may, by the former rule, work any colliery that had been opened before the commencement of his right, provided he does not employ a greater number

number of colliers, or bring up a greater quantity of coals, than the proprietor did.

33. Our law, to preserve the liferented subjects for the fiar, directed liferenters to give security, (called in the *Roman* law *cautio usufructuaria*) that they should keep them in good condition, during the liferent, 1491, c. 25. under the penalty of losing the profits thereof, 1535, c. 15. A special method is chalked out in the case of tenements within borough, by act 1594, c. 226. Liferenters are also burdened with the alimony of the heir, where he has not enough for maintaining himself; which is founded in an extension of the last clause of act 1491, c. 25. by the first part whereof, not only ward-supersiors, but liferenters, were obliged to preserve in good condition, the subject of the ward or liferent. The name of an employment, if it does not afford bread to the heir, will not defend the liferenter against this burden, 25. *July* 1705, *Ayton*. The bare right of apparency founds the action against the liferenter, 12. *Feb.* 1635, *Hepburn*. It is a burden personal to the liferenter himself, and cannot be thrown upon his adjudging creditors, as coming in his place by their diligences, 1737, *Cred. of Blair*. Liferenters are also subjected to the payment of the yearly cesses, stipends, &c. falling due during their right, and to all other burdens that attend the subject liferented.

34. Liferent is extinguished by the liferenter's death. That part of the rents which the liferenter had a proper right to, before his death, falls to his executors; the rest, as never having been *in bonis* of the deceased, goes to the fiar. *Martinmas* and *Whitsunday* are, by our custom,

Burdens
affecting it.

Cautio usufructuaria.

Alimony
of the
heir.

The ex-
piry of
liferents.

Of lands.

Regulated from, the legal terms of the payment of rent :
 by the legal terms. Consequently, if a liferenter of lands survives
 the term of *Whitsunday*, his executors are intitled to the half of that year's rent, because it was due the term before his death ; if he survives *Martinmas*, they have right to the whole. And this is the rule, tho' the conventional term should be after *Martinmas* ; for still the rent, tho' not payable, was due while the liferenter was yet alive ; and the postponing the term of payment, cannot hurt the right of the executors, *Gosford*, 24. *July* 1668, *Carnegy*. A liferenter, who outlives any part of the term-day, transmits to his executors the right to that term, *F. 8. Dec.* 1704, *Paterfon*. If the liferenter, being in the natural possession, and having first sowed the ground, should die, even before the *Whitsunday*, his executors are intitled to the whole crop, in respect that both seed and industry were his, 25. *July* 1671, *Guthrie*. Liferents of mills, tho' their fruits are continual, *de die in diem*, are governed by the same rule with liferents of land, 8. *Dec.* 1671, *Guthrie*. In a liferent of money, the executors have a right to the interest, down to the very day of the liferenter's death, where no terms are stipulated for the payment thereof ; but, where the annuity, or right of annual-rent, is taken payable at certain terms, the liferent is governed by these terms, 11. *Jan.* 1738, *Carruthers*. The above mentioned rules, serve to fix the interests of the heir and executor, as to the rents of that year, in which the proprietor dies.

What if
the life-
renter
sowed the
ground.

Liferents
of mills.

Of money.

TIT. 10. *Of Teinds.*

ECclesiastical rights are called benefices, an Benefices consist of, appellation transferred from secular feus to church livings, because they were given to churchmen, in consideration of their spiritual warfare. They consist either of lands, or of the tithe or teind of lands; the first is called the temporality, the other the spirituality of the benefice. That church-lands might not be aliened by the beneficiaries, in prejudice of their successors, Bishops, and the heads of religious houses, were disabled from making grants, without the consent of the chapter or convent; which rule continued after the reformation, during church-government by Bishops, 1606, c. 3. The King's confirmation, as the presumed patron, was also to be adhibited to grants of church-lands, *R. M. l. 2. c. 23.*; which right, tho' wrested from our sovereigns by the Pope, *Cr. 146, §. 29*, was, upon the reformation, restored to the crown, 1584, c. 7. &c.

Church-lands.

9. Teinds, or tithes, are that liquid proportion of our rents or goods, which is due to churchmen, for performing divine service. Most of the canonists affirm, that the precise proportion of a tenth, not only of the fruits of the ground, but of what is acquired by personal industry, is due to the christian clergy, of divine right, which they therefore call the proper patrimony of the church; tho' it is certain that tithes, in their infancy, were given, not to the clergy alone, but to lay-monks who

And teinds.

F f

were

were called *pauperes*, and to other indigent persons. *Charles* the Great was the first secular Prince, who acknowledged this right in the church. It appears to have been received with us, as far back as *Dav. I.* by two charters of that King, preserved in *Anderson's Diplomata*. Our first statute concerning teinds, is *Dav. II. c. 42.*

Teinds,
which
ought to
have been
paid to the
parson.

Were fre-
quently
appropri-
ated to ca-
thedrals
and mona-
steries.

Certain
orders ex-
empted
from pay-
ing them.

3. This right, if it had been divine, ought naturally to have belonged to the pastor of the parochial church; but its application was, for a long time, miserably inverted: For not only did those who were liable in payment, at first consider their obligation as fulfilled, by giving the right of their tithes, to any poor lay-friend; but even after tithes had been, by the canons, consecrated to the parochial churches, the patron, who in those ages looked on himself, upon the emerging of every vacancy, as the absolute proprietor of the benefice, assumed frequently a power of appropriating or annexing it, to a cathedral-church or monastery; by which annexation, the cathedral or monastery became the beneficiary or titular of the benefice annexed. At other times, churchmen, who had not their tithes regularly paid them, made a grant of part of them to the sovereign, that they might the better engage his interest, for making the rest effectual: And lastly, most of the religious orders, procured from the Pope, an exemption from payment of the tithe of lands possessed by themselves, which ought to have been paid to the several churches where the lands lay. These abuses were in some measure corrected, first, by a papal constitution of *Adrian IV. anno 1156*, limiting such exemptions to the three orders of cistercians,

cisterians, hospitallers, and templars; and afterwards by several councils of Lateran, one held by *Alex. III.* in 1180, one by *Innocent III.* in 1215, &c. prohibiting the farther infeudation of tithes to lay-men, and their farther consecration to any other than the parish-church.

These abuses, corrected by canons.

4. The person employed by the cathedral-church or monastery, to serve the cure in the church annexed, was called a vicar, because he held the church, not in his own right, but in the right or *vice* of his employers; and so was removeable at pleasure, and had no share of the benefice, other than what they thought fit to allow him: But, in the course of time, the appellation of vicar was limited to those who were made perpetual, and who got a stated share of the benefice for their incumbency; from whence arose the distinction of benefices into parsonages and vicarages. The Bishops, about the thirteenth century, divided with their chapters, the churches that had been annexed to their cathedrals; Those which fell to the Bishop himself, were styled menſal, because they supported the expence of his table; those that went to the chapter were called common, as belonging in common to all its members.

Vicar.

At first named during pleasure.

Afterwards perpetual.

Menſal and common churches.

5. Personal teinds, *i. e.* the tenth of what one acquires by his own industry or employment, are not acknowledged by our law; tho' they have been found due, when supported by forty years possession, 29. Nov. 1678, *Berny*. Predial teinds are either parsonage or vicarage. Parsonage teinds are the teinds of corn; and they are so called, because they are due to the parson, or other titular of the benefice. Vicarage-teinds are the small teinds of calves, lint, hemp,

Teinds are either parsonage or vicarage.

Parsonage teinds are universally due, but vicarage are local. hemp, eggs, &c. which were commonly given by the titular, to the vicar who served the cure in his place. The first sort was universally due, unless in the case of their infeudation to laics, or of a pontifical exemption; but, by the customs of almost all *Christendom*, the lesser teinds were not demanded, where they had not been in use to be paid. By the practice of *Scotland*, the teinds of animals, or of things produced from animals, as lambs, wool, calves, are due, tho' not accustomed to be paid, *F. 24. July 1678, L. Grant*; but roots, herbs, &c. are not tithable, unless use of payment be proved, *9. June 1676, Burnet*.

Parsonage teind was most commonly drawn from the stock. 6. The parson, who was intitled to the teind of corns, made his right effectual, either by accepting of a certain number of teind-bolls yearly from the proprietor, in satisfaction of it; or more frequently, by drawing or separating upon the field, his own tenth part of the corns, after they were reaped, from the stock or the remaining nine tenths of the crop, and carrying it off to his own granaries; which is called drawn teind. And, if any possessor of lands carried his part of the corns off the ground, before the churchman had drawn the teind, he was liable in a spuilzie; which frequently occasioned the loss of the whole crop, in the case, either of an ill natured, or of an indolent titular. This hardship was softened, rather than removed, by the acts, 1606, c. 8.—1612, c. 5.—1617, c. 9, regulating the times, within which the titular must either draw his teind, or leave the possessor of the lands at liberty to carry off his stock.

Hardships attending drawn teind.

Removed in part by statute.

7. After

7. After the reformation, *Ja. VI.* considered himself as proprietor of all the church-lands; partly, because the purposes for which they had been granted, were declared superstitious; and partly, in consequence of the resignations which he, and *Q. Mary* his mother, had procured from the beneficiaries: And even as to the teinds, tho' our reformed clergy, after the example of the canonists, claimed them as the patrimony of the church, our sovereign did not submit to that doctrine, farther than it extended to a competent provision for ministers. He therefore erected or secularised several abbacies and priories into temporal lordships; the grantees of which, were called sometimes lords of erection, and sometimes titulars, as having by their grants the same title to the erected benefices, that the monasteries had formerly.

Church-lands fell to the crown upon the reformation,

Erection of benefices into temporal lordships.

8. As the crown's revenue suffered greatly by these erections, the temporality of all church benefices (*i. e.* church-lands) was, by 1587, c. 29. annexed to the crown. That statute, tho' it does not comprehend teinds, excepts from the annexation, the teinds of lands belonging to parsonages and vicarages, together with their manfes and glebes; and declares, that all these shall remain with the present possessors, or with those that shall be afterwards provided to the benefices. Lands granted to universities, schools and hospitals, are also excepted (tho' these did not truly fall within the act, not being church-lands); and benefices of laic patronages, by which is meant such as were established before the reformation in laymen, whose rights the legislature had no intention to weaken.

Annexation of church-lands to the crown.

Notwithstanding

Notwithstanding this statute, his Majesty continued to make farther erections, which were declared null, by 1592, c. 119.: with an exception of such as had been made in favour of Lords of Parliament.

K. Ch. I.
raises re-
duction of
the erec-
tions.

His Maje-
sty's de-
mands.

All diffe-
rences re-
ferred to
the King
himself.

His de-
crees ar-
bitral.

9. King Ch. I. soon after his succession, raised a reduction of all these erections, whether granted before or after the act of annexation, upon the grounds mentioned at length by Mr *Forbes*, in his treatise of tithes, p. 259. In a conference between the King and the titulars, upon the subject of this suit, his Majesty insisted, 1. That all proprietors should be relieved from the hardship of having their teinds drawn by the titulars. 2. That all the superiorities of erections (*i. e.* of lands holden of the titulars as coming in place of the monasteries) should be declared to be in the crown, on a reasonable composition to be paid to the titulars, for passing from their right. 3. That a small interest should be reserved to the crown, out of all the erected teinds. At last, the whole matter was referred to the King himself, by four several submissions or compromises, in which the parties on one side were the titulars and their tacksmen, the Bishops with the inferior clergy, and the royal boroughs, for the interest they had in the teinds that were gifted for the provision of ministers, schools or hospitals within their boroughs; and, on the other part, the proprietors who wanted to have the leading of their own teinds. The submission by the titulars, contained a surrender into his Majesty's hands, of the superiorities of their several erections.

10. Upon each of these submissions, his Majesty pronounced separate decrees arbitral, dated

dated 2. *Sept.* 1629, which are subjoined to the acts of Parliament of his reign. He made it lawful to proprietors to sue the titulars for a valuation; and if they thought fit, for a sale also of their teinds, before the commissioners named or to be named for that purpose. The rate of teind, when it was possessed by the proprietor jointly with the stock, for payment of a certain duty to the titular, and so did not admit a separate valuation, was fixed at a fifth part of the constant yearly rent, which was accounted a reasonable *surrogatum*, in place of a tenth of the increase, *New Coll. vol. 2. 18.* Where it was drawn by the titular, and consequently might be valued separately from the stock, it was to be valued, as its extent should be ascertained, upon a proof before the commissioners; but in this last valuation, the King directed the fifth part to be deducted from the proved teind in favour of the proprietor, which was therefore called the King's ease, 28. *Jan.* 1708, *Doul.—7. Feb.* 1711, *Home.* The proprietor suing for a valuation, gets the leading of his own teinds, as soon as his suit commences; but if he shall suffer protestation to be extracted against him, for not insisting in the process, he loses that privilege, by 1693. *c. 23.* The proprietor is in all valuations allowed a joint proof with the titular, by our present law, 1690, *c. 30.* and upon getting his decree of valuation, he may be compelled by the titular, if he shall insist for it, to infect him in the lands, for his security of the valued teind, *Mackenzie, h. t. §. 16.*

11. Where the proprietor insisted also for a sale of his teinds, the titular was obliged to sell them at nine years purchase of the valued teind-duty;

Proprietors may sue for a valuation and sale of tithes.

Teinds valued, either jointly,

Or separately.

Privilege of a proprietor suing for a valuation.

duty; and, upon receiving the price, to execute a disposition in the purchaser's favour, containing procuratory of resignation and precept of feisin, which the decreet-arbital directs the granter to warrant, only from his own fact and deed; but by 1633, c. 19., the extent of the warrandice is left to the discretion of the commissioners. If the pursuer had a tack of his own teinds, not yet expired; or if the defender was only tacksmen of the teinds, and so could not give the pursuer an heritable right, an abatement of the price was to be granted accordingly, by the commissioners. This part of the decreet-arbital, concerning the valuation and sale of teinds, was ratified in Parliament, 1633, c. 17. and commissioners were appointed for executing it, by the same Parliament, c. 19.

Certain
teinds can-
not be
sold.

12. There is no provision in the decrees arbitral, for selling the teinds granted for the sustentation of ministers, universities, schools or hospitals; because these were to continue, as a perpetual fund, for the maintenance of the persons, or societies, to whom they were appropriated; and they are expressly declared not subject to sale, by 1690, c. 30.—1693, c. 23. By the last of these acts, it is also provided, that the teinds belonging to Bishops, which had then fallen to the crown, upon the abolishing of Episcopacy, should not be subject to sale, as long as they remained with the crown, not disposed of; nor those, which the proprietor who had right both to stock and teind, reserved to himself, in a sale or feu of the lands. But, tho' none of these teinds can be sold, they may be valued.

The superi-
orities of
erection
belong to
the King.

13. The King, by the decrees arbitral, declared his own right to the superiorities of erection

rection which had been resigned to him by the submission, reserving to the titulars the feu-duties thereof, until payment by himself to them, of one thousand merks *Scots* for every chalder of feu-victual, ratified 1633, c. 14.; which right of redeeming the feu-duties was renounced by the crown, 1707, c. 11.. If the church-vassal should consent to hold his lands of the titular, he cannot thereafter recur to the crown, as his immediate superior, 1661, c. 53.

Unless the church vassal chuses to hold his lands of the titular.

14. His Majesty referred what interest the crown ought to have, in the teinds of erected benefices, to the Commissioners; who determined an annuity to be paid out of them to the crown, of about six *per cent*, ratified 1633, c. 15. This right, not having been annexed, was conveyed to one *Livingston* in security of a debt; but, in 1674, the exercise of it was suspended by the crown; since which time, it has lain dormant, *St. 2. 8. 13.*

Annuity of teinds.

15. In explaining what the constant rent is, by which the teind must be valued, the following rules are observed. The rent drawn by the proprietor, from the sale of subjects that are more properly parts of the land than of the fruits, *e. g.* quarries, minerals, mosses, &c. is to be deducted from the rental of the lands, 11. *Dec. 1734*, heritors of *Cadder*; and also the rent of supernumerary houses, over and above what is necessary for agriculture; and the additional rent that may be paid by the tenant, in consideration of the proprietor's undertaking any burden that law imposes on the tenant, *e. g.* upholding the tenant's houses, *ibid.*; because none of these articles are paid properly on account of the fruits. Orchards must also be deducted,

Rules for fixing the rent in the valuation of teinds.

Rent of quarries &c. not teindable.

Nor of supernumerary houses.

Nor mill-rent. *New Coll. vol. 2. 18.*; and mill-rent, because the profits of a mill arise from industry; and the corns manufactured there suffer a valuation, as rent payable by the tenant, and therefore ought not to be valued a second time against the titular, as mill-rent. The yearly expence of culture ought not to be deducted; for no rent can be produced without it, 6. *Feb. 1745*, feuars of *Dalkeith*: But, if an improvement of rent is made at an uncommon expence, *e. g.* by draining a lake; the proprietor is allowed a reasonable abatement on that account, 18. *July 1739*, herit. of *Cadder*.

Nor rent improved at an extraordinary expence.

Teinds not disposed of.

Now redeemable by the patron, from the beneficiary.

In what order, teinds are subject to allocation for stipend.

16. Notwithstanding the several ways of misapplying parochial teinds in the times of popery, some few benefices remained entire in the hands of the parsons. The ministers planted in these, after the reformation, continued to have the full right to them, as proper beneficiaries; but by acts 1690, *c. 23.* and 1693, *c. 25.* a power is granted to the patron, to redeem the whole teind from such beneficiaries, upon their getting a competent stipend modified to them; which teind so redeemed, the patron is obliged to sell to the proprietor at six years purchase.

17. Some teinds are more directly subject to an allocation for the minister's stipend, than others. The teinds, in the hands of the lay-titular, fall first to be allocated, who, since he is not capable to serve the cure in his own person, ought to provide one who can; and if the titular, in place of drawing the teind, has set it in tack, the tack-duty is allocated: This sort is called free teind. Where the tack-duty, which is the titular's interest in the teinds, falls

falls short, the tack itself is burdened, or, in other words, the surplus teind over and above the tack-duty : But, in this case, the Commissioners are empowered to recompense the tackfman, by prorogating his tack, for such a number of years, as they shall judge equitable, 1690, c. 30.—1707. c. 9. Where this likewise proves deficient, the allocation falls on the teinds, heritably conveyed by the titular, unless he has warranted his grant against future augmentations ; in which case, the teinds of the lands belonging in property to the titular himself, must be allocated in the first place.

18. Where there is sufficiency of free teinds in a parish, the titular may allocate any of them he shall think fit for the minister's stipend, since they are all his own ; unless there has been a previous decree of locality : And this holds, tho' the stipend should have been paid immemorially out of the teinds of certain particular lands. This right was frequently abused by titulars, who, as soon as a proprietor had brought an action of sale of his teinds, allocated the pursuer's full teind for the stipend, whereby such action became ineffectual : It is therefore provided, by 1693, c. 23. that after citation in a sale of teinds, it shall not be in the titular's power to allocate the pursuer's teinds solely, but only in proportion with the other teinds in the parish.

19. Ministers glebes are declared free from the payment of teind 1578, c. 62.—1621, c. 10. Lands *cum decimis inclusis* are also exempted from teind. These were, according to Mackenzie, h. t. §. 6. the lands which had been feued out, prior to the above recited Lateran councils which prohibited the infeudation of teinds

Titular may allocate any of the teinds.

If there is no locality.

But not after citation in any sale of teinds.

Ministers glebes, and lands *cum decimis inclusis*, are exempted from teind.

teinds to laics, by churchmen who had right both to stock and teind; whereby the teinds were consolidated with the stock, and were never afterwards separated from it. Sir *Tho. Craig*, who is of opinion that we had no infeudation of teinds so early, understands by that expression, all lands, where the churchmen, who had right both to stock and teind, and came afterwards to feu out the lands (which they were allowed to do, by 1457, c. 71.), included the teind in the same charter with the stock; without distinguishing, whether such right was prior or posterior to the Lateran councils: And agreeably to this last opinion, it has been adjudged sufficient to exempt lands from payment of teind, that the proprietor proved his right thereto, *cum decimis inclusis*, as far back as the act 1587, c. 29. which supposes all such rights to be valid, *Dirl. 229.—7. Dec. 1737, Dempster*. Lands which formerly belonged to the Cistercians, or other privileged orders, are not now exempted from teind, 15. *June 1737*, minister of *Barry*; either because the privilege having been given to the monks, as *pauperes*, was deemed personal, and so not transmissible to the laic titulars; or because it was limited to lands which these orders were then possessed of, and it does not appear that they had property in *Scotland*, so early as the papal grant of exemption.

Teinds are *debita fructuum*, not *fundi*; for as by their first condition, the beneficiary might, if he used the proper diligence, make them effectual, by drawing them out of the several crops, he needed no real security. The action therefore for bygone teinds is only personal,

sonal, against those who have intermeddled, either with the teind by itself, or with stock and teind jointly; unless where the titular is infest in the lands, in security of the valued teind-duty. Where a tenant is, by his tack, bound to pay a joint duty to his landlord for stock and teind, without distinguishing the rent of each, his defence of a *bona fide* payment of the whole to the landlord, has been sustained in a suit at the instance of a laic titular, 21. *March 1628, Murray*; but repelled, where a churchman was pursuer, 19. *Feb. 1629, Kirk*: In both cases, the proprietor who receives such rent, is liable as intermeddler. Every person, having right to teinds, whether churchman or laic titular, has an hypothec upon the fruits, for the payment of his teind, 24. *June 1662, Vernor*,— 13. *Dec. 1664, Bishop of the Isles*; but a purchaser *bona fide* at a public market is secure, 20. *Dec. 1664, Reid*.

Hypothec
on the
fruits for
the teind.

21. In tacks of teinds, as of lands, there is place for tacit relocation; to stop the effect of which, the titular must obtain and execute an inhibition of teinds against the tacksmen, which differs much from inhibition of lands, explained under the next title, and is intended, merely to interpel or inhibit the tacksmen, from farther intermeddling. But, if the titular shall, after inhibition, summarily turn out his tacksmen, without a previous sentence, he is liable in a spuilzie, 27. *Jan. 1665, L. Berford*. This diligence of inhibition may also be used at the suit of the titular, against any other possessor of the teinds; and, if the tacksmen or possessor shall intermeddle after the inhibition is executed, he is liable in a spuilzie.

Inhibition
of teinds.

In what
case, does
a grant of
lands in-
clude the
teind.

22. Lands and teinds pass by different titles: A disposition of lands therefore, tho' granted by one who has also right to the teind, will not carry the teind, unless it shall appear from special circumstances, that a sale of both was designed by the parties. But if a proprietor who has right to his teinds, and who consequently carries his whole corns, without distinguishing between stock and teind, to the same mill, should astrict his lands, the intention of parties is presumed, that the astriction should reach to both. In lands *cum decimis inclusis*, where the teinds are consolidated with the stock, the right of both must necessarily go together in all cases.

TIT. II. Of Inhibitions.

THE constitution and transmission of feudal rights being explained, and the burdens with which they are chargeable, it remains to be considered, how these rights may be affected at the suit of creditors, by legal diligence. Diligences are certain forms of law, whereby a creditor endeavours to make good his payment, either by affecting the person of his debtor, or by securing the subjects belonging to him from alienation, or by carrying the property of them to himself. They are either real or personal. Real diligence is that which is proper to heritable or real rights; personal, is that by which the person of the debtor may be secured, or his personal estate affected. Of the

the first sort we have two, 1. Inhibition, 2. Adjudication, which law has substituted in the place of apprising.

2. Inhibition is a personal prohibition, which passes by letters under the signet, prohibiting the party inhibited, to contract any debt, or do any deed, by which any part of his lands may be aliened or carried off, in prejudice of the creditor inhibiting. It must be executed against the debtor, personally, or at his dwelling-house, according to the order prescribed in the case of summonses by 1540, c. 75. and thereafter published and registred, in the same manner with interdictions, 1581, c. 119. N^o. 1.—1600, c. 13. (1. 7. 33.). Tho' this diligence requires registration, to compleat it, yet it secures the creditor who inhibites, against all deeds of alienation, even onerous ones, that are granted posterior to the publication of the letters, (4. 1. 15.) provided he shall, within the time statuted, proceed to perfect his diligence by registration, *Dirl.* 254.—*Harc.* 639.

Inhibition.

How perfected.

3. Inhibition may proceed, either upon a liquid obligation, or even on a claim commenced before the court of Session, tho' not yet sustained; which last is called inhibition upon a depending action. The summons, which constitutes the dependance, must be executed against the debtor, before the letters of inhibition pass the signet; for no suit can be said to depend against one, till he be cited in it as a defender, *Br.* 9.: But the effect of such inhibition is suspended, till decree be obtained in the action against the debtor; and in the same manner, inhibitions on conditional debts have no effect, till the condition be purified.

The grounds of inhibition.

Inhibition on a dependance.

Inhibitions,

Inhibitions not granted of old, *nisi causâ cognita*.

Inhibitions, as they carry with them a certain degree of reproach, were not granted, by the old practice, without a trial of the cause; which is still necessary when they proceed on conditional debts, 17. *July 1713, Weir*: And tho' in other cases inhibitions now pass of course, the Lords are in use stay them, or, if they have passed the signet, to recal them, either on the debtor's shewing cause why the diligence should not proceed, *F. 15. Feb. 1699, Murray*; or even *ex officio*, without the debtor's appearance, where the ground of the diligence is doubtful, *F. 9. Feb. 1706, Wisbart*.

Inhibition limited to heritage.

4. Tho' inhibitions, by their uniform style, disable the debtor from selling his moveable, as well as his heritable estate, their effect has been long limited to heritage, from the interruption that such an embargo upon moveables must have given to commerce, 22. *March 1623, L. Braco*; so that debts contracted after inhibition, may be the foundation of diligence, against the debtor's person and moveable estate. The arrears remaining due on a *debitum fundi* to a person inhibited, tho' they be heritably secured, are moveable, and therefore do not fall under the inhibition, *Falc. vol. 2. 138*. An inhibition secures the inhibitor, against the alienation, not only of the lands that belonged to his debtor when he was inhibited, but of those that he shall have afterwards acquired, 15. *Dec. 1665, Elleis*; but no inhibition can extend to such after-purchases, as lie in a jurisdiction where the inhibition was not registred; for it could not have extended to these, tho' they had been made prior to the inhibition.

It affects after-acquisitions.

5. This



5. This diligence only strikes against the voluntary debts or deeds of the inhibited person: It does not restrain him from granting necessary deeds, *i. e.* such as he was obliged to grant, anterior to the inhibition; since he might have been compelled to grant these, before the inhibitor had acquired any right by his diligence. By this rule, a wadsetter or annual-renter might, after being inhibited, have effectually renounced his right to the reverser on payment, because law could have compelled him to it, 7. *Jan.* 1680, *Maclellan*; but, to secure inhibitors against such alienations, it is declared by *Act S.* 19. *Feb.* 1680, that, after intimation of the inhibition to the reverser, no renunciation or grant of redemption shall be sustained, except upon declarator of redemption brought by him, to which the inhibitor must be made a party. Judicial rights, *e. g.* adjudications, deduced against the inhibited person after the inhibition, upon debts contracted prior thereto, are not hurt by that diligence; for these are truly the deeds of the law, not of the person inhibited: But an adjudication led on a bond voluntarily granted after inhibition, is reducible.

It does not strike against necessary deeds.

Nor against judicial rights.

6. An inhibition is a diligence simply prohibitory, so that the debt, on which it proceeds, continues personal after the diligence; and consequently, the inhibitor, in a question with anterior creditors whose debts are not struck at by the inhibition, is only preferable from the period at which his debt is made real by adjudication: And where debts are contracted on heritable security, tho' posterior to the inhibition, the inhibitor's debt, being personal, cannot

It is simply prohibitory.

be ranked with them; he only draws back from the creditors ranked, the sums contained in his diligence. The heir of the person inhibited, is not restrained from alienation, by the diligence used against his ancestor; for the prohibition is personal, affecting only the debtor against whom the diligence is used.

Reductions *ex capite inhibitionis*, founded solely in the inhibitor's interest.

7. Inhibitions do not, of themselves, make void the posterior debts or deeds of the person inhibited; they only afford a title to the user of the diligence to set them aside, if he finds them hurtful to him: And even where a debt is actually reduced *ex capite inhibitionis*, such reduction, being founded solely in the inhibitor's interest, is profitable to him alone, and cannot alter the natural preference of the other creditors. Hence, where several infeftments of annualrent of different dates, have been granted by the debtor after inhibition, for the payment of all which, the debtor's estate is not sufficient; tho' the inhibitor cannot be hurt by any of the posterior contractions, and consequently must draw back his whole debt from the annualrenters, yet the deficiency in the fund of payment must fall, not on the whole of them, *pro rata*, but upon the least preferable, *Falc. vol. 1. 160.* Hence also, debts, tho' contracted after inhibition, are not reducible, where the inhibitor would have been totally excluded from the debtor's funds, by debts preferable to his own, tho' these posterior contractions had not been made.

8. Inhibitions may be reduced, upon legal nullities, arising either from the ground of debt, or the form of the diligence. When payment is made by the debtor to the inhibitor, the inhibition

hibition is said to be purged. Any creditor, whose debt is struck at by the inhibition, may, upon making payment to the inhibitor, compel him to assign the debt and diligence, in his favour, that he may make good his payment the more effectually, against the common debtor.

Purging of inhibition.

TIT. 12. *Of Comprisings and Adjudications.*

Heritable rights may be carried from the debtor to the creditor, either by the diligence of apprising, (now adjudication) or by a judicial sale, carried on before the court of Session. Apprising, or comprising, was the sentence of a Sheriff, or of a messenger who was specially constituted Sheriff for that purpose, by which, the heritable rights belonging to the debtor were sold, for payment of the debt due to the appriser. By the *Roman* law, the debtor's moveable estate was first taken into execution, and, if that was not sufficient, his immoveable, *l. 15. §. 2. de re jud.* In the same manner, the debtor's moveables were, by our old law, to be first distrained on a brief of distress; and in default of these, as much of his heritage was to be sold, as would satisfy the creditor, *St. Al. II. c. 24.*; so that apprisings were, by their original constitution, proper sales of the debtor's lands, to any purchaser who offered. If there was not enough for the creditor's payment, within the territory of that Sheriff who was first applied to, the crown issued

Apprisings.

Were originally proper sales.

issued letters to other Sheriffs, who were to pursue the same method with the first, 1469, c. 37. If no purchaser could be found, the Sheriff was to apprise or tax the value of the lands by an inquest (whence came the name of apprising), and to make over to the creditor, lands to the value of the debt.

Form of
deducing
appri-
sings.

2. Soon after the act 1469, all letters of apprising came to be issued from the King's signet, and directed to messengers, as Sheriffs in that part. The messenger who was employed, searched first for moveables, and, upon finding none, *denounced* the lands to be appraised, *i. e.* made publication of the intended apprising, upon the ground of the lands, and at the market-cross of the jurisdiction where the lands lay, and left copies of the execution at both places. The letters were also to be executed against the debtor, personally or at his dwelling place, fifteen days before the actual apprising. By the decree following upon this diligence, such a proportion of the debtor's lands was adjudged to the appriser, as was taxed by the inquest to amount to the principal sum and penalty contained in the debt, and to the messenger's Sheriff-fee (1. 4. 18.); but the appriser got nothing in name of interest, before the reformation. In course of time, all apprisings were led at *Edinburgh*, whereby persons came frequently to be put on the inquest, utter strangers to the value of the lands; which soon introduced the custom of apprising the whole lands belonging to the debtor, without comparing their value with the extent of the debt. Seven years were by the act 1469, allowed to the debtor, to redeem the lands appraised (called the legal reversion

The legal
reversion
of appri-
sings.

version, or the legal); but a minor may redeem at any time within his age of twenty five, 1621, c. 6. whether he himself be the original debtor, or whether he succeed as heir to the debtor: And where a major succeeds to a minor, against whom the legal of seven years was expired at his death, the major's right of reversion is prorogated for year and day thereafter.

Runs not
against
minors.

3. Tho' letters of apprising contained a power to poind moveables, nothing was *de facto* apprised by the messenger, but heritable rights. Personal rights of lands may be apprised, and tacks where assigneys are not specially excluded; and even bare faculties or powers competent to a debtor, *e. g.* a faculty to reduce a deed granted by a minor to his prejudice, *St. Ans. voce Adjudications*; for every pecuniary or patrimonial interest belonging to debtors, ought to be subjected to the diligence of creditors. Offices of trust, conferred on personal considerations, cannot be apprised; because in these, there is a *delectus personae*, not communicable to creditors by diligence: But all offices, which are either annexed to lands, or pass by voluntary conveyance, are apprisable, *Falc. vol. 1. 203*. An apprising, whether of lands, or of a right of annualrent, or other *debitum fundi*, carries no past arrears due upon such right, prior to the decree of apprising; for, tho' these are heritably secured, they are moveable subjects, 13. March 1627, *Macghie*.

What sub-
jects can
be appri-
sed.

What of-
fices can
be appri-
sed.

4. The debt on which the apprising proceeds, must be either liquid in itself, or liquidated by a sentence, to a certain value in money, before leading the diligence; that the precise sum may be known, upon payment of which

On what
debts can
apprising
proceed.

which, the debtor can redeem. It must also be a debt, the term of payment whereof is already come; for till then, no creditor can appropriate to himself his debtor's estate; see 11. *Feb. 1680, Gordon.*

5. That creditors may have access to affect the estate of their deceased debtor, tho' the heir should stand off from entering, it is made lawful, by 1540, c. 106. for any creditor, to charge the heir of his debtor to enter to his ancestor, year and day being past after the ancestor's death, within forty days after the charge; and, if the heir fails, the creditor may proceed to apprise his debtor's lands, as if the heir had been entered. Custom has so explained this statute, that the creditor may charge the heir, immediately after the death of his ancestor, provided year and day be expired, before executing the summons that is founded on the charge, *Spots. Pr. p. 137. in fine.*—19. *June 1628, Maculloch.* Tho' the statute authorises such charges against majors only, practice has also extended it against minors. The provision of this statute is, by 1621, c. 27. extended to the case, where the heir is the debtor. One must, in this matter, distinguish between a general and a special charge, tho' no distinction is made in these statutes. A general charge serves only to fix the representation of the heir who is charged, so as to make the debt his, which was formerly his ancestors; but a special charge makes up for the want of a service (explained 3. 8. 29.), and states the heir, *fictione juris*, in the right of the subjects to which he is charged to enter. Where therefore the heir is the debtor, a general charge for fixing the representation against

Apprising
upon a
charge to
enter heir

Charge, ei-
ther gene-
ral or spe-
cial.

gainst him is unnecessary, since the only concern of the creditor is, that his debtor make up titles to the ancestor's estate, which is done by a special charge: But, where the deceased was the debtor, the creditor must first charge his heir to enter in general, that it may be known whether he is to represent the debtor; if he does not enter within forty days, the debt may be fixed against him by a decree of constitution on which he must be charged to enter heir in special, upon forty days more; and these must be elapsed, before the creditor can proceed to apprise, *Act S. 18. Feb. 1721, — New Coll. 27.*

6. Apprisings, being transmissions of heritable rights, must be perfected by seisin. The superior of the lands appraised is obliged, by 1469, c. 37. to enter apprisers, on payment of a year's rent; which holds, though himself should claim the lands on an exclusive title, 17. *July 1632, Black*; but his entry on a charge, being an act of obedience, can hurt no former right competent to him. Tho' there should be many apprisings, the superior gets but one year's rent for all of them, from which the real burdens affecting the lands, arising either from law or the consent of the superior, must be deducted. If the debt due to the appriiser be small in proportion to the value of the lands, the composition is brought lower *ex aequitate*, 30. *March 1637, Paterson*. Where the crown is superior, no more is exacted from the appriiser, than one *per cent.* of the principal sum appraised for, when it is below 10,000 merks Scots, tho' that composition should be lower than the sixth part of the valued rent, exacted from singular successors by voluntary purchase.

Where

Apprisings are perfected by seisin.

The superior must enter the appriiser, for a year's rent.

Where the principal is above 10,000 merks, the composition falls to an half *per cent*.

Allow-
ance of ap-
prisings.

7. Where the superior refused to enter the appriser, the apprising was by the ancient practice, approved or allowed by the court of Session, *Hope Min. Pr.* 109, upon which allowance, three consecutive precepts were directed to the superior, commanding him to enter the appriser, *Gr.* 457, §. 20., which were no other than the ancient letters of four forms, *arg.* 1647, c. 43.; and if he still refused, application was made to the immediate higher superior, and so upwards to the sovereign, who refuses none: But now, by long usage founded on the said act 1647, a simple charge of hornning against the superior, has been substituted in place of the letters of four forms. All apprisings without distinction, and not those only where the superior was refractory, were, by 1641, c. 54. revived by 1661, c. 31. ordained to be allowed by the Lords; and the allowance, containing a note of the parties names, of the debt, and of the lands, was to be registered, in a record to be kept by the clerk of register.

Apprisers
are ac-
countable
for the sur-
plus rents
during the
legal.

8. Apprisers, being purchasers under redemption, enjoyed the rents of the apprifed lands, in satisfaction or *in solutum* of their interest, in case they chose to possess during the legal; until, by 1621, c. 6. they became obliged to apply the rents, in so far as they exceeded the interest of their debt, towards extinction of the principal sum; which is extended, in the case of a minor debtor, to the surplus rents during his minority, by 1663, c.

10. On the other part, if the rents fall short of the appriser's interest, the redemption is burdened with the arrears remaining unpaid. An appriser, who enters into possession in virtue of a decree, is accountable to the debtor, as if he had continued to possess till the expiring of the legal, tho' he should have quitted the possession, immediately after his entry; because the decree bars all others from intermeddling. If the smallest part of the debt or interest remains due at the expiration of the legal, the property of the whole estate is, in strict law, carried irredeemably from the debtor.

An appriser who has begun to possess is accountable, as if he had continued.

9. As apprisings are truly sales under reversion, in satisfaction of the debt due to the apprisers, the arrears of interest are not so properly a debt upon the reverser, as a burden upon his right of reversion; these arrears do not therefore descend upon the appriser's death, to his executors, but transmit to the heir, as a part of the right of property constituted by the apprising, 3. Feb. 1738, *Ramsay*: The executors can claim no more, than the bygone rents of the lands not levied by the appriser himself, in case he has been in the possession. Yet this right of property does not constitute the appriser vassal in the lands apprised, during the legal, tho' he should be both infest and in possession: The reverser continues vassal, in the judgment of law, as long as the right of reversion is competent to him; because so long, it is in his power, by payment, to extinguish the apprising, as if it had never been led; and consequently, the casualties of superiority fall, during the legal, by the death, not of the appri-

The bygone interest of the accumulate sum, falls not under executory.

The appriser is not truly vassal during the legal.

fer, but of the reverse, 24. *July* 1739, creditors of *Bonhard*.

Effect of
denuncia-
tion.

10. Apprising, being a legal diligence, renders the subject to be apprised, litigious from the denunciation; the effect of which is, that no voluntary deed granted thereafter by the debtor, tho' before the decree, can hurt the appriser, see *P. Falc.* 19.: But a creditor, who neglects the compleating of any begun diligence, after a reasonable time, is considered as having relinquished it; so that the debtor may after such dereliction, grant even voluntary deeds, which law will support, 23. *July* 1674, *Johnston*.

Reduction
of appri-
sings.

11. Apprisings may be either reduced upon nullities, or redeemed within the legal. They are reduced *in totum*, where the defect is gross; as where they are led on a debt not truly due, or where the appriser has neglected any of the necessary solemnities. If the informality be not so essential, the Court of Session, without overturning the apprising *funditus*, sustain it *ex aequitate*, simply as a security for the principal sum and interest, 31. *Jan.* 1679, *Irvin*; and sometimes also for the accumulations, where the question is not with co-creditors, but with the debtor himself, 3. *Nov.* 1738, *Balsour*: But the legal of adjudications so restricted, can never expire against the debtor.

Redemp-
tion of
apprisings.

12. An apprising may be redeemed, not only by the debtor, but by any posterior appriser, whose diligence is excluded by the first. He who has this right, may either use an order of redemption, as in wadsets (2. 8. 6.); or, if the appriser has been in possession, he may bring an action of compt and reckoning against him, for his intromissions. If the appriser's intro-
missions

missions within the legal, amount to the principal sum, interest and expences of diligence, including the composition paid to the superior for his entry, and interest thereof, the apprising is, by 1621, c. 6, declared to expire *ipso facto*; but in this case, singular successors are not secure, for, as intromission consists in fact, it can enter into no record, by which it may be known: And even where an apprising is extinguished by payment made by the debtor himself, the appriser's discharge is good against his singular successors, without being registered in the register of reversions, 23. *July* 1662, Lord *Frazer*. After redemption, the debtor is under no necessity to renew his seisin; for, upon the extinction of the right of apprising, his former seisin revives.

Apprisings may be extinguished by discharges unregistered.

13. Apprisings were, by the former practice, preferable, according to the dates of the seisins following upon them, where the debtor himself was infest; and, where the right was not perfected by seisin in the debtor's person, or did not require seisin, the preference was governed by the dates of the apprisings. And even where the first apprising required seisin to compleat it, all the posterior apprisings were preferred by their dates; because, the first apprising having divested the debtor of the property, there remained no right in posterior apprisers, but a reversion, which, like other personal rights, was carried without seisin. See *St. 3. 2. 17.*—*Gosford*, 22. *July*, 1675, *Boyd*. But by 1661, c. 62. a *pari passu* preference is established among all apprisings, led within year and day of that one which has been first made effectual, either by seisin,

Preference among apprisers.

The *pari passu* preference of apprisings.

or

What constitutes the first effectual apprising.

or by exact diligence for obtaining seisin. In lands holding of the crown, the presenting a signature in exchequer, by the appriser, makes his apprising effectual; in lands holding of a subject-superior, a charge against that superior to enter the appriser, is sufficient: And, in both cases, the year and day runs from the date of the first apprising, and not from the date of the seisin or diligence whereby it is made effectual, 4. *July* 1671, *L. Balfour*. In apprisings of personal rights which admit of no diligence to make them effectual, the first in date is the first effectual apprising; and consequently, all within year and day of that first, are preferred *pari passu*, 19. *Nov.* 1734, *Jackson*. The preference of apprisings after the year, falls not within this statute, and therefore is governed by the former law, which preferred all apprisings after the first, by their dates. The co-apprisers, who claim the benefit of the first appriser's diligence, must refund to him, not a proportion only, but the whole of the expence disbursed by him, in deducing the apprising, and leading the diligence necessary for making it effectual, 5. *Feb.* 1663, *Graeme*.

Expence of leading the apprising, on whom it falls.

Seisin on the first apprising is a common right to the co-apprisers.

14. The statute declares, that all the adjudgers within year and day, shall be preferred *pari passu*, as if one apprising had been led for the debts contained in all of them; which makes the seisins or diligence on the first apprising, a common right to all the co-apprisers within year and day; and consequently, tho' the first apprising should be redeemed, the diligence upon it still subsists, as to the rest, 7. *Nov.* 1679, *Straiton*. The effect given to the presenting of a signature, or to a charge against

gainst the superior, is confined to the preference of apprisers among themselves, and does not alter the nature of feudal rights, in competition with third parties: A charge therefore upon an apprising is not equivalent to a seisin, in a question with an infeftment of annualrent, *K.* 48, or with the legal right of terce, *K.* 56.

Charge against the superior has no effect against third parties.

The same statute prorogates the legal reversion of apprisings from seven to ten years; it saves the former preference due to apprisings that are led on *debita fundi* (2. 8. 18.), and it gives a right to posterior apprisers, to redeem all apprisings purchased by the apparent heir of the debtor, for the sums truly paid for them, at any time within ten years after the purchases: But voluntary acquisitions by apparent heirs, of rights affecting the estate of their ancestors, infer, by our present law, a passive title, 1695, c. 24.

Legal reversion is now prorogated to ten years.

15. The Parliament 1672, c. 19. has, in place of the old form of apprising by messengers, directed adjudications to proceed against debtors, by way of action before the court of Session. By that statute such part only of the debtor's lands is to be adjudged, as is equivalent to the principal sum and interest of the debt, with the composition due to the superior and expences of infeftment, and a fifth part more, in respect the creditor is obliged to take land for his money; but without penalties or Sheriff-fees. The debtor must deliver to the creditor, a valid right of the lands to be adjudged, or transumps thereof, renounce the possession in his favour, and ratify the decree of adjudication: And law considers the rent of the lands, as precisely commensurated to the interest of the

Adjudication substituted in place of apprisings.

Special adjudication.

the debt; so that the adjudger lies under no obligation to account for the surplus rents. In this, which is called a special adjudication, the legal is declared to be five years; and the creditor attaining possession upon it, can use no farther execution against the debtor, unless the lands be evicted from him.

General
Adjudica-
tion.

16. Where the debtor does not produce a progress, or is not willing to renounce the possession, and ratify the decree (which is the case that has most frequently happened), the statute makes it lawful for the creditor, to adjudge all right belonging to the debtor, in the same manner and under the same reversion of ten years, as he could, by the former laws, have apprised it. This last kind, which is called a general adjudication, must be deduced only for the principal sum, interest and penalty, not for a fifth part more; see *At S. 26. Feb. 1684.* But it cannot be deduced, without libelling in the summons, the other alternative of a special adjudication; for special adjudications are introduced by the statute in the place of apprisings; and it is only, where the debtor refuses to comply with the terms thereof, that the creditor can lead a general adjudication.

Abbrevi-
ate of ad-
judica-
tions.

17. By regulations 1695, c. 24. abbreviates are ordained to be made of all adjudications, after the manner of the former allowances; which are to be signed by the Lord Ordinary who pronounced the decree, and thereafter given in to the clerk of the bills, to be recorded within sixty days after the date of the decree. In every other respect, general adjudications have the same nature and effects that apprisings had; adjudgers in possession are accountable for

for the surplus rents; a citation in adjudications renders the subject litigious; superiors are obliged to enter adjudgers; the legal of adjudications does not expire during the debtor's minority, &c. Only it may be observed, that, the' appraisings could not proceed before the term of payment, yet where the debtor is *vergens ad inopiam*, the Lords, *ex nobili officio*, admit adjudication for the debt, before it be payable, 12. July 1711, *Blau*: But this sort, being founded solely in equity, subsists merely as a security, and cannot carry the property to the creditor by any length of time, *ibid.*

General
adjudica-
tions are of
the same
nature
with ap-
prisings.

18. There are two kinds of adjudication, which took place at the same time with appraisings, and still obtain; *viz.* adjudications on a decree *cognitionis causa*, otherwise called, *contra hereditatem jacentem*; and adjudications in implement. Where the debtor's apparent heir, who is charged to enter, formally renounces the succession, the creditor may obtain a decree *cognitionis causa*, in which, tho' the heir renouncing is cited for the sake of form, no sentence condemnatory can be pronounced against him, in respect of his renunciation; the only effect of it, is to subject the *hereditas jacens* to the creditor's diligence. By the old practice, if the debt was liquid, the creditor might, in the process of cognition, protest for adjudication, which was allowed to him summarily, without the necessity of a separate action, *St. 3. 2. 46*; but now adjudication cannot pass without a summons for that purpose.

Adjudica-
tion *contra*
heredita-
tem jacen-
tem.

19. Adjudications *contra hereditatem jacentem*, carry not only the lands themselves that belonged to the deceased, but the rents thereof fallen

What is
carried by
it.

fallen due since his death; for these, as an accessory to the estate belonging to the deceased, would have descended to the heir, if he had entered, 19. *Dec.* 1638, *Corfar*; which rule is applied to all apprisings or adjudications led on a special charge, by 13. *Feb.* 1740, *L. Kilbucko*.

Redemption there-
of.

This sort of adjudication is declared redeemable by 1621, c. 7. within seven years (which was then the legal of apprisings), by any co-adjudging creditor, either of the deceased debtor, or of the heir renouncing. The heir himself, who renounces, cannot be restored against his renunciation, nor consequently redeem, if he be not a minor, 27. *Jan.* 1680, *Macaulay*: But even a major may redeem indirectly, by granting a simulate bond to a confident person; the adjudication upon which, when conveyed to himself, is a good title, to redeem all other adjudications against the lands belonging to his ancestor. The superior of the lands thus adjudged, is laid under the same obligation to enter the adjudger, as in the case of apprisings, by 1669, c. 18.

Adjudication in im-
plement.

20. Adjudications in implement are deduced against those who have granted deeds without procuratory of resignation or precept of seisin, and refuse to divest themselves; to the end, that the subject conveyed may be effectually vested in the grantee. These adjudications may be also directed against the heir of the granter; in which case, *Visc. Stair* asserts that a charge to enter is unnecessary, 3. 2. 52, but his Lordship's opinion is not supported by practice. Here, there is no place for a legal reversion; for, as the adjudication is led for completing the right of a special subject, it must carry that subject as irredeemably

irredeemably, as if the right had been voluntarily compleated: And for the same reason, it being to supply the defect of a special deed, no other adjudication, tho' within year and day, can come in *pari passu* with it, *St. ibid.*

21. Adjudications *contra hereditatem jacentem* might have been, before the act 1672, and consequently may, at this day, be carried on before the Sheriff; for that act, which gives to the court of Session the exclusive jurisdiction in adjudications, can be understood only of those, which are thereby introduced in place of apprisings, 4. *Jan.* 1709, *Ker.* It is probable, that the practice prior to the act 1672 was the same, with regard to adjudications in implement, as the cognizance of these imported no higher jurisdiction than that of other adjudications; and upon that practice, the question depends, whether they may now be brought before the Sheriff, for they are not comprehended under the statute. The regulations 1695, *art.* 24. had ordained abbreviates of adjudications to be signed by the Lord pronouncer, in place of the former allowances: And tho' there were no allowances of adjudications on decrees *cognitionis causa*, yet by additional regulations, 1696, *art.* 3, abbreviates of these were also directed to be signed. Since that time, it has been the general practice, where such adjudications were led before the Sheriff, to get their abbreviates signed by him; and, where they have no abbreviates, the Lords refuse to grant letters of horning on them against superiors, *Act. S.* 2. *Dec.* 1742.

Adjudications *contra hereditatem jacentem* may be pursued before the Sheriff.

They must have abbreviates.

22. Before treating of judicial sales of bankrupt estates, the nature of sequestration may

Sequestration of land estates.

When competent.

What subjects fall under sequestration.

Factors on sequestered estates.

be shortly explained, which is a diligence that generally ushers in actions of sale. Sequestration of lands, when decreed by the judge, is a judicial act of the court of Session, whereby the management of an estate, is put into the hands of a factor or steward named by the court, who gives security, and is to be accountable for the rents to all having interest. This diligence is competent, either where the right of the lands is doubtful, if it be applied for, before either of the competitors has attained possession; or where the estate is heavily charged with debts: But, as it is an unfavourable diligence, it is not admitted, unless that measure shall appear necessary for the security of creditors. Subjects, not brought before the court by the diligence of creditors, cannot fall under sequestration; for it is the competition of creditors, which alone founds the jurisdiction of the court, to take the disputed subject into their possession: Hence, a creditor, whose debt is not made real on the lands in question, has no title to demand it; and the arrestment of rents from year to year, can only affect a sequestration of the rents arrested, but not of the lands themselves, 13. *Feb.* 1745, creditors of *Ouchtertyre*.

23. The court of Session who decrees the sequestration, has the nomination of the factor, in which they are directed by the recommendation of the creditors. Writers were, by *Act. S.* 23. *Nov.* 1710, declared incapable of this office; and tho' an objection be seldom made upon that act, yet when it is offered, the court sustains it. The debtor's apparent heir may be also accounted an improper factor, as the same grounds of suspicion that lie against the debtor himself,

himself, commonly strike with equal force against his heir, both in point of necessitous circumstances, and of design against the creditors; but where no opposition is made, nothing hinders him from being named. A factor appointed by the Session, tho' the proprietor had not been infeft in the lands, has a power to remove tenants, *New Coll. vol. 2. 41*, contrary to the general rule stated 2. 6. 23. The rules by which a judicial factor on a bankrupt estate must conduct himself, are contained in several acts of Sederunt. By *Act. S. 22. Nov. 1711. §. 6. 7. 8.* factors must, within six months after extracting their factory, make up a rental of the estate, and a list of the arrears due by tenants, to be lodged with the clerk of the process, as a charge against themselves, and a note of such alterations in the rental as may afterwards happen; and must also lodge with the clerk annually, a scheme of their accounts, charge and discharge, under heavy penalties. They are, by the nature of their office, bound to the same degree of diligence that a prudent man adhibites in his own affairs; and by *Act. S. 31. July 1690*, they are accountable for the interest of the rents, which they either have or by diligence might have recovered, from a year after their falling due. As it is much in the power of these factors, to take advantage of the necessities of creditors, by purchasing their debts at an undervalue, all such purchases made either by the factor himself, or to his behoof, are declared equivalent to an acquittance or extinction of the debt, by *Act. S. 25. Dec. 1708*. No factor can warrantably pay to any creditor, without an order of the court of Session; for he is, by the

Their duty.

the tenor of his commission, directed to pay the rents to those who shall be found to have best right to them. Judicial factors are intitled to a salary, which is generally stated at five *per cent.* of their intromissions; but it is seldom ascertained till their office expires, or till their accounting; that the court may modify a greater or a smaller salary, or none, in proportion to the factor's integrity and diligence, 22. *June 1711, Heriot.* See also *Act. S. 23. Nov. 1711.* Many cases occur, where the court of Session, without sequestration, name a factor to preserve the rents from perishing; *e. g.* where an heir is deliberating whether to enter, where a minor is without tutors, where a succession opens to a person residing abroad, &c. *St. 4. 50. 28.*; in all which cases, the factor is subjected to the rules laid down in *Act. S. 13. Feb. 1730.*

Sale of
bankrupt-
estates.

24. The word *bankrupt* is in our law sometimes applied to persons whose funds are not sufficient for their debts; and sometimes, not to the debtor, but to his estate. There was no method known in our law for the proper sale of a bankrupt estate, so as the price might be divided among the creditors, till 1681, *c. 17*, by which the court of Session was empowered, at the suit of any real creditor, to try the value of the debtor's estate, and name commissioners to sell it, for the payment of his debts: But, as the commissioners named by the Session in pursuance of this act, were generally backward to undertake so ungrateful an office, and as the consent of the debtor, which the statute required where his right of reversion was not expired, could seldom be obtained, it was enacted, by 1690, *c.*

c. 20. that decrees of sale of bankrupt estates should be pronounced by the court itself, and that such sales might proceed in all cases, without the consent of the debtor.

25. No process of sale, at the suit of a creditor, can proceed without a proof of the debtor's bankruptcy, *Act. S. 24. Feb. 1692*, or at least, as Lord *Stair* softens it, 4. 51. 6. that his lands are so charged with debts, that prudent persons will not buy from him; and therefore the summons of sale must comprehend the debtor's whole estate. The debtor, or his apparent heir, and all the real creditors in possession, must be made parties to the suit; but it is sufficient that the other creditors be called by an edictal citation, *Act. S. 23. Nov. 1711, §. 1.*

The summons of sale contains a conclusion of ranking or preference of the bankrupt's creditors. In this ranking, first and second terms are assigned to the whole creditors for exhibiting in court, or producing their rights and diligences, which must be published in the *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, according to the directions of *Act. S. 17. Jan. 1756*; and it is thereby declared, that the decree of certification proceeding thereupon, against the writings not produced, shall have the same effect in favour of the creditors who have produced their rights, as if that decree had proceeded upon an action of reduction-improbation, 4. 1. 5. The ranking of these creditors must be concluded by an extracted decree, before the actual sale, at least to the extent of the value put on the lands, by the court of Session, *Reg. 1695, art. 26.* The irredeemable property of the lands is adjudged by the court, to the highest offerer

Ranking
of credi-
tors.

The security of judicial purchasers.

offerer at the sale: The creditors receiving payment, must grant to the purchaser absolute warrandice, to the extent of the sum received by them, *Act. S. 31. March 1685*; and the lands purchased are, by 1695, c. 6. declared disburdened of all debts or deeds of the bankrupt, or his ancestors, either on payment of the price by the purchaser to the creditors, according to their preference, or on consignation of it, in case of their refusal, in the hands of the magistrates of *Edinburgh*: The only remedy provided by the act, to such creditors as judge themselves hurt by the sale or division of the price, even tho' they should be minors, is an action for recovering their share of the price against the creditors who have received it,

On whom does the expence of the sale fall.

26. The expence of these processes was at first disbursed by the factor, out of the rents in his hands; by which the whole burden of such expence fell upon the posterior creditors. By *Act. S. 23. Nov. 1711, §. 9.* it was proportioned among all the creditors, according to the shares that they should severally draw of the price; because actions of sale and ranking redounded to the common benefit of them all: But as this last regulation cut off the preferable creditors from their claim of expences, which the nature of their rights or diligences intitled them to, matters were again put on the first footing, by *Act. S. 10. Aug. 1754.*

Apparent heirs may pursue a sale.

27. Apparent heirs, and heirs served *cum beneficio inventarii*, are intitled, by 1695, c. 24. to bring actions of sale of the estates belonging to their ancestors, whether bankrupt or not; which privilege is not lost to them, tho' they should behave as heirs, 28. *Feb. 1733, Blair.*
The

The expence of these actions ought to fall upon the pursuer, where there appears to be any ex-
crescence of the price, after payment of the cre-
ditors; because, in such case he is presumed to
to act for himself: But, where there is no ex-
crescence, the creditors, who alone are gainers
by the sale, ought to be burdened with the ex-
pence of it.

28. As processes of ranking and sale are de-
signed for the common interest of all the cre-
ditors, no diligence carried on, or compleated
during their pendency, ought to give any pre-
ference in the competition; *pendente lite nihil
innovandum*. Hence, in a competition between
a creditor who had adjudged, pending an action
of sale, and another, who, that he might not be
excluded by the first adjudger, had led a second
within year and day of the first, but after the
sale, the two adjudications were preferred *pari
passu*; tho' the last, having been led after the
property of the lands was transferred from the
debtor, was an improper diligence, *Falc. vol. 1.*

Diligen-
ces *pen-
dente lite*
ineffectu-
al.

233.

29. It is a rule in all real diligences, that
where a creditor is preferable on several diffe-
rent subjects, he cannot use his preference arbi-
trarily, by favouring one creditor more than a-
nother; but must allocate his universal or ca-
tholic debt, proportionally against all the sub-
jects or parties whom it affects. If it is mate-
rial to such creditor, to draw his whole pay-
ment out of any one fund, he may apply his
debt, so as may best secure himself; but that
inequality will be rectified, as to the posterior
creditors, who had likewise, by their rights and
diligences, affected the subjects out of which he
drew

The appli-
cation of
catholic
rights in a
competi-
on.

drew his payment, by obliging him to assign in their favour, his right upon the separate subjects which he did not use in the ranking; by which they may recur against these separate subjects, for the shares which the debt preferred might have drawn out of them. As the obligation to assign is founded merely in equity, the catholic creditor cannot be compelled to it, if his assigning shall weaken the preference of any separate debt vested in himself, affecting the special subject sought to be assigned. But if a creditor upon a special subject, shall acquire from another a catholic right, or a catholic creditor shall purchase a debt affecting a special subject, with a view of creating to the special debt a higher degree of preference than was naturally due to it, by an arbitrary application of the catholic debt, equity cannot protect him from assigning in favor of the creditor excluded by such application, especially if, prior to the purchase, the subject had become litigious by the process of ranking; for transmissions ought not to hurt creditors who are no parties to them, nor to give the purchaser any new right, which was not formerly in himself or his cedent. This head of our law is accurately discussed in an essay on the *beneficium cedendarum actionum*.

B O O K III.

TIT. I. *Of Obligations and Contracts in general.*

THE law of heritable rights being explained, moveable rights fall next to be considered, the doctrine of which depends chiefly on the nature of Obligations. An obligation is a legal tie, by which one is bound to pay or perform something to another. Every obligation on the person obliged, implies an opposite right in the creditor, so that what is a burden in regard to the one is a right with respect to the other; and all rights founded on obligation are called personal. There is this essential difference between a real and a personal right, that the first confers a *jus in re*, a right of property, or other right in the thing itself, by which the person vested with it, is intitled to possess the subject as his own; or if he is not in possession, to demand it from the possessors; whereas the creditor in a personal right, has only *jus ad rem*, or a right to compel the debtor to fulfil his obligation; without any right in the subject itself, which the debtor is bound to transfer to him. It is said in the definition, *to pay or to perform*. The first, to pay, relates properly to those subjects, which the debtor is bound to deliver to

Obligations or personal rights.

Difference between real and personal rights.

the creditor, and is generally limited to sums of money. The other alternative, to perform, includes all articles consisting in fact, as an obligation to dispoſe, or to procure ſomething to be done for the creditor. One cannot oblige himſelf, but by a preſent act of the will. A bare reſolution therefore, or purpoſe to be obliged, is alterable at pleaſure, 27 Feb. 1673, *Kindaird*.

Obligations are either merely natural,

2. Obligations are either, firſt, merely natural, where one perſon is bound to another by the law of nature, but cannot be compelled, by any civil action, to the performance. Thus, tho' deeds granted by a minor having curators, without their conſent, are null, yet the minor is naturally obliged to perform ſuch deeds; and parents are naturally obliged to provide their children in reaſonable patrimonies. Natural obligations had, by the *Roman* law, moſt of the effects of proper ones, except the right of action; by ours, they intitle the creditor to retain what he has got in virtue thereof, without being ſubjected to reſtore it, 3. 3. 17, and a fidejuſſory obligation may be interpoſed to them,

Merely civil,

3. 3. 24. — 2. Obligations are merely civil; which, may be ſued upon, by an action, but are elided by an exception in equity; this is the caſe of obligations granted through force or

Or mixed.

fear, &c. 3. Proper or full obligations, are thoſe which are ſupported, both by equity, and the civil ſanction.

They are either pure,

Ex die,

3. Obligations may be alſo divided into, 1. Pure, to which neither day nor condition is adjected. Theſe may be exacted immediately, *L. 41. §. 1. de verb. obl.* 2. Obligations (*ex die*) which have a day adjected to their performance. In theſe, *dies ſtatim cedit, ſed non venit*;

nit; a proper debt arises, from the date of the obligation, because it is certain that the day will exist; but the execution is suspended, till the lapse of that day. 3. Conditional obligations, in which there is no proper debt (*dies non creditur*) till the condition be purified, because it is possible the condition may never exist; and which therefore are said to create only the hope of a debt, §. 4. *Inst. de verb. obl.*; but the granter, even of these, has no right to refile. An obligation, to which a day is adjected that possibly may never exist, implies a condition; *dies incertus pro conditione habetur, l. 21. pr. quando dies leg.* Thus, in the case of a provision to a child, payable when he attains to the age of fourteen, if the child dies before that age, the provision falls, 16. Feb. 1677, *Belsches*.

4. Obligations, when considered with regard to their cause, were divided by the *Romans*, into those arising from contract, quasi-contract, delict, and quasi-delict: But there are certain obligations, even full and proper ones, which cannot be derived from any of these sources, and to which Lord *Stair* gives the name of *obediential*. Such is, among others, the obligation of parents to aliment or maintain their children; which arises singly from the relation of parent and child, and may be enforced by the civil magistrate, *l. 5. §. 10. de agn. lib.* Under parents are comprehended the mother, grandfather and grandmother, in their proper order, *d. l. 5. §. 2.* This obligation on parents, extends to the providing of their issue in all the necessities of life, and giving them suitable education, *d. l. 5. §. 12.* It ceases, when the children can earn a livelihood.

Or conditional.

Obediential obligations.

Obligation of aliment.

hood by their own industry ; but the obligation on parents to maintain their indigent children ; and reciprocally, on children to maintain their indigent parents, is perpetual, *l. ult. §. 5. C. de bon. quae lib.* This obligation is, on the father's death, transferred to the eldest son, the heir of the family ; who as representing the father, must aliment his younger brothers and sisters : The brothers are only intitled to alimony, till their age of twenty one, after which they are presumed able to do for themselves ; but the obligation to maintain the sisters, continues till their marriage, 8. *Feb. 1739, Douglasses.* In persons of lower rank, the obligation to aliment the sisters ceases, after they are capable of subsisting by any service or employment.

Obligations arising from the duty of restitution.

5. All obligations, arising from the natural duty of restitution, fall under this class ; thus, things given upon the view of a certain event, must be restored, if that event does not afterwards exist, *Tit. ff. de cond. causa data ; e. g.* what is given in contemplation of a marriage which never followed : Thus also, things given *ob turpem causam*, where the turpitude is in the receiver and not in the giver, must be restored to the owner, *l. 1. §. 2. de cond. ob turp. caus.* : And on the same principle, one upon whose ground a house is built *bona fide* by another, is obliged, without any covenant, to restore to the builder the expence of building, in so far as it has been profitable, 23. *Feb. 1665, Jack.*

Obligations by contract.

6. A contract is the voluntary agreement of two or more persons, whereby something is to be given or performed upon one part, for a valuable consideration, either present or future,

ture, on the other part. Consent, which is implied in agreement, is excluded, 1. By error in the essentials of the contract, *l. 15. de jurisd.*

Consent is implied in contracts.

—*l. 9. pr. de contr. empt.*: for in such case, the party does not properly contract, but errs or is deceived: And this may be also applied to contracts, which take their rise from fraud or imposition. 2. Consent is excluded, by such a degree of restraint upon any of the contracting parties, as extorts the agreement; for, where violence or threatnings are used against a person, his will has really no part in the contract. Contracts were, by the *Roman* law, perfected, either *re*, by the intervention of things; or by words; or by writing; or by sole consent. In order to perfect real contracts, one of the parties must have actually given or performed something to the other: If there was barely an obligation to give or perform, it resolved into a *nudum pactum*, which was not productive of an action; but, by the law of *Scotland*, one, who obliges himself to lend or give in pledge, may be compelled to performance. The real contracts of the *Romans* are loan, commodate, depositation and pledge.

Real contracts.

7. Loan or *mutuum* is that contract, which obliges a person, who has borrowed any fungible subject from another, to restore to him as much of the same kind, and of equal goodness. Whatever receives its estimation in number, weight or measure, is a fungible, as corn, wine, current coin, &c. The only proper subjects of this contract are things which cannot be used, without either their extinction or alienation; hence, the property of the thing lent is necessarily transferred by delivery to the borrower, who consequently

Mutuum.

Its proper subjects.

consequently must run all the hazards, either of its deterioration or its perishing, according to the rule, *res perit suo domino*. Where the borrower neglects to restore, at the time and place agreed on, the estimation of the thing lent must be made, according to its price at that time and in that place; because it would have been worth so much to the lender, if the obligation had been duly performed. If there is no place nor time stipulated for, the value is to be stated, according to the price that the commodity gave, when and where it was demanded. In the loan of money, the value put on it by public authority, and not its intrinsic worth, is to be considered. This contract is obligatory only on one part; for the lender is subjected to no obligation: The only action therefore that it produces, is pointed against the borrower, that he may restore as much in quantity and quality as he borrowed, together with the damage the lender may have suffered through default of due performance.

The obligations,

And action arising from it.

Commodate.

What degrees of diligence are required in contracts.

8. Commodate is a species of loan, gratuitous on the part of the lender, where the thing lent may be used, without either its perishing, or its deterioration. Hence, in this sort of loan, the property continues with the lender: the only right the borrower acquires in the subject, is its use, after which, he must restore the individual thing that he borrowed: Consequently, if the subject perishes, it perishes to the lender, unless it has perished by the borrower's fault. What degree of fault or negligence, makes either of the contracting parties liable to the other in damages, is comprehended under the following rules. Where the contract gives a mutual benefit

nefit to both parties, each contracter is bound to adhibit a middle sort of diligence, such as a man of ordinary prudence uses in his affairs, the neglect of which is called *culpa levis*. Where only one of the parties has benefit by the contract, that party must use exact diligence, the opposite of which is *culpa levissima*; and the other, who has no advantage by it, is accountable only *de dolo vel culpâ latâ*, for dole, *l. 5. §. 2. Com.* or for gross omissions which the law construes to be dole, *l. 226. de verb. sign.* Where one employs less care on the subject of any contract which implies an exuberant trust, than he is known to employ in his own affairs, it is considered as dole, *l. 32. depos.*

Culpa levis.

Levissima.

Lata.

9. By these rules, the borrower incommo-
date, must be exactly careful of the thing lent;
and restore it at the time fixed by the contract;
or after that use is made of it, for which it was
lent: If he puts it to any other use, or neglects
to restore it at the time covenanted, and if the
thing perishes thereafter, even by mere acci-
dent, he is bound to pay the value. On the o-
ther part, the lender is obliged to restore to the
borrower, such of the expences disbursed by
him on the subject, as arose from any uncom-
mon accident, but not those that naturally at-
tend the use of it, *l. 18. §. 2. commod.* The
essential obligations consequent on this contract
lie upon the borrower: The action therefore
competent to the lender against him, for fulfil-
ling his part, is called the direct action of com-
modate; and that, which is competent to the
borrower upon the counter-part of the contract,
is called the contrary action. Where a thing
is lent gratuitously, without specifying any time
of

Obligati-
ons arising
from com-
modate.

The di-
rect and
contrary
actions of
commo-
date.

of redelivery, it constitutes the contract of *precarium*, which is revokable at the lender's pleasure, and, being entered into from a personal regard to the borrower, ceases by his death, *l. 12. §. 1. de prec.*

Deposita-
tion.

The obli-
gations a-
rising
from it.

10. Deposition is a contract, by which, one who has the custody of a thing committed to him (the depositary), is obliged to restore it to the depositor. If a reward is bargained for, by the depositary for his care, it resolves into the contract of location. As this contract is gratuitous, the depositary is only answerable for the consequences of gross neglect; but after the deposit is redemanded, he is accountable even for casual misfortunes. He is intitled, to a full indemnification for the losses he has sustained by the contract, and to the recovery of all sums expended by him on the subject: But he had no right, by the civil law, to retain the subject itself for his reimbursement; the exuberant trust which was implied in the contract, excluded all right, both of compensation and retention, *l. 11. C. depos.*

Nautae,
caupones,
stabularii.

11. By an edict of the *Roman* Prætor, which is, with some variations, adopted into our law, an obligation arises without formal paction, barely by a traveller's entering into an inn, ship or stable, and there depositing his goods, or putting up his horses; whereby the inkeeper, shipmaster or stabler, is accountable, not only for his own facts and those of his servants (which is an obligation implied in the very exercise of these employments), but of the other guests or passengers; and, indeed, in every case, unless where the goods have been
lost

lost *damno fatali*, or carried off by pirates or house-breakers. This edict, so contrary to common rules, was found necessary, *ad reprimendam improbitatem hoc genus hominum*, l. 1. §. 1. l. 1. §. 8. *naut. caup.* Not only the masters of ships, but their employers, are liable upon this edict, l. 1. §. 2. 3. *ibid.*, each of them for the share that he has in the ship, l. 7. §. 5. *ibid.* But, by the present custom of trading nations, goods brought into a ship do not fall under it, unless they are delivered to the master or mate, or entered into the ship-books. Carriers fall within the intendment of this edict; and practice has extended it to vintners within borough, *F. 17. Feb. 1687, Forbes.* The extent of the damage sustained by the party, may be proved by his own oath *in litem*, 4. *Dec. 1661, White.*

How far
masters of
ships are
bound by
that edict.

12. Sequestration, whether voluntarily consented to by the parties, or authorised by the judge, is a kind of deposit; but, as the office of sequestree, to whose care the subject in dispute is committed, is not considered as gratuitous, he cannot throw it up at pleasure, as a common depositary may do; and he is liable in the middle degree of diligence. Confignation of money is also a deposit. It may be made, either where the debt is called in question by the debtor, as in suspensions; or where the creditor refuses to receive his money, as in wadsets, &c. The risk of the consigned money lies on the consigner, where he ought to have made payment, and not confignation, 9. *July 1675, E. Queensbury*; or has consigned only a part; or has chosen for confignatary, a person neither named by the parties, nor of good credit. The

Sequestra-
tion.

Configna-
tion.

On whom
the risk of
the con-
signed mo-
ney lies.

M m

charger

charger, or other creditor, runs the risk, if he has charged for sums not due, or has without good reason refused payment, by which refusal, the consignation became necessary, 28. *July* 1665, *Scot.* It is the office of a consignatary, to keep the money in safe custody, till it be called for: If therefore he puts it out at interest, he must run the hazard of the debtor's insolvency; but, for the same reason, tho' he should draw interest for it, he is liable in none to the consigner; see 3. 9. 21. *ad fin.*

Pledge.

13. Pledge, when opposed to wadset, is a contract, by which a debtor puts into the hands of his creditor, a special moveable subject in security of the debt, to be redelivered on payment. Where a security is established by law to the creditor, upon a subject which continues in the debtor's possession, it has the special name of an hypothec. Of hypothecs in moveables there was a great variety among the *Romans*; but our law has, for preserving the free currency of trade, reduced them to a narrower compass.

Hypothec.

Hypothecs constituted by the law of Scotland.

Tradesmen and ship-carpenters have a hypothec on the house or ship repaired, for the materials and other charges of reparation, 16. *Nov.* 1711, *Watson*; but not for the expence of building a new ship, *K.* 68. because the necessity is not so urgent: Owners of ships have an hypothec on the cargo, for the freight, *Hume*, *Dec.* 1683, *Mure*: Heritors on the fruits of the ground; and land-lords on the *investa et illata*, for their rents, (2. 6. 26.). Writers also, and agents, have a right of hypothec, or more properly of retention, in their constituent's writings, for their claim of pains and disbursements. A creditor cannot, for his own

own payment, sell the subject impignorated, even after denunciation to the debtor, as he might have done by the *Roman* law, *l. 4. de pign. act.* He must apply to the judge ordinary, for a warrant to put it up to public sale or roup; and to this application, the debtor ought to be made a party.

A pledge cannot be sold without a sentence.

TIT. 2. *Of Obligations by Word or Writ.*

There is nothing in the law of *Scotland*, analogous to the *verborum obligatio* of the *Romans*, which was created by the parties uttering certain *verba solennia*, or words of style: And therefore the appellation of *verbal*, may be properly enough applied by us, to all obligations, to the constitution of which writing is not essential, which includes both real and consensual contracts; but, as these are explained under separate titles, obligations *by word*, in the sense of this rubric, must be restricted, either to promises, or to such verbal agreements as have no special name to distinguish them. Agreement implies the intervention of two different parties, who come under mutual obligations to one another. Where nothing is to be given or performed, but on one part, it is properly called a promise, which, as it is gratuitous, does not require the acceptance of him to whom the promise is made. An offer, which must be distinguished from a promise, implies something to be done by the other party; and consequently is not binding on the offerer, till it be

Verbal agreement.

Promise.

Offer.

be accepted, with its limitations or conditions, by him to whom the offer is made; after which, it becomes a proper agreement. The different methods of proof, required for supporting these different obligations, are to be explained, 4. 2. 11. and 12.

Writing must intervene, in obligations concerning heritage.

Locus poenitentiae.

When excluded.

Writing is unnecessary in *pactis liberatorijs*.

2. Writing must necessarily intervene in all obligations and bargains concerning heritable subjects, tho' they should be only temporary; as tacks, which, when they are verbal, last but for one year. In these, no verbal agreement is binding, tho' it should be referred to the oath of the party; for, till writing is adhibited, law gives both parties a right to resile, as from an unfinished bargain; which is called *locus poenitentiae*. Yet it has been adjudged, that a written offer to sell, signed by one of the parties, when it is delivered to, and verbally accepted by the other, becomes obligatory on the offerer; tho' there should be no written acceptance, or other obligation, signed by the party to whom the offer is made, 23. Nov. 1748, Lord *Kilkerran*. If, upon a verbal bargain of lands, part of the price shall be paid by him who was to purchase, the *interventus rei*, the actual payment of money, creates a valid obligation, and gives a beginning to the contract of sale, *F. 23. Dec. 1697, Laury*: And in general, wherever matters are no longer entire, the right to resile seems to be excluded. An agreement, whereby a real right is passed from, or restricted, called *pactum liberatorium*, may be perfected verbally, 8. Feb. 1666, *Ker*; for freedom is favourable, and the purpose of such agreement is rather to dissolve than to create an obligation. Writing is also essential to bargains,

gains, made under condition that they shall be reduced into writing; for in such cases, it is *pars contractus*, that, till writing be adhibited, both parties shall have liberty to withdraw, 12. *Jan. 1676, Campbell*. Writing is also required in testaments; but verbal legacies are sustained, where they do not exceed *L. 100 Scots*, (3. 9. 2.).

In what other instances, writing is essential.

3. Anciently, when writing was little used, deeds were executed by the party appending his seal to them; but even then, the presence of witnesses at the sealing was necessary, as appears by our oldest writings yet extant; see *R. M. l. 2. c. 38. §. 1.—Cr. 186, §. 17*. For

Solemnities of written obligations.

preventing frauds, that might happen by appending seals to false deeds, the subscription also of the granter was required, by 1540, *c. 117.*; and, if he could not write, that of a notary: But this act not having expressly required the subscription of the witnesses, it was thought sufficient to insert their names in the body of the deed. As it might be of dangerous consequence, to give full force to the subscription of the parties by initials (the first letters of the name and surname), which is more easily counterfeited; our practice, in order to sustain such subscription, seems to require a proof, not only that the granter used to subscribe in that way, but that *de facto* he had subscribed the deed in question, 21. *June 1681, Coutts*; at least, such proof is required, if the instrumentary witnesses be still alive, *Harc. 894,—July 1729, Thomson*.

Subscription by the party before witnesses, or by a notary for him.

4. As a further check, it is provided by 1579, *c. 80.* that all writings carrying any heritable right, and other deeds of importance, be subscribed

scribed

scribed by the principal parties, if they can subscribe; otherwise, by two notaries, before four witnesses specially designed, (or distinguished). The subsequent practice extended this requisite of the designation of the witnesses, according to the plain purview of the statute, to the case where the parties themselves subscribed; but, at the same time, where the witnesses were named in a deed, but not designed, the party founding on the deed was, by the indulgence of our judges, allowed to condescend on the designations; which condescendence was to be abstracted, either by the witnesses themselves,

The omission to design witnesses not now sup-
pliable.

if alive; or *ex comparatione literarum*, where they were deceased, and had also subscribed as witnesses: And this obtained, with respect to all deeds granted after this statute, till act 1681, c. 5. which declares the omission of the designations, not suppliable by any condescendence, *New Coll.* 84. Custom has construed

What obligations are deemed of importance.

obligations for sums exceeding *L. 100 Scots*, to be obligations of importance, which is probably founded on *Act. S. 8. June 1597*, establishing that sum as the standard, beyond which payments were not allowed to be proved by witnesses. In a divisible obligation, tho' exceeding *L. 100*, the subscription of one notary is sufficient, if the creditor restricts his claim to *L. 100*: But, in an obligation indivisible, *e. g.* for the performance of a fact, if it be not subscribed in terms of the statute, it is void.

Notaries must express the mandate in the docquet.

When notaries thus attest a deed, the attestation or docquet must specially express, that the granter gave them a mandate to sign; nor is it sufficient that this be mentioned in the body of the writing, 18. *June 1745, Birrel.*

5. In every deed, the name of him who writes it, with his dwelling-place or other mark of distinction, must be inserted, 1593, c. 175. The witnesses must, by the foresaid act 1681, both subscribe as witnesses, and their names and designations be inserted in the body of the deed: And all subscribing witnesses must know the granter, and either see him subscribe or hear him acknowledge his subscription, otherwise they are declared punishable, as accessory to forgery. Deeds, decrees and other securities, consisting of more than one sheet, may be written by way of book, in place of the former custom of pasting together the several sheets, and signing the joinings on the margin; provided each page be signed by the granter, and marked by its number; and the testing clause express the number of pages, 1696, c. 15.

6. Instruments of seisin are valid, if subscribed by one notary, before a reasonable number of witnesses, *August* 1584, c. 4. which is extended by practice, to instruments of resignation. Two witnesses are deemed a reasonable number, to every deed that can be executed by one notary, 15. *July* 1680, Bishop of *Aberdeen*. In instruments of seisin, resignation and intimation, the witnesses must subscribe, and their names and designations must be inserted in the instrument, 1681, c. 5. Seisins were allowed, by 1686, c. 17. to be written book-ways; the notary attesting the number of leaves, and signing each leaf with the witnesses. As the number of leaves was seldom condescended on or specified, as the act directed, an objection founded on that omission was repelled, *New Coll.* 2. But by *Act S.* 17. *Jan.*

1756,

The writer's name must be inserted.

Deeds may be written book-ways.

Solemnities of notarial instruments.

1756, not only is this condescendence required in seifins, but the marking each page by its number, in terms of 1696, c. 15, which related, not to seifins, but to securities. Executions by messengers and other officers of the law were at first valid, barely by affixing their stamp or signet, without subscription, 1540, c. 74. The subscription of the officer came to be required, by 1592, c. 139.; and, at last, by 1686, c. 4. the subscription also of witnesses is made necessary, and the necessity of stamping taken off. The act 1681, requires also the designation of the witnesses, in certain sorts of executions, *viz.* inhibition, interdiction, horn-ing and arrestment: Executions therefore of summonses, fall not under this act, 8. Dec. 1736, *Napier*; for the enumeration of some particulars, implies the exclusion of all others. It is not necessary, that the witnesses to a notorial instrument, or execution, see the notary or messenger sign; for they are called as witnesses to the transaction which is attested, and not to the subscription of the persons attesting; see 5. July 1710, Lord Gray.

Deeds
must be
written on
stamped
paper.

7. A new requisite has been added to certain deeds since the union, for the benefit of the revenue: They must be executed on stamped paper, or parchment, paying a certain duty to the crown. Charters, resignations, seifins and retours, are charged with 2 s. 3 d. of duty, 10. An. c. 19.; bonds, tacks, contracts and other personal obligations, with 6 d., 10. An. stat. 2. c. 9. §. 21. Bail bonds are specially excepted from the statute: Neither do bills, testaments, discharges or acquittances of rent or of interest; nor any judicial deeds, as notorial instruments, bonds

*There is now
an additional
duty of 1.*

bonds of cautionry in suspensions, &c. fall under it.

8. The inserting of the time and place of subscribing, being a strong guard against forgery, is considered by Visc. *Stair*, 4. 42. 19. as essential to all deeds; but the contrary has been found by two judgments, 15. *Feb.* 1706, *Duncan*.—21. *July* 1711, *Ogilvy*. The granter's name and designation are essential, not properly as solemnities, but because no writing can have effect without them. Bonds were, by our ancient practice, frequently executed without filling up the creditor's name; and they passed from hand to hand, like notes payable to the bearer: But as there was no method for the creditor of a person possessed of these, to secure them for his payment, all writings, taken blank in the creditor's name, are declared null, as covers to fraud; with the exception of indorsations of bills of exchange, 1696, c. 25.

Is the mention of the date or place necessary?

Blank bonds.

9. Certain privileged writings do not require the ordinary solemnities. 1. Holograph deeds (written by the granter himself) are effectual without witnesses. A deed is holograph, where the substantials of it are written by the granter, 23. *Jan.* 1675, *Vanse*. The date of no holograph writing, except a bill of exchange, (see next §.) can be proved by the granter's own assertion, in prejudice either of his heir or his creditors, but must be supported by other adminicles, 21. *June* 1665, *Braidy*. 2. Testaments, if executed where men of skill in business cannot be had, are valid, tho' they should not be quite formal, F. 1. *Jan.* 1708, *Ker*: And let the subject of a testament be ever so valuable, one notary signing

Privileged deeds. Holograph writings.

Testaments.

for the testator, before two witnesses, is in practice sufficient. Clergymen were frequently notaries before the reformation; and, tho' they are, by 1584, c. 133. prohibited to act as notaries, the case of testaments is excepted, so that these are supported by the attestation of one minister, with two witnesses. 3. Discharges to tenants are sustained without witnesses, from their presumed rusticity, or ignorance in business, 7. Nov. 1674, *Boyd*. 4. Missive letters *in re mercatoria*, commissions and fitted accounts in the course of trade, and bills of exchange, tho' they are not holograph, are, from the favour of commerce, sustained without the ordinary solemnities.

10. A bill of exchange is an obligation in the form of a mandate, whereby the drawer or mandant desires him to whom it is directed, to pay a certain sum at the day and place therein mentioned, to a third party. Bills of exchange are drawn by a person in one country, to his correspondent in another; and they have that name, because it is the exchange, or the value of money in one place compared with its value in another, that generally determines the precise extent of the sum contained in the draught. The creditor in the bill is sometimes called the possessor, or *porteur*. As parties to bills are of different countries, questions concerning them ought to be determined by the received custom of trading nations, unless where special statute interposes. For this reason, bills of exchange, tho' their form admits not of witnesses, yet prove their own dates, in questions, either with the heir, or creditors of the debtor, *K.* 57.; but, if this doctrine should be

be extended to the case of such inland bills as are made payable to the drawer himself, and where consequently the only persons concerned are the drawer and acceptor; heirs might, by antedated bills, be cut off from the plea of death-bed, and creditors from the benefit of inhibition, *Bankton, vol. 1. 364.*

11. A bill is valid, without the designation, either of the drawer, or of the person to whom it is made payable: It is enough, that the drawer's subscription appears to be truly his; and one's being possessor of a bill, marks him out to be the creditor, if he bears the name given in the bill to the creditor: Nay, tho' the person drawn on should not be designed, his acceptance presumes, that it was he whom the drawer had in his eye, *K. 96.* Bills drawn blank, in the creditor's name, fall under the statute 1696; for, tho' indorsations of bills are excepted from it, bills themselves are not. Not only the person drawn upon, must sign his acceptance, but the drawer must sign his draught, before any obligation can be formed against the acceptor; bills being really mandates: Yet it is sufficient in practice, that the drawer signs, before the bill be produced in judgment; tho' it should be after the death, both of the creditor, and acceptor, *Falc. vol. 2. 15.* A creditor in a bill may transmit it to another by indorsation, tho' the bill should not bear, *to his order*; by the same rule, that other rights are transmissible by assignation, tho' they do not bear, *to Assignees, K. 78.*

Solemnities of bills.

Indorsation.

12. The drawer, by signing his draught, becomes liable for the value to the creditor in the bill, in case the person drawn upon, either

Obligations on the drawer.

ther, does not accept, or, after acceptance, does not pay; for he is presumed to have received value from the creditor at giving him the draught, tho' it should not bear, *for value received*: But, if the drawer was debtor to the creditor in the bill before the draught, the bill is presumed to be given towards payment of the debt, unless it expressly bears, *for value*, 18, *July 1712, Cheap*. The person drawn upon, if he refuse to accept, while he has the drawer's money in his hands, is liable to him in damages. As a bill presumes value from the creditor, indorsation presumes value from the indorsee; who therefore, if he cannot obtain payment from the acceptor, has recourse against the indorser, unless the bill be indorsed in these words, *without recourse*.

On the person drawn upon.

On the indorser.

Effects of payment by the acceptor.

13. Payment of a bill, by the acceptor, acquits both the drawer and him, at the hands of the creditor; but it intitles the acceptor, if he was not the drawer's debtor, to an action of recourse against him; and, if he was, to a ground of compensation. Where the bill does not bear value in the hands of the person drawn upon, it is presumed that he is not the drawer's debtor; and consequently, he has recourse against the drawer, *ex mandato*; see 10. *July 1712. Wilson*.

Bills are considered as cash.

14. Bills, when indorsed, are considered as so many bags of money delivered to the onerous indorsee; which therefore carry right to the contents, free of all burdens that do not appear on the bills themselves. Hence, a receipt or discharge, by the original creditor, if granted on a separate paper, does not exempt the acceptor from second payment to the indorsee; hence also, no ground of compensation,

tion, competent to the acceptor against the original creditor, can be pleaded against the indorsee: But, if the debtor shall prove, by the oath of the indorsee, that he paid no value for the indorsation, the indorsee is justly considered as but a name, and therefore all exceptions, receivable against the original creditor, will be sustained against him, 15. *Jan.* 1708, *Craufurd.*

15. Bills must be negotiated by the possessor, against the person drawn upon, within a precise time, in order to preserve recourse against the drawer. Where a bill is payable so many days after sight, the possessor must, without delay, present it for acceptance, and, in case of refusal, protest; because the least delay, in presenting such bill, prolongs the term of payment, in prejudice of the drawer: But bills payable on a day certain, need not be presented for acceptance, till the day of payment, because that day can neither be prolonged, not shortened, by the time of acceptance, *K.* 93.—*Falc. vol.* 2. 75. For the same reason, the acceptance of bills, payable on a precise day, need not be dated: But, where a bill is drawn payable so many days after sight, it must; because there, the term of payment depends on the date of the acceptance.

Negotiation or diligence required in the creditor.

16. Tho' bills are, in strict law, due the very day on which they are made payable, and may therefore be protested on the day thereafter; yet there are three days immediately following the day of payment, called days of grace, within any of which, the creditor may protest the bill: But, if he delay protesting till the day after the last day of grace, he loses his recourse, 29. *Jan.* 1751, *Cruikshanks.* Where a bill is

Days of grace.

Bills in-
dorsed af-
ter the
term of
payment.

When
does the
creditor
lose re-
course a-
gainst the
drawer.

is protested, either for not acceptance, or not payment, the dishonour must be notified to the drawer or indorser, within three posts at farthest. This strictness of negotiation is confined to such bills, as may be protested by the possessor upon the third day of grace: Where therefore bills are indorsed after the days of grace are expired, the indorsee is left more at liberty, and does not lose his recourse, tho' he should not take a formal protest for not payment, if, within a reasonable time, he shall give the indorser notice of the acceptor's refusing to pay, *Falc. vol. 2. 76.* Not only does the possessor, who neglects strict negotiation, lose his recourse against the drawer, where the person drawn upon becomes afterwards bankrupt, but, tho' he should continue solvent; for he may, in that case, recover payment from the debtor, and so is not to be indulged in an unnecessary process against the drawer, which he has tacitly renounced by his negligence, *Nov. 1744, Littlejohn.* Recourse is preserved against the drawer, tho' the bill should not be duly negotiated, if the person drawn upon was not his debtor; for there the drawer can qualify no prejudice by the omission, and he ought not to have drawn on one who owed him nothing.

Privileges
of bills by
statute.

17. The privileges superadded to bills by statute are, that tho', by their form, they can have no clause of registration, yet if duly protested, they are registrable within six months after their date in case of not acceptance, or in six months after the term of payment, in the case of not payment; which registration is made the foundation of summary diligence, either against the drawer, in the case of not acceptance,

acceptance, or against the acceptor, in case of not payment, 1681, c. 20. This statute is extended by 1696, c. 36. to inland bills, *i. e.* bills both drawn and made payable in *Scotland*. After acceptance, summary diligence lies against no other than the acceptor; the drawer and indorser must be pursued by an ordinary action. It is only the principal sum in the bill, and interest, that can be charged for summarily: The exchange, when it is not included in the draught, the re-exchange incurred by suffering the bill to be protested and returned, and the expence of diligence, must all be recovered by an ordinary action; because these are not liquid debts, and so must be previously constituted.

Inland
bills or
precepts.

18. Bills, when drawn payable at any considerable distance of time after date, are denied the privileges of bills; for bills are intended for currency, and not to lie as a security in the creditor's hands, *K. 55. ad fin.* Bills are not valid, which appear *ex facie* to be donations, 25. Nov. 1736, *Weir*. No extrinsic stipulation ought to be contained in a bill, which deviates from the proper nature of bills; hence, a bill to which a penalty is adjoined, is null, see *K. 39.*; and a bill with a clause of interest from the date, *New Coll. vol. 2. 57.* Inland precepts drawn, not for money the medium of trade, but for fungibles, were, by the former practice, admitted as probative, tho' without the privilege of bills, *Br. 82.*; but, by later decisions, they have been declared null, as wanting writer's name and witnesses. Promissory notes, without writer and witnesses, were adjudged to be null, 29. Jan. 1708, *Arbuthnot*. It was afterward the opinion of the court, that they required

Certain
bills are
not privi-
leged.

required no witnesses, *F. 7. Dec. 1711, King.* This is agreed, that they are not intitled to the privileges of bills, *ibid.*—*2. Feb. 1739, Forbes.*

Solemnities of deeds signed in a foreign country.

19. As for the solemnities essential to deeds signed in a foreign country, when they come to receive execution in *Scotland*, it is a general rule, that no laws can be of authority, beyond the dominions of the lawgiver. Hence, in strictness, no deed, tho' perfected according to the law of the place where it is signed, can have effect in another country, where different solemnities are required to a deed of that sort. But this rigour is so softened *ex comitate*, by the common consent of nations, that all personal obligations, granted according to the law of that country where they are signed, are effectual every where, *K. 23.*; which obtains even in obligations to convey heritage, *5. July 1706, Cuninghame.* Conveyances themselves, if they are of heritable subjects, must be perfected according to the law of the country where the heritage lies, and from which it cannot be removed, *Feb. 1729, E. Dalkeith*; but a conveyance of moveables, which have no fixed seat, and are therefore said to follow the owner, if it be perfected according to the *lex domicilii*, will receive execution in *Scotland*, *16. July 1636, Sinclair.*—*Dirl. 390.*

Delivery.

20. A writing, while the granter keeps it under his own power or his doer's, has no force; it becomes obligatory, only after it is delivered to the grantee himself, or found in the hands of a third person. As to which last, the following rules are observed. A deed found in the hands of one, who is doer both for the granter and grantee, is presumed to have been put in his

his hands, as doer for the grantee, 1735, *Seton*. The presumption is also for delivery, if the deed appears in the hands of one who is a stranger to both; see *St. 4. 42. 8.* Where a deed is deposited in the hands of a third person, the terms of deposite may be proved by the oath of the depositary, 5. *March 1624, Hay*, unless where they are reduced into writing, 24. *Feb. 1675, Cowan*. A deed appearing in the custody of the grantee himself, is considered as his absolute right; in so much that the granter is not allowed to prove that it was granted in trust, otherwise than by a written declaration signed by the trustee, or by his oath, 1696, c. 25.

And depo-
sitation of
deeds: -

21. The following deeds are effectual without delivery. 1. Writings containing a clause dispensing with the delivery: These are of the nature of revocable deeds, where the death of the granter is equivalent to delivery, because after death there can be no revocation. 2. Deeds in favour of children, even natural ones; for parents are the proper custodians or keepers of their children's writings, 25. *Feb. 1663, Aikenhead*. From a similar reason, postnuptial settlements by the husband to the wife need no delivery, *Br. 78.* 3. Rights which are not to take effect till the granter's death, or even where he reserves an interest to himself during his life; for it is presumed he holds the custody of these, merely to secure to himself such reserved interest, 19. *June 1668, Haldane*. 4. Deeds that the granter lay under an antecedent natural obligation to execute, e. g. rights granted to a cautioner for his relief, 18. *Jan. 1677, Dick*. 5. Mutual obligations, e. g. contracts;

What
deeds are
effectual
without
delivery.

for every such deed, the moment it is executed, is a common evident to all the parties contractors; see 10. *Dec.* 1736, *Simpson*. Lastly, the publication of a writing by registration, is equivalent to delivery, *Dirl.* 272.

TIT. 3. Of Obligations and Contracts arising from Consent, and of accessory Obligations.

Consen-
sual con-
tracts.

CONTRACTS consensual, *i. e.* which might, by the *Roman* law, be perfected by sole consent, without the intervention, either of things, or of writing, are sale, permutation, location, society and mandate. Where the subject of any of these contracts is heritable, writing is necessary.

Sale.

2. Sale is a contract, by which one becomes obliged to give something to another, in consideration of a certain price in current money to be paid for it. *Arrhae*, or earnest, is sometimes given by the buyer, as an evidence that the contract is perfected; but this is not necessary. Earnest was computed in the price, by the *Roman* law; but what is given here under that name, is generally so inconsiderable, that it is *dead* earnest, *i. e.* not reckoned in the price.

Earnest.

What
things, the
subject of
sale.

Things not yet extant, and consisting merely in hope, may be the subject of this contract, as the draught of a net, &c. *l.* 8. §. 1. *h. t.* Commodities, where their importation or use is absolutely prohibited, cannot be the subject of sale; and even in run goods, no action lies against the vendor, for not delivery, if the buyer knew the goods were run, 11. *Geo.* I. c. 30.; see 16. *Nov.* 1736, *Scougal*. The price

price in current money may be fixed, either, The price how ascertained.
 1. By the agreement of parties at making the contract; in which case, let it be ever so disproportioned to the value of the subject, the sale is valid by our law, 23. *June 1669, Fairy*, tho' it was otherwise by the *Roman*, l. 2. *C. de rescind. vend.* Or, 2. By a reference, either to a third person, or even to one of the contracters themselves, 13. *March 1639, E. Montrose.*

3. Tho' this contract may be perfected before delivery of the subject, the property remains till then, with the vendor, (2. 1. 10.). Periculum rei venditae, necdum traditae. Notwithstanding which, if the subject perished, it perished, by the *Roman* law, to the buyer, §. 3. *Inst. de empt. et vend.* contrary to the rule, *res perit domino*; because the property in the vendor was considered to be but nominal, he being obliged to transfer it to the buyer. Lord *Stair* doubts, whether this would hold in our practice, 1. 14. 7. But, whatever ought to be the rule, in case of the extinction of the subject, it is an agreed point, that the hazard of its deterioration falls on the purchaser, because he has all the profits arising from it, after the sale. On the other hand, it is certain, that the subject itself perishes to the vendor, 1. If it should perish through his fault, or after his undue delay to deliver it. 2. If a subject is sold as a fungible, and not as an individual, or *corpus*, l. 35. §. 7. *de contr. empt. e. g.* a quantity of farm-wheat, sold without distinguishing the parcel to be delivered, from the rest of the farm. 3. The *periculum* lies on the vendor till delivery, if he be obliged by a special article in the contract, to deliver the subject at a certain place, *F. 25. Jan. 1687, Spence.*

4. The

Emption
a non do-
mino.

Warran-
dice.

Actio red-
hibitoria.

Pactum de
retroven-
dendo.

Permuta-
tion.

Location.

4. The vendor, where he is not the true owner, cannot, by delivery, transfer to the purchaser, that property which was not his to give; but the purchaser, in respect of his *bona fides*, makes the fruits of the subject his own, till it be evicted, or at least reclaimed, by the true owner (2. 1. 14.): And as warrandice is implied in all sales, the vendor must make the subject good, if it be evicted (2. 3. 11.) The insufficiency of the goods sold, if it be such as would have hindered the purchaser from buying, had he known it, and if he quarrels it recently, founds him in an action (*actio redhibitoria*) for annulling the contract. If the defect was not essential, he was, by the *Roman* law, intitled to a proportional abatement of the price, by the action *quantum minoris*: But as our practice does not allow sales to be reduced, on account of the disproportion of the price to the value of the subject, it is probable, that it would also reject the action *quantum minoris*. A vendor who covenants, by a *pactum de retrovendendo*, for a right to redeem the subject within a certain time, cannot after that time be restored against his delay, by offering the redemption-money, as a reverser in a wadset might do before declarator; for in sales, an adequate price is presumed to be given to the vendor, and so there is nothing penal in the irritancy (2. 8. 5.). Permutation differs from a sale chiefly in this, that in permutation, one subject is to be given in barter or exchange for another; whereas the price in a sale consists of current money.

5. Location is that contract, where an hire is stipulated for the use of things, or for the service of persons. It may, without impropriety, be

be considered as a species of sale, in which the subject sold is the use or service; and the price is the hire, which generally consists, as in a proper sale, of money. He who lets his work, or the use of his property to hire, is the locator or lessor; and the other, the conductor or lessee. In the location of things, the lessor is obliged to deliver the subject, fitted to the use it was let for; and the lessee must preserve it carefully, put it to no other use, and, after that is over, restore it. Where a workman or artificer lets his labour, and if the work is either not performed according to contract, or, if it be insufficient, even from mere unskilfulness, he is liable to his employer in damages, *l. 9. §. 5. locat.* for he ought not, as an artificer, to have undertaken a work, to which he was not equal. A servant, hired for a certain term, is intitled to his full wages, tho' from sickness, or other accident, he should be disabled for a part of his time; but, if he die before the term, his wages are only due for the time he actually served. If a master dies, or without good reason turns off a servant who eats in his house before the term, the servant is intitled to his full wages, and to his maintenance till that term: And, on the other part, a servant, who without ground deserts his service, forfeits his wages and maintenance, and is liable to his master in damages. The doctrine of location of lands, is already explained, *2. 6. 8. et seq.*

Obligations on the lessor and lessee.

6. Society or co-partnership is a contract, *Society.* whereby the several partners agree, concerning the communication of loss and gain arising from the subject of the contract. It is formed

ed, by the reciprocal choice that the partners make of one another; and so is not constituted in the case of co-heirs, or of several legatees in the same subject. A co-partnership may be so constituted, that one of the partners shall, either from his sole right of property in the subject, or from his superior skill, be intitled to a certain share of the profits, without being subjected to any part of the loss; but a society, where one partner is to bear a certain proportion of loss, without being intitled to any share of the profits, is justly reprobated. All the partners are intitled to shares of profit and loss proportioned to their several stocks, where it is not otherwise covenanted.

*Societas
leonina.*

Obligations on the
socii.

Their
powers to
transfer.

7. As partners are united, from a *delectus personae*, in a kind of brotherhood, no partner can, without a special power contained in the contract, transfer any part of his share to another. Where therefore a third person is assumed by a partner, such assumption forms a separate contract betwixt the assumer and the assumed, limited to the share of the partner assuming, and in which the others have no concern. Upon the same principle, all benefit stipulated for, by one of the partners to himself, in a matter that naturally falls under the co-partnership, accrues to the whole, 26. *March* 1624, *Inglis*; and no partner is accountable for an error in management, arising from the want of a larger share of prudence, or skill, than he was truly master of.

They are
all bound
in solidum,
for the
company
debts.

8. All the partners are bound *in solidum* by the obligation of any one of them, if he subscribe by the *firm* or social name of the company; unless it be a deed that falls not under the

the common course of administration, as if a partner should take upon him to refer a company-claim to an arbiter, *Nov. 1728, Lumf-daine*. Each partner is obliged to advance the sums necessary for carrying on the common affairs, according to his share; and he is intitled to the reimbursement of the sums he has expended, or of the loss he has sustained on the company's account, out of the common stock; and if that falls short, the other partners are liable *in solidum* to make up the loss, he bearing his own proportion thereof. The company effects are the common property of the society subjected to its debts; so that no partner can claim a division thereof, even after the society is dissolved, till these are paid: And, consequently, no creditor of a partner can, by diligence, carry to himself the property of any part of the common stock, in prejudice of a company-creditor; but he may, by arrestment, secure his debtor's share in the company's hands, to be made forthcoming to him at the close of the copartnership, in so far as it is not exhausted by the company-debts.

How far
a part-
ner's share
is affect-
able by
creditors.

9. Society, being founded in the mutual confidence among the *socii*, is dissolved, not only by the renunciation, but by the death of any one of them, if it be not otherwise specially covenanted, *l. 65. § 9. pro socio*. A partner, who renounces upon unfair views, or at a critical time, when his withdrawing may be fatal to the society, looses his partners from all their engagements to him, while he is bound to them, for all the profits he shall make by his withdrawing, and for the loss arising thereby to the company, §. 4. *Inst. h. t.* Not only natural

Society
expires by
death.

Or renun-
ciation.

Is it dissolved *ex gestate*?

tural, but civil death, *e. g.* arising from a sentence inflicting capital punishment, makes one incapable to perform the duties of a partner, and consequently dissolves the society. In both cases, of death and renunciation, the remaining partners may continue the copartnership, either expressly, by entering into a new contract, or tacitly, by carrying on their trade as formerly. Tho' this contract was dissolved, by the *Roman* law, *ex gestate*, by the bankruptcy of any of the partners, *l. 4. §. 1. pro soc.*; yet by our practice, if after goods are bought on the company's credit, one of the partners should fail, the rest cannot pocket up the whole profits, on pretence that they run the whole risk, *July 1749, Paterson*. Public trading companies are now every day constituted, with rules very different from those which either obtained in the *Roman* law, or at this day obtain in private societies. The proprietors or partners in these, tho' they may transfer their shares, cannot renounce; nor does their death dissolve the company, but the share of the deceased descends to his representative.

A joint trade differs from a copartnery.

10. A joint trade is not a copartnership, but a momentary contract, where two or more persons agree to contribute a sum, to be employed in a particular course of trade; the produce whereof is to be divided among the adventurers, according to their several shares, after the voyage is finished. If, in a joint trade, that partner who is intrusted with the money for purchasing the goods, should, in place of paying them in cash, buy them upon credit, the furnisher, who followed his faith alone in the sale, has no recourse against the other adventurers;

venturers; he can only recover from them what of the buyer's share is yet in their hands. Where any one of the adventurers, in a joint trade, becomes bankrupt, the others are preferable to his creditors, upon the common stock, as long as it continues undivided, for their relief of all the engagements entered into by them on account of the adventure, 11. *Jan.* 1740, creditors of *Macaul.*

11. Mandate is a contract, by which one employs another to manage any business for him; and, by the *Roman* law, it must have been gratuitous. It may be constituted tacitly, by one's suffering another to act in a certain branch of his affairs, for a tract of time together, without challenge. The mandatary is at liberty not to accept of the mandate; and, as his powers are solely founded in the mandant's commission, he must, if he undertakes it, strictly adhere to the directions given him: Nor is it a good defence, that the method he followed was more rational; for in that his employer was the proper judge. Where no special rules are prescribed, the mandatary if he acts prudently, is secure, whatever the success may be; and he can sue for the recovery of all the expences, reasonably disbursed by him in the execution of his office.

Mandate.

Obligations on the mandatary.

12. Mandates may be general, containing a power of administering the mandant's whole affairs; but no mandate, however ample, can be construed into an order to commit a crime, which, being itself criminal, cannot be inferred by implication. Neither does any mandate imply a power of disposing gratuitously of the constituent's property; nor even of selling his

What is comprehended under a general mandate.

heritage for an adequate price : But a general mandatary may sell such of the moveables as must otherwise perish (*quae servando servari nequeunt*). No mandatary can, without special powers, transact doubtful claims belonging to his constituent, or refer them to arbiters.

How
mandates
expire.

13. Mandates expire, 1. By the revocation of the employer, tho' only tacit, as if he should name another mandatary for the same business.

2. By the renunciation of the mandatary ; even after he has executed part of his commission, if his office be gratuitous. 3. By the death, either of the mandant or mandatary ; for the one is presumed to give, and the other to accept the mandate, from personal regards of friendship : But, if matters are not entire, the mandate continues in force, notwithstanding such revocation,

Mandates
gratia
mandata-
rii.

on, renunciation or death. Procuratories of resignation, and precepts of seisin, are made out in the form of mandates ; but, because they are granted for the sole benefit of the mandatary, all of them, excepting precepts of *clare constat*, are declared to continue, after the death, either of the granter or grantee, 1693, c. 35. Deeds, which contain a clause or mandate for registration, are for the same reason made registrable after the death of either, 1693, c. 15.—1696, c. 39.

Tacit
mandate.

14. The favour of commerce has introduced a tacit mandate, by which masters of ships are empowered to contract, in name of their exercitors or employers, for repairs, ship-provisions, and whatever else may be necessary for the ship or crew ; so as to oblige, not themselves only, but their employers, l. 1. §. 17. *de exerc. act.* An exercitor is he who employs a ship in trade, whether he be the owner,

or

or only freights her from the owner. Who ever has the actual charge of the ship is deemed the master, tho' he should have no commission from the exercitors, or should be substituted by the master, in the direction of the ship, without their knowledge, *l. 1. §. 5. ibid.* Exercitors are liable, whether the master has paid his own money to a merchant for necessaries, or has borrowed money to purchase them. The furnisher or lender must prove that the ship needed repairs, provisions, &c. to such an extent; but he is under no necessity to prove the application of the money or materials, to the ship's use. If there are several exercitors, they are liable, *singuli in solidum*. In the same manner, the undertaker of any branch of trade, manufacture, or other land-negotiation, is bound by the contracts of the institors whom he sets over it, in so far as relates to the subject of the *praepositura*: And tho' the institors be pupils, and so cannot bind themselves, the prepositor, who, knowing their state, gave them a power to contract for him, stands obliged by their deeds, *l. 7. §. 2. de inst. act.*

Exercitors are bound by the contract of the master of the ship.

Institors by their contracts bind their employers.

15. Contracts and obligations, in themselves imperfect, receive strength, by the contractor or his heirs doing any act thereafter, which imports an approbation of them, and consequently supplies the want of an original legal consent. This is called homologation, and it takes place, even in deeds intrinsically null, whether the nullity arises from the want of statutory solemnities, 21. *Jan. 1735, Tailfer*; or from the incapacity of the granter, 28. *June 1671, Hume*. It cannot be inferred, 1. By the act of a person who was not in the knowledge of the

Homologation.

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Homologation.

In what
cases it is
excluded.

the original deed; for one cannot approve what he is ignorant of. Hence, one's subscribing as witness to a deed, does not infer homologation; for witnesses are only called to attest the subscription, without being told the contents: But a brother's signing as witness to his sister's marriage contract, presumes his knowledge and homologation of the articles, from his near relation to the bride, *Forbes MS.* 15. *July 1714, Davidson.* And yet, an heir's witnessing a deed granted by his ancestor *in lecto*, does not infer homologation, let the relation be ever so near, because of the authority which the ancestor is presumed to have over the heir, *F.* 13. *Jan. 1704, Dallas.* 2. Homologation has no place, where the act or deed which is pleaded as such can be ascribed to any other cause; for an intention to come under an obligation is not presumed; hence, charters or precepts granted by superiors, in obedience to a charge, infer no homologation. Marriage-contracts, without witnesses, have been found to be homologated by subsequent marriage; but, in truth, marriage, which is entered into frequently without any previous written contract, can, in no view, be deemed an approbation of special marriage articles.

Quasi-
contracts.

16. Quasi-contracts are formed without explicit consent, by one of the parties doing something, that by its nature either obliges him to the other party, or the other party to him. Under this class may be reckoned tutory, (1. 7. 12. &c.) the entry of an heir (3. 8. 26. &c.)

Negotio-
rum & flio.

negotiorum gestio, indebiti solutio, communion of goods, and *mercium jactus, levandae navis causa.* *Negotiorum gestio* forms those obligations

tions which arise from the management of a person's affairs in his absence, by another, without a mandate. As such manager acts without authority from the proprietor, he ought to be liable in exact diligence, *l. 24. C. de usur.* unless he has, from friendship, interposed in affairs which admitted no delay, *l. 3. §. 9. de neg. gest.*; and he is accountable for his intrusions with interest. On the other part, he is intitled to the recovery of his necessary disbursements on the subject, tho', by misfortune, it should have perished afterwards, *l. 10. §. 1. de neg. gest.*, and to be relieved of the obligations in which he may have bound himself, in consequence of the management.

17. *Indebiti solutio*, or the payment to one of what is not due to him, if made through any mistake, either of fact, or even of law, 26. *July 1733, Stirling*, founds him who made the payment, in an action against the receiver for repayment (*condictio indebiti*). This action does not lie, 1. If the sum paid was due *ex aequitate*, or by a natural obligation; for the obligation to restore is founded solely in equity. 2. If he who made the payment, knew that nothing was due; for *qui consulto dat quod non debebat, praesumitur donare*. Some lawyers add a third case, *viz.* if the sum was paid in consequence of a transaction: But, where a sum is so paid, there is no *indebitum*; the transaction itself creates a debt, tho' no prior debt had existed.

18. Where two or more persons become common proprietors of the same subject, either by legacy, gift or purchase, without the view of co-partnership, an obligation is thereby created among the proprietors, to communicate the

*Indebiti.
solutio.*

Right of
dividing
common
property.

the profit and loss arising from the subject, while it remains common: And the subject might, by the *Roman* law, be divided at the suit of any one of them, by the action *communi dividundo*. No such action, in relation to commonty-lands was competent by our law, till 1695, c. 38. which authorised the division of commonties, before the court of Session, at the suit of any having interest. This division, where the question is among the common proprietors, is to be governed by the last clause in the statute, *according to the valuation of their respective properties*: But, where the question turned, between the proprietors and those that had servitudes upon the property, the rule mentioned in a preceeding clause of the act took place by the former practice, *according to the value of the interests of the several persons concerned*: Hence, proprietors were allowed a *praecipuum* for their right of property, over and above the share, on account of their own or their tenant's possession by pasturage, K. 42.; but now the superficies is only divided, without prejudice to the property; see next §.

19. It has been doubted, what is to be understood by *commonty*: The word, in proper speech, supposes two common proprietors at least; and yet in our law-language and in charters, it frequently signifies a heath or moor, tho' it should belong in property to one, if there has been a promiscuous possession upon it by pasturage; and the act 1695 excepts commonties belonging in property to the King, or to royal boroughs. The question therefore, whether action lies upon this statute, where there is but one proprietor, at the suit of those who have servitudes upon it, has been variously decided.

What is understood to be commonty.

cided. By the last judgment, *Falc. vol. 1. 251*, the court, waving the general point, directed the surface of the common to be divided in that case, according to the interest of the several parties in that surface, without prejudice to the right of property. Another act of the same year, *c. 23.* authorised the division of lands lying runrig, and belonging to different proprietors with the exception of borough and incorporated acres; the execution of which is committed to the judge ordinary, or justices of the peace.

Division
of runrig
lands.

20. The throwing of goods overboard, for lightening a ship in a storm, creates an obligation by the *Rhodian* law *de jactu*, which the *Romans* and other trading nations have made their own; whereby the owners of the ship and goods saved, are obliged to contribute for the relief of those whose goods were thrown overboard, that so all may bear a proportional loss of the goods ejected for the common safety. In this contribution, the goods ejected are valued at prime cost; and the ship and goods saved, at the price they may give at the next port, *l. 2. §. 4. de leg. Rhod.*; but the ship's provisions suffer no estimation, *l. 2. §. 2. eod. t.* A master, who has cut his mast, or parted with his anchor to save the ship, is intitled to this relief, *l. 3. eod. t.*; but, if he has lost them by the storm, the loss falls only on the ship and freight. If the ejection does not save the ship, the goods preserved from shipwreck are not liable in contribution. By the later laws of *Wisby*, *art. 20.* ejection may be lawfully made, if the master and a third part of the mariners, judge that measure necessary, tho' the owner of the goods should oppose it: And the goods ejected are

Lex Rhodia de jactu.

to be valued at the price, that the goods of the same sort which are saved, shall be afterwards sold for.

Accessory obligations.

21. There are certain obligations, which cannot subsist by themselves, but are accessions to, or make a part of other obligations. Of this sort are fidejussion, and the obligation to pay interest. Cautionry, or fidejussion, is that obligation, by which one becomes engaged as security for another, that he shall either pay a sum, or perform a deed.

For a sum of money.

A simple cautioner has the benefit of discussion.

Cautioner bound conjunctly and severally.

Cautioner for performance of facts.

22. A cautioner for a sum of money may be bound, either simply as cautioner for the principal debtor, or conjunctly and severally for and with the principal debtor. The first has, both by the *Roman* law, *Nov. 4. c. 1.* and by our customs, the *beneficium ordinis*, or of discussion; by which the creditor is obliged to discuss the proper debtor, before he can insist for payment against the cautioner. By discussing, is not barely meant the making a demand of the debt: The person of the debtor must be discussed by denunciation, and by registering the horning; his moveable estate by pouding, or arrestment and forthcoming; and his heritage by adjudication, 24. *July 1662, Birsbane*. Where one is bound as full debtor with and for the principal, or conjunctly and severally with him, the two obligants are bound equally in the same obligation, each *in solidum*; and consequently, the cautioner, tho' he is but an accessory, may be sued for the whole, without either discussing, or even citing the principal debtor. Cautioners for performance of facts by another, or for the faithful discharge of an office, *e. g.* for factors, tutors, &c. cannot by the nature of their engagement.

ment, be bound conjunctly and severally with the principal obligant, because the fact to which the principal is bound, cannot possibly be performed by any other. In such engagements therefore, the failure must be previously constituted against the proper debtor before action can be brought against the cautioner, for making up the loss of the party suffering.

Is in every case intitled to discussion.

23. In the case of two or more cautioners, each of them, by the *Roman* law, pronounced the obligatory words by himself, and so became bound to the creditor *in solidum*; until the *beneficium divisionis* was introduced, by which cautioners were intitled to insist, that the obligation might be divided among all of them *pro rata*, §. 4. *Inst. de fidejuf.* By our law, all the co-cautioners are bound in the same writing, so that there is no place for this benefit: For, when they become obliged conjunctly and severally, the plain intention of parties is, that the obligation should not be divided; and, where they are bound simply as cautioners, each co-cautioner is, by the genuine nature of such obligation, without any privilege, liable only for his own proportion, except where the obligation is in itself indivisible.

Beneficium divisionis among co-cautioners.

24. Fidejussion may be interposed to an obligation merely natural, in which the cautioner is effectually bound, tho' the principal debtor should get free: Thus a cautioner in a bond not legally attested as to the principal debtor, lies under a proper engagement, because the statutory nullity, on which the principal escapes, does not take away the natural obligation, *F. 2. Feb. 1700, Hepburn*: But cautionry cannot

Fidejussion is an obligation merely natural.

subsist without some obligation to which accessory.

Cautioners have an *actio mandati* against the debtor.

25. The cautioner, who binds himself at the desire of the principal debtor, has an *actio mandati*, or of relief against him, for recovering the principal and interest paid by himself to the creditor, and for damages; which action lies *de jure*, tho' the creditor should not assign to him on payment. Under damage, is not comprehended the loss sustained by the cautioner through his own fault, *e. g.* in suspending the debt without good grounds, or in allowing diligence to proceed upon it against his estate. As relief against the debtor is implied in fidejussory obligations, the cautioner, where such relief is cut off, is no longer bound: Hence, the defence of prescription frees the cautioner, as well as the principal debtor, *F. 19. Dec. 1695, Doul*: Thus likewise, a cautioner is not bound, tho' the creditor should offer to prove by his oath, that he heard the debtor acknowledge the debt; because, as such oath could not prove against the debtor, the cautioner, if he were obliged to depose, would pay without relief. *Dalr. 17.*

In what cases, a cautioner has no relief against the debtor.

At what period, relief is competent.

26. But, 1. Where the cautionry is interposed to an obligation merely natural, the relief is restricted to the sums that have really turned to the debtor's profit. 2. A cautioner, who pays without citing the debtor, loses his relief, in so far as the debtor had a relevant defence against the debt, in whole or in part, *19. Dec. 1632, Maxwell*. Relief is not competent to the cautioner, till he either pays the debt, or is distressed for it; except, 1. Where the debtor is expressly bound, to deliver to the cautioner

tioner his obligation cancelled, against a day certain, and has failed; or 2. Where the debtor is *vergens ad inopiam*; in which case, the cautioner may, by proper diligence, secure the debtor's funds for his own relief, even before payment or distress.

27. Mutual relief was not competent among the cautioners themselves, by the *Roman* law; for their obligations being separate, and having no mutual connection, payment, made by any one of them to the creditor, extinguished the obligation, unless the cautioner who paid, had got a cession or assignment from the creditor, which he was intitled to demand, by the *beneficium cedendarum actionum*: But, by our law, a right of relief is competent *de jure* to the cautioner who pays, against his co-cautioners, without either assignation, or even any clause of mutual relief in the bond; unless where the cautioner appears to have renounced it. In consequence of this implied relief, a creditor, if he shall grant a discharge to any one of the cautioners, must, in demanding the debt from the others, deduct that part, as to which he has cut off their relief, by that discharge. Where a cautioner in a bond, signs a bond of corroboration, as a principal obligant with the proper debtor, and with them a new cautioner, the cautioner in the new bond is intitled to a total relief against the first cautioner, at whose desire he is presumed to be bound, 10. *July 1745, Mirrie.* And this total relief against the first cautioner seems equitable, tho' he should not be a party to the bond of corroboration; for a corroborative security, in which he has no concern, ought not to advantage him

Mutual relief among co-cautioners.

Relief competent to cautioners in a corroboration.

him, by throwing part of his cautionry obligation upon another, *Dalr.* 38. 60.

Judicial
Cautionry.

Cautioners
in a sus-
pension.

28. Cautionry is also judicial, as in a suspension. Cautioners of this kind got free, if either the charger or suspender died before discussing the suspension, till *Act. S.* 29. *Jan.* 1650: And even after that act, their obligation ceased, if the decree suspended had been turned into a libel, *i. e.* sustained only as a libel through any informality; tho' the suspender should have been at last condemned in payment. This was altered by *Act. S.* 27. *Dec.* 1709; but it is sufficient, at this day, to loose the cautioner, that when he became bound, the suspender had good reason to suspend, *e. g.* if the charger had at that period no title, or had not then performed his part, tho' these grounds of suspension should be afterwards taken off. The clerk to the bills, whose duty it is to receive none but solvent cautioners, usually demanded for his security, an attestation by one of a known character, of the solvency of the cautioner offered: These attesters must, by the last quoted act of sederunt, bind themselves as cautioners for the cautioner in the suspension, and so are liable *subsidiarie* in their order, after he is discussed. In all maritime causes, where the parties are frequently foreigners, the defender must give caution, *judicio fisci et judicatum solvi*: Such cautioner gets free by the death of the defender before sentence, 20. *Jan.* 1680, *Hodge*; but he continues bound, tho' the cause should be carried from the Admiral to the court of Session, 16. *Nov.* 1636, *Stuart*. This sort of caution is only to be exacted, in causes strictly maritime, *New Coll.* 123.

29. It happens frequently, that a creditor *Correi debendi.* takes two or more obligants bound to him, all as principal debtors, without fide-jussion. Where they are so bound, for the performance of facts, that are in themselves indivisible, they are liable, each for the whole, or *singuli in solidum*, *Dirl.* 166. But, if the obligation be for a sum of money, they are only liable *pro rata*; unless, 1. Where they are in express words bound conjunctly and severally; or 2. In the case of bills or promissory notes, 13. *Nov.* 1746, *Eliot*. One of several obligants of this sort, who pays the whole debt, or fulfils the obligation, is intitled to a proportional relief against the rest; in such manner, that the loss must, in every case, fall equally upon all the solvent obligants.

30. Obligations for sums of money, are frequently accompanied with an obligation for the annual rent or interest thereof. Interest (*usurae*) is the profit due, by the debtor of a sum of money, to the creditor, for the use of it. The canon law considered the taking of interest as unlawful, because money yields no natural fruits; but the law of *Moses* allowed it to be exacted from strangers, *Lev.* xxv. 36.—*Deut.* xxiii. 19. 20.; and all the reformed nations of *Europe* have found it necessary, after the example of the *Romans*, to authorise it at certain rates fixed by statute. Soon after the reformation, our legal interest was fixed at the rate of ten *per cent. per annum*, 1587, c. 52.; from which time, it has been gradually reduced, till, at last, by 12. *An. Stat.* 2. c. 16. it was brought to five *per cent.* and has continued at that rate ever since.

Interest of money.

Rate of interest.

Interest
due by
law.

Interest
upon bills.

Upon
denuncia-
tion.

Upon sums
paid by
cautioners
distressed.

Interest
due by fa-
ctors.

Interest of
the price
of lands.

31. Interest is due, either by law, or by paction. It is due by law, either from the force of statute, under which may be included acts of federunt, or from the nature of the transaction. Bills of exchange, 1681, c. 20. and inland bills, 1696, c. 36. tho' they should not be protested, K. 15, carry interest from their date in case of not acceptance; or from the day of their falling due, in case of acceptance and not payment. Where a bill is accepted, which bears no term of payment, or which is payable on demand, no interest is due till demand be made of the sum, the legal voucher of which is a notorial protest. By 1621, c. 20. interest is due, by a debtor after denunciation, for all the sums contained in the diligence, even for that part which is made up of interest. Sums, paid by cautioners on distress, carry interest, by *Act. S. 1. Feb. 1610*, (see *Spotsf. Pr. p. 34.*) not only as to the principal sum in the obligation, but as to the interest paid by the cautioner. It was found to be sufficient distress, that the obligation was registred, tho' no charge of horning had been used thereupon against the cautioner, 24. *Jan. 1627, Wauchton*. Factors named by the court of Session are liable for interest, by a special act of federunt; see, 2. 12. 23.

32. It arises *ex lege*, or from the nature of the transaction, that a purchaser in a sale is liable in interest for the price of the lands bought from the term of his entry, tho' the price should be arrested in his hands, 17. *Feb. 1624, Dury*, or tho' the seller should not be able to deliver to him a sufficient progress, or title to the

the lands, 28. *Jan.* 1663, *L. Balnagown*; for no purchaser can in equity enjoy the fruits of the lands, while at the same time, he retains the interest of the price: But lawful consignation of the price, made by a purchaser, upon the refusal of the persons having right to receive it, stops the currency of interest. Where one intermeddles with money belonging to another which carries interest, he ought to restore it *cum omni obventionem et causa*, and is therefore liable in the interest of it, as being truly an accessory of the subject itself, 22. *Dec.* 1710, *L. Drum*,—18. *Feb.* 1736, *Erskine*. It is also from the nature of the transaction, that interest is in certain cases allowed to merchants or others, in name of damages, 13. *Jan.* 1737, *Aubray*; or *ex mora*, *New Coll.* 42. And the obligation upon tutors, to employ the *nummi pupillares* upon interest after certain periods, 1. 7. 12. may be derived from the same source.

Interest due to merchants minors, or others, *no mine damni.*

33. Interest is due by express paction, where there is a clause in a bond or obligation, by which money is made to carry interest. An obligation is not lawful, where it is agreed on, that the yearly interest of the sum lent, if it should not be paid punctually as it falls due, shall be accumulated into a principal sum bearing interest; but an obligation may be lawfully granted, not only for the sum truly lent, but for the interest to the day at which the obligation is made payable, 1621, c. 28. whereby the intermediate interest is accumulated into a principal sum, from the term of payment: Interest may be also due by implied paction: Thus, where interest upon a debt is, by a letter, promised for time past, such promise

Interest by express paction.

By tacit paction.

promise implies a paction for interest, as long as the debt remains unpaid; thus also, the use of payment of interest presumes a paction, *Dirl.* 408.; and, when interest is expressed for one term, it is presumed to be bargained for, till payment, 13. *Jan.* 1669, *Hume*.

General
properties
of obliga-
tion.

Impossible
obliga-
tions.

34. The subject-matter of all obligations consists either of things, or of facts. Things exempted from commerce cannot be the subject of obligation, 2. 1. 2. *et seq.* One cannot be obliged to the performance of a fact naturally impossible; nor of a fact in itself immoral, for that is also, in the judgment of law, impossible, *l.* 15. *de cond. inst.* Bargains, relating to the succession of a person, yet alive, were reprobated by the *Roman* law, as *contra bonos mores*, *l.* 61. *de V. O.*; but are allowed by our practice, *F.* 29. *July* 1708, *Rag.* Since impossible obligations are null, no penalty or damage can be incurred for non-performance; but it is otherwise, if the fact be in itself possible, tho' not in the debtor's power; in which case the rule obtains, *locum facti impraestabilis subit damnum et interesse*.

Obligati-
ons to
which
conditions
are adject-
ed, either
impos-
sible,

Or unfav-
ourable.

35. An obligation, to which a condition is adjected, either naturally or morally impossible, is in the general case null; for the parties are presumed, not to have been serious. But such obligation is valid, and the condition thereof held *pro non scripta*, 1. In testaments, 2. In obligations, to the performance of which, the granter lies under a natural tie, as in bonds of provision to a child. Where an obligation is granted under a condition, lawful but unfavourable, *e. g.* that the creditor shall not marry without the consent of certain friends, no more

more weight is given to the condition than the judge thinks reasonable, whether the obligant lay under a natural tie to oblige himself, *F. 20. July 1688, Pringle*, or not, *Hume, March 1682, Ford*. A condition, which is in some degree in the power of the creditor himself, is held as fulfilled, if he has done all he could to fulfil it, *l. 11. de cond. inst.* Implement or performance cannot be demanded in a mutual contract, by that party who himself declines, or cannot fulfill the counterpart; thus, a husband becoming bankrupt cannot demand, nor can any of his creditors affect the wife's tocher, till her provisions contained in the marriage articles be secured to her, *9. June 1738. cred. of Wat-son*.

Potesta-
tive con-
ditions.

Imple-
ment in
contracts
must be
mutual.

36. Donation, so long as the subject is not delivered to the donee, may be justly ranked among obligations; and it is that obligation, which arises from the mere good will and liberality of the granter. Donations imply no warranty, but from the future facts of the donor. They are hardly revokable by our law for ingratitude, tho' it should be of the grossest kind: Those betwixt man and wife are revokable by the donor, even after the death of the donee; but remuneratory grants, not being truly donations, cannot be so revoked, *1. 6. 18*. That special sort of donation, which is constituted verbally, is called a promise, *3. 2. 1*. The Roman law intitled all donors to the *beneficium competentiae* in virtue of which, they might retain such part of the donation, as was necessary for their own subsistence. Our law allows this benefit to fathers, with respect to the provisions granted to their children, *21. Feb. 1745*,

Donation.

When res-
vokable.

Benefici-
um com-
petentiae.

To whom
compe-
tent.

Buntin; and to grandfathers, which is a natural consequence of children's obligation to aliment their indigent parents; but to no collateral relation, not even to brothers.

*Donatio
mortis
causa.*

37. Donations, made in contemplation of death, or *mortis causa*, are of the nature of legacies, and like them revokable: Consequently, not being effectual in the granter's life, they cannot compete with any of his creditors; not even with those whose debts were contracted after the donation. They are understood to be given from a personal regard to the donee, and therefore fall by his predecease. No deed, after delivery, is to be presumed a *donatio mortis causa*; for revocation is excluded by delivery.

*Donation
is not pre-
sumed in
dubio.*

38. Deeds are not presumed, *in dubio*, to be donations. Hence, a deed by a debtor to his creditor, if donation be not expressed, is presumed to be granted in security or satisfaction of the debt; but bonds of provision to children are, from the presumption of paternal affection, construed to be intended as an additional patrimony: Yet a tocher, given to a daughter in her marriage-contract, is presumed to be in satisfaction of all former bonds and debts, *P. Falc.* 107.; because marriage contracts usually contain the whole provisions in favour of the bride. One who alimments a person that is come of age, without an express paction for board, is presumed to have entertained him as a friend, unless in the case of those who earn their living, by the entertainment or board of strangers, *Br.* 106.: But alimony given to minors, who cannot bargain for themselves, is not accounted a donation; except either where it is presumed from the

*In what
cases is a-
liment
presumed
a dona-
tion.*

the near relation of the person alimenter, that it was given *ex pietate*; or where the minor had a father or curators, with whom a bargain might have been made, 21. *July 1665, L. Ludquhairn*,—11. *June 1680, Gordon contra Lesly*.

Tit. 4. *Of the Dissolution or Extinction of Obligations.*

Obligations may be dissolved by performance or implement, consent, compensation, novation and confusion. 1. By specific performance: Thus, an obligation for a sum of money is extinguished by payment. The creditor is not obliged to accept of payment by parts, unless where the sum is payable by different divisions. If a debtor in two or more separate bonds to the same creditor, had made an indefinite payment, without ascribing it, at the time, to any one of the obligations, the payment was, by the *Roman* law, to be applied by the creditor, as the debtor himself would have done, *l. 1. de solut.*; and consequently, to that debt which bore hardest upon him, or to which a penalty was adjoined, *l. 3. 4. 5. eod. t.* By our law, which shews a more equal regard to the interests of the creditor and debtor, indefinite payments are applied, first, to interest or to sums not bearing interest, *K. 5. 2.* To the sums that are least secured, if the debtor thereby incurs no rigorous penalty, *Jan. 1744, Paterscn*. But, 3. If this application be penal on the debtor, *e. g.* by suffering the legal

Obligations are dissolved by implement, *e. g.* payment.

Indefinite payment.

legal of an adjudication to expire, the payment will be so applied as to save the debtor from that forfeiture. Where one of the debts is secured by a cautioner, the other not; the application is to be so made, *caeteris paribus*, that both creditor and cautioner may have equal justice done to them, *K. 58.*

Payment
bona fide.

2. Payment made by the debtor upon a mistake in fact, to one whom he believed, upon probable grounds, to have the right of receiving payment, extinguishes the obligation; e. g. payment to one who had been the creditor's factor, but whose factory was recalled, without intimation to the debtor; or payment of rent by a tenant, to the landlord from whom he had the lease, tho' such landlord has been, before the payment, divested in favour of a singular successor: But payment made to one, to whom the law denies the power of receiving it, has not this effect; as if a debtor, seized by letters of caption, should make payment to the messenger; for *ignorantia juris neminem excusat*. ¶ In all debts, the debtor, if he be not interpellated, may safely pay before the term, except in tack-duties or feu-duties, the payment whereof, before the terms at which they are made payable, is construed to be collusive, in a question with the creditor of the landlord or superior, 28. Feb. 1628, *L. Lauchope*. Payment is *in dubio* presumed, by the voucher of the debt being in the hands of the debtor; *chirographum, apud debitorem epertum, praesumitur solutum.*

3. Obligations are extinguishable by the consent of the creditor, who, without full implement, or even any implement, may renounce

nounce the right constituted in his own favour. Tho' a discharge or acquittance, granted by one whom the debtor *bona fide* took for the creditor, but who was not, extinguishes the obligation, if the satisfaction made by the debtor was real; yet where it is imaginary, the discharge will not screen him from paying to the true creditor, the debt that he had made no prior satisfaction for, *arg.* 14. *Dec.* 1661, *Humes*. In all debts which are constituted by writing, the extinction, whether it be by specific performance, or bare consent, must be proved, either by the oath of the creditor, or by a discharge in writing; and the same solemnities which law requires in the obligation, are necessary in the discharge: But, where payment is made, not by the debtor himself, but by the creditor's intromission with the rents of the debtor's estate, or by delivery to him of goods in name of the debtor, such delivery or intromission, being *facti*, may be proved by witnesses, tho' the debt should have been not only constituted by writing, but made real on the debtor's lands by adjudication.

Extinction of obligations by the creditor's consent.

Discharges of written obligations must be in writing.

But the creditor's intromission with rents may be proved by witnesses.

4. A discharge, tho' it should be general, of all that the granter can demand, extends not to debts of an uncommon kind, which are not presumed to have been under the granter's eye; as obligations of warrandice not yet incurred, or of relief of debts not yet paid to the creditor, 23. *Jan.* 1678, *Campbell*, or for performing special facts, 19. *Nov.* 1680, *Dalgerno*. A general clause, subjoined to the discharge of a special debt, comprehends all debts of the same sort with that which is specially discharged, tho' they should be for greater sums, 29. *June* 1705, *Chappel*; but they do not extend to debts of

General discharges.

Consecu-
tive dis-
charges of
three
terms du-
ties or in-
terest.

a different sort, for the granter is presumed not to have had these in view. This doctrine applies also to general assignments. In annual payments, as of rents, feu-duties, interest, &c. three consecutive discharges by the creditor, of the yearly or termly duties, presume the payment of all preceedings. Two discharges by the ancestor, and the third by the heir, do not infer this presumption, if the heir was ignorant of the ancestor's discharges, *Dalr.* 21. : And discharges by an administrator, as a factor, tutor, &c. presume only the payment of all preceeding duties, incurred during his administration. This presumption arises from repeating the discharges thrice successively; and so does not hold in the case of two discharges, tho' they should include the duties of three or more terms.

Extinction
by com-
pensation.

It does
not ope-
rate *ipso*
jure by
our law.

5. Where the same person is both creditor and debtor to another, the mutual obligations, if they are for equal sums, are extinguished, by compensation; if for unequal, still the lesser obligation is extinguished, and the greater diminished, as far as the concurrence of debt and credit goes. Compensation was not received with us, but by way of action, till 1592, c. 141. which first admitted compensation by way of exception. It had, by the *jus novum* of the Romans, its effect *ipso jure*, *l. ult. C. de compens.*; and consequently, was drawn back to the period of concurrence, and had its operation from the necessity of law, without regard to the intendment of parties; but the chief effects given to it by our law, begin from the period of pleading it in judgment. Hence, compensation was not sustained upon a debt prescribed at pleading it, tho' it was

subsisting

subsisting at the time of concurrence, *K. 17.*: Hence also, one was allowed to plead compensation, on that debt of the two that was worst secured, tho' the first concurrence was made by the other, 15. Nov. 1738, Sir *W. Maxwell*: See also *New Coll.* 85. Yet we have, from equity, given this effect to compensation, that it stops the currency of interest on both sides, downwards from the time of concurrence.

Yet it stops the currency of interest.

6. To found compensation, 1. Each of the parties must be debtor and creditor at the same time: A debtor therefore, cannot plead compensation against his creditor's assigney, upon a debt due by the cedent, which the person compensating had not acquired, till the assigney's right was compleated by intimation, *Dirl.* 3.

Requisites of compensation.

2. Each of them must be debtor and creditor in his own right: Hence a tutor cannot compensate a debt properly due by himself, with a sum for which he is creditor *tutorio nomine*.

3. The mutual debts must be of the same quality: Hence, a sum of money cannot be compensated with a quantity of corns; because, till the prices are fixed, at which the corns are to be converted into money, the two debts are incommensurable: hence also, a debt already payable, on which the creditor may have immediate execution, cannot, in strictness, be compensated with a debt, the term of payment whereof is not yet come. By a similar rule, a moveable sum cannot be compensated with an heritable debt in the old form, bearing requisition; because, before requisition, the estate burdened is debtor, more properly than the proprietor, 12. Nov. 1675, *Hume*.

The debts must be of the same quality.

7. Lastly, compensation cannot be admitted, where the mutual debts are not clearly ascertained,

And clearly ascertained.

ascertained, either by a written obligation, the sentence of a judge, or the oath of the party. Where this requires but a short discussion, sentence for the pursuer is delayed for some time, *ex aequitate*, that the defender may make good his ground of compensation; according to the rule, *quod statim liquidari potest, pro jam liquido habetur*, 31. July 1707, *Macdoulal*. Where a debt for fungibles is ascertained in money, by the sentence of a judge, the compensation can have no effect, farther back than the liquidation, because, before sentence, the debts were incommensurable: But, where a debt for a sum of money is, in the course of a suit, constituted by the oath of the debtor, the compensation, after it is admitted by the judge, operates *retro*, in so far as concerns the currency of interest, to the time that, by the parties acknowledgment, the debt became due; for, in this case, the debtor's oath is not what creates the debt, or makes it liquid; it only declares that such a liquid sum was truly due before, 4. Dec. 1675, *Watson*. By the above quoted statute 1592, compensation cannot be offered after decree, either by way of suspension or reduction; but if it is pleaded once and unjustly repelled, it may be again insisted on, either by suspension or reduction. Decrees in absence are not decrees in the sense of this act, whether they are pronounced by an inferior judge, 18. June 1662, *E. Marisbal*, or even by the court of Session, if they be afterwards turned into a libel; see 25. July 1676, *Wright*.

Compensation is not admitted after decree. —

Retention.

8. The right of retention, which bears a near resemblance to compensation, is chiefly competent

competent, where the mutual debts, not being liquid, cannot be the ground of compensation; and it is sometimes admitted *ex aequitate*, in liquid debts, where compensation is excluded by statute: Thus, tho' compensation cannot be pleaded after decree, either against a creditor or his assignee, yet, if the original creditor should become bankrupt, the debtor, even after decree, may retain against the assignee, till he gives security for satisfying the debtor's claim against the cedent, 18. Feb.

1736, *Maclarin*. This right is frequently founded, in the expence disbursed, or work employed on the subject retained, and so arises from the mutual obligations incumbent on the parties; e. g. retention by a writer, of the writings belonging to his client, till payment of his account; or retention by a tradesman, of any piece of work, till payment of the sum expended on it, or the price of the workmanship. But retention may be sustained, tho' the debt due to him who claims it, does not arise from the nature of the obligation by which he is debtor: Thus, a factor on a land estate may retain the sums levied by him in consequence of his factory, not only till he be paid of the disbursements made on occasion of such estate, but also till he be discharged from the separate engagements he may have entered into, on his constituent's account; and that, notwithstanding any diligence that may be used by the creditors of the constituent, to affect the ballance due by the factor to the common debtor, Nov.

1729, *Stark*.

9. Obligations are dissolved by novation, whereby one obligation is changed into another,
S s without

What are the ordinary subjects of retention.

Extinction by novation.

without changing either the debtor or creditor. The first obligation being thereby extinguished, the cautioners in it are loosed, and all its consequences discharged; so that the debtor remains bound, only by the last. As a creditor, to whom a right is once constituted, ought not to lose it by implication, novation is not easily presumed, and the new obligation is construed to be merely as corroborative of the old; but, where the second obligation expressly bears to be *in satisfaction* of the first, these words must necessarily be explained into novation, 6. Dec. 1632, *Chisholm*. Where the creditor accepts of a new debtor, in place of the former who is discharged, this method of extinction is called delegation.

Novation is not presumed.

Extinction by delegation.

By confusion.

How far it takes place when the right devolves on the cautioner.

10. Obligations are extinguished *confusione*, where the debt and credit meet in the same person, either by succession or singular title, e. g. when the debtor succeeds to the creditor, or the creditor to the debtor, or a stranger to both, l. 21. §. 1. *de liber. leg.*; for one cannot be debtor to himself. If he on whom the right of the creditor devolves, was only liable as cautioner, the accessory obligation is extinguished, because the debtor and creditor therein, come to be the same person; but the principal obligation against the proper debtor subsists: And, by the same reason, tho' it be true that an heir is liable, *in suo ordine*, for his ancestor's moveable debts; yet a moveable debt, due to one who afterwards succeeds as heir to the debtor, is not extinguished *confusione*, but subsists against the executor, who is primarily liable in that sort of debts, 3. 9. 28. Debts or adjudications purchased by an apparent heir, affecting

affecting the estate of the ancestor, are not extinguished *confusione*; for the heir, while he is not entered, does not represent the debtor, nor fill his place: And tho' possession upon such rights, subjects him to a passive title, 3. 8. 39, yet that statutory penalty was enacted, merely in favour of creditors, but does not create a proper representation, nor annul the diligences so acquired, which therefore are effectual to singular successors, K. 102. If the succession, from which the *confusio* arises, happens afterwards to be divided, so as the debtor and creditor come again to be different persons; the *confusio* does not produce an extinction, but only a temporary suspension of the debt, St. 1. 18. 9.: Hence an assignation in favour of an heir of tailzie and his heirs whatsoever, of a debt affecting the entailed estate, suspends the debt, only during the life of such heir; but it may revive after his death, in the person of his heir at law, against the heir of tailzie.

It does not take place in debts purchased by the debtor's apparent heir.

TIT. 5. *Of Assignations.*

Heritable rights, when they are cloathed with infeftment, are transmitted by disposition, which is a writing, containing procuratory of resignation and precept of seisin; but those which either require no seisin, as servitudes, patronages, reversions, &c. or on which seisin has not actually followed (as to which, see 2. 7. 13.), and also all moveable rights, are trans-

Rights are transmitted, either by disposition,

Or assignation.

What rights are not assignable.

Intimation of assignations.

transmissible by simple assignation. He who grants the assignation, is called the cedent, and he who receives it, the assigney or cessionary: If the assigney conveys his right to a third person, it is called a translation; and if he assigns it back to the cedent, a retrocession. Certain rights are, from the uses to which they are destined, incapable of transmission, as alimentary rights: Others cannot be assigned by the person vested in them, without special powers given to him, as tacks, (2. 6. 13.) reversions, (2. 8. 4.) &c.: The transmission of a third sort, is not presumed to be intended, without an express conveyance; as of paraphernal goods, which are so proper to the wife, that a general assignation by her to her husband, of all that did or should belong to her at her decease, does not comprehend them, *Dec. 1733, Paton*. A liferent right is, by its nature, incapable of a proper transmission; but its profits may be assigned, while it subsists (2. 9. 24.).

2. Assignations must not only be delivered to the assigney, *Harc. 113*, but intimated by him to the debtor. Intimations have been probably first introduced, merely as an interpellation or prohibition to the debtor, that he should not pay to the original creditor: But they came afterwards to be considered, as likewise necessary for completing the conveyance, 22. *Jan. 1663, Wallace*; in so much that in a competition between two assignations, the last, if first intimated, is preferred. Hence, if we shall suppose a debt assigned to one who has neglected to intimate his right during the cedent's life, any person who shall upon the cedent's death

death confirm the debt assigned, as executor-creditor to the deceased, is preferable to such assigney.

3. Tho' regularly, intimation to the debtor is made by an instrument, taken in the hands of a notary, by the assigney or his procurator; yet the law admits equipollencies, where the notice of the assignment given to the debtor, is equally strong. Thus, a charge upon letters of horning at the assigney's instance, or a suit brought by him against the debtor; supplies the want of intimation; these being judicial acts, which expose the conveyance to the eyes, both of the judge, and of the debtor; or the debtor's promise of payment by writing to the assigney, because that is in effect a corroborating of the original debt. The assigney's possession of the right, by entering into payment of the rents or interest, is also equal to an intimation; for it imports, not only notice to the debtor, but his actual compliance: Thus, an assignation of a tack, or of the rents and profits of lands, is perfected by the assigney's possessing the ground, or levying the rents; and the assignation of a bond, by the debtor's payment of interest to the assigney. Assignations to assignable reversions, are completed by their registration in the register of reversions, which was instituted for the special purpose of publishing such rights with their conveyances, 5. Dec. 1665, *Beg*; but the registration of assignments of personal rights, as bonds, contracts, &c. does not supply the want of intimation; because as to these, our records were not intended for publication, but merely for conservation and diligence. The debtor's private knowledge of the assignment,

is

What notification is equivalent to intimation.

Process or charge by the assigney to the debtor.

Possession by the assigney.

Registration of reversions in the proper record.

is not sustained as intimation, 14. *March* 1626, *L. Westeraw*, since it imports, neither publication nor possession, on the part of the assigney.

In what
cases noti-
fication is
not neces-
sary.

Judicial
and legal
convey-
ances,
need no
intima-
tion.

4. Certain conveyances need no intimation, 1. Indorsations of bills of exchange; for these are not to be fettered with forms, introduced by the laws of particular states. 2. Bank-notes are fully conveyed by the bare delivery of them; for as they are payable to the bearer, their property must pass with their possession. 3. Adjudication which is a judicial conveyance, and marriage which is a legal one, carry the full right of the subjects thereby conveyed, without intimation, *St.* 3. 1. 13. 14.; nevertheless, as there is nothing in these conveyances, which can of themselves put the debtor *in mala fide*, he is therefore *in tuto* to pay to the wife, or to the original creditor in the debt adjudged, till the marriage, or adjudication, be notified to him. Assignments of moveable subjects, tho' they be intimated, if they are made *retenta possessione*, (the cedent retaining the possession) cannot hurt the cedent's creditors; for such rights are presumed, in all questions with creditors, to be collusive, and granted in trust for the cedent himself.

Effects of
assigna-
tion.

5. An assignation carries to the assigney, the whole right of the subject conveyed, as it was in the cedent; and consequently, he may use diligence, either in his cedent's name, while he is alive, or in his own; But letters of diligence, which have been issued in name of the cedent, cannot be executed by the messenger, in the assigney's name; for messengers have no power to judge of the import of transmissions, and are confined in their executions, to the will

of

of the letters, 11. *June 1745, Stuart*. Where a right is assigned simply in trust, the nature of the trust must determine the effects of the conveyance: If it is intended that the trustee shall have full power over the subject, he may use all acts of property; but if it is granted for a special purpose, *e. g.* to do diligence, the powers of the trustee, tho' not limited in the right, ought to go no farther.

6. After an assignation is intimated, the debtor cannot prove payment, or compensation, by the oath of the cedent, who has no longer any interest in the debt; unless the matter has been made litigious by an action commenced prior to the intimation: But the debtor may refer to the oath of the assigney, who is in the right of the debt, that the assignment was gratuitous, or in trust for the cedent; either of which being proved, the oath of the cedent will affect the assigney. If the assignation be in part onerous, and in part gratuitous, the cedent's oath is good against the assigney, only in so far as his right is gratuitous, 25. *Feb. 1679, Steil*. All defences competent against the original creditor in a moveable debt, which can be proved otherwise than by his oath, continue relevant against even an onerous assigney; whose right can be no better than that of his author, and must therefore remain affected, with all the burdens which attended it in the author's person. See this question discussed in the case of mutual contracts, *St. 1. 10. 16.* and in the case of personal rights of lands, *St. 3. 1. 21.*

The cedent's oath cannot hurt the assigney.

If the assignation be onerous.

TIT. 6. *Of Arrestments and poindings.*

Arrest-
ment.

THE diligences, whereby a creditor may affect his debtor's moveable subjects, are arrestment and poinding. By arrestment is sometimes meant, the securing of a criminal's person till trial, 1487, c. 99.; but, as it is understood in the rubric of this title, it is the order of a judge, by which, he who is debtor in a moveable obligation to the arrester's debtor, is prohibited to make payment or delivery, till the debt due to the arrester be paid or secured.

Common
debtor.

The arrester's debtor is usually called the common debtor, because, where there are two or more competing creditors, he is debtor to all of them. The person in whose hands the diligence is used, is styled the arrestee.

The war-
rant of ar-
restment.

2. Arrestment may be laid on, by the authority, either of the supreme court, or of an inferior judge. In the first case, it proceeds, either upon special letters of arrestment, or on a warrant contained in letters of horning; and it must be executed by a messenger. The warrants, granted by inferior judges, are called precepts of arrestment, and they are executed by the officer proper to the court. Where the debtor to the common debtor is a pupil, arrestment is properly used in the hands of the tutor, as the pupil's administrator: This doctrine

In whose
hands it
may be
used.

may

may perhaps extend to other general administrators, as Commissioners, &c.: But arrestment, used in the hands of a factor or steward, cannot found an action of furthcoming without calling the constituent, 18. *Jan.* 1709, *Donaldson*. Where the debtor to the common debtor is a corporation, arrestment must be used in the hands of the directors or treasurer, who represent the whole body, 10. *Jan.* 1739, creditors of *Menzies*. Arrestment, when it is used in the hands of the debtor himself, is inept; for that diligence is intended only as a restraint upon third parties.

3. All debts, in which one is personally bound, tho' they should be heritably secured, are grounds, upon which the creditor may arrest the moveable estate belonging to his debtor; for every creditor, whatever the nature of his debt may be ought to have the whole of his debtor's estate subject to his diligence. Arrestment may proceed on a debt, the term of payment whereof is not yet come, in case the debtor be *vergens ad inopiam*, see 16. *July* 1678, Lord *Pitmedden*. If a debt be not yet constituted by decree or registration, the creditor may raise and execute a summons against his debtor for payment, on which pending action arrestment may be used, (in the same manner as inhibition, 2. 11. 3. which is called arrestment upon a dependence. If one's ground of credit be for the performance of a fact, or if his depending process be merely declaratory, without a conclusion of payment or delivery, such claims are not admitted to be sufficient grounds for arrestment, *Dalr.* 33.—26. *Feb.* 1712, *Ross*.

Upon
what debts
it may
proceed.

Arrest-
ment upon
a depend-
ence.

What
debts are
arrestable.

Neither
bills nor
future
debts,

Nor ali-
mentary
debts are
arrestable.

4. Moveable debts are the proper subject of arrestment; under which are comprehended conditional debts, and even depending claims. For lessening the expence of diligence to creditors, all bonds which have not been made properly heritable by seisin, are declared arrestable, by 1644, c. 41: revived by 1661, c. 51.: But this act is limited to contracts and obligations; and does not extend to adjudications, wadsets, or other personal rights of lands, which are not properly debts, 22. Feb. 1666. *Lockhart*. Certain moveable debts are not arrestable, 1. Debts due by bill, which pass from hand to hand, as bags of money. 2. Future debts; for tho' inhibition extends to *adquirenda* as well as *acquisita* (2. 11. 4.), yet arrestment is limited, by its warrant, to the debt due at the time of serving it against the arrestee. Hence, an arrestment of rents or interests carries only those that have already either fallen due, or at least become current: As for such as had neither fallen due, nor become current at the date of the first arrestment, a new arrestment must be used, which may be done on the first warrant. Current rent, is that which has begun to run from the last term, but cannot be demanded till the next. Claims, depending on the issue of a suit, are not considered as future debts; for the sentence, when pronounced, has a retrospect to the period at which the claim was first founded, 19. Dec. 1744, *Wardrop*. The like doctrine holds in conditional debts. 3. Alimentary debts are not arrestable; for these are granted on personal considerations, and so are not communicable to creditors, 19. Dec. 1738, cred. of *Douglass*; but the past interest due upon such

such debt, may be arrested by the person who has furnished the alimony. One cannot secure his own effects to himself for his maintenance, so as they shall not be affectable by his creditors. Salaries annexed to offices granted by the King, *Act. 8. 11. June 1613*, (see *Spotif. Pr. p. 228.*), and the fees of servants, are considered as alimentary funds; but the surplus fee, over and above what is necessary for the servant's personal uses, may be arrested, 9. *July 1668, Beg.*

5. In obligations which carry a yearly right to the creditor, if the obligation itself be arrestable, *e. g.* a moveable bond, or an heritable one not cloathed with seisin, the principal sum is carried by the arrestment, as well as the past interest; and consequently, all the future interests until payment, as accessory to the right itself: But in rights of lands, or in heritable bonds perfected by seisin, no more can be arrested, than the rents or interests that had either fallen due, or become current, at laying on the arrestment. In the same manner, the arrestment of a bond due to a wife, used by a creditor of the husband, carries only the past and current interest; for the right itself does not fall under the *jus mariti*, 19. *Jan. 1739*, cred. of *Clunes*.

The yearly profits may be arrested, where the right itself cannot.

6. If, in contempt of the arrestment, the arrestee shall make payment of the sum, or deliver the goods arrested, to the common debtor, he is not only liable criminally for breach of arrestment, but he must pay the debt again to the arrester. Nay, in the case of arrestment used at the market-cross of *Edinburgh*, and pier and shore of *Leith*, against a person abroad upon the public service, payment, by the arrestee

Effect of breach of arrestment.

arrestee to his creditor, after the date of the arrestment, makes him liable in second payment to the arrester; because the arrester had done all in his power to notify his diligence, *F. 22. July 1701, Blackwood.* Arrestment is not merely prohibitory, as inhibitions are; but is a step of diligence, which founds the user in a subsequent action, whereby the property of the subject arrested, may be adjudged to him:

Arrest-
ment does
not fall by
the ar-
restee's
death.

It therefore does not, by our later practice, fall by the death of the arrestee, but continues to subsist, as a foundation for an action of furthcoming against his heir, while the subject arrested remains *in medio*, 21. *Dec. 1738, E. Aberdeen.* Far less is arrestment lost, either by the death of the arrester, or of the common debtor.

Loosing of
arrest-
ment.

7. Where arrestment proceeds on a depending action, it may be loosed, by the common debtor's giving security to the arrester for his debt, in the event it shall be found due. By the ancient practice, the receiving of this caution was committed entirely to the messenger, whose certificate that caution was given; effectually loosed the arrestment; But all bonds of caution in loosings, are now to be received by the clerk to the bills, and recorded in the books of Session, 1617, c. 17. Arrestment founded on decrees, or on registred obligations, which, in the judgment of law are decrees, cannot be loosed, but upon payment or consignation; except, 1. Where the term of payment of the debt is not yet come, or the condition has not yet existed. 2. Where the arrestment has proceeded on a registred contract, in which the debts or mutual obligations are not liquid,

Loosing
not admit-
ted but on
payment
or config-
nation, in
registred
obliga-
tions.

Excep-
tions.

liquid, 31. *July 1705, Macfarlan.* 3. Where the decree is suspended, or turned into a libel; for, till the suspension be discussed, or the pending action concluded, it cannot be known whether any debt be truly due. A loosing takes off the *nexus*, which had been laid on the subject arrested; so that the arrestee may thereafter pay safely to his creditor, and the cautioner is substituted in place of the arrestment, for the arrester's security: Yet the arrester may, while the subject continues with the arrestee, pursue him in a furthcoming, notwithstanding the loosing, 7. *Feb. 1665, Graham.*

Effect of
loosing.

8. Arrestment is only an inchoated or begun diligence; to perfect it, there must be an action brought by the arrester against the arrestee, to make the debt or subject arrested furthcoming. In this action, the common debtor must be called for his interest, that he may have an opportunity, of excepting to the lawfulness or extent of the debt, on which the diligence proceeded. Tho' an arrestment cannot be executed without the territory of the judge who granted the precept, 1. 2. 1. yet one inferior judge is competent to a furthcoming, upon an arrestment laid on by the warrant of another, *St. 3. 1. 24.—23. June 1710.*

Furthcoming on
arrestment.

Dalrymple. Before a furthcoming can be pursued, the debt due by the common debtor to the arrester, must be liquidated; for the arrester can be no farther intitled to the subject arrested, than to the extent of the debt due to him by the common debtor. If the pursuer cannot prove the debt due by the arrestee *scripto*, he must refer it to his oath. Where the subject arrested is a sum of money, it is, by the decree

Before
whom can
it be pursued.

The arrester's
debt must
be first liquidated.

Decree of decree of furthcoming, directed to be paid to the pursuer towards satisfying his debt; where goods are arrested, the judge ordains them to be exposed to sale, and the price to be delivered to the pursuer, 12. Nov. 1680, *Stevensons*: So that in either case, decrees of furthcoming are judicial assignations to the arrester, of the subject arrested.

Arrestments are preferred by their dates,

Provided the arrester insists in his furthcoming.

9. In all competitions, regard is had to the dates, not of the grounds of debt, but of the diligences proceeding upon them. In the competition of arrestments, the preference is governed by their dates, according to the priority, even of hours, where it appears with any certainty, which is the first. But, as arrestment is but a begun diligence, therefore, if a prior arrester shall neglect to insist in an action of furthcoming for such a time as may be reasonably construed into a desertion of his begun diligence, he loses that preference, which it was in his power to have obtained for himself, and the last arrester is preferred: But, as dereliction of diligence is not easily presumed, the distance of above two years, between the first arrestment and the decree of furthcoming, was found, not to make such a *mora*, as to intitle the posterior arrester to a preference, Jan. 1724, *Nairn*. This rule of preference, according to the dates of the several arrestments, holds, by our present practice, whether they have proceeded on a decree, or on a dependence; on debts not yet payable, or on debts already payable; provided the pendency shall have been closed, or the debt have become payable, before the issue of the competition, 14. June 1710, *Brody*.—K. 100.

10. In the competition of arrestments with assignations, an assignation by the common debtor, intimated before arrestment, is preferable to the arrestment; for, by the intimated assignation, the debtor is fully divested, after which, the subject cannot be arrested as his. If the assignation is granted before arrestment, but not intimated till after it, the arrester is preferred; for arrestment renders the subject litigious, and so excludes every voluntary right of the debtor, either granted after the diligence, or not compleated till after it. From these rules, a third necessarily follows, that, if the intimation and arrestment are of equal dates, they are preferable *pari passu*; unless the arrester has deserted his diligence, by neglecting for a reasonable time to obtain a furthcoming.

Rules of preference between arresters and assigneys.

11. Poining is that diligence affecting moveable subjects, by which their property is carried directly to the creditor. Real poining, which proceeds on real debts, or *debita fundi*, is treated of below, 4. 1. 3. Personal poining may have for its warrant, either letters of horn-ing, containing a clause for poining, and then it is executed by messengers; or precepts of poining, granted by Sheriffs, Commissaries, &c. which are executed by their proper officers. No poining can proceed, till a charge be given to the debtor to pay or perform, and the days thereof be expired, by 1669, c. 4. except poinings against vassals for their feu-duties, and poinings against tenants for rent, proceeding upon the landlord's own decree; in which, the ancient custom of poining without a previous charge continues, 18. Dec. 1735, *Macqueen*. A debtor's goods may be poined

Poining.

Its warrant.

A previous charge must be given,

Except in poinings for feu-duties or rents.

Arrestment is no bar to poiding. pointed by one creditor, tho' they have been arrested before, by another; for arrestment being but an imperfect diligence, leaves the right of the subject still in the debtor, and so cannot hinder any creditor from using a more perfect diligence, which has the effect of carrying the property directly to himself.

What subjects may be poided. 12. It is only goods belonging to the debtor, that can be poided. Anciently, the tenant's goods might be poided for his landlord's debt, either real or personal, to the full extent of the debt, even tho' the tenant had not been in arrear of rent; but now, of a long time, probably from a favourable interpretation of act 1469, c. 37. no poiding has proceeded against a tenant, even to the least extent, for his landlord's personal debt.

No plough-goods can be poided in the time of labour. No cattle pertaining to the plough, nor instruments of tillage could, by the *Roman* law, l. 7. 8. *C. quae res pign. obl.* be poided, nor can they by ours, in the time of labouring or tilling the ground; unless where the debtor has no other goods that may be poided, 1503, c. 98. By labouring time is understood, that time, in which that tenant, whose goods are to be poided, is ploughing, tho' he should have been earlier or later than his neighbours, 20. *June* 1712, *Arnot*; but summer-fallowing does not fall under the act, 22. *Nov.* 1628, *Watson*. Tho' the statute prohibits such poiding, not only where the debtor has moveables, but even where he has lands that may be appraised, this last part of the alternative has gone into disuse, *F.* 7. *Dec.* 1692, *Turner*.

The form of poiding. 13. In the execution of poiding, the debtor's goods must be appraised, first on the ground of the lands where they are laid hold on,

on, and a second time at the market-cross of the jurisdiction, by the stated appraisers thereof; or, if there are none, by persons named by the messenger or other officer employed in the diligence. Next, the messenger must, after public intimation by three oyeses, declare the value of the goods according to second appraisement, and require the debtor to make payment of the debt, including interest and expences. If payment shall be offered to the creditor, or in his absence to his lawful attorney; or if, in case of refusal by them, consignment of the debt shall be made in the hands of the judge-ordinary or his clerk, the goods must be left with the debtor; if not, the messenger ought to adjudge and deliver them over, at the appraised value, to the user of the diligence towards his payment: And the debtor is intitled to a copy of the warrant and executions, as a voucher that the debt is discharged in whole or in part, by the goods poinded.

The goods must be twice appraised.

14. Ministers may, by 1663, c. 21. poind for their stipends, upon one appraisement on the ground of the lands; and landlords were always in use to poind so, for their rents, *Balfour, p. 40. c. 10.*—18. Dec. 1735, *Macqueen*. By the late jurisdiction act, 20. Geo. II. the appraisement of the goods at the market-cross of the next royal borough, or even of the next head-borough of stewartry or regality, tho' these jurisdictions be abolished, is declared as sufficient, as if they were carried to the head-borough of the shire. Poinding, whether it be considered as a sentence, or as the execution of a sentence, must be proceeded in, between

Ministers and heritors may poind on one appretiation.

Appretiation at the market cross of an abolished jurisdiction.

The powers of the messenger in pointing.

sun-rising and sun-setting; or at least it must be finished before the going off of day-light, 11. Feb. 1675, *Douglass*; see *F.* 10. Nov. 1703, *Gordon*. The powers of the officer employed in the execution of pointings, are not clearly defined by custom, in the case of a third party, claiming the property of the goods to be pointed. This is certain, that he may take the oath of the claimant, upon the verity of his claim, and if from thence it shall appear that the claimant's title is collusive, he ought to proceed in the diligence; but, if there remains the least doubt, his safest course is to deliver the goods to the claimant, and to express in his execution, the reasons why pointing did not proceed.

Pointing not completed.

Deforcement of the messenger.

15. As law has required certain solemnities in pointing, without which the property of the goods cannot be transferred to the creditor, therefore, if a messenger should be interrupted before completing the pointing, by any fatality, or force not imputable to a co-creditor, such incomplete pointing cannot hurt the diligence of that co-creditor: But where a pointing was forcibly stopped by the possessor of the goods, on pretence that they had been already arrested in his hands by another, the pointing is considered as completed, in a question with the prior arrester, 13. Feb. 1736, *Corry*; probably from a presumption, that the arrester, whose diligence was used as a handle for stopping the messenger, had been privy to the deforcement. The person himself who stops a pointing *via facti*, on groundless pretences, is liable, both criminally, in the pains of deforcement, 4. 4.

34, and civilly, in the value of the goods which might have been poinded by the creditor.

TIT. 7. Of Prescriptions.

PRESCRIPTION, which is a method, both of establishing, and of extinguishing property, is either positive or negative. Positive prescription is generally defined, as the *Roman usucapio*, the acquisition of property, (it should rather be, when applied to our law, the securing it against all further challenge) by the possessor's continuing his possession for the time which law has declared sufficient for that purpose: Negative, is the loss or amission of a right, by neglecting to follow it forth, or use it, during the whole time limited by law. The doctrine of prescription, which is, by some writers, condemned as contrary to justice, has been introduced, that the claims of negligent creditors might not subsist for ever, that property might be at last fixed, and forgeries discouraged, which the difficulty of detecting must have made exceeding frequent, if no length of time had limited the legal effect of writings.

2. Positive prescription was first introduced into our law, by 1617, c. 12. which enacts, that whoever shall have possessed his lands, annualrents or other heritages, peaceably, in virtue of infeftments, for forty years continually after their dates, shall not thereafter be disquieted in his right, by any person pretending a better title. Under *heritages* are comprehended

Prescripti-
on.

Positive
prescripti-
on.

hended fairs or markets, and every other right that is *fundo annexum*, and capable of continual possession. Continued possession, if proved as far back as the memory of man, presumes possession upwards to the date of the infestment. The whole course of possession must, by the act, be founded on seisins, and consequently, no part thereof on the bare right of apparençy, 15. Feb. 1671, E. Argyll; but forty years possession, without seisin, is sufficient in the prescription of such heritable rights as do not require seisin. The possession must also be without any *lawful* interruption; *i. e.* it must neither be interrupted *via facti* nor *via juris*. The prescription of subjects not expressed in the infestment, as part and pertinent of another subject, specially expressed, has been explained, 2. 6. 6.

Its title.

3. The act requires, that the possessor produce, as his title of prescription, a charter of the lands, preceeding the forty years possession, with the seisin following on it; and, where there is no charter extant, seisins, one or more, standing together for forty years, and proceeding either on retours, or precepts of *clare constat*. This has given rise to a reasonable distinction observed in practice, between the prescription of a singular successor, and of an heir. Singular successors, must produce for their title of prescription, not only a seisin, but its warrant, as a charter, disposition, &c. either in their own person, or in that of their author; But the production by an heir of seisins, one or more, standing together for forty years, and proceeding on retours or precepts of *clare constat*,

Singular
successors,
must pro-
duce, both
charter
and seisin.

An heir
need pro-
duce only
seisins.

stat, is sufficient. The heir is not obliged to produce the retours, or precepts, on which his feilins proceed, 9. Nov. 1739, *Purdy*; nor is the singular successor obliged to produce the ground of his charter, 1741, *Ged*; so that if the title of prescription produced, be a fair deed and a sufficient title of property, the possessor is secure by the act, which admits no ground of challenge, but falsehood. A special statute, for establishing the positive prescription in moveable rights, was not necessary; for, since a title in writing is not requisite for the acquiring of these, the negative prescription, by which all right of action, for recovering their property, is cut off, effectually secures the possessor.

4. The negative prescription of obligations, by the lapse of forty years, was introduced into our law, long before the positive, by 1469, c. 29.—1474, c. 55. This prescription is now amplified by the foresaid act 1617, which has extended it to all actions competent upon heritable bonds, reversions and others whatsoever; unless where the reversions are either incorporated in the body of the wadset-right, or registered in the register of reversions: And reversions so incorporated, or registered, are not only exempted from the negative prescription, but they are an effectual bar against any person from pleading the positive, K. 92. Negative prescription.

5. A shorter negative prescription is introduced by statute, in certain rights and debts. Actions of spuilzie, ejection, and others of that nature, must be pursued within three years, after the commission of the fact on which the action is founded, by 1579, c. 81. As in spuilzie and ejection. Shorter negative prescriptions.

zies and ejections, the pursuer was intitled, *in odium* of violence, to a proof by his own oath *in litem*, and to the violent profits against the defender, that statute meant only to limit these special privileges by a three years prescription, without cutting off the right of action, where the claim is restricted to simple restitution, 16. *March 1627, Hay*. Under the general words, *and others of that nature*, are comprehended all actions, where the pursuer is admitted to prove his libel, by his own oath *in litem*.

Prescription of servants fees, house-rents, and merchants accounts. 6. Servants fees, house-rents, men's ordinaries (*i. e.* money due for board), and merchants accounts, fall under the triennial prescription, by 1579, c. 83. There is also a general clause subjoined to this statute, of *other the like debts*, which includes alimentary debts, *Br. MS. 25. July 1716, Hamilton*, wages due to workmen, *F. 21. Dec. 1692, Bayne*, and accounts due to writers, agents or procurators, 16. *Dec. 1675, Somervel*. These debts may, by this act, be proved after the three years, either by the writing or oath of the defender; so that they prescribe, only as to the mean of proof by witnesses. In the prescription of house-rents, servants fees and alimony, each term's rent, fee or alimony, runs a separate course of prescription; so that in an action for these, the claim will be restricted, to the arrears incurred within the three years immediately before the citation, 12. *Feb. 1680, Ross*,—14. *Jan. 1737, Ferguson*: But in accounts, prescription does not begin till the last article; for a single article cannot be called an account, 16. *Dec. 1675, Somervel*. The currency of an account, the first part of which was furnished to a person deceased, is preserved, in question with

The period from which these prescriptions commence.

with the heir, by new furnishings within the three years to that heir, because *heres est eadem persona cum defuncto*, 26. Feb. 1670, *Graham*. Actions of removing must also be pursued within three years after the warning, by 1579, c. 82.

Prescription of removing.

7. Reductions of erroneous retours, and actions of error against the inquest, did prescribe, if not pursued, within three years after the service, by 1494, c. 57.; which term is lengthened to twenty years, as to the reduction of retours, by 1617, c. 13. This last has the appearance of a declaratory statute, as if the former had only meant to save the inquest from processes of error, and not to cut off the right of reduction, by the triennial prescription; but it does both in express words: And therefore the last act contains a special clause, that those who had, before the date of it, acquired right to lands, from persons retoured thereto, shall enjoy their rights, as the law then stood. It statutes in general, that all erroneous retours shall be free from challenge after twenty years; and so is not to be confined, as Sir *Geo. Mackenzie* conjectures, in his observations upon it, to the competition of different kinds of heirs between themselves, *e. g.* between an heir of line, and an heir of tailzie.

Prescription of retours, and processes of error.

8. Ministers stipends and multures prescribe in five years after they are due; and arrears of rent (or mails and duties) five years after the tenant's removing from the lands, by 1669, c. 9.: But the said debts may be thereafter proved to be still due, by the writing or oath of the debtor. Stipends due during a vacancy, tho' they are not included in the strict letter of this act, have been found to fall under the spirit

Prescription of ministers stipends, multures, and arrears of rent.

Of bargains of moveables.

And of arrestments.

Limitation of cautionry engagements.

spirit of it, *New Coll.* 77 ; because the favour of the debtor is equally strong in both. As the prescription of mails and duties was introduced in favour of poor tenants, that they might not suffer by neglecting to preserve their discharges, a proprietor of lands subject to a life-rent, who had obtained a lease of all the life-rented lands from the liferenter, is not intitled to plead it, 9. *Dec.* 1709, *Murray*; nor a tacksmen of one's whole estate, who had, by the lease, a power of removing tenants, 20. *July* 1733, *L. Carfin*. By the same statute, bargains concerning moveables, or sums of money which are proveable by witnesses, if not sued upon within five years after the bargain, cannot be proved, but by writing or the oath of the debtor, as to which see 4. 2. 5. 6. Under these, are included sales, locations and all other consensual contracts, to the constitution of which, writing is not necessary. By this act also, a quinquennial prescription is established in arrestments, whether on decrees or depending actions: The first prescribe, in five years after using the arrestment; and the last, in five years after sentence is pronounced on the depending action.

9. No person binding for or with another, either as cautioner or co-principal, in a bond or contract for a sum of money, continues bound after seven years from the date of the bond, provided he has either a clause of relief in the bond, or a separate bond of relief, intimated to the creditor, at his receiving the bond, 1695, c. 5. But the act declares, that all diligence used within the seven years against the cautioner,

tioner, shall stand good. As this is a public law, intended to prevent the bad consequences of rash engagements, its benefit cannot, before the lapse of the seven years, be renounced by the cautioner, *Edg. 19. Feb. 1724, Norie.* As it is correctory, it is strictly interpreted: Thus, bonds bearing a mutual clause of relief *pro rata*, fall not under it, 21. *Jan. 1708, Ballantyne*; nor bonds of corroboration, *Br. 61.—15. Dec. 1747, Lady Henr. Gordon*; nor obligations, where the condition is not purified, or the term of payment not come within the seven years; because no diligence can be used on these, *Br. 54.* The statute excludes all cautionries for the faithful discharge of offices; these not being obligations in a bond, or contract, for sums of money. And practice has denied the benefit of it to all judicial cautioners, as cautioners in a suspension. Actions of count and reckoning, competent, either to minors against their tutors or curators, or *vice versa*, prescribe, by 1696, c. 9. in ten years, after the majority or death of the minor.

It is strictly interpreted.

Prescription of tutory accounts.

10. By the before cited 1669, c. 9. holograph bonds, missive letters and books of account, not attested by witnesses, prescribe in twenty years, unless the creditor shall thereafter prove the verity of the subscription, by the debtor's oath. It is therefore sufficient to save from the effect of this prescription, that the constitution of the debt be proved by the party's oath, after the twenty years; whereas in stipends, merchants accounts, &c. not only the constitution, but the subsistence of the debt, must be proved by writing or the debtor's oath, after that term. Some lawyers extend this prescription of holograph writings, to all obligations for sums not exceeding L. 100.

Prescription of holograph writings.

Scots, which are not attested by witnesses; because tho' these are in practice sustained, notwithstanding the act 1540. c. 117, yet they ought not to have the same duration with deeds attested by witnesses. Tho' in the short prescriptions of debts, the right of action is forever lost, if not exercised within the time limited, yet where action was brought on any of those debts, before the prescription was run, it subsisted, like any other right, for forty years. As this defeated the purpose of the acts establishing these prescriptions, all processes upon warnings, spuilzies, ejections or arrestments, or for payment of the debts contained in act 1669. c. 9. are by the said act, joined with 1685, c. 14. declared to prescribe in five years, if not wakened within that time; see 4. 1. 33.

Extinction
of obliga-
tions,
by taciturnity.

11. Certain obligations are lost by the lapse of less than forty years, without the aid of statute, where the nature of the obligation, and the circumstances of parties, justify it: Thus, bills which are not intended for lasting securities, produce no action, where the creditor has been long silent, unless the subsistence of the debt be proved by the debtor's oath; but the precise time is not fixed by practice; see *Falc. vol. 2. 48. New Coll. vol. 2. 65.* Thus also, a receipt for bills granted by a writer to his employer, not insisted upon for twenty three years, was found not productive of an action, *Falc. vol. 2. 74.* The prescriptions of the restitution of minors, of the benefit of inventory, &c. are explained in their proper places.

Bona fides
presumed
in the positive prescription.

12. In the positive prescription, as established by the act 1617, the continued possession for

for forty years, proceeding upon a title of property not chargeable with falsehood, secures the possessor against all other grounds of challenge, and so presumes *bona fides*, *praesumptio-
ne juris et de jure*, 27. Nov. 1677, *Grant*. In the long negative prescription, *bona fides* in the debtor is not required: The creditor's neglecting to insist for so long a time, is construed as an abandoning of his debt, and so is equivalent to a discharge. Hence, tho' the subsistence of the debt should be referred to the debtor's own oath, after the forty years, he is not liable. *F. 7. Dec. 1703, Napier*.

It is not required in the long negative prescription.

13. Prescription runs *de momento in momentum*: The whole time defined by law must be completed, before a right can be either acquired or lost by it; so that interruption, made on the last day of the fortieth year, breaks its course. Civil possession, 2. 1. 12. has the same effects with natural, in all questions of prescription, either positive or negative. The positive prescription runs against the Sovereign himself, by the express words of the act 1617, even as to his annexed property, 1633, c. 12.; but it is generally thought, he cannot suffer by the negative: He is secured against the negligence of his officers, in the management of processes, by express statute, 1600, c. 14. The negative, as well as the positive prescription, runs against communities and hospitals, tho' their overseers are administrators only, and not proprietors; and against the church, tho' churchmen have but a temporary interest in their benefices. But because the rights of beneficiaries to their stipends are liable to accidents, thro' the frequent change of incumbents, thirteen

Prescription runs *de momento in momentum*.

The positive prescription runs against the King.

Both prescriptions run against communities, and against the church.

Decennalis et triennalis possessio.

thirteen years possession does, by a rule of the *Roman* chancery which we have adopted, found a presumptive title in the beneficiary; *decennalis et triennalis possessor non teneatur docere de titulo*: But this is not properly prescription; for if, by titles recovered, perhaps out of the incumbent's own hands, it shall appear that he has possessed tithes, or other subjects, to a greater extent than he ought, his possession will be restricted accordingly, 23.

Prescription of church lands and rents.

Does prescription run against minors?

July 1708, Rule. This right must not be confounded with that established in favour of churchmen, by *Act. S. 16. Dec. 1612,—2. 9. 17*, which is confined to church-lands and rents, and seems to constitute a proper prescription, upon a possession of thirty years.

14. The clause in the act 1617, saving minors from prescription, is extended to the positive, as well as to the negative prescription, *New Coll. 118.*; but the exception of minority is not admitted in the case of hospitals for children, where there is a continual succession of minors, that being a *casus insolitus*, *F. 17. Dec. 1695, Heriot's hospital*. Minors are expressly excepted in several of the short prescriptions, as 1579, c. 81.—1669, c. 9.; but, where law leaves them in the common case, they must be subject to the common rules.

It does not run contra non valentem agere.

15. Prescription does not run, *contra non valentem agere*, against one who is barred, by some legal incapacity, from pursuing, 25. *Jan. 1678, D. Lauderdale*; for in such case, neither negligence, nor dereliction, can be imputed to him. This rule is, by a favourable interpretation, extended to wives who, *ex reverentia maritali*, forbear to pursue actions competent to them against

against their husbands, 5. *July 1665, Macky*; but every prescription runs against wives, in favour of third parties. On the same ground, tho' by the act 1617, prescription is said to commence from the date of the obligation, with the single exception of rights of warrandice, yet the words of that, and other such statutes, are so explained, or rather corrected into an agreeableness with this rule, that the prescription runs, only from the time that the debt or right could be sued upon. Thus, inhibition prescribes, only from the publishing of the deed granted to the inhibitor's prejudice, *P. Falc.* 32.: And in the prescription of removings, the years are computed, only from the term at which the defender is warned to remove, tho' the act 1579, c. 82. warrants the commencement of them, from the date of the warning, 6. *Feb. 1629, La. Borthwick*. Neither can prescription run against persons, who are already in possession, and so can gain nothing by a pursuit. Thus, where a person, who has two adjudications affecting the same lands, is in possession upon one of them, prescription cannot run against the other, during such possession; see 26. *Nov. 1728, Fraser*.

It does not commence, till the debt can be sued for.

It does not run against persons already in possession.

16. Certain rights are incapable of prescription, 1. Things that law has exempted from commerce, 2. 1. 2. Of this sort were tithes, which being wholly appropriated, before the Reformation, to sacred uses, could not be made the property of private persons: But now they are *juris privati*, except in so far as they are actually destined for the maintenance of the clergy; and consequently, are capable of the positive prescription, tho' they cannot be lost by

Res extra commercium cannot be acquired by prescription.

But things by the negative, see §. 17. Things stolen or
 stolen
 may. possessed by violence, were so far *extra commercium* by the *Roman* law, that they could not be acquired by usucapion, even in the person of a *bona fide* possessor; but this, and all other grounds of challenge, seem to have been cut off, by the *praescriptio longissimi temporis*, l. 3. 4. *C. de praescr.* 30. vel 40 ann.; neither does our statute of prescription make any exception, in the case of stolen goods. 2. *Res me-*

Faculties
 cannot be
 lost by
 prescrip-
 tion;

Norex-
 ceptions,

If they be
 not pro-
 ductive of
 an action.
 Obligati-
 ons of
 yearly
 payments
 cannot
 prescribe,

rae facultatis, e. g. a faculty to charge a subject with debts, to revoke, &c. cannot be lost by prescription, 14. *March* 1707, *L. Bimmerfide*; for faculties may, by their nature, be exercised at any time: Hence, a proprietor's right of using any act of property on his own grounds, cannot be lost by the greatest length of time, tho' a neighbouring heritor should happen to be hurt by the exercise of it, 2. 9. 10. 3. Exceptions competent to a person for eliding an action, cannot prescribe, if they are founded on simple discharges; because discharges are intended to have no farther operation, and cannot produce an action, whereby the prescription may be interrupted: But where the exception is founded on a right productive of an action, e. g. compensation, such right must be insisted on, within the years of prescription, (3. 4. 5.). 4. Obligations of yearly pensions or payments, tho' diligence be not used on them for forty years, do not suffer a total prescription, but still subsist as to the arrears fallen due within that period, l. 7. §. 6 *C. de praescr.* 30 vel 40 ann.—*July* 1730, *Lockhart*; because prescription cannot run against an obligation, till it be payable, and each year's pension or payment

ment is considered as a separate debt. But in bonds which carry a yearly interest, since the obligation is but one, and can be fulfilled at once, the interest is merely an accessory to the principal sum; and therefore if diligence be neglected for forty years, the obligation itself is prescribed, and consequently, all the interests as accessories.

17. No right can be lost *non utendo* by one, unless the effect of that prescription be to establish it in another. Hence, the rule arises, *juri sanguinis nunquam praescribitur*: One

Nor the right of blood.

may, at the greatest distance from his ancestor's death, serve heir to him, if no other has served before him; for as that right is proper to him who has the character of heir, there can be no interest vested in any other person, to found an opposition. Hence also, a proprietor of land, cannot lose his property by the negative prescription, unless he who objects it, can himself plead the positive, in terms of the act 1617, *Edgar*, 20. *July 1725, Paton*. On the same ground, a superior's right of feuduties cannot be lost *non utendo*; because being inherent in the superiority, it is truly a right of lands, that cannot suffer the negative prescription, except in favour of one who can plead the positive; which the vassal cannot do, being destitute of a title. This rule applies also

The negative prescription in heritage.

to parsonage tithes, which are an inherent burden upon all lands not specially exempted; and from which therefore, the person liable cannot prescribe an immunity, by bare non-payment: But such vicarage tithes, as are only due, where they are established by usage, may be lost by prescription, *F. 24. July 1678, L.*

Feu-duties cannot be lost by the neg. prescription,

Nor parsonage tithes.

Grant,

Grant, (2. 10. 5.). In all these cases, tho' the radical right cannot suffer the negative prescription, the bygone duties, not demanded within the forty years, are lost to the proprietor, superior, or titular.

Interrup-
tion of
prescrip-
tion.

18. Prescription may be interrupted, by any deed, whereby the proprietor, or creditor, uses his right or ground of debt. It is not only the proprietor or creditor himself, who can interrupt, but his heir in the bare right of apparen-
cy: And even in interruption made by one who had only a putative title, the true creditor afterwards pursuing, tho' he derived no right from the interrupter, was found, by a late decision, intitled to the benefit thereof, *Falc. vol. 1.*

Registra-
tion makes
no inter-
ruption.

136. In all interruptions, notice must be given to the possessor of the subject, or the debtor, that the proprietor or creditor intends to sue upon his right: and consequently, tho' registration of the ground of debt, be in some respects considered as a decree, yet as the defender is not made a party to it, it is no interruption; nor citations which proceeded on blank summonses, 4. 1. 35; because these had no relation to any special ground of debt. All writings, whereby the debtor himself acknowledges the debt, and all processses for payment brought or diligences used against him upon his obligation, by horn-
ing, inhibition, arrestment, &c. must be effectual to interrupt prescription.

Nor cita-
tions on
blank
summon-
ses.

Interrup-
tions by
citation
prescribe
in seven
years,
if not re-
newed.

19. Interruptions, by citation upon libelled summonses, where they are not used by a mi-
nor, prescribe, if not renewed every seven years, by 1669, c. 10.: But, where the ap-
pearance of parties, or any judicial act, has fol-
lowed thereupon, it is no longer a bare citation,
but

but an action which subsists for forty years. By this statute, citations for interrupting the prescription of real right, must be given by messengers; and, by 1696, c. 19. the summonses, on which such citations proceed, must pass the signet, and be registred within sixty days after the execution, in a particular register appointed for that purpose: And, where interruption of real rights is made *via facti*, an instrument must be taken upon it, and recorded in the said register; otherwise it can have no effect against singular successors.

Requisites of interruption in the prescription of real rights.

20. Interruption has the effect to cut off the course of prescription, so that the person prescribing, can avail himself of no part of the former time, but must begin a new course, commencing from the date of the interruption. Minority therefore is no proper interruption, for it neither breaks the course of prescription, nor is it a document or evidence, taken by the minor on his right: It is a personal privilege competent to him; by which the operation of the prescription is indeed suspended, during the years of minority, which are therefore discounted from it; but it continues to run after majority, and the years before and after the minority, may be conjoined to compleat it. The same doctrine applies to the privilege arising from one's incapacity to act, *supr.* §. 15.

Effect of interruption.

Minority is not interruption.

21. Diligence used upon a debt, against any one of two or more co-obligants, preserves the debt itself, and so interrupts prescription against all of them; except in the special case of cautioners, who are not affected by any diligence used against the principal debtor, 1695, c. 5. In the same manner, a right of annualrent, con-

When partial interruption secures the whole right?

stituted upon two separate tenements, is preserved as to both, from the negative prescription, by diligence used against either of them, 22. June 1671, Lord *Balmerino*. But whether such diligence has also the effect, to hinder the possessor of the other tenement by singular titles, from the benefit of the positive prescription, may be doubted, notwithstanding the authority of that decision; for no interruption can be said to be thereby made against the possessor; and, if he continues his possession for the term of prescription, he seems to be precisely in the case of the statute 1617. This is certain, that interruption made against the possessor of a barony, by arresting or levying the mails and duties of any part of it, interrupts his prescription of the whole; for a barony is *non* *men universitatis*, or *unum quid*, 2. 6. 7.

Interrup-
tion a-
gainst
the pos-
sessor of a
barony.

TIT. 8. Of Succession in heritable Rights.

Successors, singular and universal. Singular successors are those who succeed to a person yet alive, in a special subject by singular titles; but succession, in its proper sense, is a method of transmitting rights from the dead to the living. Heritable rights descend by succession to the heir, properly so called; moveable rights, to the executors, who are sometimes said to be heirs in moveables.

Succession by special destination; and legal succession. Succession is either by special destination, which descends to those named by the proprietor himself; or legal, which devolves upon the persons whom the law marks out for successors, from a presumption, that the proprietor would have

have named them, had he made a destination. The first is in all cases preferred to the other, as presumption must yield to truth.

2. In the succession, of heritage, the heirs at law are otherwise called heirs-general, heirs whatsoever, or heirs of line; and they succeed by the right of blood, in the following order. First, descendants, whose preference before ascendants or collaterals, is established by the universal consent of nations. The *Romans* divided the succession equally among all the immediate descendants of the deceased; but we, from our close attention to the feudal plan, prefer sons to daughters, and the eldest son to all the younger. Where there are daughters only, they succeed equally, and are called heirs-portioners. Failing immediate descendants, grand-children succeed; and in default of them, great-grand-children, and so on *in infinitum*; preferring, as in the former case, males to females, and the eldest male to the younger.

Order of
succession
in heri-
tage.

Heirs at
law.

Descen-
dants.

3. Next after descendants, collaterals succeed; among whom the brothers *german* of the deceased have the first place, *i. e.* brothers both by father and mother; for the full blood excludes the half blood. But as, in no case, the legal succession of heritage is, by the law of *Scotland*, divided into parts, unless where it descends to females; the immediate younger brother of the deceased excludes the rest, according to the rule, *heritage descends*. Where the deceased is himself the youngest, the succession goes to the immediate elder brother, as being the least deviation from this rule, *Pr. Falc. 9.* If there are no brothers *german*, the sisters *german* succeed equally, then brothers *consanguinean*,

Collate-
rals.

Ascen-
dants.

nean, i. e. by the father only, in the same order as brothers german; and failing them, sisters *consanguinean* equally. Next, the father succeeds, tho' by our ancient usage he was excluded, *Cr.* 321. §. 46. After him, his brothers and sisters, according to the rules already explained; then the grand-father; failing him, his brothers and sisters; and so upwards, as far back as propinquity can be proved. Tho' children succeed to their mother, a mother cannot to her child, nor is there any succession by our law, through the mother of the deceased; in so much that one brother *uterine*, i. e. by the mother only, cannot succeed to another, even in that estate which flowed originally from their common mother, 5. Feb. 1663, *Lennox*.

No succe-
sion by the
mother.

Right of
representa-
tion in
heritage.

4. In heritage there is a right of representation, by which one succeeds, not in his own person, but in the place of, and as representing some of his deceased ascendants. Thus, where one leaves a younger son, and a grandchild by his eldest, the grandchild, tho' farther removed in degree from the deceased than his uncle, excludes him, as coming in place of his father the eldest son. Hence arises the distinction between succession *in capita*, where the division is made into as many equal parts as there are *capita* or heirs, which is the case of heirs portioners; and succession *in stirpes*, where the remoter heirs draw no more among them, than the share belonging to their ascendant, or *stirps*, whom they represent; an example of which, may be figured in the case of one who leaves behind him a daughter alive, and two grand-daughters by a daughter deceased. Tho' the right of succession does, in no case, fall to the

*Successio in
capita.*

*Successio in
stirpes.*

the mother of the deceased, nor to his relations by her; yet as children succeed to their mother, therefore, in every case where the mother herself would have succeeded, had she been alive, her children also succeed, as representing her.

5. In the succession of heirs portioners, indivisible rights, *e. g.* titles of dignity, fall to the eldest sister. A single right of superiority goes also to the eldest; for it hardly admits a division, and the condition of the vassal ought not to be made worse, by multiplying superiors upon him. Where there are more such rights, the eldest may perhaps have her election of the best; but the younger sisters are intitled to a recompence, in so far as the divisions are unequal; at least, where the superiorities yield a constant yearly rent, *e. g.* a yearly feu-duty. The principal seat of the family falls to the eldest, with the garden and orchard belonging to it, without recompence to the younger sisters, 1743, *Pedies*; but all other houses are divided amongst them, together with the lands on which they are built, as parts and pertinents of these lands.

Succession
of heirs
portioners.

6. Those heritable rights, to which the deceased did himself succeed as heir to his father or other ancestor, get sometimes the name of heritage in a strict sense, in opposition to the *feuda nova*, or feus of conquest, which he had acquired by singular titles, and which descend, not to his heir of line, but of conquest. This distinction obtains only, where two or more brothers or uncles, or their issue, are next in succession; in which case, the immediate younger brother, as heir of line, succeeds to the proper

Heir of
conquest,

Has no
place in
female
succession.

What is
included
in con-
quest.

per heritage, because that descends; whereas the conquest ascends to the immediate elder brother, *2. Att. c. 88*. It has no place in female succession, which the law divides equally among the heirs-portioners, *K. 3*. Where the deceased was the youngest brother, the immediate elder brother, whether of the same or of a former marriage, is heir, both of line and of conquest, *20. July 1664, Lady Clerkington*, contrary to the opinion of *Craig, p. 336*. An estate, disposed by a father to his eldest son, is not conquest in the son's person, but heritage; because the son would have succeeded to it, tho' there had been no disposition. The heir of conquest succeeds to all rights affecting land, which admit of seisin; and consequently, to dispositions or heritable bonds, tho' they should not be actually followed by seisin, *Hope Min. Pr. p. 40.—8. Jan. 1740, D. Hamilton*. But teinds go to the heir of line; because they are merely a burden on the fruits, not on the land, *16. Dec. 1736, Greenock*. Tacks do not fall under conquest, because they are incapable of seisin, *23. June 1663, Ferguson*: Nor personal bonds taken to heirs including executors; both for the reason just mentioned, and because they are heritable, not *ex sua natura*, but by the force of destination; and therefore that heir is understood in the destination, who is heir in the most proper sense, *8. Jan. 1740, D. Hamilton*.

Heirship-
move-
ables.

7. The heir of line is intitled to the succession, not only of subjects properly heritable, but to that sort of moveables called *heirship*, which is the best of certain kinds, *1474, c. 54*. This doctrine has been probably introduced

ced, that the heir might not have an house and estate to succeed to, quite dismantled by the executor. The list of heirship-moveables, contained in *L. B. c. 125.* is imperfect; and indeed all such lists must be greater or less, according to the variety of moveables belonging to the deceased. In that sort which goes by pairs or dozens, the best pair or dozen is the heirship. There is no heirship in fungibles, or things estimated by quantity, as grain, hay, current money, &c. To intitle an heir to this privilege, the deceased must have been either, 1. A Prelate. 2. A Baron, *i. e.* one who stood inest at his death in lands, tho' not erected into a barony; or even in a right of annualrent: Or, 3. A burges; not an honorary one, but a trading burges of a royal borough, or at least one intitled to enter burges, in the right of his ancestor, *F. 22. Nov. 1698, Cumin.* Neither the heir of conquest, nor of tailzie, has right to heirship-moveables.

What is included in them.

Every deceased cannot transmit them.

They fall to the heir of line.

8. As to succession by destination, no proprietor can settle any heritable estate, in the proper form of a testament; not even bonds including executors, tho' these are not heritable *ex sua natura*: But, where a testament is, in part, drawn up in the style of a deed *inter vivos*, such part of it may contain a settlement of heritage, tho' executors should be named in the testamentary part. The common method of settling the succession of heritage, is by disposition, contract of marriage, or simple procuratory of resignation: And, tho' a disposition settling heritage, should have neither precept nor procuratory, it founds an action against the heir of line, to compleat his titles to the estate,

Heritage cannot be settled by testament.

Heirs of
tailzie and
of provi-
sion.

How they
differ.

Heirmale.

Simple de-
stination,

Lays no
restraint
on the
heir.

state, and thereafter divest himself in favour of the disponee. All heirs by destination may properly enough be called, by a general name, heirs of tailzie, from *tailler* to cut, because the lineal succession is cut off in their favour; but they are usually distinguished, into heirs of tailzie, and of provision. The appellation of tailzie, or entail, is chiefly used in the case of a land estate, which is settled on a long series of heirs, substituted, one after another; whereas heirs pointed out in contracts of marriage, or in bonds containing clauses of substitution, are more commonly called heirs of provision. The person first called in the tailzie, is the institute; the rest, the heirs of tailzie, or the substitutes. Tailzies are frequently made in favour of the heir-male, *i. e.* of the nearest legal heir to the granter, who is himself a male, and whose propinquity is wholly connected by males, without the intervention of any female.

9. Tailzies, when considered in relation to their several degrees of force, are either, 1. Simple destinations. 2. Tailzies with prohibitory clauses; or 3. Tailzies with prohibitory, resolute and irritant clauses. That is a simple destination, where the persons, called to the succession, are substituted one after another, without any restraint laid on the exercise of their property. The heirs therefore, succeeding to such estate, are absolute fiars, and consequently, may alter the destination at pleasure: Nor can inhibition, used against them by the next substitute, cut off this right of fee; for inhibition supposes an antecedent obligation on the debtor, which that diligence is intended to secure to the inhibitor; whereas in a simple destination,

destination, the several heirs ly under no obligation, and the substitutes have only the hope of succession.

10. In tailzies with clauses prohibitory, *e. g.* declaring that it shall not be lawful to the heirs to contract debts or alien the lands, in prejudice of the succession, none of the heirs can alien gratuitously; for a proper right of credit is thereby created to the several substitutes, who may, in the character of creditors, reduce such alienations upon the statute 1621, afterwards to be explained, *F. 28. Jan. 1687, E. Callander.* And tho' the members of entail may contract debts which will be effectual to the creditors, or may dispose of the estate for onerous causes, since the fee subsists in their person; yet the substitutes may, as creditors by the prohibitory clause, secure themselves against the effect of future contractions, by inhibition. In both these sorts, the maker himself may alter the tailzie; except, 1. Where it has been granted for an onerous cause, as in mutual tailzies, 14. *Jan. 1631, Sharp*; or, 2. Where the maker is expressly disabled, as well as the institute or the heirs, *Br. 119.*

Tailzies with prohibitory clauses cannot be altered gratuitously.

Inhibition may be served upon them by the substitute.

11. Where a tailzie is guarded with irritant and resolute clauses, the estate entailed, cannot be carried off by the debt, or deed, of any of the heirs succeeding thereto, in prejudice of the substitutes. It was long doubted, whether such tailzies ought to be effectual, even where the superior's consent was adhibited; because they sunk the property of estates, and created a perpetuity of liferents. The first judgment confirming them, was 26. *Feb. 1662, V. Stourmount*; and thereafter they were explicitly

Tailzies with irritant and resolute clauses.

Their re-
quisites.

authorised, by 1685, c. 22. By this statute, the entail must be registred, in a special register established for that purpose; and the irritant clauses must be inserted, not only in the procuratories, precepts, and seifins, by which the tailzies are first constituted, but in all the after-conveyances thereof; otherwise they can have no force against singular successors, see *K.* 52.: But a tailzie, even without these requisites, is effectual against the heir of the granter, or against the institute who accepts of it, *K.* 47. That part of the act, which requires the registration of tailzies, in order to their affecting singular successors, was found to have no retrospect to tailzies, made prior thereto, *K.* 89.: But this was reversed by a judgment of the house of Peers; and indeed, the security of creditors calls for registration, equally in all tailzies, and the act 1690, c. 33. makes no exception. It has been always an agreed point, that the act 1685, regulates the posterior transmissions, even of tailzies dated before it; so that in all these, the irritant clauses must be repeated, *K.* 60. Retours upon general services are not properly transmissions of an estate; they only give right to unexecuted procuratories of resignation and precepts of seisin, and therefore they do not fall under that statute.

They are
*stricti ju-
ris.*

12. An heir of entail has full power over the entailed estate, except in so far as he is expressly fettered, *New Coll. vol. 2. 13.*; and as entails are an unfavourable restraint upon property, and a frequent snare to trading people, they are *strictissimi juris*, so that no prohibition or irritancies are to be inferred by implication. Hence, tho' all debts to be contracted by the heir

heir should, by the entail, be declared null, but without irritating the right of the heir contracting, 22. *July 1712*, cred. of *Ricarton*; or *vice versa*, tho' there should be a clause irritating the right of the heir who contracts, but without declaring the debts contracted null, 11. *July 1734*, *Bailly*; the court will not interpose to supply the defect, from presumed intention. For the same reason, a prohibition to alter the succession, tho' under an irritancy, does not disable the heir from contracting debt, *Falc. vol. 1. 116.*; nor does a prohibition to contract debt, hinder him from selling, *Falc. vol. 2. 92.*

13. An heir, who counteracts the directions of the tailzie, by aliening any part of the estate, charging it with debt, &c. is said to contraveen. It is not the simple contracting of debt that infers contravention; the lands entailed must be actually adjudged, upon the debt contracted, *K. 34.* An heir may, where he is not expressly barred, settle a jointure on his wife, not exceeding the terce; because the provisions of law are not excluded in tailzies, *K. 90.* But the settling provisions on children, being a positive deed of the granter, was found to import contravention, by *Feb. 1730*, *Borthwick*, which however was reversed upon appeal. One might think, that by the words of the act 1685, the contraveener forfeits, not only for himself, but for the heirs of his body, where there is no express clause in the entail restricting it; but the more favourable opinion, which confines the penalty to the contraveener, has been received by a decision, *F. 6. Jan. 1697*, *Simpson*: Yet, for the greater security, a clause is generally inserted in tailzies, that the
forfeiture

What
deeds in-
fer contra-
vention.

Does the
contra-
veener for-
feit for the
heirs of his
body?

How the
heir serves
upon a de-
clarator of
irritancy.

forfeiture shall not affect the descendants of the contraveener, when such is the intention of the entail. Before the next heir can take the estate on the contravention of the former, he must declare the irritancy against the contraveener; after which, he is directed by the statute, to serve himself heir to him who died last in feft in the fee, and did not contraveen.

In what
cases an
heir of en-
tail may
sell.

14. When the heirs of the last person specially called in a tailzie, come to succeed, the irritancies have no longer any person, in favour of whom they can operate; and consequently, the fee, which was before tailzied, becomes simple and unlimited, in the person of such heirs, 29. Dec. 1710, *Lefly*. By the late act for abolishing ward-holdings, 20. Geo. II. c. 50. the King may purchase lands within *Scotland*, notwithstanding the strictest entail; and, by act 51. of the same year, where the lands are in the hands of minors or fatuous persons, his Majesty may purchase them from the curators or guardians. These acts appear, by their preamble, to be limited to lands lying in the Highlands of *Scotland*; but the enacting words of both, are general. By the first of the above quoted statutes, heirs of entail may sell to their vassals, the superiorities belonging to the entailed estate; but in all these cases, the price is to be settled in the same manner, that the lands or superiorities sold, were settled before the sale.

Rights ta-
ken in
conjunct
fee to
strangers.

15. Rights, not only of land estates, but of bonds (which last are called *quasi feuda* or *feuda nominum*), are sometimes granted to two or more persons, in conjunct fee. Where a right is so granted to two strangers, without any special clause adjected to it, each of them has an

an equal interest in the fee, and the part of the deceased does not accrue to the survivor, but descends to his own heir. If the right be taken to the two jointly, and *the longest liver* and their heirs, the several shares of the conjunct fiars, are affectable by their creditors, during their lives; but, on the death of any one of them, the survivor has the fee of the whole, exclusive of the heir of the predeceased, in so far as the share of the predeceased remains free, after payment of his debts, *Falc. vol. 1. 206.* Where the right is taken to the two in conjunct fee, and to the heirs of one of them, he to whose heirs the right is taken, is the only fiar; the right of the other resolves into a simple liferent: Yet where a father takes a right to himself and his son jointly, and to the son's heirs, such right being gratuitous, and granted only in consequence of the natural obligation, by which parents are bound to provide for their children, is not understood to strip the father of the fee, unless a contrary intention shall plainly appear from the tenor of the right.

To father
and son.

16. Where a right is taken to a husband and wife, in conjunct fee and liferent, the husband, as the *persona dignior*, is the only fiar: The wife's right resolves into a liferent, *Dirl. 85.* unless it be presumeable from special circumstances, that the fee was intended to be in the wife; *e. g.* if the right flowed from her, or has been taken to her assignees, 4. *Feb. 1709, Fead,* or if the last termination of the settlement falls upon the wife's heirs, *St. 3. 5. 51. vers. 3.—St. Ans. voce, Fee:* Tho' our decisions seem to have laid but little stress upon this last presumption, see *Diction. voce, Fee.* Where a right

To hus-
band and
wife.

right of moveables is taken to husband and wife, the heirs of both succeed equally, according to the natural meaning of the words, 2. *Feb. 1632, Bartholemew.*

Heirs of provision. 17. Heirs of provision are those who succeed to any subject, in virtue of a provision in the investiture, or other deed of settlement. This appellation is given most commonly, to heirs of a

Heirs of a marriage, than heirs by simple destination, who have only the hope of succession; for heirs of a marriage, because their provisions are constituted

Cannot be disappointed by gratuitous deeds. by an onerous contract, cannot be disappointed of them, by any gratuitous deed of the father; and they may sue him or his cautioner to purge incumbrances, or to make good their provisions,

But the father can contract debt, in the event of his death, 5. *Dec. 1734, Fotheringham.* Nevertheless, as their right is only a right of succession, which is not designed to restrain the father from granting onerous or

Unless he expressly restrain himself. rational deeds, he continues to have the full power of selling the subject, or charging it with debts, unless a proper right of credit be given to the heir by the marriage-contract, *e. g.* if the father should oblige himself to infect the heir in the lands, or make payment of the sum provided, against a day certain, or when the child attains a certain age, *K. 45, 51.*; or if the father should be restrained from the contracting of debt; for such rights, when perfected by infectment, or secured by diligence, are effectual against all the posterior deeds of the father, even onerous; see *P. Falc. 30.* Nothing but the hope of a right is created to such of the substitutes in a marriage-contract, as are called after the issue of the marriage: For the parties

parties contracting (the husband and wife) are interested no farther, than to provide their issue of that marriage: As to the other substitutes, it is a simple destination, alterable at pleasure.

18. Tho' all provisions to children, by a marriage-contract conceived in the ordinary form, being merely rights of succession, are postponed to every onerous debt of the granter, even to those contracted posterior to the provisions; yet where a father executes a bond of provision to a child actually existing, whether such child be the heir of a marriage or not, a proper debt is thereby created, which, tho' it be without doubt gratuitous, is not only effectual against the father himself and his heirs, but is not reducible at the instance, even of his prior onerous creditors, if he was solvent at the time of granting it, 4. 1. 13. A father may, notwithstanding a first marriage-contract, settle a jointure on a second wife, or provide the children of a second marriage, for such settlements are deemed onerous; but where they are exorbitant, they will be restricted to what is rational: And in all such settlements, where the provisions of the first marriage-contract are incroached upon, the heirs of that marriage have recourse against the father, in case he should afterwards acquire a separate estate, which may enable him to fulfil both obligations, 27. Jan. 1730, *Henderson*.

Effect of provisions to children existing.

The father's powers in a second marriage-contract.

19. In marriage-contracts, the conquest, or a certain part thereof, is frequently provided to the issue; by which is understood, whatever real addition shall be made to the father's estate during the marriage, by purchase or donation.

Provision of conquest in a marriage contract.

Provision
taken to
heirs.

Provision
to bairns.

Different
accepta-
tions of
the word
heir.

nation. Conquest therefore must be free, *i. e.* the debts must be deducted in the computation. What the husband succeeds to during the marriage, as heir to an ancestor, is not conquest. As in other provisions, so in conquest, the father is still *fiar*, and may therefore dispose of it, for onerous or rational causes. Where heritable rights are provided to the *heirs* of a marriage, they fall to the eldest son, for he is the heir at law in heritage. Where a sum of money is so provided, the word *heir* is applied to the subject of the provision, and so marks out the executor who is the heir in moveables, *K. 95*. Where an heritable right is provided to the *bairns* (or issue) of a marriage, it is divided equally among the children, if no division be made by the father; for such destination cuts off the exclusive right of the legal heir, 29. *Jan. 1678, Stewart*. No provision granted to bairns, gives a special right of credit to any one child, as long as the father lives: The right is granted *familiae*, so that the whole must indeed go to one or other of them, but the father has a power inherent in him, to divide it among them, in such proportions as he thinks best; yet so as none of them may be intirely excluded, 16. *Dec. 1738, Campbell*; except in extraordinary cases, an instance of which, in a provision, even to the heir of a marriage, may be seen in *K. 50*.

20. Tho' by the general term of *heir*, is understood, in the common case, the heir whom the law points out, yet where there has been an antecedent destination of a subject, limiting the succession to a certain order of heirs, the general word *heir*, in all the posterior settlements, either

ther of that subject, or of any other intimately connected with it, signifies *in dubio*, not the legal heir, but the heir of the investiture. Thus, if one, who has taken a right of lands to his heir-male, should thereafter acquire a right of reversion of these lands, to his heirs indefinitely; such reversion would go, not to the heir at law, but to the heir-male. Upon the same principle, if a superior of lands should afterwards acquire the property; or a proprietor any real right affecting them, such posterior acquisitions would not descend to the heir of conquest, tho' they were purchased by the ancestor, but to that heir to whom the first rights were provided, 8.

Jan. 1740, D. Hamilton.

21. As by the *Roman* law, no man could name an heir, to his own heir who was past pupillarity, their substitutions were really no more than conditional institutions, which meant only, that if the institute either could not, or was not willing to take the succession, the substitute might; but, where the succession was actually taken up by the institute, it devolved, after his death, on his own heir, and not on the substitute. With us, clauses of substitution, when inserted in tailzies, have been always understood to give the substitute a right, at what time soever the institute died, *quandocunque defecerit*, altho' he had taken the succession before his death: And substitutions in testaments, 13. July 1681, *Chrystie*, marriage-contracts and bonds, *Harc.* 370.—17. Nov. 1747, *Anderson*,---26. June 1634, *Keith*, are also governed by the same rule; unless it be presumeable, from special circumstances, that no more is intended by the parties, than a conditional institution,

Substitution,

What by the *Roman* law?

What by ours?

A a a

tution,

tution, *Harc.* 390, — *F.* 23. *Feb.* 1697, *Dickson*; yet see *Dirlet. Doubts, voce, Substitution in Legacies*. A simple substitution gives the simple, substitute no more than the hope of Succession, *supr.* §. 9.; but, where a prohibition is Or guard- ed with a prohibition. adjoined, that no deed shall be done to hurt it, the institute cannot dispose of the subject, unless for onerous, or at least rational causes, 8. *July* 1673, *Graham*. A prohibition is implied in the substitution of children mutually to one another, *New Coli.* 34.

Provision of return. 22. A clause of return is that, by which a sum in a bond or other right, is, in a certain event, limited to return to the granter himself, or his heirs. When a right is granted for one- Its effects. rous causes, *e. g.* a bond for borrowed money, the creditor may defeat the clause of return, even gratuitously; because such clause is presumed to proceed merely from his own good-will, and so is of the nature of a simple destination, 28. *Jan.* 1737, *Robertson*: But, where the sum in the right flows from the granter, as in bonds of provision, donations, &c. or where there is any other reasonable cause for the provision of return in his favour, the receiver cannot dis- appoint it gratuitously, 31. *Jan.* 1679, *Drummond*. Yet since he is fiar, the sum may be either assigned by him for an onerous cause, or affected by his creditors; nay, he may sue for payment, without giving security that the return shall be made effectual, since his faith was trusted at granting the right; unless he be *vergens ad inopiam*, 10. *June* 1747, *Beatson*.

All heirs represent the deceased universally, 23. An heir is, in the judgment of law, *eadem persona cum defuncto*, and so represents the deceased universally, not only in his rights, but in

in his debts: In the first view, he is said to be heir *actiue*; in the second, *passiue*. From this general rule are excepted, heirs substituted in a special bond, 3. July 1666, *Fleming*; and even substitutes in a disposition *omnium bonorum*, to take effect at the granter's death, 5. June 1745, *Mercer*; for such substitutes are considered as singular successors, and their right as an universal legacy, which does not subject the legatee *ultra valorem*. But heirs male, or of tailzie, tho' their right be limited to special subjects, are nevertheless liable, not merely to the extent of the subject entailed or provided, but *in solidum*; because such rights are designed to carry an universal character, and so infer an universal representation of the granter.

24. The heir of line is primarily liable for the debts of his ancestor; for he is the most proper heir, and so must be discussed by creditors, before any other can be sued. Next to him, the heir of conquest; because he also succeeds to the *universitas* of the whole heritable rights, which his ancestor had acquired by singular titles. Then, the heir male, or of a marriage; for their propinquity of blood subjects them more directly, than any other heir of tailzie who may possibly be a stranger, and who for that reason, is not liable till all the rest be discussed, except for such of the ancestor's debts or deeds, as relate specially to the lands tailzied; as to which he is liable, even before the heir of line, *St. 3. 5. 17*. Heirs portioners are liable, *pro rata*, for their ancestor's debts; but, if any of them prove insolvent, the creditor may, after discussing her, insist for her share against the rest, *Dirl. 10.*; who will be liable,

Except heirs substituted in a bond, or heirs of provision.

The order in which heirs are liable.

Relief a-
mong
heirs.

liable, not indeed *in solidum*, but to the extent of the benefit accruing to them by the succession, *F. 21. June 1698, White*. Where an heir, liable *subsidiariè*, pays the ancestor's debt, action of relief is competent to him, against that heir who is more directly liable; in respect of whom he is not co-heir, but creditor, 3. 4. 10.

Apparent
heirs their
privileges.

25. Before an heir can have an active title to his ancestor's rights, he must be entered by service and retour. He who is intitled to enter heir, is before his actual entry, called apparent heir. The bare right of apparenacy carries certain privileges with it. An apparent heir may defend his ancestor's titles, against any third party who brings them under challenge, 19. *Jan. 1627, L. Roslin*. Tenants may safely pay him their rents; and after they have once acknowledged him by payment, he may compel them to continue it, *Gilm. 94*. The older decisions considered the rents not levied by an apparent heir who was entered into possession, as his property; in so much, that they might not only be affected, during his life, by the diligence of creditors, but even confirmed, after his death, by his executors. But in truth, tho' apparenacy be a title of possession, the rents which the heir did not really receive, and to which he had made up no right by entry before his death, must, from the necessity of law, be *in hereditate jacente* of the person last infeft, *Harc. 71*.

*Jus delibe-
randi,*

26. As an heir is, by his entry, subjected universally to his ancestor's debts, apparent heirs have therefore a year (*annus deliberandi*) allowed to them from the ancestor's decease, to deliberate whether they will enter or not, *tit.*

tit. C. de jure delib.; till the expiring of which, tho' they may be charged by creditors to enter, they cannot be sued in any process founded upon such charge. Tho' declaratory actions, and others which contain no personal conclusion, may be pursued against the apparent heir, without a previous charge; action does not lie even upon these, within the year, if the heir cannot make the proper defences without incurring a passive title, 26. *June 1667, Deuar*; But judicial sales, commenced against an ancestor, may be continued upon a citation of the heir, without waiting the year of deliberating, by a special act of sederunt, 23. *Nov. 1711, §. 5.* This *annus deliberandi* is computed, in the case of a posthumous heir, from the birth of such heir. An apparent heir, who, by immixing with the estate of his ancestor, is as much subjected to his debts as if he had entered, can have no longer a right to deliberate, whether he will enter or not, *Dirl. 450.*

Protects
the heir
from suits
for a year.

An appa-
rent heir
immixing,
loses his
*jus deli-
berandi.*

27. The apparent heir may, even after this year is expired, sue havers, *i. e.* custodians or possessors, for exhibition of all writings pertaining to his ancestor, and also of all deeds granted by him, whether to those of his own family, or to strangers, *Br. 112.*; that he may thereby be enabled to balance his ancestor's estate with his debts. An apparent heir, who has renounced the succession, cannot sue for exhibition, against that creditor at whose suit he was charged to enter heir; because his renunciation upon the charge imports an approbation of the charger's right, *Jan. 1721, Richardson*; But such renunciation does not exclude exhibition against any other creditor; its effect being

An appa-
rent heir
may pur-
sue exhibi-
tion even
after the
year.

restricted

restricted to the special debt, which was the ground of the charge, 8. *Jan.* 1675, *Waird*. For other privileges of apparency, see 2. 9. 33.—2. 12. 27.

Service of
heirs,

Proceeds
on a brief,

Which is
retour-
able.

28. All services proceed on brieves from the chancery, which are called brieves of inquest, and have been long known in *Scotland*, *St. R.* III. c. 1. The judge, to whom the brief is directed, is required to try the matter by an inquest of fifteen sworn men; which inquest cannot sit, till fifteen days after the brief has been proclaimed, 1503, c. 94. at the market-cross of the head borough, described §. 29. And this proclamation to all and sundry, supercedes the necessity of citing any particular person, as party to the service. The inquest, if they find the claim verified, must declare the claimant heir to the deceased, by a verdict or service which the judge must attest. The brief of inquest was from the beginning retourable, *i. e.* it behoved the judge to return the brief with the service proceeding on it, to the chancery, *arg. St. R.* III. c. 1. §. 3.; but it would appear that from that period to the year 1550, the obtainer of the brief got the service delivered to him, either by the judge or by the chancery; for many of our oldest families have at this day in their keeping, the authentic services of their ancestors, with the seals of the inquest appended to them: And hence, a principal service dated before 1550, was sustained, tho' there had been no evidence of its having been retoured to the chancery, 17. *Feb.* 1624, Lord *Elphinston*. But, from that time, no service has been deemed compleat, till it be retoured, *F.* 2. *Feb.* 1698, *Macintosh*; after which, the heir

heir served may, on his application, get an extract thereof from the chancery; but the service is compleat, tho' such extract should not be demanded. The brief of mortancestry (*de morte antecessoris*) was the ground of a proper action, and related to the particular case, where the heir was excluded from the possession of the lands, by the superior or other person pretending right to them, whom therefore it was necessary to call as a party to the suit, *R. M. l. 3. c. 28. et seqq.—2. Att. c. 52.*

Brief of
mortance-
stry.

29. The service of heirs is either general, or special. A general service vests the heir in the right of all heritable subjects, which either do not require seisin, as reversions, bonds secluding executors, heirship-moveables, &c. or which have not been perfected by seisin in the person of the ancestor, as dispositions, heritable bonds, &c.; but it can carry no right cloathed with infestment, not even the personal obligation, contained in a right of annualrent on which seisin had followed, *Jan. 1729, Lord Halkerton*. The brief on which a general service proceeds, may be directed to any judge-ordinary, *6. March 1630, L. Caskeyben*, and must be proclaimed in the jurisdiction where it is to be served. A special service, followed by seisin, vests the heir in the right of the special subjects, in which the ancestor died infest; and the brief must be directed, either to the Sheriff of the county, or Bailie of the borough, where the subjects lie; or, by special warrant of the court of Session, to delegates, generally the macers of the Session, to whom the court, in cases of difficulty, join one or two of their own number, as assessors. The proclamation of

General
service.

Special
service,

Some-
times
commit-
ted to de-
legates.

of this brief must, in all cases, be made at the head-borough of the jurisdiction where the lands lie. The style of all brieves, whether a general or a special service be intended, is the same, and contains seven distinct heads, which the inquest is commanded to answer. Where the heir claims to be served in special, all of them must be answered; but in a general service, the inquest answers only the two first.

Heads of
the brief
answered
in a gene-
ral ser-
vice.

30. The two questions to be answered in a general service are, first, Whether the ancestor died at the peace of the Sovereign? This is inquired into, on account of the *fisk*, for, where one dies in rebellion, his whole estate forfeits to the crown; but the affirmative is presumed, unless actual rebellion be proved. Rebellion, in consequence of a denunciation upon letters of horning, is no bar to the service, 21. *Nov. 1626, Seaton.* The second question is, Whether the claimant be the next and lawful heir to the deceased? The legitimacy is presumed; but the propinquity must be proved, either by witnesses, or if it be remote, by proper evidence in writing. The particular degrees, by which it is connected, ought to be specially set forth in the claim and service, 22. *July 1629, E. Cassils.* That degree which is proved, is presumed to be the nearest, unless the proof of a nearer be instantly offered; and the remotest degree excludes the crown's right, as *ultimus heres*.

Heads in
a special
service.

31. In a special service, the claimant must prove, upon the first head above mentioned, the precise time of the ancestor's death, that it may be known, how long the lands have been in non-entry; and that the deceased stood inest,

at

at his death, in the lands contained in the claim, which is instructed by his seisin. The following five heads are also inquired into, in a special service. 1. Of what superior the lands are held *in capite*, or immediately. 2. By what manner of holding. 3. What their extent is, both old and new. This last serves to fix the rate of the superior's casualties, which is governed by the new extent; and perhaps was also intended to ascertain the heir's proportion of public subsidies, which, till 1649, was regulated by the old extent, 2. 5. 16. As the non-entry, due out of the lands formerly holden ward of the crown, is now proportioned by the valued rent, the late act for abolishing ward-holdings provides, that the valuation shall also be inserted in the retours of such lands. 4. Whether the claimant be of lawful age. This head was formerly necessary in ward-holdings, in which the superior was not bound to enter the heir, while he was minor; but now, that ward-holdings are abolished, the question must be always answered in the affirmative. The last head, in whose hands the fee has been since the ancestor's death, serves to shew whether non-entry be due; for if the lands have been possessed by a tencer or liferenter, it is excluded, 2. 5. 20.

32. If an heir, doubtful whether the estate of his ancestor be sufficient for clearing his debts, shall, at any time within the *annus deliberandi*, exhibite upon oath, a full inventory of all his ancestor's heritable subjects, to the clerk of the shire where the lands lie; or, if there is no heritage requiring seisin, to the clerk of the shire where he died; and if, after the same is

Entry of
an heir by
inventory.

subscribed by the Sheriff or Sheriff-depute, the clerk and himself, it shall be registred in the register appointed for that purpose, his subsequent entry will subject him no farther, than to the value of such inventory, 1695, c. 24.; borrowed from l. 22. §. 2. 3. 4. *C. de jure delib.* If the inventory be given up and registred within the time prescribed, the heir may serve on it, even after the year, *F. 11. Feb. 1708, Mackay.*

Creditors need not rest on an estimation of the inventory by witnesses. 33. There is good ground to conclude, both from the rubric and tenor of this statute, that it was designed, not to deprive creditors of the right of making the most of their deceased debtor's estate, but merely to save the heir from an universal representation. Creditors therefore are not obliged to acquiesce in any presumed value, that may arise from the estimation of witnesses; but, if they be real creditors, 1681, c. 17. may bring the estate to a public sale, in order to discover its true value; since an estate is always worth what can be got for it, 12. *July 1738, heirs of L. Glenkindy.* An heir by inventory, as he is, in effect, a trustee for the creditors, must account for that value, to which the estate may have been improved since the death of the ancestor, 6. *July 1727, Aikenhead;* and he must communicate to all the creditors, the cases he has got in transacting with any one of them, *Dec. 1725, Aikenhead.* He may, upon a sale, pay the price to the creditors who first apply, *June 1733, Veitch;* but a general decree obtained by one creditor, finding the heir liable to the extent of the inventory, gives him no preference over the others, while the subject is *in medio*, 28. *Nov. 1738, cred. of Crichen.*

An heir by inventory is a trustee for the creditors.

34. Practice

34. Practice has introduced an anomalous Entry upon a precept of *clare constat*. sort of entry, without the interposition of an inquest, by the sole consent of the superior, who, if he be satisfied that the person applying to him is the next heir, grants him a precept (called of *clare constat*, from the first words of its recital), commanding his baily to infeft him in the subjects that belonged to his ancestor. These precepts are, no doubt, effectual against the superior, who grants them and his heirs; and they may, when followed by seisin, afford a title of prescription: But as no person can be declared an heir by private authority, they cannot bar the true heir from entering after twenty years, as a legal entry would have done. Of the same nature, is the entry by hasp and staple, commonly used in burgage tenements of houses, by which the baily, without calling an inquest, cognosces or declares a person heir, upon evidence brought before himself; and, at the same time, infefts him in the subject, by the symbol of the hasp and staple of the door. How far charges given by creditors to apparent heirs to enter, stand in the place of an actual entry, so as to support the creditor's diligence, has been explained, 2. 12. 5.

35. A service, proceeding on a claim as next and lawful heir, carries all the subjects descendible to an heir at law, that have not been limited by any entail; but it carries no right provided to a certain order of heirs, even tho' the claimant should, by the failure of the prior members of tailzie, happen to be also heir of provision; for he ought to have claimed as heir of provision; and the service must be restricted to the claim laid before the inquest, and the evidence

Entry by
hasp and
staple.

The service must describe the special character of the claimant.

dence brought in support of it, 21. July 1738, *Edgar*: In all succession therefore by special provision, the service must describe the heir by the particular character under which he claims.

A special service includes a general one of the same kind.

A general service cannot include a special one, since it has no relation to any special subject, and carries only that class of rights on which seisin has not proceeded; but a special service implies a general one of the same kind or character, and consequently, carries even such rights as have not been perfected by seisin; for, if the verdict's returning an answer *affirmative*, to the two first heads of the brief, vests those rights in the heir, their answering them jointly with the other five heads of the brief, must have the same effect.

In what cases service is not required

36. Service is not required to establish the heir's right in titles of honour, or offices of the highest dignity; for these descend *jure sanguinis*. As the bare right of apparenacy intitles an heir, to continue his ancestor's possession, *supr.* §. 25.; an heir may, even without a service, not only levy the rents of a land-estate, but enjoy a tack, or any other temporary right belonging to his ancestor: But, as the property of these subjects is not, by this privilege, vested in the apparent heir, it may be doubted whether he can assign such tack to another, more than he can convey his ancestor's land-estate; for it is the proprietor alone, who has a right to assign. One who is *nominatim* substituted in a bond, immediately after the creditor, needs no service for proving that the creditor is dead; but where a bond is taken to one and the heirs of his body, whom failing to a substitute, a service must be obtained by the substitute,

substitute, for proving that the heirs called before him have failed, *St. 3. 5. 6.* No right cloathed with infeftment can, in any case, be transmitted to substitutes without service.

37. A special service does not carry, out of the *hereditas jacens* of the deceased, the special subjects in which he died infeft, until the heir compleat it by seisin. Where the lands hold of the crown, the chancery issues precepts for infefting the heir, which must be directed to the Sheriff of the shire. In lands holden of a subject, the heir may, in place of the former tedious method of running precepts against the superior, *Hope Min. Pr. 55.*, obtain a warrant from the Session, for letters of horning to charge the superior to receive him, *20. Geo. II. c. 50.* Where the superior is not himself entered, such charge would be inept; in that case therefore, the heir must, in terms of *1474, c. 58.* charge the superior to obtain himself entered, within forty days, in the superiority, that so he may be in a capacity of entering his vassal, under the penalty of losing his right for life. If the superior refuse to obey either of these charges, the next superior, as coming in his place (*supplendo vices*), may be compelled at the suit of the heir to infeft him; and thus, the heir may proceed against all the intermediate superiors between him and the Sovereign, against whom a charge is both improper and unnecessary; for the crown refuses none; see *Dallas's Styles, p. 234.* The superior, thus entring his subvassal's heir, loses none of the casualties falling by his immediate vassal; seeing what he does is merely an act in obedience.

Service must be compleated by seisin.

What if the superior shall refuse to enter the heir.

Passive
titles in
heritage.

*Gestio pro
herede,*

From
what facts
inferred,

How ex-
cluded.

38. An heir, by immixing with his ancestor's estate without entry, subjects himself to his debts, as if he had entered; or, in our law phrase, incurs a passive title. The only passive title, by which an apparent heir becomes liable universally for all his ancestor's debts, is *gestio pro herede*, or his behaving himself, so as none but an heir has right to do, *l. 20. pr. de adq. vel omit. her.* Behaviour as heir is inferred, from the apparent heir's intromission after the death of the ancestor, either by himself, his tenants or factors, with any part of the lands or other heritable subjects belonging to the deceased, to which he himself might have compleated an active title by entry; even with heirship-moveables, which, in the doctrine of succession, are considered as heritage; or with the title deeds or other writings of the deceased. It is inferred without actual intromission, by the heir's conveying to a third party, or even granting discharges of rents or other subjects to which he might have succeeded as heir, see 10. Feb. 1642, *Johnston*: But his bare renunciation of the succession, in favour of another, does not infer it; because nothing is thereby transmitted to the receiver, hurtful to creditors, 5. July 1666, *Scot.*

39. This passive title is excluded, if the heir's intromission be by order of law, *e. g.* intromission with heirship-moveables in consequence of confirmation; or if it be founded on singular titles, and not as heir to the deceased; *e. g.* if he has intermeddled with the heirship, as donatary from the crown to the single escheat of the deceased, or if he has levied the rents of his ancestor's estate, in virtue of

of an adjudication against it, to which he himself had acquired a right. This last defence was always sustained, tho' the adjudication had proceeded on a bond granted by the heir himself; till the Lords declared, by *Act S. 28. Feb. 1662*, that intromission by the heir, in virtue of an adjudication founded on his own bond, should infer a passive title. And it is now enacted, by 1695, c. 24. that an apparent heir's purchasing any right to his ancestor's estate, otherwise than at a public roup (auction), or his possessing it in virtue of rights settled in the person of any such near relation of the ancestor, to whom he himself may succeed as heir, otherwise than upon purchase by public sale, shall be deemed behaviour as heir.

A special
fort intro-
duced by
statute.

40. Behaviour as heir is also excluded, where the intromission is small, unless an intention to defraud the ancestor's creditors, be presumable from the circumstances attending it, 6. *Nov. 1622, L. Dundas*. Neither is behaviour inferred against the apparent heir, from the payment of his ancestor's debt, which is a voluntary act, and profitable to the creditors; nor by his taking out of brieves to serve, for one may alter his purpose, while it is not compleated; nor by his assuming the titles of honour belonging to his ancestor, or exercising an honorary office hereditary in the family, for these are rights annexed to the blood, which may be used without proper representation, *Harc. 31*: But the exercising an heritable office of profit, which may pass by voluntary conveyance, and consequently, is adjudgeable, 2. 12. 3, may reasonably be thought to infer a passive title. Lastly, as passive titles have been introduced

In what
other cases
is behavi-
our ex-
cluded.

duced, merely for the security of creditors, therefore, where questions concerning behaviour arise among the different orders of heirs, they are liable to one another, no farther than *in valorem* of their several intromissions, 20. Nov. 1630, *Pride*.

The passive title
of *prae-
ceptio he-
reditatis*.

41. Another passive title in heritage, may be incurred by the apparent heir's accepting a gratuitous right from the ancestor, to any part of that estate to which he himself might have succeeded as heir; and it is called *praeceptio hereditatis*, because it is a taking of the succession by the heir, before it opens to him by the death of his ancestor. If the right be onerous, there is no passive title; but its onerosity must be proved, otherwise than by the assertion of the granter in the recital: If the consideration paid for it does not amount to its full value, the creditors of the deceased may reduce it in so far as it is gratuitous, upon the statute 1621; but still it infers no passive title. Tho' the right accepted of, be granted to fulfil a marriage-contract, it is not, for that reason, to be deemed onerous; for the heir of a marriage has only a right of succession, subject to the payment of the father's debts, 22. Feb. 1681, *More*.

42. The heir incurring this passive title is no farther liable, than if he had, at the time of his acceptance, entered heir to the granter, and so subjected himself to the debts that were then chargeable against him; but with the posterior debts, he has nothing to do, not even with those contracted between the date of the right, and the infestment taken upon it, Feb. 1721, *L. Aldy*; and he is therefore called
Successor

successor titulo lucrativo post contractum debitum. Not only immediate, but mediate apparent heirs, may be subjected to preception. Thus, an eldest son of an eldest son incurs it, by accepting an heritable right from his grandfather; because the acceptor is, by the necessary course of law, *alioqui successurus* to the granter, tho' not immediately: But a right granted by one brother to another, or by a father to his daughter does not infer it, tho' the succession should at last open to the grantee; because the granter might have afterwards had issue, which would succeed preferable to the grantee.

43. Neither of these passive titles takes place, unless the subject intermeddled with or disposed, be such as the intrometter or receiver would succeed to, as heir: Hence, an heir of provision, immixing with heirship-moveables, or an heir of line intermeddling with, or accepting a right to subjects provided to special heirs, incurs no passive title. In this also, these two passive titles agree, that the intromission in both, must be after the death of the ancestor; for there can be no *termini habiles* of a passive title, while the ancestor is alive. But, in the following respects they differ. 1. *Gestio pro herede*, being a vitious passive title founded upon a quasi-delict, *viz.* intromission without the order of law, cannot be brought against the delinquent's heir, if process has not been litiscontested, while the delinquent himself was alive, 4. 1. 40.; whereas the *successor titulo lucrativo* is, by the acceptance of the disposition, understood to have entered into a tacit contract with the granter's creditors, by which he undertakes the burden of their debts; and all actions

In what
these two
passive ti-
tles agree.

In what
they differ.

founded on contract are transmissible against heirs. 2. The right accepted by the *successor titulo lucrativo*, gives him an active title, whereby process of relief is competent to him against the executors of the ancestor, for such of the moveable debts as he has paid; whereas he, who behaves as heir, not being heir *actif*, has no title to sue for relief, either against the executors, or any other heir who may be liable before him, unless he has taken care to get an assignation from the creditor upon payment: But this does not bar him from the benefit of discussion, which is an exception or defence, and so requires no active title.

Proposing
defences a-
gainst the
ancestor's
debt,

And not
renoun-
cing upon
a charge
to enter,
are pas-
sive titles.

44. An apparent heir, who is cited by the ancestor's creditor in a process for payment, if he offers any peremptory defence against the debt, incurs a passive title; for he can have no interest to object against it, but in the character of heir, 11. *Feb. 1713, Lundy*. In the same manner, the heir's not renouncing upon a charge to enter heir, infers it: But the effect of both these, is limited to the special debt pursued for, or charged upon; for the deeds from which such representation is inferred, being private, can operate only in favour of the special creditor at whose suit the process or charge is raised. This passive title, which is inferred from the heir's not renouncing, has no effect till decree pass against him; and even a renunciation offered after decree, if the decree be in absence, will intitle the heir, to a suspension of all diligence against his person and estate, competent upon his ancestor's debts.

45. By the principles of the feudal law, an heir, when he is to compleat his titles by special

cial service, must necessarily pass over his immediate ancestor, *e. g.* his father; if he was not infest; and serve heir to that ancestor who was last vest and seised in the right, and in whose *hereditas jacens* the right must remain, till a title be connected thereto from him. As this bore hard upon creditors, who might think themselves secure, in contracting with a person whom they saw for some time in the possession of an estate, and from thence conclude that he was legally vested in it, it is therefore provided, by 1695, *c.* 24. that every person, passing over his immediate ancestor who had been three years in possession, and serving heir, or succeeding by adjudication on his own bond to one more remote, shall be liable for the debts and deeds of the person interjected, to the value of the estate to which he is served. This statute, being correctory of the feudal maxims, has been strictly interpreted, so as not to extend to the gratuitous deeds of the person interjected, *K.* 74.; nor to the case, where the interjected person was a naked fiar, and possessed only civilly, through the liferenter, 25. *June* 1745, *Bogle*. If an heir, in place of completing his titles, by adjudging upon his own bond, or by entering to his remoter predecessor, which are the only cases expressly guarded against by the statute, shall possess the lands in the bare right of apparency, it has been found, once and again, that the penalty of the act does not reach him, 8. *Jan.* 1736, *Lady Rattar*,—*New Coll.* 121. No. 1.; but this point is still called in question, perhaps not without some reason; for, if such a device, which is in the power of every heir, shall effectually secure against a passive

And entering to a more remote predecessor.

five title, the intention of the statute may be utterly defeated.

Reduction
by the
heir, *ex*
capite lecti.

46. Our law, from its jealousy of the weakness of mankind, while under sickness, and of the importunity of friends in that conjuncture, has declared that all deeds affecting heritage, if they be granted by a person on death-bed, (*i. e.* after contracting that sickness which ends in death) to the damage of the heir, are ineffectual, *R. M. l. 2. c. 18. §. 7. et seqq.* except where the debts of the granter have laid him under a necessity to alien his lands, *St. Gul. c. 13. §. 2.* As this law of death-bed is founded solely in the privilege of the heir, death-bed deeds, when consented to by the heir, are not reducible, *R. M. l. 2. c. 18. §. 10.* The term properly opposed to death-bed is *liege pou-ssy*, by which is understood a state of health; and it gets that name, because persons in health have the *legittima potestas*, or lawful power, of disposing of their property at pleasure.

What
constitutes
a death-
bed deed.

47. The two extremes being proved, of the granter's sickness immediately before signing, and of his death following it, tho' at the greatest distance of time, did, by our former law, found a presumption that the deed was granted *in lecto*, *St. 3. 4. 28*, which could not have been elided, but by a positive proof of the granter's convalescence; but now the allegation of death-bed is also excluded, by his having lived sixty days after signing the deed, 1696, *c. 4.* The legal evidence of convalescence is the granter's having been, after the date of the deed, at kirk OR market unsupported; for a proof of either will secure the deed from challenge, 28. *June 1671*, cred. of *Balmerino*.

Death-
bed ex-
cluded by
reconva-
lescence:
or by li-
ving 60
days af-
ter the
date.

The

The going to kirk or market must be performed, when people are met together in church for public service, or in the market-place at the time of market, *Act. S. 29. Feb. 1692.* By the older decisions, no other proof of convalescence was receivable, *7. Feb. 1671, Laury,—F. 25. Nov. 1687, Keiry;* but equipollent acts are, by our later practice, sustained, if they are equally pregnant, *F. 22. Feb. 1694, Tilliquhen.*

48. The privilege of setting aside deeds *ex capite lecti*, is competent to all heirs; not to heirs of line only, but of conquest, tailzie or provision; not only to the immediate, but to remoter heirs, as soon as the succession opens to them, tho' the deed in dispute should not appear hurtful to the immediate heir, *K. 33.* But, where it is consented to, or ratified by the immediate heir, it is secured against all challenge, even from the remoter; for such consent has the effect of a *fictio brevis manus*; the dying person is considered as disposing to the heir, and he, to the stranger in whose favour the deed was really granted: Yet the immediate heir cannot, by any antecedent writing, renounce his right of reduction, and thereby give strength to deeds, that may be afterwards granted *in lecta* to his hurt; for no private renunciation can authorise a person to act contrary to a public law; and such renunciation is presumed to be extorted through the fear of exheredation, *4. Dec. 1733, Inglis.* If the heir should not use this privilege of reduction, his creditor may, by adjudication, transfer it to himself, *2. 12. 3,* or he may, without adjudication, reduce the deed, libelling upon his interest

To what
heirs is
this redu-
ction
compe-
tent?

interest as creditor to the heir: But the grant-er's creditors, tho' their case is more favour-able than that of the heir, have no right to this privilege, in regard that the law of death-bed was introduced, not in behalf of the granter himself, but of his heir, *Dalr.* 110. He who is entered by precept of *clare constat*, or by hasp and staple, has an active title as heir; and consequently, may reduce alienations *in lecto*, of the special subjects to which he is entered.

What rights may be thus set aside. 49. The law of death-bed strikes against dis-positions of every subject to which the heir would have succeeded, or from which he would have had any benefit, had it not been so dispo-

Even moveable rights.

ned. Hence, the alienation, even of move-ables, may be set aside, where the heir has an interest; as 1. Of heirship-moveables. 2. Of conquest provided to the heir of a marriage, tho' the subject of it should be moveable, *K.* 32; and 3. An heir may reduce the assigna-tion of a moveable subject, granted by his an-cestor, where the moveable estate of the de-ceased is not sufficient for his moveable debts; that so the moveable estate may be enlarged, and the heritage saved from the diligence of personal creditors, 22. *July* 1707, *Cowie.*

But not deeds granted in conse-quence of a prior obliga-tion.

Death-bed deeds granted in consequence of a full or proper obligation in *liege pousty*, are not subject to reduction; but, where the ante-cedent obligation is merely natural, they are reducible, *K.* 27. By stronger reason, the deceased cannot, by a deed merely voluntary, alter the nature of his estate on death-bed to the prejudice of his heir, so as from heritable to make it moveable; but if he should, in *liege pousty*, exclude his apparent heir, by an irre-vocable deed containing reserved faculties, the heir

heir cannot be heard to quarrel the exercise of these faculties on death-bed; since he loses the character of heir, by the irrevocable deed divesting the disponent, and so has no interest to reduce any posterior deed.

50. The proper method for affecting the heritable estate of a person deceased, either for his own debt or for that of his heir, has been explained, 2. 12. 5. In a competition between the creditors of the deceased and of the heir, the *Roman* law, *l. 1. §. 1. de separ.*; and after their example, ours, 1661, c. 24. has justly preferred the creditors of the deceased, as every man's estate ought to be liable, in the first place, for his own debt. But this preference is, by the statute, limited to the case where the creditors of the deceased have used diligence against their debtor's estate, within three years from his death; and therefore, the heir's creditor's may, after that period, affect it for their own payment. By a subsequent branch of this act, all dispositions by an heir, of the ancestor's estate, within a year after his death, are null, in so far as they are hurtful to the creditors of the ancestor. This takes place, tho' these creditors should have used no diligence, *Falc. vol. 1. 219*; and even where the dispositions are granted after the year, they seem, by the first part of the act, to be ineffectual against the creditors of the deceased, who have used diligence within the three years. This act appears from its whole tenor, to relate only to heritage, 17. *June 1712, Ker*, and so is improperly made by Mr *Forbes*, the ground of a decision concerning moveables, 9. *Feb.*

Competition between the creditors of the deceased and of the heir.

1711,

1711, *Graham*, especially after the act 1695. c. 41.; see *Bankt.* 3. 35. 3.

TIT. 9. Of Succession in Moveables.

Rules of
moveable
succession
by law.

Collation
by the
heir.

IN the succession of moveable rights, it is an universal rule, that the next in degree to the deceased (or next of kin) succeeds to the whole; and if there are two or more equally near, all of them succeed by equal parts; without that prerogative, which takes place in heritage, of the eldest son over the younger, or of males over females. Neither does the right of representation, explained 3. 8. 4. obtain in the succession of moveables, except in the single case of a competition between the full blood and the half blood; for a niece by the full blood, will be preferred before a brother by the half-blood, tho' she is by one degree more remote from the deceased, than her uncle. Where the estate of a person deceased consists, partly of heritage, and partly of moveables, the heir in the heritage, has no share of the moveables, if there are others as near in degree to the deceased as himself: But where the heir, in such case, finds it his interest to renounce his exclusive claim to the heritage, and betake himself to his right as one of the next of kin, he may collate or communicate the heritage with the others, who in their turn, must collate the moveables with him; so that the whole is thrown into one mass, and divided equally, among all of them. This doctrine holds, not only in the line of descendants, but of collaterals, 1743, *Chancellor*; for it was introduced, that the heir might in
no

no case fare worse than the other next of kin.

2. One may settle his moveable estate upon whom he pleases, excluding the legal successor, by a testament; which is a written declaration, of what a person wills to be done with his moveable estate, after his death. No testamentary deed is effectual, till the death of the testator, who may therefore revoke it at pleasure, or make a new one, by which the first loses its force; and hence, testaments are called, last or latter wills. Testaments, in their strict acceptation, must contain a nomination of executors, *i. e.* of persons appointed to administer the succession according to the will of the deceased: Yet nothing hinders one from making a settlement of moveables, in favour of an universal legatee, tho' he should not have appointed executors; and on the other part, a testament, where executors are appointed, is valid, tho' the person, who is to have the right of succession, should not be named. In this last case, if the executor nominated be a stranger, *i. e.* one who has no legal interest in the moveable estate, he is merely a trustee, accountable to the next of kin; but he may retain a third of the dead's part (explained §. 6.), for his trouble in executing the testament; in payment of which, legacies, if any be left to him, must be imputed, 1617, c. 14. The heir, if he be named executor, has right to the third as a stranger; but if one be named, who has an interest in the legal succession, he has no allowance, unless such interest be less than a third. Nuncupative or verbal testaments are not, by the law of *Scotland*, effectual for supporting the nomination of an executor, let the

Succession in moveables by destination. Testament.

Executors.

A stranger named executor, is accountable to the next of kin.

Nuncupative testament.

subject of the succession be ever so small: But verbal legacies, not exceeding *L. 100 Scots*, are sustained; and even where they are granted for more, they are ineffectual, only as to the excess, 7. *July 1629, Wallace*.

Legacy.

3. A legacy is a donation by the deceased, to be paid by the executor to the legatee. It may be granted, either in the testament, or in a separate writing. Legacies are not due till the granter's death, and consequently, they can transmit no right to the executors of the legatee, in the event that the granter survives him.

Not due till the granter's death.

Legatum rei alienae.

By the *Roman* law, if one bequeathed a subject, knowing that it was not his own, the heir must either have purchased it for the legatee, or paid him the value; for otherwise, the legacy could have no effect. Where the testator *rei alienae*, believed the subject to belong to himself, which is *in dubio*, to be presumed, neither the thing, nor its value, could be claimed; because it was not to be supposed, he would have burdened his heir, if he had known that the subject had belonged to another, §. 4. *Inst. de legat.*; and this obtains also with us, in legacies of moveable subjects. As, by the law of *Scotland*, heritage cannot be bequeathed by testament, the testamentary conveyance, or bequest, of an heritable bond due to the testator, infers no obligation on the executor, to pay the value to the legatee, out of the moveables, 26. *Nov. 1674, Paton*; because, whatever the testator's intention might have been, he took an inhabile method of executing it. But, if the heir be named executor, such legacy is effectual, for the heir cannot take the benefit of the whole heritable succession, and at the same time decline

Legacy of an heritable bond.

decline making payment to the legatee of the special heritable bond, bequeathed to him by the deceased, 2. *Dec. 1674, Cranston*,—19. *July 1745, Paterfon*. Where a moveable bond is bequeathed, for which the testator has afterwards taken an heritable security, his altering the nature of the subject, imports a revocation of the legacy, 8. *July 1673, Edmonston*.

4. Legacies, where they are general, *i. e.* General of a certain sum of money indefinitely, give legacy. the legatee no right in any one debt or subject; he can only insist in a personal action against the executor, for payment out of the testator's effects. A special legacy, *i. e.* of Special legacy confers a *jus in re*; a particular debt due to the deceased, or of a particular subject belonging to him, is of the nature of an assignation, by which the property of the special debt or subject vests, upon the testator's death, in the legatee, who can therefore directly sue the debtor or possessor: Yet, as no legacy can be claimed till the debts are paid, the executor must be cited in such process, that it may be known, whether there are free effects, sufficient for answering the legacy. Where there is not enough for payment of all the legacies, each of the And is not general legatees must suffer a proportional subject to abatement: But a special legatee gets his legacy entire, tho' there should be nothing over, from deficiencies. for payment of the rest; and, on the contrary, he has no claim, if the debt or subject bequeathed should perish, whatever the extent of the free executory may be.

5. Minors, after puberty, can test without Who can their curators, wives without their husbands, test? and persons interdicted without their interdictors;

ctors; but bastards cannot test, except in the cases afterwards set forth, 3. 10. 3. As a certain share of the goods, falling under the communion that is consequent on marriage, belongs, upon the husband's decease, to his widow, *jure relictæ*, and a certain share to the children, called the legitime, portion natural, or bairns part of gear; one who has a wife or children, tho' he be the absolute administrator of all these goods during his life, and consequently may alien them by a deed *inter vivos* in *liege pousty*, even gratuitously if no fraudulent intention to disappoint the wife or children shall appear, 1. 6. 7, yet cannot impair their shares gratuitously on death-bed; see *Dirlet. Doubts, voce, Legittima liberorum*; nor can he dispose of his moveables to their prejudice by testament, tho' it should be made in *liege pousty*; since testaments do not operate till the death of the testator, at which period, the division of the goods in communion, have their full effect in favour of the widow and children.

One cannot alien in *lecto*, or test in prejudice of the relict or legitime.

Division of a testament, in case of a widow or children.

6. If a person deceased leaves a widow, but no child, his testament, or, in other words, the goods in communion, divide in two; one half goes to the widow, the other is the dead's part, *i. e.* the absolute property of the deceased, on which he can test, and which falls to his next of kin, if he dies intestate. Where he leaves children, one or more, but no widow, the children get one half as their legitime; the other half is the dead's part, which falls also to the children, if the father has not tested upon it. If he leaves both widow and children, the division is tripartite; the wife takes one third by herself, another falls, as legitime, to the children equally

equally among them, or even to an only child, tho' he should succeed to the heritage, 12. *Jan.* 1681, *Trotter*; the remaining third is the dead's part. Where the wife predeceases without children, one half is retained by the husband, the other falls to her next of kin: Where she leaves children, the division ought also to be bipartite, by the common rules of society, since no legitime is truly due on a mother's death; yet it is in practice tripartite; two thirds remain with the surviving father, as if one third were due to him *proprio nomine*, and another as administrator of the legitime for his children; the remaining third, being the wife's share, goes to her children, whether of that or any former marriage, for they are all equally her next of kin.

In case of the wife's predecease.

7. Before a testament can be divided, the debts owing by the deceased are to be deducted; for all executory must be free. As the husband has the full power of burdening the goods in communion, his debts affect the whole, and so lessen the legitime and the share of the relict, as well as the dead's part. His funeral charges, and the mournings and alimony due to the widow, are considered as his proper debts, 20.

What debts affect the whole executory,

June 1713, *Moncrieff*; but the legacies, or other gratuitous rights, granted by him on death-bed, affect only the dead's part. Bonds bearing interest, due by the deceased, cannot diminish the relict's share, because such bonds, when due to the deceased, do not increase it, 1661, c. 32. The funeral charges of the wife predeceasing, fall wholly on her executors who have right to her share. Where the deceased leaves no family, neither husband, wife nor child,

And what affect only the dead's part.

child, the testament suffers no division, but all is the dead's part.

What children are intitled to the legitime.

8. The whole issue of the husband, not only by that marriage which was dissolved by his death, but by any former marriage, has an equal interest in the legitime; otherwise, the children of the first marriage would be cut out, as they could not claim the legitime during their father's life. But no legitime is due, 1. Upon the death of a mother. 2. Neither is it due to grandchildren, upon the death of a grandfather; perhaps, because the immediate father is presumed to have renounced that right before his death, upon receiving his just share of the effects of the deceased. Nor 3. To children foris-familiated, *i. e.* to such as, by having renounced the legitime, are no longer considered as *in familia*, and so are excluded from any farther share of the moveable estate, than they have already received.

Renunciation of the legitime, how inferred.

9. As the right of legitime is strongly founded in nature, the renunciation of it is not to be inferred by implication; neither by the child's carrying on an employment by himself, nor by his marriage, nor even by his accepting a provision from his father, unless it specially bear to be in satisfaction of the legitime.

Its effects.

Renunciation by a child, of his claim of legitime, has the same effect as his death, in favour of the other children intitled thereto, and consequently the share of the renouncer divides among the rest; but he does not thereby lose his right to the dead's part, if he does not also renounce his share in the father's executory; see 21. *July 1738, Campbells*. Nay, his renunciation of the legitime, where he is the only younger

younger child, has the effect to convert the whole subject thereof into dead's part, which will therefore fall to the renouncer himself as next of kin, if the heir be not willing to collate the heritage with him, *Falc. vol. 2. 62.*

10. For preserving an equality among all the children, who continue intitled to the legitime, we have adopted the *Roman* doctrine of *collatio bonorum*; whereby the child, who has got a provision from his father, is obliged to collate it with the others, and impute it towards his own share of the legitime; but if, from the deed of provision, the father shall appear to have intended it as a *praecipuum* to the child, collation is excluded. This intention was presumed, from a clause, that the child was to continue a bairn in the house, 18. *Nov. 1737, Beg.* A child is not bound to collate an heritable subject provided to him, because the legitime is not impaired by such provision, 14. *Feb. 1677, D. Buccleugh* As this collation takes place, only in questions among children who are intitled to the legitime, the relict is not bound to collate donations given her by her husband, in order to increase the legitime; and, on the other part, the children are not obliged to collate their provisions, in order to increase her share.

Collation among the younger children.

In what cases excluded.

11. As an heir in heritage must compleat his titles by entry, so an executor is not vested in the right of the moveable estate of the deceased, without confirmation; which, therefore, is called, by some lawyers, tho' improperly, the *aditio hereditatis in mobilibus*. Confirmation is a sentence of the Commissary or Bishop's court, empowering an executor, one or more, upon

Confirmation.

Quot of
testa-
ments.

upon making inventory of the moveables pertaining to the deceased, to recover, possess, and administer them, either in behalf of themselves, or of others interested therein. The Bishop was, in all confirmations, intitled to the twentieth part of the moveables, called the quot of the testament, which was anciently computed, without deduction of debts. Quots were first prohibited during the usurpation, by 1641, c. 61. which act was revived by 1661, c. 28.: They were soon thereafter restored, 1669, c. 19. with this restriction, that they should be paid out of the free gear, *deductis debitis*; and now they are again prohibited, 1701, c. 14. without prejudice to the dues of court payable at confirmation. Testaments must be confirmed in the commissariot, where the deceased had his principal dwelling-house at his death, 7. Feb. 1672, Commiss. of *Edinburgh*,—*New Coll.* 57. If he had no fixed residence, or died in a foreign country, the confirmation must be at *Edinburgh*, as the *commune forum*; but if he went abroad with an intention to return, the commissariot within which he resided, before he left *Scotland*, is the only proper court, 1426, c. 89.

Before
what com-
missariot
must the
testament
be con-
firmed?

Form of
confirma-
tion.

12. Confirmation proceeds upon an edict, which is affixed on the door of the parish-church where the deceased dwelt, and serves to intimate to all concerned, the day of confirmation, which must be nine days at least, after publishing the edict. In a competition for the office of executor, the Commissary prefers, *primo loco*, the person named to it by the deceased himself, whose nomination he ratifies or confirms, without any previous decerni-

Confir-
mation of
a testa-
ment te-
stamen-
tary.

ture ;

ture ; this is called the confirmation of a testamentary. In default of an executor named by the deceased, universal disponees are by the present practice preferred, *New Coll.* 125.; after them, the next of kin, then the relict, then creditors, and lastly, special legatees. All these must be decerned executors, by a sentence called a decree dative ; and, if afterwards they incline to confirm, the Commissary authorises them to administer, upon their making inventory, and giving security to make the subject thereof forthcoming, to all having interest ; which is called the confirmation of a testament dative.

Of a testament dative

13. Executors were, by our ancient practice, obliged to confirm the whole moveable estate of the deceased, and for that end it behooved them to give up the inventory on oath, *Cr.* 348. §. 2.—*Hope Min. Pr.* p. 25. and, if any new subject came afterwards to their knowledge, they were allowed to add it to the principal testament ; but now the Commissaries must admit whatever inventories are offered, *New Coll.* 88. Where no person applied for the office, the Bishop, that he might be secured of his quot, could, by our former practice, charge all having interest to confirm, upon general letters of horning ; and if there was no appearance, he preferred to the office his own procurator-fiscal, who was thereby intitled to the whole dead's part, till one having an interest claimed the office, who was of course decerned executor surrogate, *i. e.* executor in his room ; but all charges to confirm are now prohibited, except at the suit of the widow, children or others having interest, by 1690. c. 26.

Confirmation must be upon inventory.

General letters, charging to confirm, are now discharged.

The creditor of the deceased may cite the executor, or may himself confirm

14. A creditor, whose debtor's testament is already confirmed, may sue the executor, who holds the office for all concerned, to make payment of his debt. Where there is no confirmation, he himself may apply for the office, and confirm as executor-creditor; which intitles him to sue for, and receive the subject confirmed, for his own payment: And, where one applies for a confirmation, as executor-creditor, every co-creditor may apply to be conjoined with him in the office. As this kind of confirmation is simply a form of diligence, creditors are, by *Act S. 14. Nov. 1679*, exempted from the necessity of confirming more than the amount of their debts.

A creditor in a debt not constituted, may charge the next of kin to confirm.

15. A creditor, whose debt has not been constituted, or his claim not closed by decree, during the life of his debtor, has no title to demand directly the office of executor *qua* creditor; but he may charge the next of kin who stands off, to confirm, who must either renounce within twenty days after the charge, or be liable for the debt; and, if the next of kin renounces, the pursuer may constitute his debt, and obtain a decree *cognitionis causâ*, against the *hereditas jacens* of the moveables, upon which he may confirm, as executor-creditor to the deceased, 1695, c. 41.

A creditor to the next of kin; how he may recover his debt.

Where one is creditor, not to the deceased, but to his next of kin who stands off from confirming, he may, by the same statute, affect the moveables of the deceased, either by requiring the procurator-fiscal to confirm and assign to him, or by obtaining himself decerned executor-dative to the deceased, as if he were creditor to him, and not to his next of kin.

16. Where

16. Where an executor has either omitted to give up any of the effects belonging to the deceased in inventory, or has estimated them below their just value, there is place for a new confirmation, *ad omiffa, vel malè appretiata*, at the suit of any having interest. The estimate put on the executory goods by the deceased himself, however low, must stand good as to the dead's part, over which he has full power. In this confirmation, the executor in the principal testament must be cited, because it has the effect to exclude him from a part of the administration to which his office intitles him; and, if it appears that he has not omitted or undervalued any subject *dolose*, the Commissary, in place of naming a new executor, will ordain the subjects omitted, or the difference between the estimations in the principal testament and the true values, to be added thereto; but, if *dole* shall be presumed, the whole subject of the testament *ad omiffa vel malè appretiata*, will be carried to him who confirms it, to the exclusion of the executor in the principal testament, *F. 16. Feb. 1703, Robertsons.*

Confirmation, *ad omiffa, vel malè appretiata.*

In this sort, the first executor must be cited.

17. Executory, being an office, is not descendible to heirs: Where therefore there is but one executor, the office dies with himself; if there are two, or more, it accrues to the survivors. Where all the executors happened to die, while any part of the testament remained not executed, *i. e.* before they had obtained possession, payment, decree or new security for the debts in their own name, an executor might, by our former practice, have been named *ad non executà*: But now for near a century, confirmations, *ad non executà*, have been seldom

Executory is not descendible to heirs.

Executors are *non executà*.

dom used; for, where-ever a testament is confirmed for the executor's own behoof, *e. g.* by the next of kin, or by an executor-creditor for his own payment, such confirmation is adjudged to have the effect of an assignation, or procuratory *in rem suam*; whereby the full right of the subjects confirmed, and consequently, that of execution, is transmitted to the representatives of the person confirming, 12. Feb. 1662, *Bells*.—23. June 1737, *Mitchel*.

Legitime
and relict's
part trans-
mit with-
out confir-
mation.

18. The legitime and relict's share, because they are rights arising *ex lege*, in consequence of the communion of goods, and of the natural obligation upon fathers to give a certain portion of their estates to their issue, operate *ipso jure* upon the father's death, in favour of the relict and children; and consequently pass from them, though they should die before confirmation, to their next of kin:

The dead's
part does
not.

Whereas the dead's part, which falls to the children or other next of kin in the way of succession, remains, if they should die before confirming, *in bonis* of the first deceased; and so does not descend to their next of kin, but may be confirmed by the person who, at the time of confirmation, is the next of kin to the first deceased.

Special as-
signations
and lega-
cies need
not be con-
firmed.

Special assignations, tho' neither intimated, nor made public, during the life of the granter, carry to the assignee the full right of the subjects assigned, without confirmation, 1690, *c.* 26. Special legacies are really assignations, and so fall under this statute,

Possession
of move-
ables, e-
qual to
confirm.

Jan. 1729, *Gordon*.—The next of kin, by the bare possession of the *ipsa corpora* of moveables, acquires the property thereof without confirmation,

tion, and transmits it to his executors, 14. Nov. 1744, *Macwhirter*.

19. The confirmation of any one subject by the next of kin, as it proves his right of blood, has been, by our later decisions, adjudged to carry the whole executory out of the testament of the deceased, even what was omitted; and to transmit all to his own executors, 23. Jan. 1745, Executors of *Murray*. The confirmation of a stranger, who is executor nominated, as it is merely a trust for the next of kin, has the effect to establish the right of the next of kin to the subjects confirmed, in the same manner as if himself had confirmed them. An executor decerned, who is not willing to put himself to the expence of confirming doubtful debts, may, even before confirmation, sue the debtors of the deceased, if he gets a licence from the Commissary for that purpose: But such licences, being intended only for saving expence, where there is a danger of getting nothing, are granted, *excludendo sententiam*; and therefore, if the executor shall, before confirmation, take decree for the debt, the decree is null. Diligence used by an executor upon a licence, falls, if he should die before confirmation, since the licence is merely a personal permission, which dies with the person licensed, 30. June 1705, *Jackson*.

Partial confirmation of the next of kin transmits the whole.

Licence to pursue before confirmation.

20. Where there are two or more executors, they hold the office *pro indiviso*, or as one person: All of them must therefore concur, in suing the debtors of the deceased, 8. March 1634, —*contra L. Lag*, and if any one shall refuse to concur, he may be excluded from the office,

Executors hold the office *pro indiviso*.

After execution, the subjects divide among them.

Co-executors are liable only *pro rata*.

Executors are not liable *ultra vires inventarii*.

Diligence prestable by executors.

Executors whether liable for interest.

office, at the suit of the co-executors; but after a debt comes to be established in their person by decree, each executor may, by himself, sue for his particular share thereof; and the debtor may safely make payment to him of such share, 17. March 1630, *Semple*. Yet a debtor to the executory, ought not to make payment of any part of his debt to an *executor-creditor*, without concurrence of the other executors; because the right of an executor-creditor depends entirely on the lawfulness of his debt, which the co-executors have an interest to inquire into, before payment, 7. Nov. 1738, *Inglis*. As all the co-executors have an equal right in debts due to the deceased, they are liable only *pro rata*, in debts due by him, unless it shall appear, that he who is sued, has by himself intermeddled with as much of the executory effects, as the debt sued for amounts to, 22. July 1630, *Salmon*.

21. Executory, tho' it be sometimes said to carry a certain degree of representation of the deceased, is properly an office: Executors therefore are not subjected to the debts due by the deceased, beyond the value of the inventory; but, at the same time, they are liable in diligence, for making the inventory effectual to all having interest. A decree and registred horning, is held to be sufficient diligence against debtors. An executor-creditor who confirms more than his debt amounts to, is liable in diligence for what he confirms; see *Act S. 14. Nov. 1679*. Executors are not liable in interest, even upon such bonds recovered by them, as carried interest to the deceased, 23.

Jan.

Jan. 1747, *E. Roseberry*; see *Falc. vol. 1.* 177. because their office obliges them to retain the sums they have made effectual, in order to a distribution thereof, among all having interest. And on the same principle, tho' an executor should put out the executory-money, after it is in his hands, at interest, he is not liable in interest; for, as by his office he ought to have retained the money, he lends on his own risk, and consequently is intitled to the whole profits, *July* 1730, creditors of *Thomson*.

22. Since executors are trustees for all who have interest in the executory, they cannot, even after the debts due to the deceased are established in their own person, assign them to the damage of those concerned; nor can the effects of the deceased fall under the executor's escheat, farther than the executor's proper interest reaches, 21. *Dec.* 1671, *Gordon*. On the same ground, the creditors of the deceased, may affect by diligence, not only the original subjects confirmed in the testament, but even bonds taken payable to the executor himself, if they were granted as the value of executory goods; and hence also, an executor must communicate, to all having interest in the executory, the benefit of the eases got in transacting the debts acquired by him after confirmation, from which period he became their common trustee, 4. *June* 1747, *M^cKenzie*.

Executors
are trustees
for
all having
interest.

23. As there was no method to come at the knowledge of all the personal creditors of a person deceased, executors might, at first, have paid *primo venienti*, to that creditor who first obtained a sentence; but, being judicial trustees, they could not pay any debt, without the authority

Executors
may pay
primo ve-
nienti.

Privileged thorty of a sentence, except those called pri-
debts may vileged, which always were, and still continue
be paid preferable to every other debt. Under that
without name are comprehended, medicines furnished to
sentence. the deceased on death-bed, Physicians fees du-
ring that period, funeral charges, which include
whatever is necessary for the decent perform-
ance of the funeral, *New Coll.* 57: and the
rent of his house, and his servant's wages, for
the year or term current at his death. The
executor might, by our former law, have also
retained the executory effects, for the payment
of his own debts, 26. *Jan.* 1628, *Adie*, even
tho' he had obtained no warrant from the Com-
missary, to retain: And he could have paid the
debts, which were acknowledged by the de-
ceased himself in his testament, without sen-
tence; if, before payment, he was not inter-
pelled by another creditor, 31. *March* 1624,
L. Curryhill. But by *Act S.* 28. *Feb.* 1662,

And debts
due to the
executor
himself.

And testa-
mentary
debts.

Pari passu
preference
by act of
federunt.

all creditors, who either obtain themselves con-
firmed, or who cite the executor already con-
firmed, within six months after their debtor's
death, are preferred, *pari passu*, with those who
have done more timely diligence: Since which
act, no executor can either retain for his own
debt, or pay a testamentary debt, so as to ex-
clude any creditor, who shall use diligence with-
in the six months, from the benefit of the *pari*
passu preference; neither can a decree for pay-
ment of debt be obtained, in that period, against
an executor, because, till that term be elapsed, it
cannot be known, how many creditors may be
intitled to the fund in his hands. If no dili-
gence be used within the six months, the exe-
cutor may, as at first, retain for his own debt,
and

and pay the residue *primo venienti*; but if, before actual payment upon a decree, another creditor should interpel him by a citation, the executor must call both, in an action of multiple-poinning, that the last may have an opportunity of objecting to the other's ground of debt or diligence, 16. Dec. 1629, *White*: And he can make no payment, even on decree, without bringing into the field the testamentary creditors, because he is interpellated as to these, by the testament, which is his own title, 8. March 1631, *Duff*. In a competition between diligences used after the six months, the preference was formerly governed by the priority of the citations, July 1723, Sir *Ja. Gray*: But by the later practice, the first citation founds no preference by itself, 15. Feb. 1738, *Græme*. Such creditors of the deceased as have used diligence within a year after their debtor's death, are preferable on the subject of his testament, to the creditors of his next of kin; but after that period, these postponed creditors have access to it, in terms of the act 1695, c. 41.

Executor cannot pay, even on decree, if interpellated.

Priority of citation after the 6 months gives no preference.

Creditors of the next of kin.

24. Executors who wanted to be discharged of their trust, and to have their accounts settled, insisted by the old practice, for decrees of exoneration before the commissaries, which contained a particular inventory of the funds belonging to the deceased, and how they were applied, St. 3. 8. 75. But this action is now disused, and executors, when they are sued by creditors before the judge competent are admitted to plead by way of exception, that the inventory is exhausted by lawful payments. If there are any debts due to the deceased, which the

Exoneration of executors.

executor has not been able to recover from the debtors, he will be exonerated as to these, by producing to the court, decrees and registred hornings; and by granting assignations thereof to the creditors on the executory, according to their several preferences, that they may sue for payment in their own names.

Passive title of vitious intromission.

Against whom it strikes.

From what acts it is inferred.

Presumed vitious intromission, introduced by act of Sed.

25. The only passive title in moveables is vitious intromission, which may be defined, an unwarrantable intermeddling with the moveable estate of a person deceased, without the order of law. This is not confined, as the passive titles in heritage are, to the persons interested in the succession, but strikes against all intromettors; because even strangers, when attending on dying persons, have frequent opportunities of intermeddling with moveables, which are more easily abstracted than heritage. The bare intermeddling infers this passive title, tho' the thing intermeddled with should not be applied to any use, by the intromettor, 29. *June 1705, Archibald.* Where an executor confirmed, intermeddles with more than he has confirmed, he incurs a passive title; fraud being, in the common case, presumed, from his not giving up in inventory the full subject intermeddled with, 13. *Dec. 1709, Drummond.* Vitious intromission is presumed, by *Act S. 23. Feb. 1692*, in the special case where the repositories of a dying person are not sealed up, as soon as he becomes incapable of sense, by his nearest relations; or, if he dies in a house not his own, they must be sealed by the master of such house, and the keys delivered to the Judge-ordinary, to be kept by him, for the benefit of all having interest.

26. The

26. The passive title of vitious intromission, takes no place, 1. Where the subject intermeddled with, was truly no part of the estate of the deceased, or ceased to be such before the intromission; *e. g.* where the goods of one who died at the horn are vested in a donatary; or where there is an executor confirmed: For in these cases, the intromettor is only accountable to the donatary or executor, whose goods they are by the declarator or confirmation. By special statute, 1696, *c.* 20. the confirmation of an executor-creditor, because it is no more than a step of diligence, does not screen a third party intermeddling, from the passive title, unless he claims under the creditor confirmed; but tho' he should derive no right from the creditor, he seems to be secured by the last words of the act, if his intromission has been with the special subject confirmed. 2. It is excluded by any probable title, or by any circumstance that takes off the presumption of fraud; *e. g.* by a general disposition of moveables, tho' that is of itself an incomplete right without confirmation, 12. *July* 1666, *Scot*; or by the title of sale, tho' the subject sold had truly belonged to the deceased, and not to the seller; or by the small value of the thing intermeddled with, 22. *Jan.* 1713, *Stark*. In consequence of this rule, necessary intromission, or *custodiae causâ*, by the wife or children, who only continue the possession of the deceased, in order to preserve his goods for the benefit of all concerned, infers no passive title.

Vituous intromission excluded, where the subject was not the defunct.

In intromission on a probable title.

In intromission, *custodiae causâ*.

27. Upon the same principle, an intromettor, by confirming himself executor, and thereby subjecting himself to account, before action be brought against him on the passive titles, purges

Vitiosity, purged by confirmation.

purges, or takes off the vitiosity of his prior intromission: And where the intromettor is one who is interested in the succession, *e. g.* a relict or next of kin, his confirmation, at any time within a year from the death of the deceased, will exclude the passive title, notwithstanding a prior citation, 13. Dec. 1709, *Drummond*. As this passive title was intended, only for the security of creditors, it cannot be sued upon by legatees; And since it arises *ex delicto*, it cannot be pleaded against the heir of the intromettor. As in delicts, any one of many delinquents may be subjected to the whole punishment, so any one of many intromettors may be sued *in solidum* for the pursuer's debt, without calling the rest; and the intromettor who pays, has no action of relief against his fellow delinquents, being destitute of an active title. If they are jointly sued, they are liable, not *pro rata* of their several intromissions, but *pro virili*, 16. Nov. 1626, *Chalmers*.

Vituous intromettors have no relief against each other.

Mutual relief betwixt the heir and executor.

28. The whole of a debtor's estate is subjected to the payment of his debts; and therefore, both his heirs and executors are liable for them, in a question with creditors; but as succession is by law divided into the heritable and the moveable estate, each of these ought, in a question between the several successors, to bear the burdens which naturally affect it. Action of relief is accordingly given, by 1503, c. 76. to the heir who has paid a moveable debt, against the executor; and tho' the statute enacts nothing, concerning a relief to the executor against the heir for heritable debts, practice has, *ex paritate rationis*, extended it to that case, 7. March 1629, *Falconer*. This relief is not

cut

cut off, by the deceased's having disposed, either his land-estate or his moveables, with the burden of his whole debts; for such burden is not to be construed as an alteration of the legal succession, but merely as a farther security to creditors, see *Falc. vol. 1. 185.* unless the contrary shall be presumed from the special style of the disposition.

TIT. 10. *Of last Heirs and Bastards.*

BY our ancient practice, feudal grants taken to the vassal and to a special order of heirs, without settling the last termination upon *heirs whatsoever*, returned to the superior, upon failure of the special heirs therein contained, *Cr. 351. §. 11.—Dirl. and Stewart, V. Limitation*; but now, that feus are become patrimonial rights, the superior is, by the general opinion, held to be fully divested by such grant, and the right descends to the vassal's heirs at law. And even where a vassal dies, without leaving any heir who can prove the remotest propinquity to him, it is not the superior, as the old law stood, *R. M. l. 2. c. 55. §. 1. 2.* but the King, who succeeds as last heir, both in the heritable and moveable estate of the deceased, in consequence of the rule, *quod nullius est, cedit domino Regi.*

Where there is no heir, the King succeeds.

2. If the lands, to which the King succeeds, be holden immediately of himself, the property is consolidated with the superiority, as if resignation had been made in the Sovereign's hands. If they are holden of a subject, the King, who cannot be vassal to his own subject,

King's right, where the lands hold of himself.

names

Where
they hold
of a sub-
ject.

names a donatary, who, to compleat his title, must obtain decree of declarator, in which a general citation against all and sundry is sufficient, 31. *July 1666, Crawfurd*; and thereafter he is presented to the superior, by letters of presentation from the King under the quarter-seal, in which the superior is charged to enter the donatary to the lands, with all the rights competent to the former vassal. The whole estate of the deceased is, in this case, subjected to his debts, and to the widow's legal provisions, 7. *July 1629, Wallace*; and may therefore be affected, either by the adjudication or confirmation of creditors, according to the nature of the right: But, in the carrying on of such diligence, the officers of state, and the donatary, must be cited as parties. Neither the King nor his donatary is liable, beyond the value of the succession. A person who has no heir to succeed to him, cannot alien his heritage *in lecto*, to the prejudice of the King, who is intitled to set aside such deed, in the character of *ultimus heres*, *New Coll.* 86.

The King
succeeds as
ultimus
heres to
the ba-
stard.

Bastards
cannot test
without
letters of
legitima-
tion.

3. A bastard can have no legal heirs, except those of his own body; since there is no succession but by the father, and a bastard has no certain father. The King therefore succeeds to him, failing his lawful issue, as last heir. Tho' the bastard, as absolute proprietor of his own estate, can dispose of his heritage in *liege pousty*, and of his moveables by any deed *inter vivos*, 20. *July 1739, Ewing*, yet he is disabled, *ex defectu natalium*, from bequeathing by testament, without letters of legitimation from the Sovereign, 18. *June 1678, Commissioners of Berwickshire*. If the bastard has lawful children,

ren, he may test, without such letters, and name tutors and curators to his issue, 8. *March* 1628, *Muir*; for, in such case, the King can have no interest to object, the bastard's children being his lawful heirs. Letters of legitimation, let their clauses be ever so strong, cannot enable the bastard to succeed to his natural father, to the exclusion of lawful heirs; for the King cannot by any prerogative, cut off the private right of third parties: But he may, by a special clause in letters of legitimation, renounce his right to the bastard's succession, failing his descendents, in favour of him who would have been the bastard's heir, had he been born in lawful marriage; seeing such renunciation encroaches upon no right competent to any third party.

Unless they have lawful issue.

Effect of letters of legitimation.

4. The legal rights of succession, being founded in marriage, can be claimed only by those who are born in lawful marriage; the issue therefore of an unlawful marriage are incapable of succession. Marriage entered into, after divorce for adultery, between the persons guilty, is declared unlawful, and their issue incapable of succeeding, by 1600, c. 20. A bastard is not only excluded, 1. From his father's succession, because law knows no father, who is not marked out by marriage; and 2. From all heritable succession, whether by the father or mother; because he cannot be pronounced lawful heir by the inquest, in terms of the brief; but also, 3. From the moveable succession of his mother; for, tho' the mother be known, the bastard is not her lawful child, and legitimacy is implied in all succession deferred by law: And, if a bastard might be de-

Impediments to succession.

Bastards incapable of legal succession.

cerned

cerned executor as next of kin to his mother, he would, by consequence, be intitled to an equal share of her moveable succession, with any of her lawful children. A bastard, tho' he cannot succeed *jure sanguinis*, may succeed by destination, where he is specially called to the succession, by an entail or testament.

But not of
succession
by destina-
tion.

5. Certain persons, tho' born in lawful marriage, are declared incapable of succession by statute. The director of the chancery, was, by 1609, c. 4. prohibited to issue precepts on retour, in favour of persons excommunicated; and subject-superiors were left at liberty to refuse brieves, and precepts of *clare constat*, in their favour; but these penalties are now taken off, by 1690, c. 28. Aliens are, from their allegiance to a foreign Prince, incapable of succeeding in feudal rights, without naturalization, *Falc. vol. 2. 66.*; see 1558, c. 65, 66. — 1669, c. 7. That part of these statutes, which supposes them also incapable of moveable succession, tho' it obtains, at this day, in some other countries, is not in force with us. Children born in a foreign state; whose fathers, were natural-born subjects, and not attainted, are declared natural-born subjects, by 4. *Geo. II. c. 21.* Persons educated in, or professing the Popish religion, if they shall neglect, upon their attaining the age of fifteen, to renounce its doctrines by a signed declaration, cannot succeed in heritage; but must give place to the next Protestant heir, who will hold the estate irredeemably, if the Popish heir does not, within ten years after incurring the irritancy, sign the *formula* prescribed by the statute 1700, c. 3.

Are ex-
communi-
cated per-
sons inca-
pable of
succession?

Aliens
cannot
succeed in
feudal
rights,

Nor Pa-
pists.

B O O K IV.

TIT. I. *Of Actions.*

HITHERTO of *persons* and *rights*, the two Actions,
 first objects of law; *actions* are its third
 object, whereby persons make their rights ef-
 fectual. An action may be defined, a demand
 regularly made and insisted in, before the judge
 competent, for the attaining or recovering of
 a right; and it suffers several divisions, accord-
 ing to the different natures of the rights pur-
 sued upon.

2. Actions are either real or personal. A Real and
personal.
 real action, is that which arises from a right in
 the thing itself, and which therefore may be
 directed against all possessors of that thing:
 Thus, an action for the recovery, even of a
 moveable subject, when founded on a *jus in re*,
 is in the proper acceptation real; but real actions
 are, in vulgar speech, confined to such as are
 directed against heritable subjects. A personal
 action is founded, only on an obligation un-
 dertaken for the performance of some fact, or
 the delivery of some subject; and therefore can
 be carried on, against no other than the person
 obliged, or his heirs. Both rights are included in
 an investment of annualrent, which contains, not
 only a personal obligation on the granter to pay,
 but a right of hypothec in the subject itself;
 and therefore the creditor can either sue the
 granter or his representatives in a personal action;

G g g

or

or he may, for his payment, insist in a real action of poinding the ground, against the possessors of the subject affected, tho' they should not represent the granter, 2. 8. 15.

Poinding
of the
ground,

3. Poinding *of the ground*, tho' it be properly a diligence or an execution, is generally considered by lawyers, as a species of real actions; and is so called, to distinguish it from personal poinding, which is founded merely on an obligation to pay. Every *debitum fundi*, whether legal or conventional, is a foundation

To whom
compe-
tent.

for this action. It is therefore competent to an annual renter, for the interest due upon his right; to a superior, for his feu-duties or for his non-entry-duties before citation in a declarator, according to the distinction laid down, 2. 5. 19.; and in general, to all creditors in

Against
what
goods is it
directed?

debts which make a real burden on lands. As it proceeds on a real right, it may be directed against all goods that can be found on the lands burdened, even tho' the original debtor should be divested of the property, in favour of a singular successor: But, 1. Goods brought upon the ground by strangers, are not subject to this diligence, 6. Feb. 1679, *Collet*. 2. Even the goods of a tenant, cannot be poinded for more than his term's rent, by 1469, c. 37; *i. e.* as practice has explained it, for more than the tenant was *de facto* owing to his master of past rents, at the time of poinding, 4. Feb. 1674, *Lady Pitfoddels*.

Who are
called in
it?

4. In a poinding of the ground, not only the natural possessors must be cited, but the proprietor of the ground, who has an obvious interest in the issue of the cause. Where therefore the action is brought against lands that are granted

granted in wadset, the wadsetter must be cited who is really the proprietor, and not the reverfer who has the bare right of redemption. The defenders in this action are made parties, not as debtors to the pursuer but as proprietors or possessors of the lands affected; because the process, being founded on a real right, affects the lands themselves. A decree therefore, when it is once obtained upon it, operates against all singular successors, in the lands, without any new sentence, 26. *June 1662, Adamson*: Whereas in personal poinding, the goods are not poinded, as being on the ground of any special lands, but as the goods of the pursuer's debtor; and therefore the warrant cannot extend against the goods of any other than the debtor.

Effects of a decree of poinding the ground.

5. Actions are either ordinary or rescissory. All actions are, in the sense of this division, ordinary, which are not rescissory. Rescissory actions are divided, 1. Into actions of proper improbation. 2. Actions of reduction-improbation. 3. Actions of simple reduction. Proper improbations, which are brought for declaring writings false or forged, are treated of below, 4. 4. 34. *et seqq.* Reduction-improbation is an action, whereby a person who may be hurt or affected by a writing, insists for producing or exhibiting it in court, in order to have it set aside or its effect ascertained, under the certification that the writing, if not produced, shall be declared false and forged. This certification is a fiction of law, introduced that the production of writings may be the more effectually forced, and therefore it operates only in favour of the pursuer; so that the writing, tho'

Actions ordinary and rescissory.

Reduction-improbation.

Certification.

tho' declared false, continues in full strength in all questions with third parties. Because the summons in this action proceeds on acknowledged grounds of falsehood, his Majesty's Advocate, who is the public prosecutor of crimes, must concur in it.

May be
founded
either in
a real in-
terest,

6. This action may be founded, either upon a real interest, or a personal. A proprietor of lands has a real interest to reduce all deeds affecting his estate: And tho' a pursuer's interest, in consequence of his property, appears to be equally strong, whether the deeds in question flow from his author or not; yet by our practice hitherto, no writings can be called for in this process, but those which have been granted by persons, with whom the pursuer connects a title, *St. 4. 20. 14.—F. 16. Dec. 1709, L. Innercauld.* By our older forms, one whose right to lands was merely personal, could not call for seifins of these lands, in order to reduction; but now he may, if they be granted by his author, *24. Jan. 1739, Keith.* Where the writings called for, were not granted to the defender himself, but conveyed to him under singular titles, the pursuer was formerly obliged to cite the defender's authors who were liable to their disponent in warrandice; but to prevent unnecessary delays, defenders are, by the present practice, obliged to cite their own authors, *Act S. 16. Feb. 1723.* A reduction-improbation is founded on a personal interest, when one insists for certification against deeds granted by himself, or by any of his ancestors whom he represents by service; but this is not competent to an apparent heir, because he can have no interest till he be served.

Or a per-
sonal.

7. As

7. As the certification in this process draws after it so heavy consequences, three successive terms were, by the former custom, assigned to the defenders for production, which are reduced to two, by 1672, c. 16. §. 25. *concerning the Session*. After the second term is elapsed, intimation must be made judicially to the defender, to satisfy the production within ten days; and till these are also expired, no certification can be pronounced, *Act S. 1. Jan.*

1709. Certification cannot pass against deeds recorded in the books of Session, if the defender shall, before the second term, offer a condescendence of the dates of their registration, they being considered as already in the hands of the clerk of court; and even thereafter, an extract of a deed so recorded, will stop certification against the original, unless falsehood be objected; in which case, the original must be brought from the record, to the court. Extracts of charters from the chancery, cannot stop certification; for as no charters are recorded there, after sealing, that record proves not the existence of a sealed charter. No extract from an inferior court is a bar to certification; the principal writing must be laid before the court on a proper warrant.

8. In an action of simple reduction, the certification is only temporary, declaring the writings called for, null, until they be produced; so that they recover their full force after production, even against the pursuer himself; for which reason, that process is now seldom used. Because its certification is not so severe as in reduction-improbation, there is but one term assigned

Terms assigned for production.

Can certification pass against writings in publica custodia.

Simple reduction.

signed to the defender for producing the deeds called for.

Grounds
of reduction.

9. The most usual grounds of reduction of writings are, the want of the requisite solemnities, (3. 2. 3.); or that the granter was minor, (1. 7. 19.); or interdicted, (1. 7. 34.); or inhibited, (2. 11. 2.); or that he signed the deed on death-bed, (3. 8. 46.); or was compelled or frightened into it; or was circumvented; or that he granted it, in prejudice of his lawful creditors.

Reduction
upon force,
or fear, or
circum-
vention

10. In reductions on the head of force, or fear, or fraud and circumvention, the pursuer must libel the particular circumstances from which his allegation is to be proved; and, tho' not any one of them should be relevant or sufficient by itself, they may, when joined together, be sufficient to reduce the deed. Where therefore there is the least appearance of relevancy, the court is in use, before answer, *i. e.* before pronouncing any interlocutor upon the relevancy of the circumstances libelled, to allow a conjunct proof to both parties, as to the manner of granting the deed. Reduction is not competent upon every degree of force or fear; it must be such as would shake a man of constancy and resolution. Neither is it competent, on that fear which arises from the just authority of husbands or parents, over their wives or children, *l. 21, 22. de rit. nupt.*; nor of magistrates over those subjected to them, *l. 3. §. 1. quod met. causa*; nor upon the fear arising from the regular execution of lawful diligence by caption, provided the deeds granted under that fear, relate to the ground of debt contained in the diligence, 22. *Jan. 1667, Mair*; but if they

Not com-
petent on
every de-
gree of
force or
fear.

they have no relation to that debt, they are reducible *ex metu*, *Falc.* 4.

11. Where a person of a weak or facile temper executes a deed in itself irrational, the most slender circumstances of fraud on the part of the receiver, will be laid hold of, to set it aside. But without some such circumstance, the deed must stand; for, let a person be ever so subject to imposition, if he is not fatuous or legally interdicted, his deeds are effectual, unless they have been drawn from him by unfair practices. Yet where the deed itself discovers oppression, or a catching an undue advantage from the necessities of our neighbour, dole is said *inesse in re*, and so requires no extrinsic proof. Thus, a bond taken from an heir for quadruple the sum lent, tho' payable only in the event that he should succeed to his ancestor, was reduced, except as to the principal sum really advanced, and its interest, 13. *July 1745, Abercromby.*

Nor on the granter's facility, per s.

12. The reduction of alienations hurtful to creditors, is founded upon the act 1621, c. 18. which we have borrowed from the *Roman* law, *l. 1. et seqq. quae in fraud. cred.* By the first part of this statute, all alienations granted after contracting of lawful debts, in favour of conjunct or confident persons, without true, just and necessary causes, and without a just price really paid, are declared null. One is deemed a prior creditor, whose ground of debt existed, before the right granted by the debtor; tho' the written voucher of the debt should bear a date posterior to it, 21. *Jan. 1669, cred. of Pollock.*—27. *July 1669, Street.* Persons are accounted conjunct, whose relation to the grant-
er

Reduction upon the act 1621. First part of the act.

Who are deemed prior creditors?

Conjunct
or confi-
dent per-
sons.

er is so near, as to bar them from judging in his cause, 8. *Feb.* 1712, Lord *Elibank*. Confident persons are those who appear to be in the granter's confidence, by being employed in his affairs, or about his person; as a doer, steward, or domestic servant.

Gratui-
tous deeds
are redu-
cible,

13. Tho' by the letter of this act, the right to be reduced must be granted, both without a price paid, and in favour of a conjunct or confident person, yet by practice, gratuitous rights, even where they are granted to strangers, are subject to reduction. But rights, tho' gratuitous, are not reducible, if the granter had, at the date thereof, a sufficient fund for the payment of his creditors, *Dirl.* 287.—*K.* 9. Provisions to children are, in the judgment of law, gratuitous; so that their effect, in a question with creditors, depends on the solvency of the granter; But settlements to wives, either in marriage-contracts, 18. *Nov.* 1729, cred. of *Thoirs*, or even after marriage, are onerous, in so far as they are rational; and consequently are not reducible, even tho' the granter was insolvent, 11. *Jan.* 1738, *Robertson*.—17. *Feb.* 1738, Sir *R. Mackenzie*. This rule holds also in rational tochers contracted to husbands, *Forb. MS.* 22. *Jan.* 1714, *Lockhart*: But it must, in all cases, be qualified with this limitation, *if the insolvency of the granter was not publicly known*; for if it was, fraud is presumed in the receiver of the right, by contracting with the bankrupt, 23. *Nov.* 1680, *Wood*.

If the
granter
was insol-
vent.

Provisions
to child-
ren are
gratui-
tous,
But not
settle-
ments to
wives

On whom
does the
proof lie.

14. The creditor who objects to the deed, must, by the words of the act, prove that it was gratuitous, either by the oath or writing of the receiver; but, as the statute is now explained,

plained, the receiver, if he be a conjunct or confident person, must attract or support the onerous cause of his right, not merely by his own oath, but by some circumstances or adminicles, 15. *Dec. 1671, Duff*: If there is no real ground of suspicion, the slightest adminicles will serve, *K. 105*. Where a right is granted to a stranger, the narrative of it expressing an onerous cause, is sufficient *per se*, to secure it against reduction, 22. *June 1680, Trotter*.

15. By a second branch of this statute, all voluntary payments or rights, made by a bankrupt to one creditor, to disappoint the more timeous diligence of another, are reducible at the instance of that creditor who has used the prior diligence. Grants made by the debtor, in consideration of sums instantly advanced by the grantee, are not securities given to creditors, and so fall not under the sanction of the statute; *e. g.* a sale of lands, 8. *Feb. 1681, Neilson*, or a bond of borrowed money, 28. *June 1665, Monteith*. A creditor, tho' his diligence be but begun by citation, may insist in a reduction of all posterior voluntary rights, granted to his prejudice, *Harc. 639.—F. 9. January 1696, Brown*; but the creditor who neglects to compleat his begun diligence within a reasonable time, is not intitled to reduce any right granted by the debtor, after the time that the diligence is considered as abandoned, 9. *July 1709, Drummond*.

Second
branch of
the act.

What is
meant by
prior dili-
gence.

16. A prohibited alienation, when conveyed by the receiver, to another who is not privy to the fraud, subsists by the statute, in the person of the *bona fide* purchaser. Where the conjunction or confidence between the granter and

Reduction
not good
against
sing. suc-
cessors.

H h h

receiver

Nullity,
when re-
ceivable
by excep-
tion.

receiver cannot be perceived, either from the tenor of the right, or from the conveyance of it to the purchaser, the purchaser is not presumed to have been partaker of the fraud, 9. *Jan.* 1730, *Allan*. This statute declares all alienations made contrary thereto, to be null, either by way of action or exception: But in practice, it is only in the case of moveable rights, that the nullity is receivable by exception, 16. *June* 1671, *Bower*; it must be declared by reduction, where the right is heritable, 22. *July* 1664, *Lord Lour*.

Reduction
upon the
act 1696.

17. By act 1696, c. 5. all alienations by a bankrupt, within sixty days before his bankruptcy, to one creditor in preference to another, are reducible, at the instance, even of such co-creditors, as had not used the least step of diligence. A bankrupt is there described by the following characters; diligence used against him by horn-ing and caption; and insolvency, joined either with imprisonment, retiring to the sanctuary, absconding, or forcibly defending himself from diligence. It is sufficient that a caption is raised against the debtor, tho' it be not executed, provided he has retired to shun it, 24. *Feb.* 1737, *Lord Kilkerran*. It is provided, that all heritable bonds or rights on which seisin may follow, shall be reckoned, in a question with the granter's other creditors upon this act, to be of the date of the seisin following thereon; and it has been variously decided, whether heritable bonds, granted in security of debts presently contracted, fall under this branch of the statute; but by the last decision, *Falc. vol.* 2. 189, the act was found to relate only to securities for former debts, and not to *nova debita*.

18. Rights

18. Rights granted by a debtor in trust for his creditors, tho' they should contain no partial clause, preferring any one creditor before the rest, were formerly set aside at the suit of those creditors who did not accede to them; because the right of creditors to affect their debtor's estate by diligence, ought not to be restrained, by a deed of the debtor, imposing a trustee on them without their consent, 12. *July* 1734, *Snee*: But now they are sustained, if the debtor be not bankrupt, in the precise terms of the statute 1696, 13. *Nov.* 1744, *Snodgrafs*,—*Falc.* vol. 1. 179.

Trust-right, if reducible.

19. Actions are, both by the *Roman* law and ours, divided into *rei persecutoriae*, and *penales*. By the first, the pursuer insists, barely to recover what *patrimonio ejus abest*, the subject that is his, or the debt that is due to him; and this includes the damage sustained by the pursuer, *damnum et interesse*; for one is as truly a sufferer in his patrimonial interest by that damage, as by the loss of the subject itself. In penal actions, which always arise *ex delicto*, something is also demanded by way of penalty.

Actions, either *rei persecutoriae*, or penal.

20. Actions of spuilzie, ejection and intrusion, are penal. An action of spuilzie is competent, to one dispossessed of a moveable subject violently, or without order of law, against the person dispossessing; not only for being restored to the possession of the subject, if extant, or for the value, if it be destroyed, but also for the violent profits. (as to which see 2. 6. 24.), in case the action be brought within three years from the spoliation. The pursuer need prove no more than that he was in the lawful possession: Nay, tho' the defender should offer

Action of spuilzie.

Ejection
and intrusion.

offer to prove himself proprietor, it is no good defence; for he ought not *jus sibi dicere*. But it is a relevant defence, that the defender had a probable title for what he did, for *quilibet titulus excusat a spolio*; or that he made voluntary restitution *de recenti*, of the goods spuilzied, *cum omni causa*. Ejection and intrusion are in heritable subjects, what spuilzie is in moveables. The difference between the two first is, that in ejection, violence is used; whereas the intruder enters into the void possession, without either a title from the proprietor, or the warrant of a judge. The actions arising from all the three, are of the same general nature.

Contravention of
law-borrows.

Its penalty.

21. The action of contravention of lawborrows is also penal. It proceeds on letters of law-borrows, (from *borgh* a cautioner) which contain a warrant to charge the party complained upon, that he may give security, not to hurt the complainer in his person, family or estate, 1429. c. 129.—1581, c. 117. These letters do not require the previous citation of the party complained upon, because the caution which the law requires, is only for doing what is every man's duty; but, before the letters are executed against him, the complainer must make oath, that he dreads bodily harm from him. The penalty of contravention is ascertained to a special sum, according to the offender's quality, the half to be applied to the fisk and the half to the complainer, 1593, c. 166.; which may be demanded, tho' the person complained upon, should not have given caution, in obedience to the letters, 1597, c. 269. Contravention is not incurred by the uttering of reproachful words, where they are not

not accompanied, either with acts of violence, or at least a real injury; and as the action is penal, it is elided by any probable ground of excuse.

22. Penalties are the consequences of delict, or transgression; and as no heir ought to be accountable for the delict of his ancestor, farther than the injured person has really suffered by it, penal laws die with the delinquent, and are not transmissible against heirs. Yet the action, if it has been commenced, and litiscontested in the delinquent's lifetime, may be continued against the heir, tho' the delinquent, should die during the dependence, as to which, see §. 40. Some actions are *rei persecutoriae* on the part of the pursuer, when he insists for simple restitution, which yet may be penal in respect of the defender; e. g. the action on the passive title of vitious intromission, by which the pursuer frequently recovers the whole debt due to him by the deceased, tho' it should exceed the value of the goods intermeddled with by the defenders.

Penal actions not transmissible against heirs.
Exception to this rule.

23. The most celebrated division of actions in our law, is into petitory, possessory, and declaratory. Petitory actions are those, where something is demanded from the defender, in consequence of a right of property, or of credit in the pursuer: Thus, actions for restitution of moveables, actions of poinding, of forthcoming, and indeed all personal actions upon contracts or quasi-contracts, are petitory. Possessory actions are those which are founded, either upon possession alone, as spuilzies, or upon possession joined with another title, as removings (2. 6. 23.); and they are competent, either

Actions petitory.

Possessory.

Ejection
and intrusion.

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Actions petitory.

Possessory.

either for getting into possession, for holding it, or for recovering it; analogous to the interdicts of the *Roman* law, *quorum bonorum, uti possidetis*, and *unde vi*. The nature and privileges of possession have been already explained, 2. 1. 12. *et seqq.*

Action of
molesta-
tion.

24. An action of molestation is a possessory action, competent to the proprietor of a land estate, against those who disturb his possession. It is chiefly used in questions of commonry, or of controverted marches. Where it is pursued before the Session, the judges are, by 1587, c. 42. ratifying an act of federunt, ordained to remit the cause to the Sheriff of the country where the lands lie; who is empowered to take cognition of the marches, and to put the facts contained in the libel and defences, to the knowledge of an inquest, consisting of persons dwelling in the parish, most of them landed men: But this is now seldom practised; for the court ordinarily allow a proof to be brought before themselves, and give judgment thereupon. Where a declarator of property is conjoined with a process of molestation, the Session alone is competent to the action. Actions on brieves of perambulation, 1579, c. 79. have the same tendency with molestations, *viz.* the settling of marches between conterminous lands: The difference commonly stated between the two, is, that the first sort is founded solely on a right of property, and so is petitory; whereas in molestations, the pursuer founds also on his possession.

Brief of
perambu-
lation.

Action of
mails and
duties.

25. The action of mails and duties is sometimes petitory, and sometimes possessory. In either case, it is directed against the tenants and natural

natural possessors of land estates, for payment to the pursuer, of the rents remaining due by them for past crops, and of the full rent for the future. It is competent, not only to a proprietor whose right is perfected by seisin, but to a simple disponent, for a disposition of lands includes a right to the mails and duties; and consequently to an adjudger, for an adjudication is a judicial disposition. In the *petitory* action, the pursuer, since he founds upon right, not possession, must make the proprietor, from whom the tenants derive their right, party to the suit; and he must support his claim, by titles of property or diligences, preferable to those in the person of his competitor. In the *possessory*, the pursuer, who libels that he, his ancestors or authors, have been seven years in possession, and that therefore he has the benefit of a possessory judgment, need produce no other title than a seisin, which is a title sufficient to make the possession of heritage lawful; and it is enough; if he calls the natural possessors, tho' he should neglect the proprietor, *St. 4. 22. 14. et seqq.* A possessory judgment founded on seven years possession, in consequence either of a seisin or a tack, has this effect, that tho' one should claim under a title preferable to that of the possessor, he cannot compete with him in the possession; till in a formal process of reduction, he shall obtain the possessor's title to be declared void, *St. 4. 26. 3.*

26. A declaratory action is that, in which some right is craved to be declared in favour of the pursuer, but nothing sought to be paid or performed by the defender; such as declarators of

Petitory.

Possessory.

A possessory judgment.

Declaratory actions.

of marriage, of irritancy, of expiry of the legal reversion, actions competent to superiors or their donataries, for declaring casualties incurred by vassals, &c. Under this class, may be also comprehended rescissory actions, which, without any personal conclusion against the defender, tend simply to set aside the rights or writings libelled, in consequence of which, a contrary right or immunity arises to the pursuer. Declarators of property are now seldom used, because rights affecting property are more effectually forced into the field, by the action of reduction-improbation, which has always a declaratory conclusion subjoined to it. Decrees upon actions that are properly declaratory, confer no new right; they only declare what was the pursuer's right before, and so have a retrospect to the period at which that right first commenced, as in declarators of liferent-escheat, 2. 5. 33.; but this character is not applicable to most of our declaratory decrees. Declarators, because they have no personal conclusion against the defender, may be pursued against an apparent heir, without a previous charge given him to enter to his ancestor; unless where special circumstances require a charge.

Their properties.

Action of proving the tenor.

Casus amissionis.

27. An action for proving the tenor, whereby a writing, which is destroyed or a-missing, is endeavoured to be revived, is in effect declaratory. In obligations that are extinguishable, barely by the debtor's retiring or cancelling them, the pursuer, before a proof of the tenor is admitted, must condescend on such a *casus amissionis*, or accident by which the writing was destroyed, as shews it was lost when in the creditors' possession; otherwise, bonds that have been

been cancelled by the debtor on payment, might be reared up, as still subsisting against him: But in writings which require contrary deeds to extinguish their effect, as assignations, dispositions, charters, &c. it is sufficient to libel that they were lost any how, even *casu fortuito*, St. 4. 32. 3. 4.

28. Regularly, no deed can be revived by this action, without some adminicle in writing, *i. e.* without some collateral deed, referring to that which is libelled; for no written obligation ought to be raised up, barely on the testimony of witnesses: Yet where one's whole writings have been destroyed by fire, or in other such special cases which call for an extraordinary remedy, a proof of the tenor may be admitted, without any such adminicle, St. *ibid.* If these adminicles afford sufficient conviction, that the deed libelled did once exist, the tenor is admitted to be proved by witnesses, who must depose, either that they were present at signing the deed, or that they afterwards saw it duly subscribed. Where the relative writings contain all the substantial clauses of that which is lost, the tenor is sometimes sustained without witnesses, F. 26. June 1712, *Inglis*. In a writing which is libelled to have contained uncommon clauses, all these must appear by the adminicles; otherwise, a right might be again brought to life, of a quite different nature from that which was lost.

Adminicles in writing.

Sometimes sufficient per se.

29. The tenor of all writings, both voluntary and judicial, may be proved by this action; even decrees of apprising, which, of all others, require the greatest nicety of form, Dirl. 283: By act 1579, c. 94. the tenor of letters of

Can the tenor of all writings be proved?

horning and executions thereof, which have not been judicially produced, cannot be proved by witnesses; but this statute does not seem to extend, to the case of hornings supported by written adminicles. Actions of proving the tenor are, on account of their importance, appropriated to the court of Session; and the witnesses must give their testimonies in presence of all the judges.

Multiple
poin-
ding,

30. The action of double or multiple poinding may be also reckoned declaratory. It is competent to a debtor, who is distressed or threatened with distress, by two or more persons claiming right to the debt, and who therefore brings the several claimants into the field, in order to the debating and settling their several preferences, that so he may pay securely to him whose right shall be found preferable. This action is daily pursued by an arrestee, in the case of several arrestments used in his hands for the same debt, or by tenants, in the case of several adjudgers, all of whom claim right to the same rents. In these competitions, any of the competitors may bring an action of multiple poinding in name of the tenants, or other debtors, without their consent, or even tho' they should disclaim the process; since the law has introduced it as the proper remedy for getting such competitions determined: And while the subject in controversy continues *in medio*, any third person who conceives he has a right to it, may, tho' he should not be cited as a defender, produce his titles, as if he were an original party to the suit, and will be admitted for his interest in the competition.

May be
pursued by
any ha-
ving inte-
rest, tho'
the debt-
or dis-
claim.

31. Certain

31. Certain actions may be called accessory, because they are merely preparatory or subservient to other actions. Thus, exhibitions *ad deliberandum*, 3. 8. 27. are intended only to pave the way for future processes. Where a party to a suit was to prove a point, by writings which were in the hands of a third person, a separate action was, by our ancient forms, necessary for forcing the exhibition thereof, *St.* 4. 41. 4. 5.; but this is now done summarily, by an incident diligence granted by warrant of the court, against the havers or possessors of these writings, for exhibiting them. The persons cited on this diligence, must either produce the writings called for, or depose that they neither have them, nor had them since the citation, nor have fraudulently put them out of their custody to elude a future citation, nor suspect by whom they were taken away, nor where they now are; see *Act S. 22. Feb. 1688.*

Accessory
actions.Exhibi-
tions.Incident
diligence.

32. An action of transference is also of this sort, whereby an action, during the pendency of which, the pursuer or defender happens to die, is craved to be transferred from the deceased to his representative, in the same condition in which it stood formerly. If it be the pursuer who is dead, it was called a transference *active*; if the defender, it is a transference *passive*. Upon the pursuer's death, his heir may now, by 1693, c. 15. insist in the cause against the defender, without a transference *active*, upon producing, either a retour or a confirmed testament, according as the subject is heritable or moveable: But transfereces *passive* continue by that act on the former footing; it being reasonable upon the death

Transfe-
rence.Transfe-
rence
active,
now un-
necessary.

What
judges can
transfer.

death of a defender, to give previous notice to his heir, before he be obliged to defend in a process, of which perhaps he knew nothing before. Transferences, being but incidental to other actions, can be pronounced by that inferior judge alone, before whom the principal cause depended; but, where the representatives of the deceased live in another territory, it is the supreme court which must transfer, *Gossford, 9. Jan. 1674, Denholm*. By the above cited statute 1693, obligations may be now registred summarily after the creditor's death; which before was not admitted, without a separate process of registration, to which the granter was necessarily to be made a party.

Waken-
ing.

33. A process of wakening is likewise accessory. An action is said to sleep, when it lies over, not insisted in for a year, in which case its effect is suspended; but even then, it may, at any time within the years of prescription, be revived or wakened by a summons, in which the pursuer recites the last step of the process, and concludes that it may be again carried on, as if it had not been discontinued. An action, that stands upon any of the inner-house rolls, cannot sleep; nor an action in which decree is pronounced, because it has got its full completion; Consequently, the decree may be extracted after the year, without the necessity of a wakening.

Trans-
sumpt.

34. An action of transumpt falls under the same class. It is competent to those, who have a partial interest in writings that are not in their own custody, against the possessors thereof, for exhibiting them, that they may be transumed for their behoof. Tho' the ordinary title
in

in this process be an obligation by the defender, to grant transumps to the pursuer, it is sufficient, if the pursuer can show that he has an interest in the writings; but, in this case, he must transume them on his own charges. Actions of transumpt may be pursued before any judge ordinary. After the writings to be transumed are exhibited, full duplicates are made out, collated and signed, by one of the clerks of court, which are called transumps, and are as effectual as an extract from the register, so that they cannot be defeated, but by improbation; in which case, the user of the transumpt must either produce the principal writings themselves, upon a diligence, or otherwise, suffer certification to pass against them. Advocations, 1. 2. 20. and suspensions, 4. 3. 5. are not so properly accessory actions, as judicial steps, that give a new form to the actions to which they relate. Summonses *praevento termino*, which were used for shortening the days of appearance assigned in suspensions or advocations, are now quite in disuse; for, by the present practice, a fixed rule is observed, with respect to these days; and no suspension or advocacy passes upon long days, as the custom was formerly.

Competent to any having interest.

Summonses *praevento termino*.

35. Actions proceeded anciently, upon brieves issuing from the chancery, directed to the justiciary or judge-ordinary, who tried the matter by a jury, upon whose verdict, judgment was pronounced: And to this day, we retain certain brieves, as of inquest, terce, ideotry, tutory, perambulation, and perhaps two or three others. But summonses were, immediately upon the institution of the college of justice, introduced into

Actions proceeded anciently on brieves.

Now, on summonses.

Summons-
es must
be now
libelled.

into our law, in the place of brieves. A summons, when applied to actions pursued before the Session, is a writ in the King's name, issuing from his signet upon the pursuer's complaint, authorising messengers to cite the defender to appear before the court, and make his defences. Formerly, when a summons passed the Signet, it contained little more than the pursuer's name, and the date of signeting: Before citing the defender upon it, his name and the days of appearance were filled up in the blank; but the libel or declaration, setting forth the ground of action, needed not have been engrossed in it, till it was called in court. By *Act S. 16. Feb. 1723*, which was but temporary, the libel was ordained to be filled up in summonses before execution, with certain exceptions therein contained; and this act is made perpetual by a posterior one, 19 *Feb. 1742*.

*Induciae
legales.*

Privileged
summons.

36. The days indulged by law to a defender, between his citation and appearance, to prepare for his defence, are called *induciae legales*. If he is within the kingdom, twenty one and six days, for the first and second diets of appearance, must be allowed him for that purpose; and, if out of it, sixty and fifteen. Defenders residing in *Orkney* or *Zetland* must be cited on forty days, 1685, c. 43. In certain summonses which are privileged, the *induciae* are shortened: Spuilzies and ejections proceed on fifteen days, 1503, c. 65. wakenings and transferences, being but incidental, on six; see the list of privileged summonses, in *Act S. 29. June 1672*. A summons must be executed, *i. e.* served against the defender, so as the last diet of appearance may be within a year after the date

date of the summons; and it must be called within a year after that diet, otherwise it falls forever. Offences against the authority of the court, acts of malversation in office, by any member of the college of justice; and acts of violence and oppression, committed during the dependence of a suit, by any of the parties, may be tried without a summons, by a summary complaint.

Actions
tryable
without
summons.

37. Different civil actions were by the *Roman* law frequently competent, on the same ground of right, to the pursuer; who, after he had prevailed in one action, might insist in the other, in so far as it contained more than he had recovered by the first. Our law knows no such concurrence; for where an action is in part penal, *e. g.* a removing, *spuilzie*, &c. a pursuer who restricts his demand to, and obtains decree merely for restitution, cannot thereafter bring a new process for the violent profits. Yet the same fact may be the foundation, both of a criminal and civil action, because these two are intended for different purposes; the one, for satisfying the public justice, the other for indemnifying the private party: And tho' the defender should be absolved in the criminal trial, for want of evidence by witnesses, the party injured may bring an action *ad civilem effectum*, in which he is intitled to refer the libel to the defender's oath.

Concourse
of actions.

38. Where actions of different kinds were competent, tho' upon the same ground of right, they could not by the *Roman* law, be included in the same libel, *l. 43. §. 1. de reg. jur.*; for every different species of action had a particular *formula*, which it behoved the pretor to observe,

Accumu-
lation of
actions.

serve, in remitting the cause to the judge. But where one had separate claims against another, all productive of the same sort of action, he might have thrown them into one libel, *l. 52. §. 14. pro socio*, because there, as the actions were of the same kind, one *formula* served for all. By our forms, one libel may contain different conclusions on the same ground of right, rescissory, declaratory, petitory, &c. if they be not repugnant to each other: Nay, tho' different sums be due to one, upon distinct grounds of debt, or even by different debtors, the creditor may insist against them all, in the same summons.

Defences,
dilatory
and per-
emptory.

39. Defences are pleas offered by a defender, for eliding an action. They are either dilatory, which do not enter into the cause itself, and so can only procure an absolutor from the *lis pendens*: Or peremptory, which entirely cut off the pursuer's right of action, (*quae perimunt causam*). The first, because they relate to the forms of proceeding; must be offered *in limine judicii*, and all of them at once, *Act S. 20. Nov. 1711, §. 16*. But peremptory defences may be proponed, at any time before sentence, *l. 2. C. sent. resc.* but with the restriction contained in *Act S. 23. July 1674*.

Litiscon-
testation.

40. A cause, after the parties had litigated it before the judge, was said by the *Romans* to be litiscontested. By litiscontestation; a judicial contract is understood to be entered into by the litigants, by which the action is perpetuated against heirs, even when it arises *ex delicto*. By our law, litiscontestation is not formed, till an act is extracted, admitting the libel or defences to proof, *7. Feb. 1712. Stuart*.

TIT. 2.

TIT. 2. *Of Probation.*

ALL allegations, by parties to a suit, must be supported by proper proof. Probation is either by writing, by the party's own oath, or by witnesses. In the case of allegations, which may be proved by either of the three ways, a proof is said to be admitted, *prout de jure*; because, in such case, all the legal methods of probation are competent to the party: If the proof he brings by writing be lame, he may have recourse either to witnesses or to his adversary's oath; but, if he should first take himself to the proof by oath, he cannot thereafter use any other probation, for the reason assigned §. 3.; and on the contrary, a pursuer, who had brought a proof by witnesses, on an extracted act, was not allowed to recur to the oath of the defender, 18. Nov. 1737, *M^r Brair*. Single combat, as a sort of appeal to providence, was, by our ancient law, admitted as evidence, in matters both civil and criminal, *R. M. l. 3. c. 13. §. 4.* It was restricted by *St. R. III. c. 16*, to the case of such capital crimes, where no other proof could be had; and some traces of this blind method of trial remained in the reign of *J. VI. 1600, c. 12.*; for even by that act, the King might authorize duels on weighty occasions.

Probation.

Prout de jure.

By single combat.

2. As obligations or deeds, signed by the party himself, or his ancestors or authors, must be, of all evidence, the least liable to exception, therefore every debt or allegation may be proved by proper evidence in writing.

By writing.

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The solemnities essential to probative deeds have been already explained, 3. 2. 3. *et seqq.*

Books of account kept by merchants, tradesmen, and other dealers in business, tho' not subscribed, are probative against him who keeps them; and, in case of furnishings by a shop-keeper, such books, if they are regularly kept by him, supported by the testimony of a single witness, afford a *semiplena probatio* in his favour, which becomes full evidence by his own oath in supplement, *Gosford, 5. June 1672, Wood.*

Notorial instruments, how far probative. Notorial instruments and executions by messengers, bear full evidence that the solemnities, therein set forth, were used, not to be invalidated otherwise than by a proof of falsehood; but they do not prove any other extrinsic facts therein averred, against third parties, nor are they evidence of the warrant, on which they proceed: Thus, a seisin does not prove the existence of the relative charter, 20. Dec. 1664, *Norvel; non enim creditur referenti, nisi constet de relato.*

Probation by oath of party on reference. 3. Regularly, no person's right can be proved by his own oath, nor taken away by that of his adversary; because these are the bare averments of parties in their own favour. But, where the matter in issue is referred by one of the parties, to the oath of the other, such oath, tho' made in favour of the deponent himself, is decisive of the point; not because a party's oath in his own cause is evidence, but because the reference is a virtual contract between the litigants, by which they are understood to put the issue of the cause, upon what shall be deposed: And this contract is so strictly regarded, that the party who refers to the oath of the other,

other, cannot afterwards in a civil action, plead upon any deed against the party deposing, inconsistent with his oath, *K. 31.* To obviate the snares that may be laid for perjury, he, to whose oath of verity a point is referred, may refuse to depose, till his adversary swear, that he can bring no other evidence in proof of his allegation, *St. 4. 44. 2.* The party to whom reference is made, in place of making oath, sometimes defers the point back to his adversary; but this is not indulged, unless it shall appear, from the circumstances of the case, that he himself cannot depose in the matter referred to him, with distinctness.

4. A defender, tho' he cannot be compelled to swear to facts in a libel properly criminal, yet may, in trespasses, where the conclusion is limited to a fine, or to damages; *e. g.* in blood-wits, *13. Feb. 1634, Bailie of Melrofs*; in batteries, *F. 24. July 1678, Gordon*; or injuries, *2. Jan. 1736, Stuart.* Wives are obliged to make oath, on debts contracted by them before marriage, *9. March 1627, Ker*; and executors, on debts due by the deceased, *13. March 1627, Ker*; which oaths are effectual against themselves, as to their proper interest: But the husband cannot be affected by the wife's oath; nor the relict or others concerned in the executry, by that of the executor, who is merely their trustee. In general, an oath of party cannot either hurt or benefit third parties; being, as to them, *res inter alios acta*, *l. 9. §. 7. l. 10. de jurej.* A tutor's oath, tho' it cannot bind his minor in a matter of debt, yet is effectual against him, as to acts of administration done by the tutor, *12. Dec. 1661, Hepburn.*

In what cases a party may refuse to depose.

An oath of party affects only the litigants.

Qualified
oaths.

Qualities
either in-
trinsic,

Or ex-
trinsic.

In what
cases is
the quali-
ty of pay-
ment in-
trinsic.

5. An oath upon reference, is sometimes qualified by special limitations restricting it. The qualities which are admitted by the judge as part of the oath, are called intrinsic, those which the judge rejects or separates from the oath, extrinsic. Where the quality makes a part of the allegation which is relevantly referred to oath, it is intrinsic. Thus, because a merchant, suing for furnishings after the three years, must, in order to make a relevancy, offer to prove by the defender's oath, not only the delivery of the goods, but that the price is still due; therefore, tho' the defender should acknowledge upon oath his having received the goods, yet, if he adds, that he paid the price, this last part, being a denial that the debt subsists, is intrinsic; since it is truly the point referred to oath. Where the quality does not import an extinction of the debt, but barely a counter claim, or *mutua petitio*, against the pursuer, it is held as extrinsic, and must be proved *aliunde*. The quality of compensation is extrinsic, 9. Dec. 1664, *Learmont*; for compensation does not operate by our law, *ipso jure*. A creditor, in a holograph bond, is not obliged, even after the vicennial prescription is elapsed, to prove that the debt still subsists, but simply, that the bond was signed by the debtor, 1669, c. 9.; the quality of payment is therefore, in this case, extrinsic, and resolves into a defence, being no part of the libel referred to oath.

6. One who sues on a debt, constituted neither by writing, nor before witnesses, must refer, not only its constitution, but subsistence to the defender's oath; since the oath of the debtor, by which alone the debt can be proved, ought

ought to be also effectual for a proof of its payment: The quality therefore of payment or satisfaction must, in such case, be intrinsic, by the above mentioned rule, 14. *Jan.* 1737, *Moffat*. Yet a defender who, in his oath, admits the constitution of a debt, cannot get off by adjecting the quality of payment, where the payment ought, by its nature, to be vouched by written evidence, 23. *Dec.* 1707, *Brown*. The observations made upon this point, apply with equal force, to the case where the defence of payment is referred by the defender to the pursuer; Thus, if the creditor shall depose, that the money he received was not in payment of the debt pursued for, but in consequence of a separate bargain, the quality is intrinsic, being really a denial of the point referred to oath, 27. *Nov.* 1705, *Sinclair*; but if he acknowledges that he received a sum in payment, it will not avail him, tho' he should add, that he had afterwards disbursed it on the debtor's account.

7. Oaths of verity are sometimes deferred by the judge to either party, *ex officio*; which, because they are not founded on any implied contract between the litigants, are not finally decisive, but may be traversed on proper evidence afterwards produced; or the cause, if it has been pursued before an inferior court, may be advocated, in respect the judge had no good reason to examine the party. These oaths are commonly put by the judge, for supplying a lame or imperfect proof, and are therefore called, oaths in supplement. There are frequent instances of them, in that sort of disbursements by factors, which does not easily admit of vouchers;

Oaths in
supple-
ment,

Are de-
ferred for
supplying
an imper-
fect proof.

vouchers; or in furnishings by merchants, the quantity or prices of which, are not fully proved by witnesses. Where the evidence brought before the judge does not amount, even to a *semplena probatio*, he ought not to take the party's oath in supplement, *F. 28. Dec. 1695, Thomson*. After a party deposes, upon a reference, either of his adversary or of the judge, in general terms, he cannot be re-examined upon any particular fact which may involve him in perjury; *Dirl. 453*. And lest parties should be led into the suspicion of that crime, the court, where special interrogatories are to be put, begin with these, and then proceed to the general one; see *Diction. vol. 2. p. 15*.

Re-examination of a party not allowed.

Oath of calumny,

Is only an oath of opinion.

Cannot be put, after a full proof.

Nor in reductions-improbations.

8. To prevent groundless allegations, oaths of calumny have been introduced, by which either party may demand his adversary's oath, that he believes the facts contained in his libel or defences, to be just and true, *1429, c. 125*. As this is an oath, not of verity, but only of opinion, the party who puts it to his adversary, does not renounce other probation, *St. 4. 44. 20*; and therefore no party is bound to give an oath of calumny, on recent facts of his own, *Act. S. 13. Jan. 1692*; for such oath is really an oath of verity. Formerly, parties, even after they had proved their allegations, might have been compelled to swear *de calumnia*, *13. Jan. 1625, Lord Duffus*; but these oaths are now confined to the cases where the proof is not yet brought, or where it is defective, *F. 22. Dec. 1699, Logy*. They do not take place in reductions-improbations before production; for the pursuer's allegation that the writings called for are false, is founded merely in a *fictio juris*, and

so is not inconsistent with his belief that they genuine, *Dahr.* 159. They have not been so frequent, since *Act S.* 1. *Feb.* 1715, §. 6. whereby any party, against whom a fact shall be alledged, is obliged, without making oath, to confess or deny it; and, in case of calumnious denial, is subjected to the expence that the other party has thereby incurred.

Now
much in
disuse.

9. In all oaths, whether of verity or calumny, the citation carries, or at least implies, a certification, that if the party does not appear at the day assigned for deposing, he shall be held *pro confesso*; from a presumption of his consciousness, that the fact upon which he declines to swear, makes against him; but no party can be held *pro confesso*, if he be in the kingdom, without a previous personal citation used against him. The Court of Session are in use to restore the party, who offers *de recenti* to purge his contumacy, upon refunding to his adversary the expence he has been put to by the delay; but no person will be restored *ex intervallo*, where the adverse party is in danger of losing his other probation, by the death of the witnesses, unless on the most pregnant grounds. Where one is restored *ex justitia*, e. g. because he was not legally cited, the effect of the certification is entirely taken off, *Harc.* 741; but if he be restored *ex gratia*, and happens to die before deposing, the presumptive confession operates against his heir. Tho' an oath which resolves into a *non memini*, cannot be said to prove any point, yet where one so deposes upon a recent fact, to which he himself was privy, his oath is considered as a dissembling of the truth,

A party
not com-
paring to
depose, is
held *pro*
confesso,

But he
may be
reponed,
either *ex*
justitia or
ex gratia.

Oath
which re-
solves into
a *non me-*
mini.

truth, and he is held *pro confesso*, as if he had refused to swear, 6. Feb. 1675, *Irvine*.

Oath in
litem.

It obtains
only, in
cases of
wrong.

10. An oath *in litem*, is that which the judge defers to the pursuer, for ascertaining, either the quantity or the value of the goods taken from him without order of law, or the extent of his damages. An oath *in litem*, as it is the affirmation of a party in his own behalf, is only allowed, where there is proof that the other party has been engaged in some illegal act, *e. g.* in a *spuilzie*, or in an unwarrantable intermeddling with the Pursuer's goods; or where the public policy has made it necessary, as in the case of *nautae, caupones, stabularii*, 3. 1. 11. This oath, as to the quantity, is not admitted, where there is a concurring testimony of witnesses brought in proof of it, see *F.* 16.

In what
cases, sub-
ject to mo-
dification.

Jan. 1697, *Fea.* When it is put as to the value of goods, it is only an oath of credulity, and therefore it has always been subject to the modification of the Lords, *Harc.* 740: But as a further check upon exorbitant values that may be put by the party on his own goods, the court has, by the later practice, ordained the pursuer, before making oath, to exhibit a special condescendance of the prices, with the grounds on which it proceeds, which they tax as they see reasonable, and then admit the oath, not exceeding such previous modification, 19. *Nov.* 1737, *Man.*

Probation
by wit-
nesses.

11. Anciently, when writing was little used, most points might have been proved by witnesses, *R. M l.* 3. c. 1. §. 6. 22. 23. &c: Even that possession, which is essential to heritable rights, depended on the testimony of the *pares curiae*,

curiae, 2. 3. 15.; but after writing came to be a more general accomplishment, the lubricity of testimonies made it necessary, to bring probation by witnesses within a narrower compass. By a constitution of *Ch. IX. of France* dated 1566, all contracts for sums exceeding 100 livres, must be reduced into writing. The law of *Scotland*, tho' it has not carried this point so far, rejects the testimony of witnesses, 1. In payments of any sum above *L. 100 Scots*, all which must be proved either *scripto vel juramento*, by *Act S. 8. June 1597.* 2. In all gratuitous promises, which, tho' for the smallest trifle, cannot be proved by witnesses; since, as their force depends entirely on the import of the words uttered by the promiser, he may be misunderstood by inattentive hearers, 19. *Jan. 1672, Deuchar.* 3. In all contracts, where writing is either essential to their constitution, 3. 2. 2, or where it is usually adhibited, as in the borrowing of money. And it is a general rule, subject to the restrictions mentioned in the next §, that no debt or right, once constituted by writing, can be taken away by witnesses, *l. 1. C. de testib.*

12. On the other part, probation by witnesses is admitted to the extent of *L. 100 Scots*, in payments, nuncupative legacies, and verbal agreements which contain mutual obligations, 26. *June 1706, Anderson.* And it is received to the highest extent, 1. In all bargains which have known engagements naturally arising from them, concerning moveable goods. 2. In facts performed in satisfaction, even of a written obligation, where such obligation binds the party precisely to the performance of them, 25. *Nov.*

Rejected
in pay-
ments a-
bove
*L. 100
Scots.*

In gratui-
tous pro-
mises.

In con-
tracts
where
writing
is adhibi-
ted.

In what
cases, ad-
mitted
below
*L. 100
Scots.*

In what
cases, to
the high-
est extent.

1624, *Bisset*, — 7. *Jan.* 1662, *E. Lauderdale*.
 3. In facts which, with difficulty, admit of a proof by writing, even tho' the effect of such proof should be the extinction of a written obligation, especially if the facts import fraud or violence; thus, a bond is reducible *ex dolo*, on a proof by witnesses. Lastly, all intromission by a creditor with the rents of his debtor's estate payable in grain, may be proved by witnesses, 4. *Feb.* 1671, *Wishart*, — 2. *Dec.* 1675, *Thomson*; and even intromission with the silver rent, where the creditor has entered into the total possession of the debtor's lands, 25. *Jan.* 1711, *Bailly*.

What persons are rejected as witnesses.

Near relations.

Domestic servants.

Moveable tenants.

13. No person, whose near relation to another bars him from being a judge in his cause, 681, c. 13, can be admitted as a witness for him; but he may, against him, 24. *Nov.* 1709, *Monteith*; except a wife or child, who cannot be compelled to give testimony against the husband or parent, *ob reverentiam personae, et metum perjurii*, *F.* 23. *July* 1700, *Erskine*, — *eod. die*, *Drummond*. Tho' the witness, whose propinquity to one of the parties is objected to, be as nearly related to the other, the objection stands good, *New Coll.* 48. The testimony of domestic servants is rejected, because of their dependence on their masters; but that of handicraftsmen is admitted, for those who employ them, *F.* 26. *Feb.* 1685, *Erskine*. Formerly moveable tenants, *i. e.* tenants who have no written tacks, were disallowed, from the presumed influence of their landlords over them; but now, since that influence is much worn out, our present practice admits them, 15. *Jan.* 1735, *Blackader*.

14. The

14. The testimony of infamous persons is rejected, *i. e.* persons who have been guilty of crimes that law declares to infer infamy, or who have been declared infamous, by the sentence of a judge; but *infamia facti* does not disqualify a witness, 31. Jan. 1671, Lady Milton. Pupils are inhabile witnesses; being, in the judgment of law, incapable of the impressions of an oath. The testimony of women is always received, when it is *necessary, i. e.* when the fact cannot be proved without them; and it is seldom admitted, where other witnesses can be had, Feb. 1730, Dunbar,—13. Jan. 1736, Wiseman. Near kinsmen or domestic servants, may, where there is a penury of witnesses, arising from the nature or circumstances of the fact, be received *cum notâ*; that is, their testimony, tho' not quite free from suspicion, is to be conjoined with the other evidence, and to have such weight given it, as the judge shall think it deserves.

Infamous
persons.

Pupils.

Women.

Witnesses
received
cum notâ.

15. All witnesses, before they are examined in the cause, are purged of partial counsel, that is, they must depose, that they have no interest in the suit, nor have given advice how to conduct it; that they have got neither bribe nor promise, nor have been instructed how to depose; and that they bear no enmity to either of the parties. These, because they are the first questions put to a witness, are called *initialia testimonii*. Where a party can bring present proof of a witness's partial counsel, in any of the above particulars, he ought to offer it, before the witness be sworn; but, because such objection, if it cannot be instantly verified, will be no bar to the examination, law allows the

Witnesses
are purged
of partial
counsel.

*Initialia
testimonii.*

Protesta-
tion for
reproba-
tor.

the party in that case, to protest for *reprobator*, before the witness is examined; *i. e.* that he may be afterwards allowed to bring evidence of his enmity, or other inhability.

The acti-
on there-
upon is
admitted,
not only
before
sentence,

16. The Lords, by the former practice, admitted action of reprobator, tho' no such protestation had been entered, so long as sentence was not pronounced in the principal cause; provided it could be admitted, without damage to him who had cited the witness, *F. 13. July 1700, Goodin*: But by our present custom, reprobators are not received, unless specially protested for at the examination of the witness, even tho' he who summoned him, can qualify no loss, by the intermediate death of others, whom he might have brought for proof of the

But after
it.

same facts, *5. Jan. 1737, Wright*. Reprobator is competent even after sentence, where protestation is duly entered, *26. June 1623, Cochran*; but in that case, the party insisting must consign *L. 100 Scots*, which he forfeits if he succumb, *3. Dec. 1635, Robinson*. This action must have the concurrence of the King's Advocate, because the conclusion of it imports perjury; and for this reason, the witness must be made a party to it, *9. Nov. 1676, Paterson*.

The wit-
ness must
be made a
party.

Diligence
against
witnesses.

17. The interlocutory sentence or warrant, by which parties are authorised to bring their proof, is either by way of act, or of incident diligence. In an act, the Lord Ordinary who pronounces it, is no longer judge in the process; but in an incident diligence, which is commonly granted upon points that do not exhaust the cause, the Lord Ordinary continues judge. If a witness does not appear at the day fixed by the

the warrant of citation, a second warrant is granted of the nature of a caption, containing a command to messengers, to apprehend and bring him before the court. Where the party to whom a proof is granted, brings none within the term allowed by the warrant, an interlocutor is pronounced, circumducing the term, and decerning against him for not proving, (the word *circumduce* is used nearly in the same sense, l. 73. §. 1. 2. *de judic.*). Where evidence is brought, if it be upon an act, the Lord Ordinary on the acts, after the term for proving is elapsed, declares the proof concluded, and prepares a state of the case, which must be judged by the whole Lords; if it is upon an incident diligence, the import of the proof may be determined by the Lord Ordinary.

Circum-
duction
for not
proving.

Conclud-
ed cause.

18 Where facts do not admit a direct proof, presumptions are received as evidence, which, in many cases, make as convincing a proof as the direct. Presumptions are consequences deduced from facts known or proved, which infer the certainty, or at least a strong probability, of another fact to be proved. This kind of probation is therefore called artificial, because it requires a reasoning, to infer the truth of the point in question, from the facts that already appear in proof. Presumptions are either, 1. *juris et de jure*; 2. *juris*; or 3. *hominis* or *judicis*. The first sort obtains, where statute, or custom, establishes the truth of any point upon a presumption; and it is so strong, that it rejects all proof that may be brought to elide it in special cases. Thus, the testimony of a witness, who forwardly offers himself without being cited, is, from a presumption of his partiality, rejected,

Prefump-
tions,

*Juris et
de jure.*

rejected, let his character be ever so fair; and thus also, a minor, because he is by law presumed incapable of conducting his own affairs, is, upon that presumption, disabled from acting without the consent of his curators, tho' he should be known to behave with the greatest prudence. Many such presumptions are fixed by statute, 1592, c. 145,—1621. c. 18,—1690, c. 21, &c.

Juris.

19. *Praesumptiones juris* are those, which our law-books or decisions have established, without founding any particular consequence upon them, or statuting *super praesumpto*. Most of this kind are not proper presumptions inferred from positive facts, but are founded, merely on the want of a contrary proof; thus, the legal presumptions for freedom, for life, for innocence, &c. are in effect so many negative propositions, that servitude, death, and guilt, are not to be presumed, without evidence brought by him who makes the allegation. All of them, whether they be of this sort, or proper presumptions, as they are only conjectures formed from what commonly happens, may be elided, not only by direct evidence, but by other conjectures, affording a stronger degree of probability to the contrary. *Praesumptiones*

Judicis.

hominis or *judicis*, are those which arise daily from the circumstances of particular cases; the strength of which is to be weighed by the judge.

Fictio juris.

20. A *fictio juris* differs from a presumption. Things are presumed, which are likely to be true; but a fiction of law assumes for truth, what is either certainly false, or, at least, is as probably false as true. Thus, an heir is feigned
or

or considered in law, as the same person with his ancestor; thus also, writings, against which certification is obtained in a reduction-improbation, are adjudged to be false, *fictione juris*, tho' the most convincing proof should be brought, that they had once existed, and were genuine. Fictions of law must, in their effects, be always limited to the special purposes of equity, for which they were introduced; see an example, 4. 1. 5.

TIT. 3. Of Sentences and their Execution.

PROPERTY would be most uncertain, if debateable points might, after receiving a definitive judgment, be brought again in question, at the pleasure of either of the parties: Every state has therefore affixed the character of final, to certain sentences or decrees, which, in the *Roman* law, are called *res judicatae*, and which exclude all review, or rehearing.

2. Decrees of the court of Session, are either *in foro contradictorio*, where both parties have litigated the cause, or in absence of the defender. Decrees of the Session *in foro* cannot, in the general case, be again brought under the review of the court, either on points which the parties neglected to plead before sentence (which we call competent and omitted), or upon points pleaded, and found insufficient (proponed and repelled), 1672, c. 16. §. 19. But decrees, tho' *in foro*, are reversible by the court, where either they labour under essential nullities, *e. g.* where they are *ultra petita*, or not conformable

*Res judi-
catae.*

Decrees
of the
Session
in foro.

In what
cases re-
ducible.

conformable to their grounds and warrants, or founded on an error in calcul, &c.; or where the party against whom the decree is obtained, has thereafter recovered evidence sufficient to overturn it, of which he knew not before, *St. 4. 1. 44*, — *Mackenzie. §. 1. h. t.*

3. As parties might formerly reclaim against the sentences of the Session, at any time before extracting the decree, no judgment was final till extract; but now, a sentence of the inner-house, either not reclaimed against, within six federunt days after its date, *Act S. 9. July 1709*, or adhered to upon a reclaiming bill, tho' it cannot receive execution till extract, makes the judgment final, as to the court of Session, *Act S. 26. Nov. 1718*. And, by an order of the house of Lords, 24. *March 1725*, no appeal is to be received by them from sentences of the Session after five years from extracting the sentence; unless the person intitled to such appeal be minor, cloathed with a husband, *non compos mentis*, imprisoned, or out of the kingdom. Sentences, pronounced by the Lord Ordinary, have the same effect, if not reclaimed against, as if they were pronounced in presence; and all petitions against the interlocutor of an Ordinary, must be preferred, within eight federunt days after signing such interlocutor, *Act S. 9. July 1709*.

Two consecutive interlocutors are final.

Time limited for appeals.

Decrees of the Session in absence, are not *res judicatae*.

4. Decrees, in absence of the defender, have not the force of *res judicatae*, as to him; for where the defender does not appear, he cannot be said to have subjected himself, by the judicial contract which is implied in *litis-contestatio*: A party therefore may be restored against these, upon paying to the other his costs in recovering

covering them. The sentences of inferior courts may be reviewed by the court of Session, before decree by advocation, 1. 2. 20, and after decree by suspension or reduction; which two last, are also the methods of calling in question such decrees of the Session itself, as can again be brought under the review of the court.

5. Reduction (4. 1. 5.—18.) is the proper remedy, either where the decree has already received full execution by payment, or where it decrees nothing to be paid or performed, but simply declares a right in favour of the pursuer. Sentences are reviewed either by reduction,
 Suspension is that form of law, by which the effect of a sentence condemnatory, that has not yet received execution, is stayed or postponed, till the cause be again considered. Or suspension.
 The first step towards suspension is a bill preferred to the Lord Ordinary on the bills. This bill, when the desire of it is granted, is a warrant for issuing letters of suspension which pass the signet; but, if the presenter of the bill shall not, within fourteen days after passing it, expedite the letters, execution may proceed on the sentence, *Act S. 3. July 1677.* A sifit granted on a bill, without passing it, expires also in fourteen days, *Act S. 9. Nov. 1680.* Suspensions of decrees *in foro* cannot pass, but by the whole Lords in time of Session, and by three in vacation time; but other decrees may be suspended by any one of the Judges.

6. As suspension has the effect of staying the execution of the creditor's legal diligence, it cannot, in the general case, pass, without caution given by the suspender to pay the debt, in the event it shall be found due, see *Act S. 29. Jan. 1650.* Where the suspender cannot, from

Suspenders must give caution.

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his

Juratory
caution.

In what
cases sus-
pension
cannot
pass on
caution.

Suspen-
sion, when
compe-
tent.

The sus-
pender
cannot
cite the
charger
upon his
letters.

his low or suspected circumstances, procure unquestionable security, the Lords admit juratory caution, *i. e.* such as the suspender swears is the best he can offer; but the reasons of suspension are, in that case, to be considered with particular accuracy, at passing the bill, *Act S. 8. Nov. 1682.* The nature of the obligations, arising from this judicial cautionry, is explained, 3. 3. 28. Decrees in favour of the clergy, of universities, hospitals or parish school-masters, for their stipends, rents or salaries, cannot be suspended, but upon production of discharges, or on consignment of the sums charged for, 1669, *c. 6.* — 1696, *c. 14.* A charger, who thinks himself secure without a cautioner, and wants dispatch, may, where a suspension of his diligence is sought, apply to the court, to get the reasons of suspension summarily discussed on the bill.

7. Though he, in whose favour the decree suspended is pronounced, be always called the charger, yet a decree may be suspended, before a charge be given on it. Nay, suspension is competent, even where there is no decree, for putting a stop to any illegal act whatsoever: Thus, a building, or the exercise of a power which one assumes unwarrantably, is a proper subject of suspension. Letters of suspension bear the form of a summons, which contains a warrant to cite the charger; and it is likely that they were anciently used by way of summonses: But they have now of a long time been considered, merely as a prohibitory diligence; so that the suspender, if he would turn provoker, must bring his action of reduction in common form, as was found in a suspension of

of the election of a magistracy, *Feb. 1722, Magistr. of Edinburgh.* If upon discussing the letters of suspension, the reasons shall be sustained, a decree is pronounced, suspending the letters of diligence on which the charge was given, *simpliciter*; which is commonly called a decree of suspension, and has the same force with a reduction, as it takes off the effect of the decree suspended, to perpetuity. If the reasons of suspension be repelled, the court find the letters of diligence orderly proceeded, *i. e.* regularly carried on; and they ordain them to be put to farther execution.

Decree of suspension.

Decree finding the letters orderly proceeded. The execution of decrees.

8. Decrees are carried into execution, by diligence, either against the person, or against the estate of the debtor. The first step of personal execution was anciently, by letters passing the signet, which were called letters of four forms, because the debtor was thereby charged to make payment, four times successively, each charge upon three days. By the fourth, he was charged either to pay the debt, or to enter himself into a prison specified in the letters; and, if he did neither, within the days of the charge, the messenger was directed to denounce him rebel; which severity was thought justifiable, because the debtor might have prevented it, by entering into prison. Letters of horning were not authorised to pass upon liquid debts, till 1584, c. 139. but letters of four forms appear to have also continued in use, till the year 1613; see *Sp. Pr.* p. 149, 150. Before horning could pass on the decree of an inferior judge, the decree was, by our former practice, to have been judicially produced before the Session, and their authority interposed

Personal, by letters of four forms,

And by letters of horning.

Decree
conform.

General
letters of
horning
dis-
charged.

Letters of
caption.

Concur-
rence of
messen-
gers and
magi-
strates.

posed to it by a new decree ; which, because it was made out in the precise terms of the other, was called a decree conform : But now, letters of horning may be granted by warrant of the court without the necessity of a decree conform, on the decrees of magistrates of boroughs, sheriffs, admirals and commissaries, 1593, c. 177, — 1606, c. 10, — 1609, c. 15, — 1612, c. 7. Letters of horning were sometimes directed against all and sundry, without any previous decree, or even citation, *St.* 4. 3. 25, as letters against parishioners, for building church-yard-dikes, in consequence of 1597, c. 232, or against the heritors of a parish for the payment of stipend. These general letters were declared, by 1592, c. 140. to be no foundation, for denouncing any person who was not previously cited to answer to the charge directed against him; and now, by 1690, c. 13, no general letters can issue except for the King's revenue, or ministers stipends, or upon poidings of the ground.

9. If the debtor does not obey the will of the letters of horning, within the days of the charge, 2. 5. 24, the charger, after denouncing him rebel, and registering the horning,

2. 5. 25. 26, may apply for letters of caption, which contain a command, not only to messengers, but to magistrates, to apprehend and imprison the debtor. All messengers and magistrates, who refuse their assistance in executing the caption, are liable *subsidiariè* for the debt; and such subsidiary action is supported by the execution of the messenger employed by the creditor, expressing that they were charged to concur, and would not. By magistrates are understood,

understood, only such as the law obliges to have sufficient prisons, as sheriffs, stewarts, bailies of subsisting boroughs of regality, or magistrates of royal boroughs: Hence a bailie of a borough of barony, cannot be charged to execute a caption, 13. *March* 1623, Bailie of *Duns*. Letters of caption contain an expresse warrant to the messenger, in case he cannot get access, to break open all doors, and other lock-fast places, where he is to search.

10. Law secures Peers and married women, against personal execution by caption, upon civil debts. Pupils are secured by special statute, 1696, c. 41. No caption can be executed against a debtor, within the precincts of the King's palace of *Holyroodhouse*: But this privilege of sanctuary afforded no security to criminals, as that did, which was, by the canon law, conferred on churches and religious houses. The King's castles are not intitled to this privilege, *Falc. vol. 2.* 218. Where the personal presence of a debtor, under caption, is necessary in any of our supreme courts, the judges are empowered to grant him a protection, for such time as may be sufficient for his coming and going, not exceeding a month, 1681, c. 9, ——— 1698, c. 22.

11. After a debtor is imprisoned, he ought not to be indulged the benefit of the air, not even under a guard; for creditors have an interest, that their debtors be kept under close confinement, that, by the *squalor carceris*, they may be brought to pay their debt: And any magistrate or jailor, who shall suffer the prisoner to go abroad, without a proper attestation, upon oath, of the dangerous state of his health,

What persons secured against caption.

Privilege of sanctuary.

Protection against caption.

Prisoners must be closely confined.

Magistrates, when liable *subsidiarie* for the debt.

Form of
liberating
a prisoner.

health, is liable *subsidiariè* for the debt, by *Act S. 14. June 1671*. Magistrates are in like manner liable, if they shall suffer a prisoner to escape, thro' the insufficiency of their prison, *Act S. 11. Feb. 1671*: But, if he shall escape under night, by the use of instruments, or by open force, or by any other accident which cannot be imputed to the magistrates or jailor, they are not chargeable with the debt; provided they shall have, immediately after his escape, made all possible search for him. Regularly, no prisoner for debt upon letters of caption, tho' he should have made payment, could be released without letters of suspension, containing a charge to the jailor to set him at liberty; because the creditor's discharge could not take off the penalty incurred by the debtor for contempt of the King's authority: But, to save unnecessary expence to debtors in small debts, jailors are by *Act S. 5. Feb. 1675*, empowered to let go prisoners, where the debt does not exceed 200 merks *Scots*, upon production of a discharge, in which the creditor consents to his release.

Liberation.
upon *cessio bonorum*,

Must proceed on the prisoner's oath.

12. Our law, from a consideration of compassion, allows insolvent debtors to apply for a release from prison, upon a *cessio bonorum*, i. e. upon their making over to the creditors, all their estate, real and personal. This must be insisted for, by way of action, to which all the creditors of the prisoner ought to be made parties. The prisoner must, in this action, which is cognisable only by the court of Session, exhibit a particular inventory of his estate, and make oath that he has no other, and that he has

has made no conveyance of any part of it, since his imprisonment, to the hurt of his creditors. He must also make oath, whether he has granted any disposition of his effects before his imprisonment, and condescend on the persons to whom, and on the cause of granting it; that the Court may judge, whether, by any collusive practice, he has forfeited his claim to liberty, *Act Sed. 1. Dec. 1635, and 8. Feb. 1688.*

13. A fraudulent bankrupt is not allowed this privilege; nor a criminal, who is liable in an assythment or indemnification to the party injured or his executors, tho' the crime itself should be extinguished by a pardon, *Falc. vol. 2. 230.* A disposition granted on a *cessio bonorum* is merely in farther security to the creditors, not in satisfaction or *in solutum* of the debts. If therefore, the debtor shall acquire any estate after his release, such estate may be attached by his creditors, as if there had been no *cessio*, except in so far as is necessary for his subsistence, *l. 4. pr. de cess. bon.—2. Att. c. 7.*

§. 3. Debtors, who are set free on a *cessio bonorum*, are obliged to wear a habit proper to dyvours or bankrupts. The Lords are, by 1696, c. 5. prohibited to dispense with this mark of ignominy, unless in the summons and process of *cessio*, it be libelled, sustained and proved, that the bankruptcy proceeds from misfortune. And bankrupts are condemned to submit to the habit, even where no suspicion of fraud lies against them, if they have been dealers in an illicit trade, *New Coll. 4.*

14. Where a prisoner for debt declares upon oath, before the magistrate of the jurisdiction, that he has not wherewith to maintain himself, Indigent prisoners must either be alimended,

Or libera- self, the magistrate may, by 1696, c. 32. set
 ted on the him at liberty, if the creditor, in consequence
 act of of whose diligence he was imprisoned, does
 grace. not alimnt him within ten days after intimation
 made for that purpose. But the magistrate
 may, in such case, detain him in prison, if he
 chuses to bear the burden of the alimnt, ra-
 ther than release him, 20. *Feb. 1713, Grier-*
son. This statute, which is usually called the
 act of grace, is limited to the case of pri-
 soners for civil debts: No prisoner therefore
 can claim the benefit of it, who is committed,
 either for not performing a fact in his own
 power, *F. 2. Dec. 1709, Ross,* or for not pay-
 ing a fine or damages arising *ex delicto*, 23.
Nov. 1738, Maclesly.

Execution
 against
 the debt-
 or's e-
 state.

Letters of
 open
 doors.

Letters of
 ejection.

15. Decrees are executed against the move-
 able estate of the debtor, by arrestment or
 poinding, *B. 3. T. 6*; and against his heri-
 table estate, by inhibition, *B. 2. T. 11.* or ad-
 judication, *B. 2. T. 12.* Letters of poinding,
 as well as of horning, may be issued by war-
 rant of the court of Session, on the decrees of
 inferior judges, 1661, c. 29. A messenger em-
 ployed in poinding, if he has not also letters of
 caption alongst with him, has no power to break
 open doors; but if he returns an execution that
 access was denied him, letters will be issued of
 course, giving him that power, which are called,
 letters of open doors. If one be condemned,
 in a removing or other process, to quit the pos-
 session of lands, and refuses, notwithstanding a
 charge, letters of ejection are granted of course,
 ordaining the Sheriff to eject him, and to enter
 the obtainer of the decree into possession.
 Where the party still continued to possess in
 spite

spite of law, the *Scots* Privy-council, while that court subsisted, granted letters of fire and sword, authorising the Sheriff to dispossess him by all the methods of force; but, by our present practice, where one opposes by violence, the execution of a decree, or of any lawful diligence, which the civil magistrate is not able by himself and his officers to make good, the execution is enforced, *manu militari*.

16. A decree arbitral, which is a sentence Decrees proceeding on a submission to arbiters, has some arbitral. affinity with a judicial sentence, tho' in most respects the two differ. A submission is a con- Submis- tract entered into, by two or more parties sion. who have disputable rights or claims, whereby they refer their differences to the final determination of an arbiter or arbiters, and oblige themselves to acquiesce in what shall be decided.

Where there are two or more arbiters, an over- Over- man is commonly named in the submission, to man. whom power is given to determine, in case the arbiters cannot agree in the sentence; and sometimes, the nomination of the oversman, is left to the arbiters: But in either case, the oversman has no power to decide, unless the arbiters differ in opinion; for the power of decision is given in the first place to them, *Dalr.* 161.

Where the day within which the arbiters are How long to decide, is left blank in the submission, submissi- practice has limited the arbiters power of deci- ons are ding to a year. As this has proceeded from the obligatory. ordinary words of style, empowering the arbiters to determine betwixt and the day of next to come; therefore, where a submission is indefinite, without specifying any time, it ought, like all other contracts or ob-

ligations to subsist for forty years. And on this ground, a bond obliging the granter, to submit debateable claims to certain persons, is perpetual, and productive of an action at any time within the years of prescription, 25. *Feb.* 1630, *Hay*,—3. *Feb.* 1669, *Boswal*. Submissions, like mandates, expire by the death of any of the parties submitters; see 25. *Feb.* 1630, *Hay*.

Can arbiters be compelled to decide?

17. Formerly, arbiters who had accepted a submission, might have been compelled by letters of horning to pronounce sentence; which proceeded from the style in which submissions were then executed, by which not only the parties, but the arbiters, consented to the registration of the submission, in order to diligence. As this part of style is now disused, it may be doubted, whether an arbiter who has accepted the office, may, like a mandatary, throw it up at pleasure; see *F.* 30. *June* 1699, *Chiesly*, and *l.* 3. §. 1. *de rec. et qui*. This is certain, that he cannot now be compelled by summary diligence, to decide. As arbiters are not vested with jurisdiction, they cannot compel witnesses to make oath before them, or havers of writings to exhibit them; but this defect is supplied by the court of Session, who at the suit of the arbiters, 6. *Jan.* 1670, *Ker*, or of either of the parties, *F.* 26. *June* 1696, *Stevenson*, will grant warrant for citing witnesses, or for the exhibition of writings. For the same reason, the power of arbiters is barely to decide; the execution of the decree belongs to the judge. Where the submitters consent to the registration of the decree arbitral, performance may be enforced by summary diligence.

Arbiters cannot grant warrant for citing witnesses,

Nor execute their own sentences.

18. The

18. The power of arbiters is wholly derived from the consent of parties. Hence, where their powers are limited to a certain day, they cannot pronounce sentence after that day; tho' they may, *in ipso termino*, i. e. on the very day, betwixt and which, the parties empowered them to decide, *F. 30. June 1694, Wilson*: Nor can they subject parties, to a penalty higher than that which they have agreed to in the submission, *24. Feb. 1739, Cred. of Boquhan*. And where a submission is limited to special claims, sentence pronounced on subjects not specified in the submission, is null, as being *ultra vires compromissi*.

They cannot exceed the powers given them.

19. But, on the other part, as submissions are designed for a most favourable purpose, the amicable composing of differences, the powers thereby conferred on arbiters, receive an ample interpretation. For this reason, a general submission of all questions and claims between the parties, imports a power to the arbiters, to decide upon claims, not only of moveable, but of heritable bonds, *15. Dec. 1631, Kincaid*. Hence also, where arbiters in a special submission, decree mutual general discharges to be granted *hinc inde*, the decree is nevertheless valid, in as far as it relates to the claims specified in the submission; and the effect of the general discharge is by a favourable interpretation restricted to these claims, *F. 25. Dec. 1702, Craufurd*. In like manner, tho', by the *Roman* law, a decree arbitral, which decided only part of the claims submitted, and left the rest open, was null, *l. 19. §. 1. de rec. et qui*. such partial decree is effectual by our customs, *20. March 1630, Stark*: Yet to prevent

The powers of arbiters are amply interpreted.

prevent cavilling, that power, where it is intended to be given to arbiters, is by the present style specially expressed in the submission. Where the submitters have mutual claims against one another, a decree arbitral which determines only those on one part, and leaves all on the other undetermined, is null, 30. *June 1625, Falconer*; for it can, in no case, be presumed to be the meaning of parties, that one of them shall have the benefit of a final decision, on the claims competent to him, while the other is left to make good all his, by a law-suit.

Decrees
arbitral
not reduc-
ible on
iniquity.

20. Our more ancient law, by which decrees arbitral might be reduced on the iniquity of the sentence, or enormous prejudice of the party, defeated the principal design of submissions, viz. the cutting off of law-suits; and was hardly reconcileable to the express compact of the submitters, by which they agree to acquiesce in the decision of the arbiter, *l. 27. §. 2. de rec. et qui.* But, by *Reg. 1695, §. 25.* decrees arbitral are declared not reducible upon any ground, except corruption, bribery or falsehood.

TIT. 4.

Tit. 4. Of Crimes.

THE word Crime, in its most general sense, Crimes, includes every breach, either of the law of God, or of our country; in a more restricted meaning, it signifies such transgressions of law, as are punishable by courts of justice. Crimes were, by the *Roman* law, divided into public and private. Public crimes were those that were expressly declared such by some law ^{Public,} or constitution, *l. 1. de publ. judic.* and which, on account of their more atrocious nature, and hurtful consequences, might be prosecuted by any member of the community, §. 1. *Inst. eod.* 1. Private crimes could be pursued only by the party injured, and were generally punished, ^{And pri-} by a pecuniary fine to be applied to his use. ^{vate.} By the law of *Scotland*, no private party, except the person injured or his next of kin, can accuse criminally: But the King's Advocate, who, in this question, represents the community, has a right to prosecute all crimes *in vindictam publicam*, tho' the party injured should refuse to concur. Smaller offences, as petty riots, injuries, &c. which do not demand the public vengeance, pass generally by the appellation of delicts, and are punished, only by a small pecuniary mulct, or perhaps by a short imprisonment.

2. It is of the essence of a crime, that there ^{Dole is} be an intention in the actor to commit it; ^{essential to} an action, in which the will of the agent has no ^{crimes.} part,

part, is not a proper object, either of rewards or punishments: Hence arises the rule, *crimen dolo contrahitur*. Simple negligence does not therefore constitute a proper crime, *l. 7. ad leg. Corn. de sicar.*: Yet where it is extremely gross, it may be punished arbitrarily or *extra ordinem*; see *l. 11. de incend. ruin. naufr.* Far less can we reckon in the number of crimes, involuntary actions, the first cause of which is not in the agent; or those committed by an idiot or furious person: But lesser degrees of fatuity, which only darken reason, will not afford a total defence, tho' they may save from the *poena ordinaria*. Actions committed in drunkenness are not, as to this question, to be considered as involuntary, seeing the drunkenness itself, which was the first cause of the action, is both voluntary and criminal.

3. On the same principle, such as are in a state of infancy, or in the confines of it, are incapable of a criminal action; dole not being incident to that age, *l. 12. ad leg. Corn. de sicar.* The *Roman* law asserts, in general, that crimes are not imputable to pupils, *l. 22. pr. ad leg. Corn. de fals.*; but the precise age at which a person becomes capable of dole, being fixed neither by nature nor by statute, is by our practice to be gathered by the judge, as he best can, from the understanding and manners of the person accused. Where the guilt of a crime arises chiefly from statute, the actor, if he is under puberty, can hardly be found guilty; but, where nature itself points out its deformity, he may, if he is *proximus pubertati*, be more easily presumed capable of committing it: Yet, even in

Yet negligence is in some cases punishable.

Involuntary actions.

Actions committed by idiots.

Actions committed in drunkenness.

Infants cannot commit crimes.

Can pupils commit them?

in that case, he will not be punished *poenâ ordinariâ*.

4. One may be guilty of a crime, not only by perpetrating it himself, but by being accessory to a crime committed by another; which last, is, by civilians, styled, *ope et consilio*, l. 50. §. 3. *de furt.* and, in our law-phrases, art and part. A person may be guilty, art and part, either by giving advice or counsel to commit the crime; or 2. By giving warrant or mandate to commit it; or 3. By actually assisting the criminal in the execution. A bare advice does not seem, by the *Roman* law, to have inferred guilt, l. 36. *pr. de furt.*; contrary to the practice of most other nations. It is generally agreed by doctors, that, in the more atrocious crimes, the adviser is equally punishable with the criminal; and that in the slighter, the circumstances arising from the adviser's lesser age, the jocular or careless manner of giving advice, &c. may be received as pleas for softening the punishment. One who gives mandate to commit a crime, as he is the first spring of action, seems more guilty, than the person employed as the instrument in executing it; yet the actor cannot excuse himself, under the pretence of orders which he ought not to have obeyed. How far the commands of a superior may, in certain cases, either free entirely from punishment, or mitigate it, is explained by *Mackenzie, Crim. Treat. Tit. Art and Part. §. 5. 6.*

Accessories, or art and part.

By advice.

Mandate.

5. Assistance may be given to the perpetrator of a crime, not only in the actual execution, but previous to it, by furnishing him with poison, arms, or the other means of perpetrating it; but, if he who thus assists, had no reason to believe,

Or assistance.

believe, that these instruments were intended for a criminal purpose, no guilt can be inferred against him. That sort of assistance, which is not given till after the criminal act, and which is commonly called abetting, tho' it be of itself criminal, does not infer art and part of the principal crime; as if one should favour the escape of a criminal, knowing him to be such, or conceal him from justice. But if, previous to the commission of the crime, one should promise protection to the criminal, it will involve both in equal guilt; for nothing can be a stronger incitement to crimes, than the assurance of being screened or protected from punishment.

Crimes
punished
capitally.

Arbitrary
punish-
ment ne-
ver ex-
tended to
death.

6. Those crimes that are, in their consequences, most hurtful to society, are punished capitally, or by death; others escape with a lesser punishment, sometimes fixed by statute, and sometimes arbitrary, *i. e.* left to the discretion of the judge, who may exercise his jurisdiction, either by fine, imprisonment, or a corporal punishment. Where the punishment is left, by law, to the discretion of the judge, he can in no case, extend it to death; for, where the law intends to punish capitally, it says so in express words, and leaves no liberty to the judge to modify: But where, in any of our ancient laws, *L. B. c. 132,—1457. c. 77. &c.* the life of the offender is put in the mercy or will of the King, it is probable that the judge, in place of pronouncing sentence himself, left it to the Sovereign; who inflicted, sometimes a capital, and sometimes a lesser punishment on the person guilty, according to his

his demerit. The single escheat of the criminal falls on conviction, in all capital trials, tho' the sentence should not express it; for if the bare non-appearance in a criminal prosecution, draws this forfeiture after it, 2. 5. 26. 27; much more ought the being convicted of a capital crime, to infer it.

Capital crimes infer single escheat.

7. Certain crimes are committed more immediately against God himself; others, against the State; and a third kind, against particular persons. The chief crime in the first class, cognisable by temporal courts, is blasphemy, under which may be included atheism. This crime consists in the denying or vilifying the Deity, by speech or writing. Blasphemers were punished capitally, both by the *Jewish* law, *Lev.* xxiv. 16, and by the *Roman*, *Nov.* 77. All who curse God or any of the persons of the blessed Trinity, are by our law, 1661, c. 21, to suffer death, even for a single act; and those who deny him, if they persist in their denial. This act is ratified by 1695, c. 11, which also makes the denial of a providence, or of the authority of the holy Scriptures, criminal; and punishable capitally for the third offence.

Blasphemy.

8. All persons who used witchcraft, sorcery or necromancy, or pretended skill therein; and all consulters of witches, were punished by death, 1563, c. 73. But by act 9. *Geo.* II. c. 5, no prosecution can be carried on for witchcraft or conjuration; and by the same act, all who undertake, from their skill in any occult science, to tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods, are to suffer imprisonment for a year, stand in the pillory four times in that year, and find surety for their future good behaviour.

Witchcraft.

Telling fortunes.

9. Some crimes against the State are levelled directly against the supreme power, and strike at the constitution itself; others discover such a contempt of law, as tends to baffle authority, or slacken the reins of government. Treason, *crimen majestatis*, is that crime which is aimed against the majesty of the State; and can be committed only by those who are subjects of that State, either by birth or residence. It was high treason, by the law of *Scotland*, to intend the King's death, to lay any restraint upon his person, or to entice any foreign power to invade his dominions, 1662, c. 2, and to rise in arms, maintain forts, or make treaties with foreign States, without his authority, 1661, c. 5. Certain facts, tho' not in their nature treasonable, were declared by Statute to be punishable as treason, *viz.* theft by landed men, 1587, c. 50, murder under trust, *ibid.* c. 51, wilfully setting fire to coal-heughs, 1592, c. 146, or to houses or corns, 1528, c. 8, and assassination, 1681, c. 15. Treason was punished by death, and by the forfeiture to the King, of the traitor's estate, both real and personal: But this forfeiture did not cut off the right of the creditors, tacksmen, superiors, vassals, heirs of entail, or widows of the forfeiting persons, 1690, c. 33. Treason, might by our law, have been tried after the death of the traitor, and sentence condemnatory upon such trial, carried the estate to the crown, 1540, c. 69; which was indeed agreeable to the *jus novum* of the *Romans*, l. 8. pr. C. ad. leg. *Ful. maj.*; but contrary to the rules of law, and the dictates of humanity.

10. Soon

10. Soon after the union of the two kingdoms in 1707, the laws of treason then in force in *England*, were made ours by 7. *An. c. 21*, both with regard to the facts constituting that crime, to the forms of trial, the corruption of blood, and all the penalties and forfeitures consequent on it. By this act, the facts that inferred statutory treason by our former law, are declared simply capital crimes.

English
laws of
treason
made
ours.

11. It is high treason, by 25. *Edw. III. c. 2*. to imagine the death of the King, Queen consort, or of the heir apparent of the crown; to levy war against the King, or adhere to his enemies; to counterfeit the King's coin, or his great or privy Seal; to kill the chancellor, treasurer, or any of the twelve judges of *England*, while they are doing their offices; which last article is by the forenamed act 7. *An.* applied to *Scotland*, in the case of slaying any judge of the Session or of Justiciary, sitting in judgment. Those who wash, clip or lighten the proper money of the realm, 5. *Eliz. c. 11.*—18. *Eliz. c. 1.*; who advisedly affirm by writing or printing, that the Pretender has any right to the crown, or that the King and Parliament cannot limit the succession to it, 6. *An. c. 7*; or who hold correspondence with the Pretender, or any person employed by him, 13. *Cul. III. c. 3.* are also guilty of treason.

Treason
what, by
the laws
of Eng-
land.

12. The forms of proceeding in the trial of treason, whether against Peers or Commoners, are set forth in a small treatise, published by order of the house of Lords in 1709, subjoined to a collection of Statutes concerning treason. By the conviction upon this trial, the whole estate of the traitor forfeits to the crown. His blood

Forms of
proceed-
ing in
treason.

Pains of
treason.

blood is also corrupted, so that, on the death of an ancestor, he cannot inherit; and the estate which he cannot take, falls to the immediate superior, as escheat, *ob defectum heredis*, without distinguishing whether the lands hold of the crown, or of a subject, *Coke 1. Inst. vol. 1. l. 1. c. 1. §. 4.*—*Hale Plac. Cor. vol. 1. c. 27.* By the aforesaid act 7. *An.* it is provided, that no attainder for treason, shall, after the Pretender's death, hurt the right of any person, other than that of the offender, during his natural life; but this provision, is by a posterior act, 17. *Geo. II. c. 39*, not to take place, as long as any of the sons of the Pretender shall be alive. It was for some time doubted, whether the act 1690. *c. 33*, saving the rights of creditors, &c. was repealed by the act 7. *An.* subjecting traitors, tried in *Scotland*, to the pains and forfeitures of the *English* law; since the excluding of creditors is not properly a penalty on the traitor, and our private rights, are by *art. Union, c. 18*, declared unalterable, except for the evident utility of the subject, which article might seem to require an express repealer; see *farther report of Commissioners of inquiry, 1719, p. 15. 21. 23, &c.* But it now seems to be an agreed point, that the rights, even of third parties in the case of forfeiture on treason, must be determined by the law of *England*.

Act saving
the rights
of credi-
tors, &c.
repealed.

Misprision
of treason.

13. Misprision of treason, from *Meprendre*, is the overlooking or concealing of treason. It is inferred by one's bare knowledge of the crime, and not discovering it to a magistrate, or other person intitled by his office to take examinations; tho' he should not in the least degree assent to it. The foresaid act 7. *An.* makes the *English* law of misprision, ours. Its punishment

ment is, by the law of *England*, perpetual imprisonment, together with the forfeiture of the offender's moveables, and of the profits of his heritable estate, during his life, *Hale Plac. Cor. vol. 1. c. 28.*; that is, in the stile of our law, his single and liferent-efcheat.

14. The crime of sedition consists in the raising commotions or disturbances in the state. It is either verbal or real. Verbal sedition, or leasing making, is inferred from the uttering of words, tending to create discord between the King and his people. It was formerly punished by death, and the forfeiture of goods; 1425, c. 43.—1540, c. 83.; but now, either by imprisonment, fine or banishment, at the discretion of the judge, 1703, c. 4. Real sedition is generally committed, by convoking together any considerable number of people, without lawful authority, under the pretence of redressing some public grievance, to the disturbing of the public peace. Those who are convicted of this crime, are punished by the confiscation of their goods; and their lives are to be at the King's will, 1457, c. 77. For preventing rebellious riots and tumults, it is enacted 1. *Geo. I. St. 2. c. 5.* that if any persons, to the number of twelve, shall assemble and being required by a magistrate or constable to disperse, shall nevertheless continue together for an hour after such command, the persons disobeying shall suffer death, and the confiscation of moveables.

15. Judges, who, wilfully or through corruption, use their authority as a cover to injustice or oppression, are punished with the loss of honour, fame and dignity, 1540, c. 104. Under this head, may be classed theftbote (from

Sedition,

Verbal,
or leasing-
making.

Real.

Riot-act.

Corrup-
tion in
judges.
Theft-
bote.

bote,

bote, compensation), which is the taking a consideration in money or goods from a thief, to exempt him from punishment, or connive at his escape from justice. A sheriff or other judge, guilty of this crime, forfeits his life and goods, 1436, c. 137.: And by a posterior statute, 1515, c. 2. even a private person, who takes theftbote, suffers as the principal thief. The buying of disputed claims, concerning which there is a pending process, by any judge or member, either of the Session, or of an inferior court, is punished by the loss of the delinquent's office, and all the privileges thereto belonging, 1594, c. 216.

Buying of
claims.

Deforce-
ment.

Session,
compe-
tent to it.

16. Deforcement is the opposition given, or resistance made, to messengers or other officers, while they are employed in executing the law, The court of Session is competent to this crime, 1581, c. 118.; and by the last statute relating to it, 1592, c. 150, it is made punishable with the confiscation of moveables, the one half to the King, and the other to the creditor at whose suit the diligence was used, Where the deforcement is brought, only *ad civilem effectum*, for recovering the debt and damages, the statute is amply interpreted; and consequently, process will be sustained, if the messenger should be any how hindered in the execution of the diligence, tho' without the effusion of blood; but in a criminal trial, where the conclusion is penal, effusion of blood must be libelled, in terms of the act 1592. Thus also, tho' the words of the act are levelled only against the debtor, or person commanded by him, practice has extended it, in a *civil* action, against those who interpose to save their friend from diligence, without being desired by the debtor.

17. Deforce-

17. Deforcement of the officers of the customs by persons to the number of eight or upwards, was punished by transportation to *America*, for a term of years not exceeding seven, 6. *Geo.* I. c. 21. §. 34.: But now by 19. *Geo.* II. c. 34. armed persons, to the number of three or more, assisting in the illegal running, landing or exporting of prohibited or uncustomed goods, or any who shall resist, wound or maim any officer of the revenue, in the execution of his office, shall suffer death, and the confiscation of moveables.

Deforcement of officers of the revenue.

18. Breach of arrestment, 3. 6. 6. is a crime of the same nature with deforcement, as it imports a contempt of the law, and of our judges; and it is subjected to the pains inflicted on deforcement, by 1581, c. 118, viz. an arbitrary corporal punishment, and the escheat of moveables; with a preference to the creditor for his debt, and for such farther sum as shall be modified to him by the judge. Under this head of crimes against good government and police, may be reckoned the forestalling of markets, that is, the buying of goods intended for a public market, before they are carried there; which, for the third criminal act, infers the escheat of moveables, 1592, c. 148, slaying salmond in forbidden time, 1503, c. 72, offences against the acts for preserving the game, 2. 1. 6. destroying plough-graith in time of tillage, and slaying or houghing horses or cows in time of harvest, 1587, c. 82. and destroying or spoiling growing timber, 1698, c. 16.—1. *Geo.* I. St. 2. c. 48.

Breach of arrestment.

Forestalling of markets.

Offences against the game, planting, &c.

19. Crimes against particular persons, may be directed, either against life, limb, liberty, chastity, goods or reputation. Murder is the wilful

Murder.

- wilful taking away of a person's life, without a necessary cause. The distinction which obtained in our ancient law, between slaughter premeditated, or upon *forethought felony*; and that which was committed on a sudden, or *chaud-mella*, indulging to the last the privilege of girth and sanctuary, *St. Rob. II. c. 9,—1555, c. 31*, was taken off, by *1661, c. 22*. (copied after *1649, c. 19*.), which supposes homicide to be a capital crime, without any such distinction. Casual homicide, where the actor is in some degree blameable, and homicide in self-defence, where the just bounds of defence have been exceeded, are punished arbitrarily by this act; but the slaughter of night-thieves, house-breakers, assistants in masterful depredations, or rebels denounced for capital crimes, may be committed with impunity. The crime of demem-
 bration or the cutting off of a member, is joined with that of murder, in *1491, c. 28*.; but in practice, its punishment has been restricted to the escheat of moveables, and an assythment or indemnification to the party. Mutilation,
 or the disabling of a member, is punished at the discretion of the Judge; see *Pitmedden* on demem-
 bration, *p. 65*.
 20. Self-murder is as highly criminal, as the killing our neighbour; and for this reason, our law has, contrary to the rule, *crimina morte extinguuntur*, allowed a proof of the crime, after the offender's death, that his single escheat might fall to the King or his donatary. To this end, an action must be brought, not before the Justiciary, but the Session, because it is only intended *ad civilem effectum*, for proving and declaring the self-murder; and the
 next

next of kin to the deceased must be made a party to it.

21. The punishment of parricide, or of the murder of a parent, is not confined, by our law, to the criminal himself. All his posterity in the right line, are declared incapable of inheriting; and the succession devolves on the next collateral heir, 1594, c. 220. Even the cursing or beating of a parent, infers death, if the person guilty be above sixteen years; and an arbitrary punishment, if he be under it, 1661, c. 20. A presumptive or statutory murder is constituted by 1690, c. 21. by which any woman who shall conceal her pregnancy, during its whole course, and shall not call for, or make use of help in the birth, is to be reputed the murderer, if the child be dead, or a missing. This act was intended to discourage the unnatural practice, which yet continues too frequent, of women making away with their children begotten in fornication, to avoid church-censures.

Parricide.
Murder of infants.

22. Duelling, *bellum inter duos*, is the crime of fighting in single combat, on previous challenges given and received. The singular combat was authorised by the Gothic polity, as a method of determining both civil and criminal questions; but fighting in a duel, without licence from the King, is by 1600, c. 12. made punishable by death. This act is ratified by 1696, c. 35. which also enacts, that whatever person, principal or second, shall give a challenge to fight a duel, or shall accept a challenge, or otherwise engage therein, shall be punished by banishment and escheat of moveables, tho' no actual fighting should ensue.

Duelling.

23. Haimfucken, (from *haim*, home, and *Haimfuc-*
socken, to seek or pursue), is the assaulting or ^{beat-}

P P P

beating

beating of a person in his own house. The punishment of this crime is no where defined, except in the books of the Majesty, which make it the same as that of a rape, *l. 4. c. 9. 10*; and it is, like rape, capital by our practice, *Mack. Cr. Tr. tit. Haimsucken*. The assault must be made in the proper house of the person assaulted, where he lies and rises daily and nightly, *ibid. l. 1. c. 9. §. 1.*; so that neither a public house, nor even a private, where one is only transiently, falls within the law.

Battery,
*pendente
lite.*

24. Any party to a law-suit, who shall slay, wound or otherwise invade his adversary, at any period of time, between executing the summons, and the compleat execution of the decree, or shall be accessory to such invasion, shall lose his cause, *1584, c. 138,—1594, c. 219*. As these acts direct, that proof shall be previously taken of the invasion, by the Justice *or other competent judge*, the court of Session sustain themselves judges, because they are truly competent to all causes, where the conclusion is merely civil. The sentence pronounced on this trial, against him who has committed the battery, is by the act declared not subject to reduction, either on the head of minority, or any other ground whatever: And if the person prosecuted for this crime, shall be denounced for not appearing, his liferent, as well as single escheat, falls upon the denunciation.

Wrong-
ous im-
prison-
ment.

25 The crime of wrongous imprisonment is described, *1701, c. 6*. It is inferred, by granting warrants of commitment in order to trial, proceeding on informations not subscribed, or without expressing the cause of commitment; by receiving or detaining prisoners on such warrants; by refusing to a prisoner a copy of the

the warrant of commitment; by detaining him in close confinement, above eight days after his commitment; by not releasing him on bail, where the crime isailable; and by transporting persons out of the kingdom, without either their own consent, or a lawful sentence; see below, §. 48. The persons guilty of wrongous imprisonment, are punished by a pecuniary mulct, from 6000 down to L. 400 *Scots*, according to the rank of the person detained; and the judge or other person, acting contrary to the directions of the act, is over and above, subjected to pay to the person detained a certain sum *per diem*, proportioned to his rank, and is declared incapable of public trust. All these penalties may be insisted for, by a summary action before the Session; and are subject to no modification. Private persons may be guilty of this crime, 14. *Dec.* 1736, *Paterfon*.

26. Adultery is the crime by which the marriage-bed is polluted. This crime could, neither by the *Roman* law, l. 6. §. 1. *ad leg. Jul. de adult.* nor the Jewish, *Lev. xx. 10. Deut. xxii. 22.* be committed, but where the guilty woman was the wife of another: By ours, it is adultery, if either the man or woman be married. We distinguish between simple adultery, and that which is notorious or manifest. Open and manifest adulterers, who continue incorrigible, notwithstanding the censures of the church, were punished, 1551, c. 20, by the escheat of moveables; but soon thereafter, by 1563, c. 74. the punishment of notorious and manifest adultery was made capital. This crime is distinguished by one or other of the following characters; where there is issue procreated between

Adultery,
what.

Notour
adultery.

Simple adultery.

tween the adulterers ; or where they keep bed and company together notoriously ; or where they give scandal to the church, and are upon their obstinate refusing to listen to their admonitions, excommunicated, 1581, c. 105. The punishment of simple adultery, not being defined by statute, is left to the discretion of the judge ; but custom has made the falling of the single escheat, one of its penalties, 9. *Jan.* 1662, *Baird.*

Bigamy.

27. Bigamy, is a person's entering into the engagements of a second marriage, in violation of a former marriage-vow still subsisting. Bigamy, on the part of the man, has been tolerated in many states, before the establishment of Christianity, even by the *Jews* themselves ; but it is prohibited by the precepts of the gospel, and it is punished by our law, whether on the part of the man, or of the woman, with the pains of perjury, 1551, c. 19.

Incest.

28. Incest, is committed by persons who stand within the degrees of kindred forbidden in *Lev.* xviii. ; and it is punished capitally, by 1567, c. 14. The same degrees are prohibited in affinity, as in consanguinity, *Lev.* xviii. 14. *et seqq.* As this crime is repugnant to nature itself, it is an ill-founded opinion, that incest cannot be committed, but between persons born in lawful marriage ; for in questions of the law of nature, all children, whether lawful or natural, stand on an equal footing : *Civilis ratio civilia jura corrumpere potest, non vero naturalia.* It is difficult indeed, to bring a legal proof of a relation merely natural, on the side of the father ; but the mother may be certainly known without marriage.

29. There

29. There is no explicate statute, making Rape, or the ravishing of women, capital; but it is plainly supposed, in act 1612, c. 4. by which, the ravisher is exempted from the pains of death, only in the case of the woman's subsequent consent, or her declaration that she went off with him, of her own free-will; and even then, he is to suffer an arbitrary punishment, either by imprisonment, confiscation of goods, or a pecuniary fine.

30. Theft is defined, a fraudulent intermeddling with the property of another, with a view of making gain. Neither the law of *Moses*, nor of *Rome*, punished theft capitally. By the first, the thief was bound to restore, in some cases, five times the value, in others, less, *Exod. xxii. 1. et seqq.*; and by the *Roman*, either the double or quadruple, according to the circumstances attending the crime. Our ancient law proportioned the punishment of the theft, to the value of the goods stolen; heightening it gradually, from a slight corporal punishment to a capital, if the value amounted to thirty-two pennies *Scots*, which, in the reign of *Dav. I.* was the price of two sheep, *R. M. l. 4. c. 16. §. 3.*—*L. B. c. 121. §. 6.* In several later acts, it is taken for granted, that this crime is capital, 1587, c. 82, —1606, c. 5. &c. But where the thing stolen is of small value, we consider it, not as theft, but as pickery, which is punished either corporally or by banishment. The breaking of orchards, and the stealing of green wood is punished by a fine, which rises as the crime is repeated, 1579, c. 84.

31. Theft may be aggravated into a capital crime, tho' the value of the thing stolen be trifling; Aggravated theft.

Refet of theft. trifling; as theft twice repeated, *L. B. c. 121. §. 5.* or committed in the night, *arg. 1661, c. 22.*; or by landed men; or of things set apart for sacred uses. The receivers and concealers of stolen goods, knowing them to be such, suffer as thieves, *St. Al. II. c. 21.* Those who barely harbour the person of the criminal (*receptatores*) within forty-eight hours, either before or after committing the crime, are punished as partakers of the theft, *1567, c. 21.* Such as sell goods belonging to thieves or lawless persons, who dare not themselves come to market, are punished with banishment, and the escheat of moveables, *1587, c. 109.*

Robbery, Rief, Stouth-rief, Sorning. 32. Theft attended with violence, is called robbery; and in our old statutes, rief, *1477, c. 78.* or stouthrief, *1515, c. 2.*; under which class may be included sorning, or the taking of meat and drink by force, without paying for it. Stouthrief came at last to be committed so audaciously; by bands of men associated together, that it was thought necessary to vest all our free-holders, with a power of holding courts upon forners and rieurs, and condemning them to death, *1594, c. 227.* Nay, all were capitally punished, who, to secure their lands from depredation, paid to the rieurs a yearly contribution, which got the name of *black-mail*, *1567, c. 21.*—*1587, c. 102.* An act passed, *1609, c. 13.* commanding to banishment a band of forners, who were originally from *Egypt*, called *Gypsies*, and adjudging to death all that should be reputed *Egyptians*, if found thereafter within the kingdom.

Egyptians. Robbery committed on the seas, is called piracy, and is punished capitally by the High Admiral. Several of the facts which constitute

tute this crime, are set forth in a *British* statute, 8. *Geo.* I. c. 24.

33. Falsehood, in a large sense, is the fraudulent imitation or suppression of truth, to the damage of another. The lives and goods of persons convicted of using false weights or measures

False-
hood.

were, by our old law, in the King's mercy; and their heirs could not inherit, but upon a remission, *L. B. c.* 132. The latest statute against this crime, 1607, c. 2. punishes it by confiscation of moveables.

False
weights
and mea-
sures.

34. That particular species of falsehood, which consists in the falsifying of writings, passes by the name of forgery, and was, by the *Roman* law, punished capitally, where the atrocity of the fact required it, *l. 22. C. ad leg. Corn. de fals.* By our statute-law, the punishment of this crime was, at first, the amputation of the hand, *St. Al.* II. c. 19.; afterwards, proscription, banishment and dismembering of the hand and tongue, joined with the other pains inflicted by the common law, 1551, c. 22.; and at last, it is declared in general terms, to be the pains due to the committers of falsehood, 1621, c. 22. Our practice has, now of a long time, agreeably to the *Roman* law, made the crime capital, unless the forgery be of executions, or other writings of smaller moment; in which case, it is punished arbitrarily, *Feb.* 1739, *Macvicar.*

Forgery.

Its punish-
ment.

35. The writing must not only be fabricated, but put to use or founded on, in order to infer this crime. Any person who founds on a writing alledged to be false, may be put to declare judicially, whether he is willing to abide by it, as a true deed. If he declines to abide

The false
writing
must be
used.

What, if
the user a-
bide by it.

bide by it, the deed is pronounced false ; but he is not absolved, on his passing from it, if evidence be brought that he was accessory to the forgery, 1621, c. 22. Frequently, the user of the deed offers to abide by it *qualificatè*, or under protestation that it came fairly into his hands, and that he had no accession to the crime. The immediate receiver of a writing must, in all cases, abide by it simply ; but heirs and singular successors are, in certain favourable cases, allowed to do it, under a quality, the import of which is to be afterwards considered by the judge.

The court
competent
to forge-
ry.

Configna-
tion in
improbations.

36. The trial of forgery, tho' it be strictly criminal, is proper to the court of Session, 1. 3. 11.; but where improbation is moved against a deed by way of exception, the inferior judge, before whom the action lies, is competent to it, *ad civilem effectum*, arg. 1557, c. 62. He who pleads improbation, either by way of action or exception, was, by said act 1557, obliged to give security, to pay a certain sum, at the discretion of the judge, if he should succumb in his allegation : Afterwards, by an Act of Sederunt, mentioned in *Books S. 8. Jan. 1581*, in place of security for the sum modified, it was to be consigned ; but these acts are now quite in disuse, where the improbation is undertaken by way of action. When it is pleaded as an exception, our practice, to discourage affected delays, obliges the defender who moves it, to consign L. 40 *Scots* ; which he forfeits, if his plea shall appear calumnious.

37. The proof in improbations is either direct or indirect. The first is, by the testimony of the writer of the deed, and of the witnesses who

who attest it, called the instrumentary witnesses. A proof by the indirect manner, is gathered from circumstances and extrinsic arguments. If one of the two instrumentary witnesses should depose that the writing is true, and the other, that he did not attest it, the writing will be annulled, being supported by the testimony of one witness only; but the user will not be subjected to the pains of falsehood, because he is justified by the oath of that witness. Where witnesses attest a deed without knowing the grantor and seeing him subscribe, or hearing him own his subscription, the deed is not only improbable, but such witnesses are declared accessory to forgery, 1681, c. 5.: Yet as this sort of accession is merely statutory, the punishment ought to be restricted, at the discretion of the judge. The circumstances, by which forgeries are most frequently discovered in the indirect way, is, *comparatione literarum*, by comparing the hand-writing of the writer, or the subscription of the grantor, as it stands in other genuine writings, with that which appears in the deed in question; by the manner of spelling; by the agreement or disagreement of the stile of the deed, with that of the age in which it is said to have been executed; by the stamp of the paper; by a false date, or by a proof that the alledged grantor was not, at the date, in that place where the deed bears to have been signed; which last is called *alibi*.

38. Where a person, found guilty of forgery by the court of Session, is by them remitted to the Justiciary, 1. 3. 11. an indictment is there exhibited against him, and a jury sworn, before whom the decree of Session is produced, in place

Direct.

And indirect.

Forgery, when capital, is remitted to the Justiciary.

of all other evidence of the crime, in respect of which, the jury find the pannel guilty; so that that decree, being pronounced by a competent court, is held as full proof, or, in the stile of the bar, as *probatio probata*.

Perjury.

39. Perjury, which is the judicial affirmation of a falsehood on oath, really constitutes the *crimen falsi*; for he who is guilty of it, does, in the most solemn manner, substitute falsehood in the place of truth. To constitute this crime, the violation of truth must be deliberately intended by the swearer; and therefore reasonable allowances ought to be given to forgetfulness or misapprehension, according to his age, health and other circumstances. The breach of a promissory oath does not infer this crime; for he who promises on oath, may sincerely intend performance when he swears, and so cannot be said to call on God to attest a falsehood. Tho' an oath, however false, if made upon reference in a civil question, concludes the cause, the person perjured is liable to a criminal trial; for the effect of the reference can go no farther than the private right of the parties.

Its punishment.

40. Notwithstanding the mischievous consequences of perjury to society, it is not punished capitally, either by the *Roman* law, *l. 13. C. de test.* or by ours. The special punishment of swearing falsely on an assize, was confiscation of moveables, imprisonment for a year, and infamy, *R. M. l. 1. c. 14.*; which punishment came, in the course of time, to be transferred to perjury in general, with a small variation, *1555, c. 47.* The court of Session is competent to perjury *incidenter*, when, in any examination upon oath, taken in a cause depending

Before whom, competent.

pending before them, a person appears to have sworn falsely; but in the common case, that trial is proper to the justiciary. Subornation of perjury consists in tampering with persons who are to swear in judgment, by directing them how they are to depose; and it is punished with the pains of perjury, said 1555, c. 47.

41. The crime of stellionate, from *stellio*, Stellio-nate. *Plin. hist. nat. l. 30. c. 10.* includes every fraud which is not distinguished by a special name; but is chiefly applied to conveyances of the same numerical right, granted by the proprietor to different disponees, *l. 3. §. 1. Stellation.*—1592, c. 140. The punishment of stellionate must necessarily be arbitrary, to adapt it to the various natures and different aggravations of the fraudulent acts, *l. 3. §. 2. Stellation.* The persons guilty of that kind of it, Granting of double rights. which consists in granting double conveyances, are by our law declared infamous, and their lives and goods at the King's mercy, 1540, c. 105. The cognisance of fraudulent bankruptcy is appropriated to the court of Session, who may inflict any punishment on the offender, that Fraudulent bankruptcy. appears proportioned to his guilt, death excepted, 1696, c. 5.

42. The crime of usury, before the reformation, consisted in the taking of *any* interest for the use of money; and now, in taking an higher rate of interest than is authorised by law. It is divided into *usura manifesta*, or direct; and *velata*, or covered. One may be guilty Direct. of the first kind, either where he covenants with the debtor, for more than the lawful interest on the loan of money; or where one receives the interest of a sum before it is due, since there-
by

Under-taking a risk, excludes ufury. by he takes a consideration for the use of money, before the debtor has really got the use of it, 1621, c. 28. Where a debt is clogged with an uncertain condition, by which the creditor runs the hazard of losing his sum, he may covenant for an higher interest than the legal, without the crime of ufury; for there, the interest is not given, merely in consideration of the use of the money, but of the danger undertaken by the creditor. Hence, one who lends money upon bottomry, the repayment of which, depends upon the safe return of the ship on which the money is lent, may lawfully take a rate of interest proportioned to his risk.

Bonds of bottomry.

Indirect ufury,

By our old law,

By a British act.

Ufury, how punished.

43. Covered ufury, is that which is committed under the mask, not of a loan, but of some other contract; *e. g.* a sale, or an improper wadset. Thus, a back-tack, which is given by a wadsetter to the reverfer, for payment of a tack-duty exceeding the legal interest of the sum lent, is accounted a loan, tho' covered under the contracts of wadset and location; and consequently, infers ufury: And in general, all obligations entered into, with an intention of getting more than the legal interest for the use of money, however they may be disguised, are declared usurious, by 1597, c. 247. As a farther guard against this crime, the taking more than the legal interest for the forbearance of payment of money, merchandise or other commodities, by way of loan, exchange or other contrivance whatever; or the taking a bribe for the loan of money, or for delaying its payment, when lent, is declared ufury, 12. *An. stat.* 2.

c. 16.

44. The punishment of ufury, was by said 1597,

1597, declared to be the escheat of moveables, annulling the usurious contract, and a forfeiture of the principal sum lent, with the lawful interest due upon it, to the King or his donatary, with the burden of restoring to the private party, in case he should concur in the prosecution, the unlawful profits given by him to the creditor. But by the foresaid act of Q. Anne, the usurious obligation is not only declared void; but the creditor, if he has received any unlawful profits, forfeits the treble value of the sums or goods lent. Usury, when it is to be pursued criminally, must be tried by the Justiciary; but where the libel concludes only the voiding of the debt or restitution, the Session is the proper court.

Before
whom
compe-
tent.

45. Injury, in its proper acceptation, is the reproaching or affronting our neighbour. Injuries are either verbal or real. A verbal injury, when directed against a private person, consists in the uttering contumelious words, with an intention to defame. The twitting one with natural defects, tho' it be inhumane, does not fall under this description, as these imply no real reproach in the just opinion of mankind. Tho' the *animus injuriandi* be commonly presumed, from the injurious words themselves, yet special circumstances may elide that presumption. Thus, one's informing against his neighbour, as a thief or disorderly person, to a magistrate; or his alledging in judgment a crime against his adversary in his own defence, is no injury, if such information or plea does not appear calumnious. The truth of the injurious words, tho' it may alleviate the guilt, does not absolve entirely from punishment. The cog-

Injury.

Verbal.

nifance

Before
whom,
compe-
tent.

Its punish-
ment.

Real in-
jury.

Crim. ju-
risdic-
tion,
*ratione do-
micii,*

nifance of this kind of injury, was formerly proper to the commissaries, who, as the *judices christianitatis*, were the only judges of scandal; but for some time past, it has been tried by other criminal judges, and even by the Session, *New Coll.* 147. It is punished, either by a fine, proportioned to the condition of the persons injuring and injured, and the circumstances of time and place, *l. 7. §. 8. de injur.* or by publickly acknowledging the offence; and frequently the two are conjoined. The calling one a bankrupt, is not, in strict speech, a verbal injury, as it does not affect the person's moral character, yet as it may hurt his credit in the way of business, it founds him in an action of damages, which must be brought before the judge-ordinary.

A real injury is inflicted by any fact, by which a person's honor or dignity is affected; as striking one with a cane, or even aiming a blow without striking; spitting in one's face; assuming a coat of arms, or any other mark of distinction proper to another, &c. The composing and publishing defamatory libels may be reckoned of this kind. Real injuries are tried by the judge-ordinary; and punished, either by fine or imprisonment, according to the demerit of the offenders.

46. After having shortly explained the several crimes punishable by our law, this treatise may be concluded, with a few observations on criminal jurisdiction, the forms of trial, and the methods by which crimes may be extinguished. Criminal jurisdiction is founded, 1. *Ratione domicilii*, if the defender dwells within the territory of the judge; for every criminal judge must have a power inherent in him, of punishing all

all offenders subject to his jurisdiction. Vagabonds who have no certain domicile, may be tried, wherever they are apprehended. 2. *Ratione delicti*, if the crime was committed within the territory; because, in this way, those under whose eye the fact was perpetrated, will, by seeing it also punished, be most effectually deterred from copying after such examples, *St. Gul. c. 18*; and the just resentment of the person injured or his friends, will be most amply satisfied, *l. 28. §. 15. de poen.* And indeed by several old temporary acts, 1436, *c. 148*,—1491, *c. 28*, criminals were to be tried by that judge alone, within whose territory the crime was committed. Treason is triable by the *English* law, in that county alone where it is committed: But by 19. *Geo. II. c. 9*, it was made lawful to try treasons committed *anno* 1745, in any county that the King should appoint; and by a temporary act now expired, 21. *Geo. II. c. 19*, treason committed in certain *Scots* counties, was made triable by the court of Justiciary, wherever it should sit.

Ratione delicti.

Treason, where triable.

47. No criminal trial can proceed, unless the person accused is capable of making his defence. Absents therefore cannot be tried; nor fatuous nor furious persons, *durante furore*, even for crimes committed, while they were in their senses. For a like reason, minors who had no curators, could not, by the *Roman* law be tried criminally, *l. 4. C. de aut. pr.* lest they should, from the heat of youth, either speak out or conceal that, which, if it had not been spoken or concealed, might have profited them. This privilege was still farther stretched by *R. M. l. 3. c. 32. §. 15.* which exempted all minors from such prosecutions;

What persons cannot be tried criminally.

prosecutions; but our present practice, considers every person who is capable of dole, to be also sufficiently qualified for making his defence in a criminal trial.

Commitment of criminals.

48. No person can be imprisoned in order to trial for any crime, without a warrant in writing, expressing the cause, and proceeding upon a subscribed information, 1701, c. 6. unless in the case of indignities done to judges, riots, and the other offences specially mentioned in the

Bail taken in crimes not capital.

statute. Every prisoner committed in order to trial, if the crime of which he is accused be not capital, is intitled to be released upon bail, the extent of which is to be modified by the judge, not exceeding 6000 merks Scots for a Noble-

man, 3000 for a landed Gentleman, 1000 for any other Gentleman or Burgess, and 300 for any other inferior person, *ibid.*; which sums,

to which the bail to be taken is limited, are doubled by 11. Geo. I. c. 26. §. 11. That per-

A criminal may insist for his trial.

sons, who either from the nature of the crime with which they are charged, or from their low circumstances, cannot procure bail, may not lie forever in prison untried, it is made lawful by the said act 1701, to every such prisoner, to apply to the criminal judge, that his trial may be brought on. The judge must, within twenty four hours after such application, issue letters directed to messengers, for intimating to the prosecutor to fix a diet for the prisoner's trial, within sixty days after the intimation, under the pain of wrongous imprisonment: And if the prosecutor does not insist within that time, or if the trial is not finished in forty days more, when carried on before the Justiciary, or in thirty, when before any other judge; the prisoner is, upon a second

second application, setting forth that the legal time is elapsed, intitled to his freedom, under the same penalty.

49. Upon one's committing any of the grosser crimes, it is usual for a Justice of the Peace, Sheriff, or other Judge, to take a precognition of the facts, *i. e.* to examine those who were present at the criminal act, upon the special circumstances attending it, in order to know whether there is ground for a trial, and to serve as a direction to the prosecutor, how to set forth the facts in the libel; but the persons examined may insist to have their declarations cancelled, before they give testimony at the trial. Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, and magistrates of boroughs, are also authorised to receive informations, concerning crimes to be tried in the circuit-courts, which informations are to be transmitted to the Justice-clerk, forty days before the sitting of the respective courts. This method of taking up of dittay is substituted, by 8. *An. c.* 16. §. 3. 4. in place of the old one, by the strefs (*traistis*) and porteous rolls, mentioned 1487, *c.* 99; see *Skene, voce Traistis*. To discourage groundless criminal trials, all prosecutors, where the defender was absolved, were made liable to pay his expences, as they should be modified by the judge, 1587, *c.* 87.; and besides were subjected to a small fine to be divided between the fisk and the defender: And where the King's Advocate was the only pursuer, his informer was made liable in the payment thereof, 1579, *c.* 78. These statutes sufficiently warrant the present practice, of condemning vexatious prosecutors in a pecuniary mulct, tho' far exceeding the statutory sum.

Precognition in order to trial.

Method of presenting to the circuit-courts.

Penalty of vexatious prosecutions.

Trial, either by indictment or criminal letters.

Caution to be found by the private prosecutor,

And by the defender.

Accomplices, must be inserted in the letters.

50. The forms of trial on criminal accusations, differ much from those observed in civil actions, if we except the case of such crimes as the court of Session is competent to, and of lesser offences tried before inferior courts. The trial of crimes proceeds, either upon indictment, which is sometimes used, when the person to be tried is in prison; or by criminal letters, issuing from the signet of the Justiciary. In either case, the defender must be served with a full copy of the indictment or letters, and with a list of the witnesses to be brought against him, and of the persons who are to pass on the inquest, 1672, c. 16. §. 11. *concerning the Justice court*; and fifteen free days must intervene, between his being so served, and the day of appearance. When the trial proceeds upon criminal letters, the private prosecutor must give security at raising the letters, that he will report them duly executed to the Justiciary, in terms of 1535, c. 35.; and the defender, if he be not already in prison, is, by the letters, required to give caution, within a certain number of days after his citation, for his appearance upon the day fixed for his trial: And if he gives none within the days of the charge, he may be denounced rebel, which infers the forfeiture of his moveables.

51. Formerly, accomplices in crimes, or associates, were not cited in virtue of any special warrant contained in the criminal letters; their names were only inserted in a bill or writing to which the letters referred, and might be struck out at the messenger's pleasure. As messengers by an abuse of this trust, frequently suffered delinquents to escape for money, it was enacted by

by 1579, c. 76. that all the persons to be cited, should be specially mentioned in the body of the criminal letters.

52. That part of the indictment, or of the criminal letters, which contains the ground of the charge against the defender, and the nature or degree of the punishment he ought to suffer, is called the libel. All libels must be special, setting forth the particular facts inferring the guilt, and the particular place where these facts were done. The time of committing the crime, may be libelled in more general terms, with an alternative as to the month, or day of the month: But the defender will be allowed to prove, that upon certain days of the time libelled, he was *alibi*; and on such proof, the libel cannot strike against him, as to these days. The necessity of special libels, obtained in our former law, not only in the trial of principal criminals, but of accessaries; but, as it was not practicable in most cases, to libel upon the precise circumstances of accession that might appear in proof, libels against accessaries were declared sufficient, if they mentioned, in general, that the persons prosecuted were guilty, art and part, 1592, c. 151.

Criminal
letters
must be
special,

Except a-
gainst ac-
cessaries.

53. The defender, in a criminal trial, may raise letters of exculpation, for citing witnesses, in proof of his defences against the libel, or of his objections against any of the jury or witnesses; which letters must be executed, to the same day of appearance, with that of the indictment or criminal letters. As the right of the defender to prove his defences, ought to be as ample and extensive, as that of the pursuer

Letters of
exculpa-
tion.

pursuer to prove his libel, letters of exculpation ought not to be refused on any relevant defence, tho' such defence should be inconsistent with the libel; otherwise libels might be so laid, as to cut off the defender from every article of exculpation.

Diets of
appear-
ance, per-
emptory.

Deserting
the diets.

54. The diets of appearance, in the court of Justiciary, are peremptory: The criminal letters must be called, on the very day to which the defender is cited, 1587, c. 79; and hence, if no accuser appears, their effect is lost, *instantia perit*, and new letters must be raised. If the libel, or any of the executions, shall to the prosecutor appear informal, or if he be diffident of the proof, from the absconding or absence of a necessary witness, the court will, upon a motion made by him, desert the diet *pro loco et tempore*; after which, new letters become also necessary. A defender, who does not appear on the day to which he is cited, is declared fugitive, in consequence of which, his single escheat falls. The defender, after his appearance in court, is called the pannel.

Form of
determi-
ning the
relevancy.

Without
written
informa-
tions.

55. The two things to be chiefly regarded in a criminal libel, are, 1. The relevancy of the facts, *i. e.* their sufficiency to infer the conclusion; 2. Their truth. The consideration of the first, belongs to the judges of the court; that of the other, to the jury or assize. In trials before the Justiciary, after hearing council on both sides upon the relevancy, informations *hinc inde*, were, by 1695, c. 4. directed to be offered to the court: But, by the late jurisdiction act, 20. Geo. II. §. 41. the judges, after the pleading, and minutes thereof made up by the clerk,

clerk, may forthwith pronounce their interlocutor; reserving power to themselves in cases of difficulty, to direct informations, either on the relevancy of the libel, the import of a special verdict, the degree of punishment, or any other matter that may be alleged for the pannel, before judgment.

56. If the facts libelled be found irrelevant, the pannel is dismissed from the bar; if relevant, the court remits him to the knowledge of an assize. The word assize (from *assis*, settled or established) has different significations: It is sometimes taken for the sittings of a court; sometimes for its regulations or ordinances, especially those that fix the standard of weights and measures; and sometimes it signifies a jury, either because juries consisted of a fixed determinate number, or because they continued sitting till they pronounced their verdict; see *Skene, voce Assisa*. A jury or assize consists of fifteen sworn men (*juratores*) picked out by the court, from a greater number, not exceeding forty five, 1579, c. 76, — 1587; c. 88. who have been summoned for that purpose, by the sheriff, and given in list to the defender, at serving him with a copy of his libel.

57. Anciently, no person could be convicted of the smallest offence, till he was found guilty, by a jury of his countrymen: And tho' now, for more than a century backwards, inferior judges have tried lesser breaches of the peace *de plano*; yet, to this day, all prosecutions of a higher nature, whether before the supreme or inferior criminal courts, must proceed by jury: And no trial, even for a bloodwit, if pursued before the Justiciary, can be carried on without

Assize,

Or jury.

All proper crimes must be tried by a jury.

a jury. In the trial of crimes competent to the court of Session, the fifteen judges may well be considered in the character, both of court, and of jury.

- Probation of crimes.** 58. Crimes cannot, like debts, be referred to the defender's oath; for no person is compellable to swear against himself, where his life, limb, liberty or estate is concerned; nor even in crimes which infer infamy, because one's good name is, in right estimation, as valuable as his life. The law is however forced, in the crime of usury, to depart from some of its common rules, that the crime may be brought to light. Where the usury is founded on a written obligation, in the hands of the defender, the pursuer may, by an exhibition, force him to produce it, in evidence of the crime, contrary to the rule, *nemo tenetur edere instrumenta contra se*: And where it is not founded upon writing, the crime may be proved by the usurer's own oath, notwithstanding the rule, *nemo tenetur jurare in suam turpitudinem*, 1600, c. 7. Crimes therefore are in the general case, proveable, only by the defender's free confession, or by writing, or by witnesses. No extrajudicial confession, unless it is adhered to, by the pannel in judgment, can be admitted as evidence; for the whole proof must be deduced in open court, in presence of the assize or jury, as well as of the pannel, 1587, c. 90. A judicial confession ought to be received with all the qualities that the pannel has thought fit to adject to it; so that the prosecutor, who pleads upon one part of it, must admit the whole.
- Oath of party.** Proof by writing. Proof by writing is seldom used, but in usury, forgery and perjury. Tho' in deforcement, the
- Extrajudicial confession.**
- Judicial confession.**

the written execution of the messenger or officer, is sufficient evidence of the violence, in all civil questions concerning the validity of the diligence, till it be declared false; yet in a criminal trial moved against the deforcers, the messenger's execution, who is a party interested in the prosecution, is not regarded.

59. All objections, relevant against a witness in civil cases, are also relevant in criminal. No witness is admitted, who may gain or lose by the event of the trial. Hence, in the crime of usury, the testimony of him, who has given the unlawful profits, is rejected, because he becomes a gainer by the conviction of the usurer, 1600, c. 7. In deforcement, the persons employed by the messenger to attest the execution, are in some sense parties, violence being commonly used against them, as well as against the messenger; yet, as the proof of the crime would be frequently impracticable, if their evidence were rejected, the law considers the messenger, as the only party against whom the violence is intended, and therefore receives the testimony of the witnesses, tho' they should be beaten. *Socii criminis*, or associates in the same crime, are not admitted against one another, except either in crimes against the state, as treason; in occult crimes, where other witnesses cannot be had, as forgery; or in thefts or depredations committed in the *Highlands*, 21. *Geo. II. c. 34. §. 21.* The testimony of the private party injured, may be received against the pannel, where the King's Advocate is the only prosecutor; if from the nature of the crime, there must needs be a penury of witnesses, as in rape, robbery, &c.

Proof by
witnesses.

Interested
witnesses.

*Socii crimi-
nis.*

Party in-
jured.

Must two
witnesses
concur to
each act.

60. Where a crime is to be proved by several circumstances connected together, every one of which makes a part of the same criminal act, a single witness to each circumstance is sufficient evidence. But it may be doubted, whether this ought to obtain in crimes re-iterated by different criminal acts; for if a single witness should be deemed sufficient in such case, for proof of each separate act, it would destroy one of the strongest checks, by which the testimony of false witnesses may be controuled; see 7. *Gul. III. c. 3. §. 4.* Formerly, the depositions of witnesses, in all trials before the criminal court, were reduced into writing; but that practice is abolished, by 21. *Geo. II. c. 19.* unless where the libel concludes death or de-
 membration. Crimes which, by their nature, hardly admit direct evidence, may be proved by presumptive; and these presumptions ought from the severity of the conclusion in criminal trials, to be so pregnant, as necessarily to carry conviction along with them: But where a crime is to be tried, only *ad civilem effectum*, e. g. where a process of adultery is brought for obtaining a divorce, more slender presumptions will be received; so that the same proof that has been judged sufficient for procuring a divorce before the Commissaries, may be cast, if the crime should be afterwards tried criminally.

Proof by
presump-
tion.

Verdict
of assize.

61. After all the witnesses have been examined in court, the assizers are shut up in a room by themselves, where they must continue, excluded from all correspondence, till their verdict or judgment be subscribed by the foreman (or chancellor) and clerk, 1587, c. 91,—1672, c. 16. art. 8. *concerning the justice-court*; and according to this verdict, the
 court

court pronounces sentence, either absolving or condemning. It is not necessary, by the law of *Scotland*, that a jury should be unanimous in finding a person guilty; the narrowest majority is as sufficient against the pannel, as for him. Juries cannot be punished on account of an erroneous verdict, either for or against the pannel; but they might, by our former law, for absolving him against clear evidence. This crime of wilful error in an assize, was tried, by a grand assize, consisting of twenty five gentlemen possessed of land-estates; and was punished by imprisonment for a year, forfeiture of moveables and infamy, *R. M. l. 1. c. 14. §. 2. et seqq.* — 1475, c. 64. But these assizes of error have been, at no period, much in use, see *Skene, voce Assisa*; and they are declared a grievance by the convention of estates, 1689, c. 18.

Assize of
error.

62. Tho' the proper business of a Jury be to inquire into the truth of the facts found relevant by the Court, for which reason, they are sometimes called the inquest; yet, in many cases they judge also in matters of law or relevancy. Thus, tho' an objection against a witness should be repelled by the court, the assizers are under no necessity to give more credit to his testimony than they think just: And in all trials of art and part, where special facts are not libelled, the jury, if they return a general verdict, are indeed judges, not only of the truth, but of the relevancy of the facts that are sworn to by the witnesses. A general verdict, is that which finds, in general terms, that the pannel is guilty or not guilty, or that the libel or defences are proved or not proved. In a special verdict, the

Powers of
a jury in
matters of
law.

General
verdict.

S f f

jury

jury finds certain facts proved, the import of which, is to be afterwards considered by the court.

Sentences,
within
what
time, to
be execu-
ted.

63. By our old law, the sheriff was confined to a definite time, in pronouncing and executing sentence on certain criminals. When a murderer was taken red-hand, *i. e.* apprehended in the criminal act, it behoved the sheriff, not only to try him, but to execute the sentence within three suns; whereas, if he was apprehended *ex intervallo*, forty days were allowed for that purpose, 1426, c. 90,—1491, c. 28. It was afterwards provided, by 1695, c. 4, that in all cases, where the sheriff was tied down to do justice in three suns, sentence might be executed at any time within nine days, provided it had been pronounced within three. But by our present law, criminal judges not only may, but must suspend for some time, the execution of such sentences as affect life or limb, that so condemned criminals whose cases deserve favour, might have access to apply to the King for mercy. No sentence of any court of judicature, south of the river *Forth*, importing either capital or corporal punishment, could be executed in less than thirty days; and, if north of it, in less than forty, after the date of the sentence, by 11. *Geo.* I. c. 26. §. 10. This act, in so far as it concerns corporal punishments, less than death or dismembring, *e. g.* whipping, pillory, &c, is altered; so that judges may now inflict these, eight days after sentence on this side *Forth*, and twelve days after sentence beyond it, 3. *Geo.* II. c. 32.

64. Crimes

64. Crimes are extinguished, 1. By the Extinction
 death of the criminal; both because a dead per- of crimes,
 son can make no defence, so that his trial is truly by death.
 a judging upon the hearing of one side; and be-
 cause, tho' his guilt should be ever so notorious,
 he is after death carried beyond the reach of
 human penalties, and consequently continues no
 longer an object of correction, which is one of
 the great purposes of punishment: Such trials
 therefore can have no effect, but to punish the
 innocent heir, contrary to that most equitable
 rule, *culpa tenet suos auctores*. 2. Crimes
 may be extinguished by a remission from the so- By remis-
 vereign. But a remission, tho' it secures the sion.
 delinquent from the public resentment, the ex-
 ercise of which belongs to the crown, cannot
 cut off the party injured from his claim of da-
 mages, over which the crown has no prerogative.
 Agreeably to this distinction, no person was al-
 lowed to plead a remission, till he had given se-
 curity to satisfy or assyth the private party,
 1457, c. 74.—1528, c. 7.; and in the case of
 slaughter, it behoved the wife or the executors
 of the deceased, who were intitled to the assyth-
 ment, to sign letters of *flains*, acknowledging
 that they had received satisfaction, before any
 remission could be granted to the slayer, 1592,
 c. 155. No. 1.—1593, c. 174. Whoever there-
 fore founds on a remission, is liable in damages
 to the private prosecutor, in the same manner,
 as if he had been tried and found guilty. Even Acts of
 general acts of indemnity passed in Parliament, indemai-
 tho' they secure against such penalties as law in- ty.
 flicts upon the criminal, merely *per modum*
poenae, 1. July 1713, Stuart; yet do not,
 against the payment of any pecuniary fine,
 which

which is given by statute to the party injured, 22. Feb. 1712, *Robertson*; nor consequently against the demand of any claim competent to him, in name of damages.

Extinction by the party's forgiving the offence.

65. Lesser injuries, which cannot be properly said to affect the public peace, may be extinguished, either by the private party's expressly forgiving them, or by his being reconciled to the offender, after receiving the injury. Hence arises the rule, *disimulatione tollitur injuria*. But where the offence is of a higher nature, the party injured, tho' he may pass from the prosecution, in so far as his private interest is concerned, cannot preclude the King's Advocate, or procurator-fiscal, from insisting *ad vindictam publicam*.

By prescription.

66. Crimes are also extinguished by prescription, which operates by the mere lapse of time, without any act, either of the Sovereign or of the private sufferer. Crimes prescribe both by the *Roman* law, l. 12. C. *ad leg. Corn. de fals.* and by the custom of *Scotland* (see *Mackenz. Crim. Tit. Prescription*), in twenty years; but in particular crimes, the prescription is limited by statute to a shorter time. No person can be prosecuted upon the act for wrongous imprisonment, 1701, c. 6. after three years. High treason, committed within his Majesty's dominions, suffers likewise a triennial prescription, if indictment be not found against the traitor, by a grand jury, within that time, 7. *Gul. III. c. 3. §. 5*. All actions, brought upon any penal statute made or to be made, where the penalty is appropriated to the crown, expire in two years after committing the offence, and where the penalty goes to the crown or other prosecutor,

Short prescription of certain crimes, by statute.

prosecutor, the prosecutor must sue within one year, and the crown within two years after that year ended, 31. *Eliz. c. 5.*: And this, tho' an *English* act, affects *Scotland*, as it limits all the penal *British* statutes passed since the union, which concern this part of the united kingdom. Certain crimes are, without the aid of any statute, extinguished by a shorter prescription than twenty years. By our old law, *R. M. l. 4. c. 10.* in the cases of rape, robbery and hame-sucken, the party injured was not heard, after a silence of twenty four hours, from a presumption, that persons could not be so grossly injured, without immediately complaining: And it is probable, that a prosecution for these crimes, if delayed for any considerable time, would be cast, even at this day, or at least the punishment restricted. Lesser injuries suffer also a short prescription; law *presuming* forgiveness, from the nature of the offence, and the silence of the party. The particular space of time sufficient to establish this presumption, must be determined by the judge, according to circumstances.

Without
statute.

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A.

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